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This thesis is concerned with a fresh examination of British
military policy in Egypt and Palestine from August 1914 to June
1917. By the judicious use of private papers and contemporary
official documents it has been possible to outline the strategic
decisions taken in London and their effect upon the generals and
their troops in Egypt throughout this period. A re-assessment of
the careers of Generals Maxwell and Murray while in Egypt has also
been made. The entire work falls into two parts: from August 1914
up to the end of December 1915 the concern is with the period in
Egypt while General Maxwell was in sole command; from January 1916
until June 1917 General Murray's command in the country becomes
the centre of interest.
It is revealed that when General Maxwell took over in Egypt in
1914 the country was in a state of military chaos, and when the
Turks attacked the Sues Canal in February 1915 many of the Indian
troops were proved to be unreliable. Nonetheless, thoughts of
striking offensively at the enemy in Syria were entertained
repeatedly throughout 1914 and 1915 and at many different locations
other than the most popular choice, Alexandretta. These offensive
suggestions were strengthened by British interest in Arab
co-operation in Syria in 1915 which was believed to be potentially
most valuable. Finally, concern for Egyptian security at the end
of 1915 helped to undermine Maxwell's position because so little
had been done to the country's defences east of the Suez Canal.
3General Murray's arrival in Egypt in January 1916 has been
shown to be dramatic; he successfully cleared up and re-organized a
most confusing situation and did all that had been asked of him.
His operations to the east of Egypt in the Sinai until January
1917, moreover, were conducted with some skill and energy both by
himself and his subordinates. His very success, however, meant
that still more was expected of him in London even though he was
so short of troops, and this led to two defeats at Gaza. Even
after these he continued to command intelligently and most of the
foundations for the future success of General Allenby were laid in
Palestine in these months. Although Murray has often been
portrayed as a hindrance to the Arab revolt, he did, in fact,
support it to the best of his ability and was, at times, most
enthusiastic about co-operation between his troops and Arab
irregulars.
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9A NOTE ON THE USE OF WAR DIARIES
The War Diaries of the British forces in Egypt during the
period under consideration which are held in the Public Record
Office are numerous but not always consistent. I have therefore
adopted the following manner of referring to them.
The first time a War Diary is mentioned in a footnote it is
given its full title, e.g. W.D. 11th Indian Division 31 Jan. 1915
W.O. 95/kk22. The date is that of the entry in the War Diary
itself. Should the same War Diary be used again in the text, only
the date of the entry and the Public Record Office reference would
be supplied.
If they are particularly important (a GHQ Diary, for example)
War Diaries often contain extensive appendices, which are usually
full of additional documents and plans. In such cases I have cited
only the document itself and the W.O. 95 reference instead of the
entire War Diary notation, since the document concerned could be
found elsewhere also, e.g. Captured Turkish Army Order No. 21.
21 Feb. 1915 W.O, 95/kkl7.
This procedure has seemed to me the most logical method of
using what is both a very rich and a most confusing source of
additional information, since there are no fixed rules of reference.
Some Intelligence War Diaries also appear in the Public Record
Office class W.O. 157 and in the India Office class L/MIL and the
same course of action has been followed with them.
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INTRODUCTION
'It would require a very good writer to
write the History of the Histories of the War.'
General Murray at Aldershot 26 February 1932
The initial assumption underlying this study has been that a
serious and systematic examination of British military policy in
Egypt and Palestine from the start of the Great War until the
arrival of General Allenby in June 1917 has not been attempted
since the official records became available at the Public Record
Office. My intention has been to show that this omission from the
historiography of the First World War is a sad one because there ia
much that is both interesting and, indeed, revealing to be found in
a careful scrutiny of the material.
In one sense it is a subject in itself to explain why this
fairly large topic has been neglected, but we need to make at least
a brief consideration of the reasons because by doing so we shall
gain a good general understanding of the traditional approach of
many historians to our topic.
Without doubt the campaigns fought by Allenby in 1917 and 1918
have tended to cast a shadow over all that went before them.
Allenby was remarkably successful. This success has perhaps caused
some writers to exaggerate the standard of these campaigns from the
British side so that Liddell Hart described the Megiddo offensive
of 1918 as 'one of the most quickly decisive campaigns and the most
completely decisive battles in all history.' 1 Allenby's sweeping
victories have attracted a certain amount of attention from military
I B. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London, 1973),
p.553.
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writers seeking to ascertain what caused these successes. 2 On the
other hand, such studies tend to distort any understanding of the
command in Egypt before June 1917 simply because it is often used
only as a contrast with the victories under Allenby. After all,
since both Generals Maxwell and Murray can quite legitimately be
criticised for certain of their decisions the assumption has usually
been, therefore, that Allenby acted correctly where they did not
and, conseqantly, he succeeded while they failed. It does not seem
so surprising, as a result, that Murray's advance across the Sinai
or Maxwell's repulse of the Turks at the Canal do not appear nearly
so interesting or worthy of examination as do, say, the occupation
of Jerusalem or the deception of the Turks at Beersheba. This very
fact has even been admitted by one of Allenby's biographers, Wavell,
who explained that military history tends to look more to spectacular
events than to apparently mundane tasks such as the reorganisation of
armies, a task that took up a great deal of General Murray's time in
Egypt, for example.3
If the successes of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force after June
1917 have made the campaign before them seem a little mundane they
have also emphasized the generalship of Allenby. Wavell, who knew the
man during the war,never seems able to escape from a degree of
reverence for him in his biography that sounds somewhat unfortunate
2 The most obvious example of this is A. P. Wavell, The Palestine
campaigns (London, 1928), but see also A. Kearsey, The operations
in Egypt and Palestine, illustrating the Field Service Regulations
(London, 1929).
3 A. P. Wavel]., Allenby: a study in greatness (London, 19k0 ), p.261.
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to the modern reader:
Israelite, Assyrian, Greek, Roman, Jew, Arab,
Crusader, Turk had entered Jerusalem as conquerors
before the British. None of these nations can have
been represented by one more impressive or worthier
of his race than was Allenby, physically or morally.
Wavell was not the only one who regarded Edmund Allenby so highly,
for T. E. Lawrence described him as 'the image we worshipped.' 5 With
praise as strong as this Allenby's predecessors have rather faded
into the background in comparison and they have not received
sufficient attention.
The personality and career of T. E. Lawrence himself have had
a profound impact on the historiography of the Palestine campaigns.
For one thing, the emphasis of his still most popular Seven Pillars
of Wisdom is iated upnabhe Arab Revolt, while the operations of
the EEF seem to take place almost as an adjunct to those of the
Arabs. Moreover, since the Arabs did not capture Aqaba and establish
direct contact with the EEF until July 1917 Lawrence's perspective
on the operations before this date tends to be somewhat sketchy, to
say the least. The extent of Lawrence's influence in the later 1920s
can be gauged by a letter to General Murray from a Colonel Watkins
in America:
I consider it unfair to you, sir, as well as to the
men who served under you... to have the facts buried...
This country was publishing such outrageous stories
of the Palestine campaign, and making an effort to
steal the glory.., and confer it on Lawrence, that I
made up my mind to give the American peopig the
facts. ... This country is 'Lawrence mad.'
14. Ibid., p.230.
5	 E. Lawrence, Seven pillars of wisdom (London, 1935), p.383.
6 Cl. E. A. Watkins to Murray 25 Jan. 1929. Murray papers
79/148/k.
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Nor was Lloyd George immune from this intense popular enthusiasm
for the man and his writings, for he outlined in the preface to his
War Memoirs that he had 'sought out for laudation' certain military
leaders, including Allenby and Lawrence.7
The Arab Revolt itself has also been responsible for a certain
amount of distortion. Because of later developments in the Middle
East and the apparent agreements made by the British with both the
Jews and the Arabs, as well as secret negotiations with the French,
most attention given to this subject has centred upon the politics
of the movement when, in fact, from the British perspective at least,
it was largely a military matter. Sir Henry McMahon, the High
Commissioner in Egypt and the very man who negotiated with Sherif
Hussein, admitted this in September 1916: 'It was the most
unfortunate date in my life when I was left in charge of this Arab
movement.., it is nothing to do with me: it is purely a military
business.
British military policy in Egypt and Palestine also became a
battleground for the postwar debate over Allied strategy in the Great
War. Although more and more evidence is now coming to light which
suggests that the traditional division between 	 and
'Westerners' was a caricature of the wartime debate itself, we ought
not to overlook its influence on our later understanding of the war.9
For example, Robertson almost certainly deliberately plays down the
strength of the Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal in 1915; he
7 D. Lloyd George, War memoirs II (London, 1936), p.vii.
8 Quoted by E. Kedourie, The Chatham House version and other
Middle-Eastern studies (London, 1970), p.1k.
9 D. French, British strategy and war aims, 191k-16 (London, 1986),
pp.x-X]..
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describes it as 'this fiasco' which 'never had the least chance of
succeeding', presumably in order to strengthen his later arguments
that more of Britain's forces ought to have been concentrated in
10
France.
A further problem Ucint a xaination of this campaign is
what we can only call religious mysticism. Jerusalem, the Zion of
the Bible, seems to cast a great shadow over many of the accounts
of the EEF's operations. Even the Official History itself admits
that 'the spiritual and historical traditions of the country in
which they fought had an influence upon the troops' so that they
'could not be indifferent to the sacred memories of the soil which
they trod.'	 Hints of this influence can easily be found, for
General Murray is often described as a 'Moses', a fact which, after
all, should not surprise us, for he also crossed the Sinai, while
Gaza, the site of the general's best-known battles, also had biblical
connections. 12 And yet these allusions really demonstrate a 'lack of
logic', for none of the operations conducted in the Sinai and
Palestine were anything like a modern crusade or even a second
conquest of the 'Promised Land' of the Jews because there were
Christians and Muslims on both sides of the conflict.13
Finally, the tragic events at the Dardanelles seem to dominate
all accounts of Allied strategy in the Mediterranean in 1915, with
the inevitable result that any planning for action in and around
Egypt and the important role that this country played in London's
10 Sir W. Robertson, Soldiers and statesmen, 191k-1918, I (London,
1926), p.11+8.
11 Official History, p.6k7.
12 See Watkins to Murray 25 Jáaa 1929, op.cit. and M. Hastings (ed.),
The Oxford book of military anecdotes (Oxford, 1985), p . k7O . For
Gaza see Judges 16:3.
13 L. von Sanders, Five years in Turkey (Annapolis, 1927), p.35.
thinking during this period has been neglected. In fact, as early
:15
as the 1930s a large library of British, French, Turkish and German
accounts of the Gallipoli campaign had already grown up while there
was little available for the student of affairs in Egypt and the
Sinai during the corresponding period.1k
This lack of attention given to British military policy in
Egypt and Palestine up to June 1917 has caused a number of mis-
conceptions to arise concerning this period in literature that does
cover it. For example, it helped to create the impression in the
popular mind that the campaign only began with the capture of
Jerusalem:
This view, entirely erroneous though it be, is not
unreasonable, for a thick veil shrouded the doings
of the army in Egypt in the early days, and the
people at home saw only the splendid results of two
years' arduous preparation and self-sacrifice. 15
Moreover, such distortion could even cause basic inaccuracies to
creep into some of the popular accounts of the campaign.16
Having outlined the major reasons why the subject under examina-
tion has been neglected we need to make a brief survey of the most
important texts consulted. Naturally we must begin with the Official
History, because it has formed the basis for all subsequent accounts
and offers more detail than ny other work. Most opinion has tended
to be favourable: Liddel]. Hart described the account as 'brilliantly
readable', while General Murray even went so far as to admit that it
1k A. Moor)iead, Gallipoli (London, 195 6 ), p.365.
15 A. Bluett, With our army in Palestine (London, 1 9 1 9), p.2.
16 See, e.g., E. Dane, British campaigns in the Nearer East 1 191k-
19 1 8, from the outbreak of war with Turkey to the taking of
Jerusalem, I (London, 1918), p.3O1. Dane tells the reader that
the Turkish garrison at El Arish was destroyed in 1916, when,
in fact, these troops evacuated the position.
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was 'well written, and very fairly apportions praise and blame.'17
On the whole one would have to agree with these comments, because,
given the material available and the constraints within which they
had to write, the two authors, Cyril Falls and Lieutenant-General
Sir George MacMunn, did a good job; their final product, however,
is open to certain criticisms. The authors admit that they had
problems for the period 191k to 1915 because full records were not
18
always kept by the staff of the troops in Egypt. This is a
revealing admission, and it has been possible to trace the precise
extent of the documents consulted by the authors through extensive
research at the Public Record Office, since Falls often left
manuscript notes upon documents that he had examined. 19
 From the
research it is clear that only a limited number of documents were
in fact consulted. Moreover, there is also evidence to suggest that
the authors found it difficult to gain copies of certain documents.2°
Interestingly enough, the authors seem to have gone to great lengths
to draw upon the personal reminiscences of certain of the leading
characters involved in the events covered; Maxwell seems to have
had more of an influence upon the final result than did Murray, for
instance 21
Because it claims to be an 'official' version of all military
operations in the theatre the authors do at times tend to fall into
17 Liddell Hart to Cyril Falls 10 Dec. 1935, Liddell Hart papers
1/276/1k. Lecture at Aldershot by Murray 26 Feb. 1932, Murray
papers 79/k8/3.
18 Official History, p.vi.
19 For an example of this see a note by Falls 8 July 1925 asking
for Eastern Force orders No. ki and 1+3 to be copied in WO 95/1+1+50.
20 Chetwode to Edmonds 26 Sept. 1921+, Edmonds papers 11/1/32.
21 Maxwell to MacMunn 11+ Nov. and note by MacMunn on this, CAB 1+5/79.
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the trap of simply listing events without comment. Consequently
there is 'a distinct lack of atmosphere' and 'human backgrounds,
both of which were of particular importance for operations and
strategy in Sinai, for example. 22 Moreover, one finds very little
about bad orders, faulty plans or poor leadership: most of the
failures suffered by the British forces tend to be ascribed to the
weather, unexpected resistance or the exhaustion of the troops.23
Indeed, the narrative is weak on the planning of operations at certain
points and fails to give an adequate picture of the interaction
between higher strategy and the decisions of Maxwell and Murray.
The Australian Official History was published before Falls and
MacMunn had completed their task. Although the author looked at some
official documents he admits his ignorance at certain points in his
narrative; the entire work gives the impression of having been
2k
written in some haste - which it most certainly was. As one might
expect its perspective is unashamedly Australian, so that the actions
of other troops are neglected and criticism of non-Australian
generals is not uncommon. 25 Nonetheless, this has remained an
influential work and a recent biography of General Chauvel draws
26heavily upon it.
These two texts represent the best printed sources for operations
in and beyond Egypt in terms of sheer weight of information. Other
works, however, are available. Wavell's The Palestine Campaigns,
22 Brig. A. C. Femberley to Director, Historical Section CID
Jan. 1929, CAB k5/79.
23 Lt.-Col. Garsia to Director, Historical Section CID 26 Feb. 1929,
CAB k5/?9.
2k C. E. W. Bean, 'The technique of a contemporary war historian',
Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, II (19k2), pp.G5-79.
25 C. Falls, War books: a critical guide (London, 1930), p.7.
26 See Hill, p.117.
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although only a fairly short account, was the textbook used by the
military academies on the subject. Like his biography of Allenby,
however, Wavell's history of the entire campaign suffers from 'the
persistent survival of the subjective outlook.' 27 One final book
that deserves mention here is A Key to Victory by C. Garsia.
Lieutenant-Colonel Garsia was a staff officer with the 5kth Division
in Palestine and his book seeks to redress the failings of the
Official History by examining the failures inherent in the planning
of the EEF for the battles at Gaza. His stimulating book gains
something from the fact that he talked with Kress von Kressenstein,
the German officer serving with the Turks in Syria, after the war.28
Incidentally, it is possible to trace the major strategic decisions
of both the Turks and Germans during the period by reference to the
appendices of the Official History and various German articles. 29 In
fact, Kress von Kressenstein's own version of the campaign is even
available in English translation, as is that of his immediate
superior, Liman von Sanders.3°
There remain a number of personal accounts of the campaign from
the British side which tend to be somewhat idiosyncratic, as one
might expect, since they were written by junior officers, common
soldiers or journalists. 31 Finally, the precise course of events
surrounding the Turkish attack upon the Canal in 1915 has been very
27 C. Garsia, A key to victory: a study of war planning (London,
19k0), p.225.
28 Notes on Egypt and Palestine campaigns by Garsia 10 Oct. 1928,
CAB k5/78.
29 Falls and NacMunn saw the official histories of the Turkish
General Staff. See also M. Y. Ben-Gavriel, 'Die drei deutschen
Versuche, den Suezkanal zu erobern', Deutsche Pundschau, LXXXII
(1956), pp.9k7-50.
30 K. von Kressenstein, 'The campaign in Palestine from the enemy's
side', RUSI Journal, LXVII (1922), pp.5O3-5l3. Sandtrs, op.cit.
31 See, e.g., M. S. Briggs, Through Egypt in wartime (London, 1918).
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well covered from both the British and French perspectives, although
even so the exact nature of British planning to meet this attack had
notbeen understood, as we shall see.32
Having made this brief summary of the major literature covering
British military policy in Egypt and Palestine from 191k to June
1917 and its weaknesses it should now be clear what the basic
objectives behind this thesis are. Perhaps this can be most clearly
expressed by reference to a quotation from the Official History
about the general strategy of the period: 'It was not until after
the First Battle of Gaza had been fought in March 1917 that the
Government contemplated. the invasion of Palestine.' 33 This kind of
assumption is supported by other authorities; for example, Cruttwell
describes the EEF's advance to the edge of the Sinai in these terms:
'Murray's forces began gradually, almost imperceptibly, to change
3kfrom.., defenders of Egypt to... invaders of 	 It has
been one of my main intentions in this thesis to disprove such
assumptions and to demonstrate conclusively that the invasion of
Palestine was at least 'contemplated' from 191k onwards, while the
posture adopted by the British forces in the region was more
energetic and ambitious than is usually admitted.
As a result of this new approach to the period before Allenby's
arrival in Egypt a fresh assessment of the careers of both Maxwell
and Murray in the country has been possible and proves most revealing.
The published biography of Maxwell fails to give an accurate
-
32 For a Frenchlsee, e.g., L. Lepotier, 'La guerre des isthmes dans
la bataille d'Afrique', Revue de Dfense Nationale, XII (1956),
pp.1165-81.
33 Official History II, p.629.
3k C. R. )4. F. Cruttwell, A history of the Great War, 191k-1918.
2nd.ed. (Oxford, 193 6 ), p.353.
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presentation of hi character and merely hints at the fact that he
could be a remarkably difficult man, lacking in refinement and too
ready to bear a grudge. 35 Murray, on the other hand, has had no
biographer and yet emerges most favourably from an examination of
his unpublished letters, may of which survive, and a careful
scrutiny of his own private papers in the Imperial War Museum.
Indeed, it becomes clear that earlier writers deliberately played
down his role and achievements so that Allenby's successes might
appear still more remarkable. For example, Wavell was warned before
he published his biography of Allenby not to be too cruel to Murray
because he could bring out Allenby's true character just as well
without doing th].s. 6 A close friendship and genuine degree of
respect between Murray and Robertson also emerges before March 1917
and a deliberate attempt has been made to re-examine the latter's
involvement with the Palestine campaign by drawing upon his private
correspondence with Murray.
Every effort has been made to place the decisions and events
in this theatre in the context of the strategic planning being done
in London throughout the period under review. This has revealed the
extent to which both Maxwell and Murray were often constrained and
pressured into action by their superiors, and especially discloses
the intense pressure the BEF was under throughout its time in the
sinai. In order to outline these developments in policy most
effectively I have found it convenient to stick to contemporary
documents as much as possible, using secondary sources only when
35 G. Arthur, General Sir John Maxwell (London, 1932), p.133:
'Maxwell's letters may have lacked the polish which distinguished
the allocutions of at least one of his contemporaries.' It seems
likely that Arthur is referring here to Murray.
36 Bartholomew to Wavell no date, Allenby papers 6/VIII/23.
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this has been absolutely necessary.
Extensive use of War Diaries has been a feature of this
research. By examining not only the diaries of GHQ but also those
of other staffs and even specific units it has been possible to
reveal new features of the campaign that the Official History was
often not even aware of or actually tried to suppress. Thus
previously unknown weaknesses within the British forces in this
theatre have been discovered. Moreover, the examination of
unpublished diaries, letters and papers of such important figures an
the campaign as General Chetwode and Guy Dawnay along with lesser-
known soldiers adds an entire element to the campaign that the
Official History does not even hint at - personality clashes.
Finally, unpublished official documents in the Public Record
Office and other private papers have made possible a new approach to
the Arab Revolt by uncovering the desire of the soldiers in Egypt to
foment it long before June 1916 and their aim to raise the tribal
chiefs to the east of Syria rather than in the Heja.
22
CHAPTER 1
EGYPT BEFORE THE WAR:
ITS POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING
'I want a well-managed inn to serve as a
half-way house on the way to my country
place; but I don't want to buy the inn.'
Lord Palmerston
The British Empire in the years before the First World War was
rather like a 'huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty
fingers and toes outstretched in every direction which cannot be
approached without soliciting a scream.' 1 Concern with the 'fingers'
and 'toes' of the empire took up a great deal of the time of British
statesmen. Indeed, such was the regularity with which this subject
was raised that it is surprising the topic did not lose any impact
simply through sheer repetition. 2 Nevertheless, it is to one of
these 'toes' that we must turn if we are to understand the back-
ground to British military policy in Egypt and Palestine during the
First World War.
The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, thus greatly increasing
direct British involvement in the Near East. 3 It did not take long
I Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 1907,
quoted by Z. S. Steiner, Britain and the origins of the First
World War (London, 1977), p.18.
2 See J. Morris, Pax Britannica (London, 1968), pp.51-52.
3 C. Smith, 'The emergence of the Middle East', Journal of
Contemporary History, III (1968). Sxnith points out that the names
given to various regions in these years were different from those
used today. The 'Near East' covered the region of Palestine and
Syria; it was also known as 'The Levant.'
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for Britain to acquire the Egyptian Government's shares in the
waterway, or, for that matter, control of the entire country. 1 It is
possible to trace the origins of this 'annexation' back to the early
days of British dominion in India in the eighteenth century, for
communications with the 'jewel' of the empire were always at the
back of the strategists' minds. 5 The Suez Canal provided a new,
rapid route to India, and although the politicians might wax lyrical
over the value of the British civilizing influence in Egypt, it was
the canal that mattered. 6 Moreover, the Egyptian ports of Alexandria,
Port Said and Suez made the area into a very important potential
military base. This factor was accentuated by the retreat of the
Royal Navy from the overtaxing defence of the Dardanelles to the
Nile. 7 In fact, the importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal was seen
to be far greater in this period' than any interest in new-found oil
deposits in the Persian Gulf.
Some have argued that since the British were firmly entrenched
in Egypt it was inevitable that one day they would seek territory to
the east of the Suez Canal:
History shows that a strong Egypt always aggresses
on the middle east, and conversely, England, already
in possession of India, is driven, by the old
k Although England governed Egypt the country still remained
technically under the authority of the Sultan of Turkey, at
least until the outbreak of war in 191k.
5 1. Marlowe, The making of the Suez Canal (London, 196k), p.3O7.
6 For example, in June 1910 Arthur Balfour made a long speech on
the problems of governing Egypt, but did not make one reference
to the Suez Canal. See D. Judd, Balfour and the British Empire
(London, 1968), pp.287-289.
7 The Royal Navy had, of course, been trying to stop Russia
gaining control of the Straits. See Steiner, op.cit., p.18.
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Egyptian tradition and by the necessity of joining
up strong positions, to build the bridge from
Egypt to India. 8
This line of argument might find support in the fact that the army
which' ultimately advanced from Egypt after 191k was known as the
'Egyptian Expeditionary Force.' Nor can it be doubted that the
'approaches' to the Suez Canal were sensitive areas so far as British
foreign policy was concerned.9
Britain was always likely to show some interest in the lands of
Palestine and Syria, therefore, especially as this 'limb' of the
Ottoman Empire seemed to be growing in importance in the early years
of the twentieth century. A War Office report written in 1911
reflected this state of affairs. The report noted that this region
had been very important in ancient times since it contained the main
lines of communication between the civilizations of the East and
West. However, with the decline of the Middle East the communications
had been allowed to deteriorate. Nevertheless, a number of new
developments might cause Syria to resume its position of importance.
These developments included the determination of Turkey to regain her
military strength and authority within her own empire, concessions
granted by Turkey for the construction of railways and, finally, the
impact of European influence, especially in terms of new capital
investments. In turn, it was possible that these factors could lead
8 Emil Zimmerman in 'Post' of 16 June 1916, quoted in 'Third
Memorandum by the Political Secretary, India Office, on German
press opinion regarding the Middle East', CAB 37/156/5. See also
I. Friedman, The question of Palestine, 191k-1918 (London, 1973),
p.1, for a similar line of argument.
9 M. Kent, 'Great Britain and the end of the Ottoman Empire, 1900-
1923' in 4. Kent (ed.), The Great Powers and the end of the
Ottoman Empire (London, 198k), p.l83.
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to a militarily powerful Turkey, with the eventuality of, amongst
other things, there being a rail link for military purposes between
the Bosphorus and Syria, or even right up to Egypt. 1 ° Some of these
conditions seemed to have been fulfilled in the years immediately
before 191k, for a revolution in Turkey in 1908 initiated what
appeared to be a new and energetic rgime known as the 'Young
Turks', while the construction of the Baghdad railway with German
finance greatly facilitated the empire's communications between
Asia Minor and Syria. As for anxiety about a Turkish railway that
might run all the way up to Egypt, this was very real, and would
even cause concern after 191k, so that Lord Cromer could write: 'I
am congratulating myself upon the fact that I scuffed out the idea
of connecting Syria and Egypt by railway.'11
Official British policy towards the Ottoman Empire before 191k
was that of 'benevolent neutrality.' The Foreign Office aimed at
maintaining the integrity of Turkey's domains while avoiding any
definite alliances. 12 This meant that the Foreign Secretary often
had to declare that the British Government entertained no ambitions
in Syria. Official declarations of policy, however, were not always
accepted at face value by other European powers. France believed she
had a traditional and historic interest in Syria and she was extremely
sensitive about British influence being 'the most powerful of all
10 Military Report on Syria. Revised edition by General Staff 1911,
WO 33/563.
11 Cromer to Harry Boyle Oct. 191k, Cromer papers. Cromer had been
Britain's Consul-General in Egypt.
12 F. Ahmad, 'Great Britain's relations with the Young Turks, 1908-
191 k ', middle Eastern Studies, II (1966), pp.302-329; M. Kent,
'Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905-1k' in F. H. Hinsley
(ed.), British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge,
1977), pp.k36-k51.
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foreign influences in Syria.' 13 Indeed, although the 'Entente
Cordiale' of 190k led to a search for a working relationship between
Britain and France in the Arab countries on the outskirts of the
IL1.
Ottoman Empire, tension remained between the two in Syria. So
great was the French fear of real British intervention in Syria. that
they readily believed rumours about impending British occupations
and became particularly anxious whenever Foreign Office officials
traversed the country. 15
 The problem for France was that the British
were more popular than the French among the indigenous population;
conflict between these two allies over Syria would continue into the
war. Russia made an effort to bolster her prestige in Syria before
191k, so much so that the Turks themselves feared an imminent Russian
invasion of the country.16 Even the Germans had colonies in this
region and Jewish settlements could be found in a number of locations.17
Any military operations in this land, therefore, were bound to lead
to international complications.
To this sketch of the general international framework into
which Egypt fitted in the years preceding the Great War we must add
13 Reconnaissance of Syria from the coast eastwards June 1908.
Part I, p.15. WO 33/k56,
1k J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 191k-1920
(London, 1969), p.1.
15 W. I. Shorrock, French imperialism in the Middle East: the
failure of policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-191k (London,
1976), pp.115-135.
16 D. Hopwood, The Russian presence in Syria and Palestine, 18k3-
191k (Oxford, 1969), p.210. Russian warships and thousands of
Russian pilgrims at Jerusalem regularly made the Turks nervous.
17 There was a German colony just outside Haifa in Palestine, for
example. The War Office estimated that there were 100,000 Jewish
settlers in Palestine in 190k. See Military Report on Arabia.
General Staff 190k, p.20. WO 33/331.
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a number of further observations about its geographical setting.
When contemporaries spoke of 'Syria' they usually meant the entire
strip of country on the Mediterranean coast from the Cilician Gates
in the north to Rafah, on the Egyptian frontier, in the south.18
But this term itself did not correspond with the political divisions
of Turkey, the occupying power in the region; nor did it have much
meaning for the indigenous population. The Turkish system of local
government divided the area into 'Sanjaks' and 'Vilayets': three
Sanjaks covered the country from near Tarsus to north of
Alexandretta; the Vilayet of Beirut stretched from Alexandretta to
north of Jaffa; the Vilayet of Damascus, including the country east
of Lebanon and the Jordan, reached from Hama to Aqaba; finally, the
Sanjak of Jerusalem covered the land from north of Jaffa to the
Egyptian frontier and east to the Dead Sea. 19 To add to the
complexity of this arrangement, Lebanon was specially administered
from Constantinople because of the troubles there had been between
its different inhabitants, Druses, Christians, Turks and Maronites.
Since the Egyptian frontier reached as far as Rafah the Sinai
Peninsula was a province of Egypt. The Sinai actually covers an area
of some 62,000 km and it takes its name from the mountain so well-
known to readers of the Bible. Interestingly enough, the word Sinai
comes from a Semitic word ('Horeb') that means dry ground or waste
20
and desolation - a good descriptive term for the whole peninsula.
18 I have chosen to adopt this use of the term 'Syria' throughout
because it corresponds with the contemporary documents quoted.
The reader should remember, therefore, that when 'Syria' occurs
in the text it includes the area known as 'Palestine', which was
usually taken to refer to the country from Tyre to Rafah.
19 See Map 2: Turkish communications and the coast of Syria, before
Chapter 6.
20 G. W. Bromiley (ed.), The International Standard Bible
Encyclopedia IV (Grand Rapids, 1988), p.526.
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In reality the Sinai is divided into two geographical areas: in the
south it is largely mountainous, while in the north most of the
terrain is sandy desert and chiefly waterless apart from isolated
oases. Perhaps most significantly of all there were no modern roads
or railways across this vast expanse of desert and mountain, making
it a formisable barrier to any would-be traveller. The three routes
that did exist were little more than tracks; the most important of
these ran near to the coast from Qantara through Romani and El
Arish to Gaza. Another route ran via Neki from Suez to Aqaba, while
the third - and most difficult of all - went through Jifjaffa to
the Canal at Ismailia. The existence of these tracks and the nature
of the terrain through which they passed would dictate to both Turk
and Briton alike the size and speed of military operations that
could be aththipted in the peninsula.
C}4AR 2
EGYPT ENTERS THE WAR: AUGUST - DECEMBER 1914
'The art of war is to dispose one's troops so that they
are everywhere at the same time.'
Napoleon Bonaparte
EGYPT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR
Egypt and its defence played a not insignificant part in British
strategy right from the very earliest days of the Great War. On 3
August 1914, at the very first meeting in London of the War Council - a
committee hastily assembled by Asquith, the Prime Minister, to discuss
the major policy of the war - Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, 'raised the question of bringing Indian troops to Egypt.'
In response Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, argued that
one division from India might be sent at once to garrison Egypt. ' On
the next day Kitchener developed this argument more fully by advocating
that the regular garrisons of British troops in Egypt, Malta and
Gibraltar - making in total about eleven battalions - should be relieved
by the troops under order to sail from India. 2	 Even as the earliest
moves of the conflict in Europe were taking place Egypt had all but lost
its original garrison, therefore. It was Kitchener's intention to use
these men as reinforcements in France, if necessary, and his decision to
ship troops of the Indian army to Egypt was important since it rapidly
established in the minds of the decision-makers in London the idea that
Egypt should be a sort of starting-off point where soldiers were
prepared for front-line duties in Europe and elsewhere.
1	 War Council meeting 5 Aug. 1914,CAB 42/1/2.
2 War Council meeting 6 Aug. 1914,CAB 42/1/3. By this, the second
meeting of the War Council, Kitchener had decided to send two Indian
divisions, and not one, to Egypt.
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Although by making this decision London realised it had
subordinated the security of Egypt to the demands of the Western Front,
the British authorities in Alexandra were not too displeased by the
decision. On the contrary, Sir Mime Cheetham, the acting Chargé d'
Affaires, informed the Foreign Office on 9 August that even a small
influx of Indian troops would demonstrate to both the Turks and the
Egyptian population that the country was 'not isolated from the rest of
the world.'	 When this telegram was passed to the India Office the
Military Secretary theresaw its significance since, he felt, it had 'an
important military bearing' upon the security of Egypt. The
Secretary of State at the India Office, Lord Crewe, also understood the
fringe benefits of Lord Kitchener's decision and the need to impress the
indigenous population:
it has been found desirable to hurry up the two complete divisions
from India which we are sending to Egypt, as the attitude... of the
charismatic element there, makes it necessary to show strength
there.
It was, in reality, all a matter of projecting an image of apparent
military power upon the supposedly easily-influenced minds of the
Egyptian people, a policy which had the advantage of allowing the
British to hold Egypt with only a skeleton force, as the Military Chief
in the country later admitted: 'We all gambled on the large numbers of
troops passing through Egypt and the Canal - I have no doubt this had
its effect on the population, they were I believe enormously impressed
at the number of soldiers at England's call.' e
Cheetham to Grey 9 Aug. 1914, 	 L/P&S/lO/464/3136.	 See also note
by General Barrow of 10 Aug. 1914:	 'Lord Crewe should see this, at
once, as it has en important military bearing.'
Crews to Curzon 19 Aug. 1914,Curzon papers MSS Eur F112/105A.
Notes by Maxwell on Egypt in 1914, no date)	CAB 45/79.
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The notion of a 'gamble' was uppermost in the minds of the British
authorities in Egypt when they considered the stark realities of their
military impotence in the first few months of the war. For example,
although the first transports containing Indian troops reached Suez on 8
September the majority of this force (3rd Indian Division) sailed from
Alexandria on 19 September.
	 Meanwhile, with the departure of the
original British garrisons on 30 September, the only trained troops
present in Egypt consisted of r,e Indian brigade. Remarkably, the
War Office even pressed f or these men to be sent to France in October,
though it subsequently allowed the unit to remain in Egypt until
replaced by the next force of Indian troops to arrive. In London
Kitchener took a close interest in the exact movements of Indian troops
through Egypt and had deliberately held the 3rd Indian Division in that
country for just over a week on what he called 'temporary duty', his
aim being for this force to secure Egypt while the intended
replacements for the pre-war garrison, the 24th East Lancashire
Division, made their way from England. '
6 For full details of the arrival and departure of Indian troops in
Egypt, see Official History, pp. 13-15.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy 4 Sept. 1914, and Kitchener
to General Duff 4 Sept. l9l4	 LIMILI17/5/1618.
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These rapid changes in the allocation of troops
were due to the increasing demands of France, coupled with concern over
Turkish activities to the east of Egypt. Official British policy
remained, while Turkey was neutral, to do as little as possible to
antagonise the Sublime Porte - even to the extent of preventing British
troops from crossing the Suez Canal, although the Egyptian border with
the Ottoman Empire lay well over 100 miles to the east, across the Sinai
Peninsula,4n4the Sinai itself had even been evacuated! ° 	 However,
behind this almost excessive timidity the British in Egypt had their
eyes wide open.	 On 9 August they picked up reports of Turkish
mobi]isation being carried out with 'great thoroughness' and,
consequently, on the 18th and the 31st of that month the Egyptian Camel
Corps was moved to Ismailia 'as a precautionary measure' to watch the
approaches to the Suez Canal across the Sinai. Cheetham was also
aware of the potential threat and informed London that if Turkey did
enter the war then there was evidence to suggest they contemplated an
attack on Egypt. 0 These were prudent words, because Co lr.lthad
ordered preparations to commence f or an attack upon Egypt as early as 2
August, 11
Kitchener to Grey 22 Sept. 1914,F.O. 800/102.
W. D. G H Q Force in Egypt, 9, 18 and 31 Aug. 1914. 	 The Official
History (p. 13) incorrectly gives the impression that troops were
only moved to Ismailia for the first time on 31 Aug. 1914.
Cheetham to Grey 28 Aug. 1914,W.O. 106/52.
Kress von Kressenstein, 'The campaign in Palestine from the enemy's
side'	 (Translation of 'Between Caucasus and Sinai'), R.U.S.I.
Journal	 LXVII (1922), p. 503.
MAXWELL ASSUMES COMMAND
Meanwhile, Major-General Byng,
	 who had commanded the British
garrison in Egypt before the war, was ordered home in the middle of
August. His replacement was to be Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell,
though he did not reach Egypt until 8 September, and in the meantime
there seems to have been some confusion in Egypt as to who would command
there.	 Cheetham, however, made it absolutely clear to the Foreign
Office that what was needed was a man 'who knows the country'. 12
Maxwell fitted the bill admirably. He had already spent thirty years
of his life in Egypt, including four years as the Commanding Officer,
and he was also a close friend of Kitchener, who had been behind his
appointment.	 The civilian authorities in Egypt were happy with
Maxwell since they considered him approachable and described him as
'exactly what we required'.
	 That Maxwell had his limitations from a
military point of view would become apparent; but he was probably the
right man for the job in 1914.
	 There was possibly only one other
soldier who was more conversant with Egyptian peculiarities;
	 but
unfortunately he was now Secretary of State for War in London.
12 Cheetham to Grey 19 Aug. 1914,F.O. 800/48.
'	 Maxwell had been G 0 C in Egypt 1908-1912.
	 At the start of the
war he had been serving as a liaison officer in France.
14	 R. Storrs, Qrientations (London 1943), p. 145.	 For praise of
Maxwell's handling of civilian affairs see R. Graham to Sir W.
Tyrell, 25 Oct. 1914,
	 F.O. 800/48.
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When Maxwell landed in Egypt he found a far from satisfactory
situation. One major problem was simply the number of different units
embarking, disembarking or passing through the country, a problem that
could only worsen, for in October it was decided that the Australian and
New Zealand soldiers then on their way to France should be retained in
Egypt in order to complete their training. ' To Major-General
Callwell, the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, this
seemed a sensible move; but he was becoming concerned by his chief's
tendency to have 'Egypt on the brain.' In fact, Kitchener even managed
to get entangled in a serious row with the Colonial Office over his
efforts to rush men to Egypt and left his D.M.O. exasperated:
'Whenever Maories or Fiji Islanders or people from Malay volunteer for
war in Europe 'K' sends them to Egypt - it will be like a menagerie.' '
Unfortunately Egypt was not equipped to be a 'menagerie'.	 For one
thing, Maxwell was desperately short of staff officers to organise such
activities. His predecessor did not even have an A.D.C., while he
himself only enjoyed the services of a single staff officer, second
grade, as his entire General Staff.Moreover, to organise embarkation
duties (although these were 'onerous from the first, and increased
almost daily') he could count on only eight officers for the three
ports of Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. 17 It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that Maxwell's only staff officer at this time admitted after
the war that many of the incidents in which he became involved were
'more suitable f or relation in a novel than in a history.'
These Australian and New Zealand troops started to arrive in Egypt
in early Dec.
Caliwell to Henry Wilson 22 Oct. 1914 and Callwell to Henry Wilson
28 Oct. 1914k	Henry Wilson papers 73/1/18.
17 Official History, Appendix 4, p. 408. Thertis no mention of this
acute shortage in the main text, nor of the chaos that existed with
the rapid transit of so many troops through the country.
'	 Col. Russell to Director, Historical Section, Committee of Imperial
Defence, 3 Dec. 1928,	 CAB 45/80.
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The authorities in India made Maxwell's Job still more difficult by
failing to provide him with sufficient information concerning the Indian
troops being sent to him. " Nor was the Journey from India itself
without complications and a lot of stores were found to have been opened
on arrival so that certain units suffered from considerable deficiencies
initially. 20 Moreover, while on board ship disease could, and did,
break out amongst the soldiers; consequently, permission was needed to
leave some of them at Aden in order to prevent further infection. 2
Finally, poorly organised embarkation in India combined with the chronic
staff shortages in Egypt could lead to sheer chaos once unloading took
place. 22	 The Lancashire Territorials rushed to Egypt also arrived in
a shambles.	 In fact, Maxwell informed Fitzgerald, Kitchener's
secretary, that 1,500 of these men reached him full of lice and so
poorly vaccinated that hundreds of them could hardly move.
Kitchener had also decided to send two regiments of Yeomanry to Egypt;
but these fared little better since they discovered on arrival that a
lot of their equipment had been misplaced and, subsequently. many of
their horses died.	 Sir John was so shocked by this he sent a special
report to London on the way these troops were shipped out. 24
'	 W.D. I E F 'E' 23 Oct. 1914, L/MIL/17/5/3893.
20 W. D. No. 1 Section Supply & Transport 10th Indian Division 18 Nov.
1914,	 WO 95/4424.
21 Marine Transport Officer to C G S	 India, 4 Nov.	 1914,
L/MIL/ 17/5/3950.
22 W.D. No. 51 Indian General Hospital 19 Nov. 1914 and 3 Dec. 1914,
W.O. 95/4743.
23 Maxwell to Fitzgerald Ii Oct. 1914,
	
PRO 30/57/45.
24	 Arthur, p. 136.
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In spite of this nightmare of muddled bureaucracy Maxwell had
started to come to terms with his strategic situation as he perceived
it. With admirable objectivity he outlined to Kitchener one particular
danger he was determined to avoid: • I do not want to be led into
playing the game Germany evidently wants us to and retain troops here
that are wanted in France.' 28	 However, although he correctly gauged
Berlin's policy towards Egypt, he did not do so well as far as
was concerned,	 for he believed the Turks would not attempt a major
attack across the Sinai though they might try something on a small
scale. 26	 In part, Maxwell's error was due to a basic misconception by
the British as to the nature of the Ottoman Empire's army and its
capabilities. Before the war there had been a significant body of
opinion that argued the Turks simply did not have the ability to equip
and organise an expedition of a sufficient size to cross the Sinai
Peninsula and threaten Egypt. The Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 seemed
to encourage this view because, it was felt, after such a series of
defeats the Turkish military would require time to recuperate. 27
Moreover, as Cairo started to receive information concerning German
dissatisfaction with Ottoman inefficiency in December 1914 these
opinions seemed to have been confirmed. 28
26 Maxwell to Kitchener 5 Oct. 1914, 	 PRO 30/57/45.
26	 Ibid.
27	
'Reinforcements for Egypt' by Col. Harper, 3 Feb. 1914, 	 W.O.
106/43 C3/41.	 Harper wrote of the Turks' ability to cross the
Sinai:	 'It is open to doubt whether these qualities can ever be
found in the Turkish army.'
28	 8 Dec. 1914,	 W.O. 95/4360.
37
But it was not as simple as this; in fact, there were those in
Cairo in 1914 who argued, quite correctly as it turned out, that the
Turkish soldier was ideally suited f or this type of expedition:
His physical needs are easily satisfied with dirty water, rice and
bread, and he is not at all a bad manager of transport animals.
It may therefore be supposed that his mobility is greater than his
insufficient equipment would lead one to expect. 29
Herein lay the crucial point:
	 so long as the British viewed the
Ottoman army through 'European eyes' they would sadly misjudge its
capabilities and limitations. While heavy losses and insufficient
supplies might well dissuade a European power like Britain from crossing
the Sinai because of its sensitivity to the sufferings of its meri,this
would not be the case for Corl?4n+Inork.The Turks were quite prepared to
'sacrifice large numbers' in such an operation, because their men were
used to terrible hardships and, therefore, they would attack, argued a
prominent Egyptian while in conversation with a British officer.
'Report re Turkish ilitary preparations and political intrigues
having an attack on Egypt as their direct object' by P. Graves, 10
Nov. 1914,	 W. 0. 157/689.
° Notes by General Birdwood on conversation with son of ex-Khedive of
Egypt before attack on Egypt
	 Birdwood papers, 138 Ci).
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THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT ALONG THE CANAL
Early in November Britain's position in Egypt, and indeed in the
whole of the Near East, became somewhat clearer when London finally
declared war on the Sublime Porte after offensive action by the Turks
against Russian ports in the Black Sea at the end of October. °' In a
sense Maxwell's job became somewhat easier for he could now declare a
state of martial law quite acceptably in Egypt, thus making the British
army the supreme legal authority in the country and so extending his own
power to act should there be trouble.
	 He next suggested to Kitchener
in the middle of November that Egypt be proclaimed a British
Protectorate, a course of action that was finally taken on 18 November
so that the last pretensions of Turkish rule in the country were finally
severed, since, on the following day, the pro-Turk Khedive of Egypt was
deposed and a British nominee made Sultan in his place. 32 At the same
time the title of the British representative was altered from Consul-
General to High Commissioner,a change which was, in itself, less than
revolutionary for Sir Milne Cheetham remained as acting High
Commissioner until Sir Henry McMahon replaced him on 9 January 1915.
Nevertheless, a great deal of responsibility now lay upon the shoulders
of General Maxwell who had to contend both with Egypt's defence from
external aggression and its security from internal unrest, as well as
numerous civil matters. 	 Cheetham himself saw dangers in such a
situation: 'While recognising the advantages of single control,
experience leads me to believe that either civilian or military work
here fully occupies the time of one man.'
Britain did not declare war until 5 Nov. and this delay caused
Maxwell some confusion,f or on 3 Nov. he informed Kitchener that the
Admiralty seemed to be at war with Turkey while the Foreign Office
was nott	 Maxwell to Kitchener, 3 Nov. 1914,	 W.O. 159/13.
32	 Maxwell to Kitchener, 17 Nov. 1914,	 F.O. 800/102.
Cheetham to Foreign Office, 20 Nov. 1914,
	 F.O. 800/48.
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Cheetham was to be proved correct: organising a military campaign and
governing Egypt could not be done successfully by one man, as the
British were to discover throughout the war.
Turkey's declaration of war brought a fresh impetus to efforts
intended to rescue Egypt from attack in the east, especially since
reports started to be received that Ottoman forces had occupied El Arish
in the Sinai - news which even reached the Cabinet in London. 04
Maxwell had already started to make preparations for the defence of his
eastern frontier along the Suez Canal and local civilians found them
impressive.	 However, appearances were deceptive - at least as far
as the unskilled eye of the civilian was concerned. In reality, Sir
John was desperately short of the necessary staff work needed to
organise an adequate defensive scheme and a search had to be mounted
for the only copy known to exist in Egypt of a 1910 report outlining the
necessary measures required. This report had been written by the
G 0 C Egypt in 1910, General Bullock, and advocated the possible use of
some forward positions in the Sinai as a supplement to the natural
defensive value of the Canal; and since it was all he had, Maxwell
adopted it as the basis for his defensive planning.
Asquith to King George, 18 Nov. 1914,
	 CAB 41/35/61.
R. Graham to Tyrell, 20 Nov. 1914,
	 F.0. 800/48.
28 Nov. 1914, W.0. 95/4360.	 Captain Russell to Director,
Historical Section 3 Dec. 1928,	 CAB 45/80.
' 'Remarks on scheme submitted by G 0 C Egypt for Defence of Suez
Canal'.	 I )une 1910,	 W.0. 106/42/ C3/11.
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Defensive positions were constructed on both banks of the Canal,
therefore. Posts were dug on the east bank to cover the Canal ferries,
while on the west bank trenches were positioned between these posts.
Some training was done with the troops to try out the various tactical
defensive schemes for these separate localities, and there was even a
certain amount of planning for 'a decisive counter-attack' against an
assaulting enemy force.
The Royal Navy had offered to provide fire-support by placing ships
in the Canal during a Turkish attack. 	 Such an offer was greatly
appreciated;	 but Maxwell soon discovered that the Navy could be a
source of mixed blessings. 	 For one thing, the Admiralty was inclined
to order its ships away at a moment's notice - and without even
informing the Egyptian authorities. 	 Moreover, If ships were to be
used to defend the Suez Canal then they would need as free a passage as
possible up and down the waterway. In consequence, the Navy opposed a
'multiplicity of bridges' across the Canal, which was precisely what the
local military commanders desired If they were to rush reinforcements to
the east bank in order to develop a possible counter-attack. ° 	 Such
problems also greatly hindered swift contact between separate units.
W.D. 31st Indian Infantry Brigade, 	 30 Dec. 1914,	 W.0. 95/4422.
Maxwell notes on Egypt in 1914. 	 18 Aug. 1924,	 CAB 45/79.
° W.D.	 Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, 	 30 Dec. 1914,	 W.O.
95/4423.
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Nor was the standard of construction work done upon the defensive
positions themselves particularly high. Although some brigades worked
especially hard, with large working parties being organised daily, this
failed to prevent complaints about the quality of trenches when the
defences were finally put to the test in February 1915.
For example 1
 Lieutenant-Colonel Dunsford of the 2nd Rajputs complained
in the following manner about the trenches around the Toussoum area:
'There were practically no fire trenches ready made in the positions
taken up so the men dug themselves into the bank.' The major
reason for this sort of short coming was simply a desperate lack of
engineers available to General Maxwell. Indeed, so bad was the
situation that for about ten days in the middle of January 1915 there
was only one field company to cover a front of 95 mIles.
41	 W.D.	 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade,	 16 Jan. 1915,	 W.O.
95/4422.
42 Report on Operations of 3 & 4 Feb. 1915, by Lt.-Col Punsford,
W.O. 95/4422.
Official History, p. 33.
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A deficiency of engineering experience probably caused the embarrasing
events that followed a decision to reduce the frontage of the Canal that
needed to be defended by flooding. A number of holes were made in the
Canal bank at Port Said so as to inundate an area of the Sinai to the
east.	 Unfortunately, insufficient thought had been given as to how to
control the water, and the result, predictably, was disaster. When the
water 'threatened to gain control' 100 Gurkhas were forced to work all
day and night In order to attempt to repair the damage, but to no avail
since heavy rains and strong winds made the position still worse. Some
defensive redoubts were washed away, the local salt works damaged, and
as for troops who had been out on reconnaissance beyond the area of
inundation, they had to wade back to their original positions through
water which reached up to their waists.
The personnel available to man these defences was almost
exclusively Indian. Two Indian divisions (the 10th and 11th ), along
with the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, shared the responsibility
with some Egyptian and Territorial artillery batteries. The East
Lancashire Division, as well as the Australian and New Zealand
contingents, formed a reserve, making the grand total of 64,230 in
Egypt.
'	 W.D.	 69th Punjabis, 26 Nov. 1914. 	 W.b. 29th Indian
Infantry Brigade 25-30 Nov. 1914, W.0. 95/4432. See also
Official History, p.25 for an account of this policy that does not
mention any of the problems encountered.
83rd meeting Military Members, 	 Army Council, 20 Nov. 1914,	 W.0.
163/ 45.
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But the situation was not nearly as reassuring as these figures seemed
to suggest.	 Maxwell held the Territorial and Antipodeans in reserve
because they required further training. As for the Indian divisions
the very term 'division' was misleading; in reality, they were brigades
thrown together in order to create divisions, but they lacked sufficient
staff, artillery and divisional troops.	 Nor did they even have the
usual proportion of British battalions like other Indian divisions.
There was also a certain amount of friction within the command-structure
since Lord Kitchener forced an additional inaJor-eneral upon Maxwell.
Although the Egyptian commander complained that this freak
reorganisation was 'unsuitable and that in any case he had more Major-
Generals already than he knew what to do with' Kitchener still got his
way. The final result was that Major-General Wilson, whom Maxwell had
originaly appointed, remained in overall command of all troops along the
Canal whlle Major-General Wallace was given one of the two Indian
divisions within the same command. ' The Secretary of State's
involvement in this affair was not helpful, for two tnajor-enerals in
the same command did not make for an efficient command even without a
potential enemy attack.
'	 Notes by Gen. Bingley, 	 23 Oct. 1925.,	 CA8145/78.
Callwell to Henry Wilson 6 Dec. 1914,	 Henry Wilson papers
73/1/18.
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Wilson's Indian troops were potentially a source of grave concern1
since many of them were Moslems like their Turkish opponents. The
enemy was, of course, all too aware of this and made every attempt to
encourage disloyalty amongst them, even to the extent of selling copies
of the Koran containing anti-British messages.
	 Desertions
followed.	 In December thirteen Indian soldiers crossed to the Turkish
lines from a unit sent out to search for four men who themselves
deserted a day or so before! "	 Although the numbers who deserted
never reached alarming proportions, this very Incident sent ripples as
far as London, causing Callwell to remark: 'I am afraid that there
will be trouble with the Indian army before many years are out.' SO
Meanwhile, the Aga Khan - as the spiritual head of the Ismailite sect
of Islam and a loyal servant of the British war effort - noticed some
uneasiness amongst the Indian troops while visiting Egypt.
Unfortunately, although the intention of the Aga Khan's visit was to
strengthen the loyalty of the Indian troops in Egypt, it became 'a
ludicrous failure' because he could only speak to the troops through an
interpreter - and they laughed at him.
Col. Bingley to C.in C. India, 2 Dec. 1914,
	 L/MIL/17/5/3894.
'Nominal roll of Indian prisoners of war suspected of having
deserted to the enemy or of having given information to or
otherwise assisted the enemy after capture,'
	 Oct. 1918,
L/MIL/ 17/5/2403.
Ca].lwell to Henry Wilson, 13 Dec. 1914,
	 Henry Wilson papers
73/1/18.
	





'The Nobel Prize for Peace.'
	 Note by Sir A. Hirtzel, 8 June 1924,
L/P&S/ 10/588/2149.
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The problem remained, therefore, and could not be ignored. General
Bingley, the Chief Staff Officer of the Canal Defences, tried to explain
to the official historians after the war how the issue seemed to
dominate proceedings because,although the number of desertions and signs
of disaffection remained limited, nobody then knew 'how far the poison
would spread.'
Egyptian troops, too, might waver in their allegiance. The
majority of the Egyptian army was employed f or the defence of the Sudan;
but some artillery and a few coastguards were on the Canal and
vulnerable to enemy propaganda. The Turks used Bedouin Arabs of the
Sinai to smuggle letters to these Egyptians to stir up mutiny amongst
them, which may well have inspired a number of them to desert some days
later.
Nor could the indigenous population of Egypt be relied upon to
remain loyal, especially if a Turkish attack developed on the Canal.
Cairo Intelligence, thanks to the fortuitous capture of a German spy,
had uncovered plans to ' -foment troubles in Egypt by the formation of
bands of brigands.., in the hope of scattering the British military
forces and thus to assist a Turkish attack.' The Turks had also
been at work; they had been negotiating with Sayed Ahmed, the leader of
the Senussi sect of Islam to the west of Egypt, who might raise the
Bedouin of Libya against the British - thus providing Maxwell with a
possible war on two fronts if the Senussi and Turks co-operated
successfully.
Notes on draft chapters by Bingley, Oct. 1925, 	 CAB 45/78.
54	 Intelligence Report No.9, 18 Nov. 1914,	 W.O. 157/688.
The Adviser of the Interior to Cheetham,	 19 Oct.	 1914,
L/P&S/ 10/464/4359.
Cheetham to Foreign Office, 10 Nov. 1914, 	 Cheetham papers.
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CHAPThR 3
THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFENDING EGYPT OFFENSIVELY:
NOVEMBER 1914 - FEBRUARY 1915
'The P.M. gave me a withering look, rolled up the map and muttered
peevishly, NYOU soldiers are all alike; you have no imagination.'
Winston Churchill to Sir James Marshall-Cornwall
THE DEFENSIVE STRATEGY OF EGYPT BEFORE 1914
Although it was apparent to everyone in Egypt in the early months
of the war that the country was in a state of military chaos this did
not stop serious discussions being held in London about using Egyptian
troops aggressively against the Turkish enemy, and these even mushroomed
into actual preparations being made by Cairo for an amphibious operation
at Alexandretta in February 1915.
One major reason f or there being so much enthusiasm for operations
In Syria in 1914 was the simple fact that this very subject had been
fairly extensively considered before the war. Because of a perceived
threat to the security of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, after an
incident in 1906 when Turkey seized the port of Tabah at the head of the
Gulf of Aqaba, a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had
examined the question of how best to defend Egypt. Its recommendation
was quite straightforward; if the Turks decided to attempt the invasion
of Egypt then four divisions were to be landed at Haifa on the Syrian
coast where they would cut the lines of communication of the enemy force
in its rear. * This scheme of defence had been approved by the C.I.D.
itself at its 102nd meeting on 29 June 1909. The General Staff
subsequently undertook a serious reconnaissance of the Haifa region; but
1 1 The military requirements of the Empire as affected by Egypt and the
Sudan', it Mar. 1909, CAB 11/74.
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they remained convinced that it was well suited to the location of an
amphibious landing and advance into the interior. However, a fresh Sub-
Committee, under the Chairmanship of Lord Esher, was asked to re-examine
the matter by the War Office. Although Esher's Committee did not feel
an attack on Egypt was very likely, it came to the same conclusion and
its report was submitted in July 1910. The Haifa plan had won the day
over the alternatives partly because of a distaste in military circles
for any kind of purely passive defence of Egypt which, it was claimed,
would be 'inconsistent with the fundamental principles of conducting
war'. 3 Moreover, it was also made clear that unless the Turks
attempted an invasion of Egypt on a large scale 'and thereby afford us
an opportunity of inflicting a decisive defeat, a defensive attitude on
our part... is likely to result in deadlock'. * Prophetic words indeed
and well worth remembering as our examination of events in Egypt and the
Sinai progresses; but for now their significance lies in their influence
before the war and the evidence they afford of the War Office's dislike
of a passive defence of Egypt based, inevitably, upon the line of the
Suez Canal alone.
There were other arguments that made a strategic defence based upon
the line of the Suez Canal unpopular before the war. For example,
allowing the enemy so close to the Empire's main line of communications
was surely asking for trouble; after all, it would not be difficult for
the Turks to block the Canal. 	 What is more, if the Turks were allowed
a Untitled and unsigned paper 24 Nov. 1914 in Secretary's file,
CAB 17/11.
* 'The military requirements of the Empire op. cit. Appendix II,
Military responsibilities in Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.




to cross the Sinai unopposed and assault the Canal, this might well be
perceived as a sign of military weakness by the Egyptian population and
could lead to civil strife of some sort. • The passage of time did not
alter the validity of these arguments and they made a defensive line
located along the Canal as unpopular in the later months of 1914 as it
had been after 1906.
Though Haifa was finally chosen as the best site for an amphibious
operation, other towns on the Syrian coast had been considered; these
included Beirut, Jaff a, Acre and Alexandretta to the north. Full use
was to be made of seapower and the intention had been to confuse the
enemy by feints against the coast at different positions; more than one
landing might even be executed simultaneously in order most effectively
to bewilder the Turks. A possible raid against Gallipoli was even
considered as part of this general strategy and not as an operation in
its own right. ' These other landing places were all regarded as sites
of secondary or supplementary operations in support of action at
Half a.
But no further action was taken concerning this question after the
second type-written report of 1910 had been produced, because the CIGS
at the time, Sir John French, believed it so important to concentrate
all attention upon the European theatre of war that 'the remoter
possibilities of an attack on Egypt ought not to occupy the time of the
General Staff'. And no such operation was ever attempted by the
British, while London's strategy in Egypt and Syria during the First
World War rapidly took a course precisely contrary to that recommended
• Ibid.




• General scheme for an invasion of Syria by an Expeditionary Force.
1908, W.0. 106/43C3/29.
Untitled paper 24 Nov. 191.4. op. cit.
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by Morley's committee end the other pre-war planners. Nonetheless,
this does not mean that the C.I.D.'s recommendations were entirely
forgotten.
The Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. that produced the Haifa strategy
was no second-rate, low-key body; the Chairman was the Secretary of
State f or India (Lord Morley) and its members included Asquith, Grey,
Ha]dane, Esher and Sir John French. These were influential men and Grey
and Asquith, for example, were both prominent figures in the direction
of British strategy during the first half of the war. Moreover, while
we should be careful not to over-emphasize the influence of the C.I.D.
before 1914 it is probably safe to say that this report must, at the
very least, have implanted an idea in the minds of many leading
politicians of the period. 10 And there was one other especially
influential figure in Whitehall in 1914 who had played a part in the
C. I. D.'s recommendations before the war - Maurice Hankey. The secretary
of nearly all the major war-directing committees in London from 1914 to
1918 had actually done a reconnaissance of the Syrian coast while in the
Navy before serving as assistant to and then secretary of the C.I.D.
itself.
10 J.P.Mackintosh, 'The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence
before 1914', English Historical Review. LXXVII (1962),
pp. 490-503. As for the work of the C.I.D.: 'The reports were of
some value but did not affect the major lines of military or naval
policy', p. 495.
11 S.Roskill, Hankey. man of secrets, I (London, 1970), p. 83.
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HAIFA IS RECONSIDERED IN 1914
When Turkey finally entered the war and began to threaten Egypt by
troop movements in the Sinai 1 Hankey raised the Haifa option and
suggested that a landing might be made there to secure Egypt.
Because the Ottoman Empire had entered a war on a scale which the C.I.D.
did not anticipate, he considered that the full force of four divisions
would not be necessary to execute the operation; he therefore suggested
that only a relatively small force should be required now that the enemy
faced campaigns against Russia in the Caucasus and the British in
Mesopotamia (where the Indian army had landed troops) in addition to any
moves they might make against Egypt. ' 	 Next he approached the
Admiralty and the War Office and encouraged them to examine the question
once more.
Hankey's approach must have caused a stir, for on the very next day
Colonel Talbot at the War Office sent a note to General Caliwell
outlining the problems of a landing at Haifa. Talbot felt a landing
might force the Turks to recall any attack upon Egypt, but that problems
would start when the British decided what to do next; he argued: 'If we
send an expedition, we shall find it most difficult to withdraw it; and
if we leave it there, it may eventually be confronted by very superior
Turkish forces.' He concluded therefore that the 'game is not worth the
candle'. 14 However 1 in spite of this unfavourable response, Caliwell
himself was drawn by the possibilities open to a force of some 70,000
men which had by then collected in Egypt. He envisaged 'comparatively
small bodies of troops' making appearances at coastal towns such as
12 Hankey to Crease 19 May 1915, CAB 63/5. For reports of Turkish
invasions into the Sinai reaching London see, for example, Report of
the Cabinet Meeting 18 Nov. 1914 by Asquith to the King CAB
41/35/61.
13 Untitled paper 24 Nov. 1914, op. cit.
14 Note by Col. Talbot 25 Nov. 1914, W.0. 106/1469.
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Jaffa, Haifa, Tripoli and Alexandretta in order to threaten landings or
even carry them out under the cover of warships. His observations
demonstrated his frustration at being unable to conduct a major
operation rather than any profound strategic insight, as he himself
admitted: 'The truth is that one does not like to sit still in Egypt
doing nothing, but that no offensive operations of a really serious
character appear to be practicable.' The CIGS; General Wolfe-Murray,
seemed to sympathise with Caliwell for, while he agreed that a major
landing at Haifa was not possible, his comments were not entirely
negative and he recommended waiting for Maxwell's forces to settle down
before attempting any 'diversions'. . In a letter to General Henry
Wilson Callwell later explained that 'as long as nothing was done beyond
temporary occupation of one or two coastal towns, such actions might be
possible'. •
Meanwhile, the possibility of action at Haifa became a serious
topic for discussion at the War Council on 25 November 1914. This was
none too surprising, for Churchill had written to Kitchener on the
previous day - no doubt prompted by Hankey's suggestion - explaining
that he considered action at Gallipoli the best way to fight Turkey, but
if that proved impossible he suggested 'you might threaten Ga]lipoli
with a landing and... a concentration there and then turn off sharp to
Haifa for the more modest exploit'. 17 He this same line
of reasoning at the War Council and strongly advocated an attack upon
the Gallipoli Peninsula which, if successful, would give Britain control
of the Dardanelles and allow her to enforce peace-terms on the paralysed
Turks; but, he added, if such action was discovered to be 'impractical'
then it seemed worthwhile to make only a feint at Gallipoli and make
'our real point of attack' at Haifa or some point on the Syrian coast.
Significantly, Churchill supported his arguments by reference to the
' Ibid. Note by Callwell 28 Nov. 1914 and comment by Wolfe-Murray
28 Nov. 1914.
Caliwell to Henry Wilson 23 Dec. 1914, Henry Wilson papers 73/1/18.
17 Churchill to Kitchener 24 Nov. 1914, W.0. 106/1469.
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recommendations made by the C.I.D. in 1909. However, although Lord
Kitchener acknowledged the need for a diversion against the Turks,he did
not believe that the time was right for such action, especially since
the forces in Egypt were still disorganised. 11
But this was not the end of the Council's concern over Egypt on 25
November. Anxiety as to Turkish moves in the Sinai meant that if there
was to be no operation on the Syrian coast for the moment then the
attention of the Council naturally moved to the Suez Canal. The First
Lord of the Admiralty detailed the ships available for the defence of
Egypt , therefore - but this was not at all what Balf our wanted to hear.
He wanted the wells in the Sinai some 30 miles to the east of the Canal
to be occupied, or at least destroyed, by the British so that the enemy
would find 'great difficulty' in crossing the desert. This very course
of action had been advocated by Lord Cromer in October, but it did not
find favour with the Secretary of State for War who considered the wells
too far from the Canal to make their permanent occupation practicable
and very difficult to destroy.
The War Council meeting of 25 November 1914 demonstrated the
concern that existed in London for the security of Egypt, a concern that
was not satisfied with a purely passive defence of the country along the
Canal. It also proved the extent to which the findings of the C. I. D.
still had a degree of influence upon British strategy in 1914 even
though this has tended to be over-shadowed because of the ultimate
triumph of the Gallipoli scheme. Churchill, f or example, does not even
mention Haifa in his version of the discussions of 25 November 1914,
while Hankey in his account graphically describes the impact of the
First Lord's speech advocating Gallipoli so that he tends to give the
War Council meeting 25 Nov. 1914, CAB 42/1/4.
19 Ibid. For Cromer' s views on this see Memorandum by Lord Cromer
respecting the steps to be taken in event of war with Turkey.
16 Oct. 1914, CAB 37/121/124.
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impression that all other subjects were superfluous. '
Nor did Haifa entirely disappear from the agenda after the end of
November. For example, in the early days of 1915 there were still those
at the War Office who believed Haifa and Acre were both 'excellent
places for disembarking troops' on the Syrian coast. 21 And in Egypt
Colonel Clayton saw attractions in the Haifa option: 'This plan has the
advantage that it would mean the occupation of a district which it is
quite conceivable Great Britain might eventually desire to control.'
Moreover, according to reports being received at Cairo, the population
of the Haifa region believed that the town was the 'key' to Syria and
wished f or a British occupation of the area. 23 In February there was
still talk in London of 'a dash with 10,000 men to Haifa or
Alexandretta' by Maxwell, while in Egypt General Birdwood was calling
for a deliberate feint at Haifa to confuse the enemy in order to assist
what had by then become a still more popular option - an amphibious
operation at Alexandretta. 24 Alexandretta clearly was not, therefore,
either the first or the only amphibious operation considered in
connection with the security of Egypt in 1914 and early 1915 as the
Official History suggests. 25
20 W.S.Churchill, The World Crisis. 1911-1918,1 (London, n.d.), p. 437.
M.Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918,1 (London, 1961), p. 243.
'Syria' by Capt. Siceffington-Smyth. 1-2 Jan. 1915, W.O. 106/1569.
22 Intelligence Appreciation Note 3 Jan. 1915 by Clayton 	 Clayton
papers 694/3/ 1.
23 The following is a brief and necessarily incomplete summary of the
views held by prominent and representative Syrians'. No date,
Clayton papers 694/3/53.
24 Deedes Diary 1 Feb. 1915.	 Birdwood to Kitchener 14 Feb. 1915
PRO 30/57/61.
25 Official History, pp. 20-21.
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DEFENDING EGYPT AT ALEXANDRETA
Though aware of the weakness of his own position General Maxwell
did not allow his mind to be tied exclusively to a purely defensive
approach to the defence of Egypt. For instance, he knew of the plight
of the Maronite Christians In the Lebanon who wished for arms to be
smuggled to them from their supporters in Greece so that they could
defend themselves from any Turkish attacks. On the final day of October
1914 Maxwell informed Kitchener of this matter and explained that if the
Maronites were armed they might cause trouble in the rear of any enemy
attack on the Canal. Some attention was given to the subject in
London and the Admiralty decided that Britain could help the Maronites
directly by allowing Cyprus to be used In the transit of the weapons
across the Mediterranean; and orders were Issued to permit this.
However, the whole affair subsequently became far more complicated, for
Syrians in the United States offered to form themselves into an
auxiliary force in Cyprus, ready to land in the Lebanon; all they wanted
from London for this scheme were transport, weapons and permissions The
Foreign Office was none too enthusiastic about any of this because they
felt it was not worth the bother. $ Nonetheless, there was a certain
attraction about using enthusiastic recruits for offensive operations In
Syria while Egypt could not spare sufficient troops herself. The War
Office recognised this to a certain extent. Early in November a
Mr Bleed, a civilian who had lived in Palestine for ten years, wrote to
the War Office and suggested that with proper encouragement 100,000 Jews
in all parts of the world and many Syrian Christians could be enlisted
to conquer Palestine from the Turks via Egypt and the Caucasus. Although
Callwell recommended the rejection of this particularly ambitious plan,
one of his subordinates, Major Holland, made the following most
Arthur, p. 136. Maxwell to Kitchener 31 Oct. 1914.27 Admiralty to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
3 Jan. 1915, FO 371/2479/1820.
20 Maj. K.El-Aswad Bey to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice 1915 and FO minutes
9 Mar. 1915	 FO 371/2480/27310.
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revealing comment:	 'The reconquest of Palestine by the Jews sounds
1luring.' *9
Maxwell's enthusiasm for offensive action of some kind in Syria
GOOfl proved decisive in terms of planning for amphibious operations.
Early in December, Callwel]. admitted that Kitchener wanted to embark on
'Syrian adventures', but that there were no troops available. •
Nevertheless, the Secretary of State asked Maxwell for his views on the
subject and on 4 December 1914 Kitchener received his reply: if a
diversion was contemplated then the best location would undoubtedly be
at Alexandretta. 31 Moreover, offensive action did not seem quite so
outlandish as December progressed, f or the Australian and New Zealand
contingents landed in Egypt early in the same month; in fact, Callwell
believed these new troops might be used along the Syrian coast. ••
There were good reasons for Maxwell favouring Alexandretta. For
one thing, as early as 1904 the General Staff had acknowledged it to be
one of the best landing places in Syria. U Moreover, its geographical
location had become of great strategic importance - at least,the British
believed this to be so. Although Alexandretta itself was only a
terminus of a branch line of the Turkish railway connecting
Constantinople to Syria and Mesopotamla (known as the Baghdad railway)
this was misleading, for, in reality, the port played a crucial role in
the enemy's communications. Because the rail tunnels through the Amanus
mountains had not been completed by 1914 and the only other route
9 Ashland Bleed to War Office 2 Nov. 1914.
	 Minutes by Callwell 11
Nov. and Holland 12 Nov., W.O. 32/11347.
3° Caliwell to Henry Wilson 2 Dec. 1914, Henry Wilson papers 73/1/18.
3 Arthur, pp. 153-154. Maxwell to Kitchener 4 Dec. 1914.
32. Callwell to Henry Wilson 23 Dec. 1914,op.cit. Caliwell's attitude
towards a landing at Alexandretta was complex; he seems to have
opposed a major operation involving permanent occupation, but still
favoured 'temporary occupation' of 'one or two coast towns', as he
had suggested in November.
83 Military Report on Arabia. General Staff. 1904, W.O. 33/331.
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through these mountains - the road - was not even suitable for wheeled
transport, untIl 1916 the quickest way to move supplies to Syria or
Mesopotamia actually Involved moving them by train to Alexandretta, and
thence by road to A].eppo or to a station just west of It, where they
rejoined the main line. It followed, therefore, that if the British
could occupy the town then the Turks would be forced to use the Amanus
road If they wished to keep their communications with Syria open; and
during the months of January to March this road was more or less closed.
$4 This seemed most appealing to Egyptian Intelligence who began to
argue that 'if Alexandretta is held and the Syrian coast guarded nothing
further can reach Syria or Baghdad'. And this was not at all surprising,
since they began to pick up a great deal of Information about enemy
stores and equipment pouring through the town presumably on their way to
the Egyptian frontier. • Added emphasis was given to this movement
of supplies and to the entire region around Alexandretta by the
activities of a British cruiser; HMS 'Doris' sailed up the Syrian coast
bombarding Turkish positions and landing raiding parties to disrupt
their communications at a number of locations, but especially around
Alexandretta, where the ship shelled the railway, destroyed bridges and
even came to an agreement with enemy troops to disable some railway
englnesi 6
Meanwhile, In London, two memoranda produced and circulated to the
War Council within days of each other gave added emphasis to the coast
of Syria in British strategy. The first of these, written by Maurice
$4 For further details see W.R.Stanley, 'Review of Turkish Asiatic
railways to 1918: some political - military considerations',
Journal of Transport History. VII (1966), pp. 189-200. The reader
is recommended to have a look at the map of Turkish communications
to understand the significance of Alexandretta. The construction of
the Baghdad railway gave Alexandretta an added significance It had
not had before 1914.
•f 'Notes on Turkish forces in Syria' 15 Dec. 1914, W.0. 157/689.
3 HMS'Doris	 Report of proceedings off Syrian coast. 14 to 27 Dec.
1914, CAB 37/124/13. This report was circulated to the War Council
and had a profound impact on its members.
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Hankey, expressed frustration at the deadlock in France and sought a
solution to this in an attack on Germany's allies; initially his
attention was drawn to the Balkans but, he explained, if further action
was not possible there then 'an attack in Syria would prove a severe
blow to Turkey'. Although this memorandum was lacking in detail and
did not even outline where in Syria this attack was to take place,it
nonetheless correctly gauged the existing atmosphere in the War Council
and impressed the Prime Minister. Baif our, however, was quick to
point out the basic problem with any action against Turkey; while he
also saw the need to hit the Ottoman Empire as hard as possible, he
reminded Hankey that any such operations 'however successful, must be
regarded as merely subsidiary'.
The second memorandum was penned by Lloyd George and in many ways
bore a remarkable resemblance to Hankey's. Interestingly enough,
Hankey actually wrote to the Chancellor on 2 January 1915, before he had
even seen the Welshman's paper, enclosing his own memorandum because, he
believed, they both had 'not very dissimilar' views - and he was quite
correct. 40 Lloyd George, like Hankey, was exasperated by the slow
progress on the Western Front and looked elsewhere for the decisive
blow; again, like Hankey, he looked initially to the Balkans for
inspiration; but his second operation was to be against Turkey and was
to involve the calculated risk of allowing the enemy to 'entangle
themselves' in an attack on Egypt so that a British force of 100,000
could be landed in Syria to cut them off, thus dealing a crushing blow
to the Ottoman army and enabling London to order the occupation of
Syria. 4 So far Lloyd George's ideas bore a close resemblance to those
•7 Memorandum by Hankey 28 Dec. 1914, CAB 37/122/194.
1$ H.H.Asquith, Memories and Reflections 1852-1927. II (London, 1928),
pp. 51-52.
$9 Baif our to Hankey 2 Jan. 1915, B.M. Add. 	 . 49703.
40 Hankey to Lloyd George 2 Jan. 1915, Lloyd George papers C/4/19/2.
41 'The war: suggestions as to the military position' by Lloyd George
1 Jan. 1915, CAB 42/1/8.
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of the C.I.D. before the war, although it has been argued that he was
actually thinking of Alexandretta and not Haifa as the site of his
amphibious attack. 42. It would seem quite likely, as well, that the
Chancellor was drawing on the ideas of men around him,f or this was the
usual way in which he formulated new policies; and he was, after all, no
military expert at the end of 1914. 43 Nonetheless, he did have the
courage to express his convictions firmly and he believed in them
sufficiently to pass them on to those who he thought ought to see them.
" Moreover, there was one element in Lloyd George's memorandum that
appears to have been completely unique, for he argued that a British
success in Syria offered the possibility of 'a dramatic victory.., in
territory which appeals to the imagination of the people'. This
point of view he would forcefully state again in the future; but for the
present his ideas were not totally ignored, for Asquith described them
as 'quite good', for example. '
Meanwhile, the War Office now started seriously to consider
operations at Alexandretta. What seems to have stimulated the
military experts in London was a telegram sent by Cheetham on 5 January
1915. Cheetham suggested Alexandretta as 'the spot at which a decisive
stroke at the Turkish lines of communications could be dealt most
42 'Lloyd George and the strategy of the war. Evidence from documents
upon the question' by Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart papers
1/450/file 1.
43 See A.J.P.Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: a diary by Frances Stephenson
(London, 1971), p. 21.
D.Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George. I (London, n.d.),
p. 214. He appears to have sent the original copy of this
memorandum dated 31 Dec. 1914 to Asquith. See MS Asaifk 133 folio
12-20.
'lhew.e.$45 
,(suggestions as to the military position, op. cit.
4' Asquith. p. 54.
C.E.Callwell, Experiences of a dug-out 1914-1918 (London, 1920),
p. 61. Caliwell writes that this was the first time he actually
considered any problem under the heading 'operations' with
Kitchener, which suggests that the discussions over Haifa in 1914
never reached the Secretary of State.
effectively'. 4S The War Office's immediate reaction was favourable;
Alexandretta, the General Staff argued, offered real possibilities as
only 'a comparatively small force' would be needed - at least at first.
Some further thinking was done upon the subject and a rough scheme was
drawn up for an advance by three columns from Alexandretta towards the
Baghdad railway with the intention of disabling it. 4 All the time,
however, the numbers of troops believed to be required seemed to be
rising. On 8 January 1915, for example, Kitchener mentioned the matter
at the War Council and explained that as many as between 30,000 and
50,000 troops could be necessary, while the Directorate of Military
Operations now estimated 21,000 in a detailed examination of the
proposed landing. fO By the time the subject was mentioned again at the
War Council on 13 January 1915 Kitchener had started to get cold
feet; he explained that 'a very good scheme' had been produced and 'it
would be kept in mind' but as	 yet the troops in Egypt were not
sufficiently trained to execute
Even though the decision by the Secretary of State naturally
dampened enthusiasm for Alexandretta in London it did not extinguish it.
In fact, as it became obvious that the Turks had made a serious attack
upon the Suez Canal in February so this enthusiasm was rekindled. It
would seem that both Kitchener and Maxwell had decided to delay matters
in order to gain more accurate information as to precisely what the
Turks were up to before they acted on the Syrian coast, as Callwell
explained to General Robertson on 13 February 1915: 'I should not
wonder if part of the force in Egypt very shortly made an attack on
Alexandretta. I have been wanting this to be undertaken for some weeks,
but both Lord K. and Maxwell preferred to wait until the attack on the
4 Cheetham to F 0. 5 Jan. 1915, Clayton papers 693/9/1.
4 'Note on Mr Cheetham's Proposals for Operations in Syria' by
General Staff. Jan. 1915, W.0. 106/1570.
D War Council meeting 8 Jan. 1915, 	 CAB 42/1/12.	 Expedition to
Alexandretta 11 Jan. 1915, W.O. 106/1570.
War Council meeting 13 Jan. 1915, CAB 42/1/16.
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Canal had declared itself'. Indeed, Callwell himself had wanted the
attack to go in at the very end of September when a lot of ships were
actually available.
All these developments certainly had a great impact in Egypt.
According to General Birdwood, Maxwell came to see him and explained
that he had just received a wire from Lord Kitchener asking if Birdwood
might take 5,000 of his Australian troops to Alexandretta. Birdwood
agreed to this and Sir John telegraphed this information to London;
there followed another message from the War Office asking if Birdwood
believed 5,000 would be enough for such a venture. Birdwood's reply to
this, through Maxwell, was that he thought the operation really needed
the entire Australian Army Corps if it was to be successful.
Nonetheless, a few days later he received a communication ordering him
to go ahead with the necessary preparations for such an action and he
and his staff subsequently 'went into all details f or landing and had
all... plans ready' for the seizing and holding of the necessary
positions around the Baghdad railway inland from Alexandretta. f The
first of these messages seems to have reached Birdwood on 23 January
1915 and his personal reaction was most ovourhk., even to the extent
of the general actually suggesting that some old rifles from India might
be used to arm the local Armenians in the region of Alexandretta, since
he believed they would support his troops. The extent to which
preparations for actions at Alexandretta influenced the Force in Egypt
can be seen by the fact that its Indian troops were grouped together
administratively because they might be needed for this operation.
Callwell to Robertson 13 Feb. 1915, Robertson papers 1/8/5.
%. Callwell to Robertson 1 Feb. 1915, Robertson papers 1/8/4.
4 Birdwood to Ellison 13 Apr. 1924, W.0. 161/84.
IT Birdwood to Kitchener 23 Jan. 1915, PRO 30/57/61.
1 Notes on draft chapters by A.H.Bingley, CAB 45/78.
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However, although the military in Egypt were all ready to go to
Alexandretta their diplomatic brethren were now less sure about this
course of action. For one thing) they knew that Paris regarded Syria as
a region of French influence, a fact which Cheetham had commented on in
his original telegram of 5 January 1915. In London the Foreign Office
began to realise the full implications of any British military action in
Syria and even described it as 'the most difficult issue of the war'.
Matters were made much more difficult for McMahon in Egypt by the
inflammatory way in which the local papers handled the affair, so that he
was forced to censor many of them. 1 The	 situation was
wors.necl by the arrival of a French Military Mission in the country
in February; in fact, permission for the arrival of this unit had been
agreed upon in January and its appearance now was unfortunate rather
than evidence of immediate French concern over the future of Syria.
IS Nonetheless, the threat of serious objections by the French to any
action by London at Alexandretta remained a serious barrier to this
operation throughout 1915. A
But the major obstacle to a serious attack at Alexandretta was
Winston Churchill, as Caliwell admitted 18 months later: 'We all wanted
to go to Alexandretta last January year, instead of embarking on the
Dardanelles adventure; but Winston was too many for us and dragged
Lord K. and the Government after him'. • Gallipoli now started to take
the centre-stage in London as the navy and army prepared for action
there and Kitchener's attention was distracted from the coast of
Syria. •1 Since the preliminary bombardments at the Dardanelles began
11 Minute by G.R.C. 3 Mar. 1915 and McMahon to Grey 15 Feb. 1915,
FO 371/2780/23865.
Grey to Kitchener 9 Jan. 1915, FO 800/102. Kitchener to Grey no
dates FO 371/2355/4552.
Ironically Haifa did not create such problems,since it did not fall
within France's area of perceived influence in Syria.
O Caliwell to Wingate 7 Aug. 1916, Wingate papers 139/2.
'I G.H.Cassar, Kitchener: architect of victory (London, 1977), p. 260.
Cassar admits that Kitchener initially found Alexandretta more
appealing than Gallipoli.
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in February it is clear how they managed to snuff out further
speculation over Alexandrette just as it was becoming most interesting
because of the Turkish attack.
It is idle to speculate too much as to whether a chance was missed
at Alexandretta in January and February 1915. On the other hand, it is
surely of some significance that contemporaries certainly believed this
to be the case. In September 1915, for example, Lord Hardinge believed
it would have been 'far better and just as useful' if London had decided
to attack at Alexandretta rather than Gallipoli. Moreover, in May of
1916 the entire issue was re-examined in Egypt and the conclusion was
most revealing:	 these operations 'appeared to offer favourable
prospects' it was decided. • Finally, those who observed the Turkish
retreat after their attack on the Canal on 3 February 1915 believed the
disorder caused by these men was so great that not only the Christian
peoples of the area but 'even the Mohammedan population were hoping that
the Allies would push their victory and land troops in Syria'.
Private letter from Lord Hardinge 17 Sep. 1915, 	 MS Aus+h 15
folio 13-14.
6$ Memorandum regarding operations in the Gulf of Iskanderun by
G. Dawnay. 3 May 1916	 W. 0. 95/4362.
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THE TURKISH ATTACK UPON THE CANAL : 3 FEBRUARY 1915
1 am much blamed by the wisearses back home...
for not having followed the Turks up when they were
defeated on the Canal... 	 I played the game and did
nothing to jeopardise operations on the Western theatre.'
General Maxwell, 8 February 1915
THE BUILD UP TO THE ATTACK
Intelligence in Egypt had long been aware of Turkish preparations
for an attack on the Suez Canal and the advance of the enemy force was
followed in some detail. In fact, so sure were the Egyptian
authorities that an attack would take place that they issued a statement
to the press to this very effect on 11 January 1915. 	 Their confidence
was due to detailed estimates of the capabilities and movements of
Turkish forces in Syria: one report emanating from the Intelligence
Department, for instance, correctly assumed there was 'ample water' in
the Sinai for an attacking army because of recent heavy rain, and that
the Turks could bring heavy guns within range of the Canal in spite of
the poor roads.
The attack was expected to come on 27 January 1915, the Kaiser's
birthday, but it did not materlalise on that date. 2 Instead, the
Turks seemed to halt at Beersheba, in Syria, apparently to wait for
their heavy artillery;	 and from this point onwards Egyptian
Intelligence started to fail.
1 Intelligence paper 10 Jan. 1915,W.O. 157/689. This very accurate
information did not reach the front line units so that these were
surprised by the heavy shell fire from the enemy positions.
2 McMahon to Grey 25 Jan. 1915, F.O. 800/48.
W.D. 11th Indian Division, 31 Jan. 1915,W.O. 95/4422.
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The British assumed that the enemy would cross the Sinai direct by the
northern route, along the coast. Unfortunately the Turks did not
oblige and marched through the Sinai by a more central route, thus
nearly catching the British by surprise at a time when so far all had
gone exceptionally well in terms of accurate intelligence. '
Meanwhile, the British had not merely been observing these events
in a state of paralysis - preparations were underway to meet the attack.
As late as 20 January 1915 Indian units were still seeking to render
useless wells and watering-holes in the Sinai that might be used by the
advancing enemy, while along the Canal some of their brothers had worked
hard on improving the defences. On 23 January the'general scheme of
defence.., was explained and final arrangements... were discussed' at a
meeting of all the Commanding Officers. The principles involved in
this defensive scheme had already been outlined by General Maxwell
earlier in the month after he had been informed of a plan by one of his
subordinates to occupy an advanced position in the Sinai. He had
explained that the defence was to be on 'purely passive lines', and that
only counter-attacks and short pursuits of the enemy after he had been
defeated on the main line of defence were to be undertaken. This
very cautious approach was itself an interpretation of orders issued by
Kitchener warning the G 0 C Egypt not to risk a British reverse 'owing
to the precarious position at that time in France.' e
6 Jan. and 24 Jan. 1915,W.O. 95/4360.
6	 Lt.-Col. Bambridge to Major A.K. Rawlins 20 Jan. 1915,W.O. 95/4404.
W.D. 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade 15 Jan. 1915,W.O. 95/4428.
W.D. 28th Indian Infantry Brigade 23 Jan. 1915,W.0. 95/4621.
W.D. Suez Canal Defences 11 Jan. 1915,W.O. 95/4417.
Official History, p.49.
	 Gen. Bingley to MacMunn 18 Nov. 1925,CAB
45/78.
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But Maxwell's subordinates were not nearly so cautiously minded as
Lord Kitchener might have hoped. In fact, for a time, while the enemy
appeared to have halted in the middle of the Sinai the British seriously
contemplated taking action themselves. 	 General Bingley suggested that
if the Turks remained stationary 'it will be as well in due course to go
out and attack one or other of his detachments.' ' Moreover, General
Birdwood went to see Maxwell and asked f or permission to march one
division about five miles east of Ismailia so as to meet the advancing
Ottoman force head on or take it in the flank if it went north or south
of this position. 10 Meanwhile, even the Secretary of State had become
dissatisfied with his own guide-lines; at the War Council on 28 January
1915 he suggested an attack by sea on Gaza, on the Syrian coast, if the
Turks continued their advance. 1 These plans and discussions
demonstrate that it is wrong to assume, as has been done, that an
'active defence was never contemplated' by the Force in Egypt along the
Canal in January and February 1915. 12
As for the Turkish force that had halted, and so confused Cairo, it
was nominally under the command of Djemal Pasha - the supreme commander
of the entire province of Syria - but in reality executive power lay
with Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, a German officer of impressive
ability. Fortunately for the British, however, these two men found
each other's company hard to stomach and their mutual dislike cannot
have assisted the implementation of their plan8. 19
'Notes on Situation,'	 27 Jan. 1915 by A.H. Bingley,W.O. 95/4360.
Gen. Wilson approved of this plan.
10 Notes by Birdwood on conversation with Maxwell,
	 Birdwood papers
138 (ii).
11	 War Council meeting 28 Jan. 1915,CAB 42/1/26. 	 This strategy had
been posed before the war. 	 See 'The Question of military action
in or near the Sinai Peninsula' 5 May 1906,W.O. 106/42 C3/13B.




'Note on the intentions of the enemy' 11 Feb. 1915,W.O. 157/689.
Cairo picked up evidence of this quarrel between the two men.
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The expeditionary force itself consisted of about 20,000 men with some
field artillery and a battery of heavy guns, which would prove a real
nuisance to the defences of the Canal. ''	 But its real intentions
remain somewhat unclear - even now. The official aim was to capture
Egypt and Djemal Fasha made much of this by giving his army the
appearance of a crusading force on its way to liberate their fellow
Moslems in Egypt from the yoke of Christian oppression. '
	 And yet
this was by no means the full story, since DJenal's colleagues in
were extremely dubious about his prospects of success while the
Germans attached to his force feared a disaster; and even he himself
had little hope of success. 16
The Turks did, on the other hand, have what they believed to be one
advantage - a sympathetic population in Egypt. As we have already seen,
there had been attempts in 1914 by the enemy to enlist the support of
Egyptian popular feeling and now they hoped these would bear fruit.
Unfortunately, there had been a development in Egypt that now made such
an eventuality increasingly unlikely.
	 The arrival of the Australians
and New Zealand contingents in December 1914 had a remarkable impact in
the country; according to one officer these men so 'completely
overawed' the Egyptians by their appearance and indiscipline that their
continued presence made any serious trouble most unlikely. "
" Official History, p.51.
'	 F.G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany. Austria and the
diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance. 1914-1918 (London,1970), p.99.
'	 Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish statesman. 1913-1919 (London,
no date), p.l54.	 For German opinion see 'Turkish Invasion of
Egypt.	 Summary of news since 7 Jan. 1915.' 	 20 Jan. 1915,W.O.
157/689.
'" Notes by Gen. Blng].ey 23 Oct. 1925,CAB 45/78.
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Since a rising in Egypt rapidly proved out of the question, the
Turks found themselves having to adopt more limited aims. These
involved making a sort of reconnaissance in force to test out the
defences, keep London's attention fixed on the Canal and even try to
do some serious damage to the tenability of the British position
along the Canal by attempting to blow up the Sweet Water Canal and
so deprive the defending troops of fresh water.18 They also hoped to
use their heavy artillery to sink Allied shipping in the canal and
so block the great waterway as a&vital line of communication for the
British Etnpire. 19
 The Turks, no doubt aided by their German friends,
also seriously considered how best to cross the Canal in order to
hold both sides af it while the maximum amount of damage could be
inflicted; according to a. later British report on the enemy's
preparations for this operation, using rafts and pontoons, 'great
attention' was paid to detail.20
The Turkish expedition against the Canal in February 1915 ought
not to be lightly dismissed as a 'fiasco' that 'never had the least
21
chance of succeeding', therefore, as some later argued.
	 In fact,
this attack presented the British authorities in Egypt with real
difficulties, as we shall see, and General Sir Archibald Murray even
believed that it offered the Turks 'more possible prospect of
success' in their campaign aganst Egypt than at any other time
during the war.22
18 G. Bell to Cromer 29 Nov. 1915, WO 79/6k. The Official History
(p.36) is mistaken when it claims there was no evidence of the
Turkish troops carrying explosives.
19 Captured Turkish Army Order No. 22, WO 95/kkl7.
20 'Technical report on Turkish attempted crossing Sues Canal
between Toussoum and Serapeum February 1915', WO 95/k360.
21 Robertson, I, p.1k8.
22 Lecture at Aldershot by Murray 26 Feb. 1936, Murray papers
79/k8/3.
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THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE
Kress von Kressenstein finally launched his attack in the early
hours of 3 February 1915. The main assault came upon the Canal just
below Toussoum, between Lake Tiinsah and Serapeum, while there was a
diversionary move against the ferry post at Ismailia to the north.
Although the Turks failed to achieve surprise at Toussoum,they had gone
to great efforts to obtain this and it was largely the disobedience of
their own troops, and not the vigilance of the defenders, that prevented
it. 23 On reaching the eastern bank of the Canal some of their troops
tried to cross it by launching the pontoons and rafts they had brought
f or this purpose;
	 but the fire of the 62nd Punjabis and a Egyptian
battery rapidly made this very difficult. Nonetheless, showing
considerable bravery, the Ottoman troops paddled three of these craft
across the Canal to the other bank; and yet it was all to no avail for
these men were soon either all dead or captured. In spite of this
setback the enemy had not given up,f or as the sun began to rise they
started a major attack against Toussoum; this assault was defeated by
the combination of a British counter-attack over the Canal and the fire
power of Allied warships that had collected in the Canal in order to
supplement Maxwell's defences1 24 Meanwhile, at Ismailia - though the
attack at this point was only a diversion - the Turkish heavy artillery
began to cause considerable problems for the warships; in fact, two of
them came under such heavy fire that they had to take evasive action
and it was not until the offending enemy howitzer had been located and
silenced that ' a serious danger' to the Canal was removed. 2e
23 Captured Turkish Army Order No.21 21 Feb. 1915 1 W.O. 95/4417. The
troops were ordered to march in silence but they started to shout
as they attacked.
24 It is possible to follow the activities of the British ships
involved in some detail by reference to their logs in the Public
Record Office. See, f or example, that of 1114S 'Swiftsure' 3 & 4
Feb. 1915,ADM 53/62022.
2S	 Official History, p.44.
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But by the middle of the afternoon of 3 February the attack was actually
coming to an end, though this was not immediately obvious to the
defenders, since the Turks continued to shell Toussoum, for example,
until 2 p.m. These, then, are the bare facts of the battle for the
Canal in February - but the basic events of that day conceal the very
serious problems faced by General Wilson during the engagement.
This action was rio picnic for the Force in Egypt and, although
there Is no mention of it elsewhere, the British were nearly seriously
embarrassed. The fighting around Toussoum was fierce and even the
official account admits that 'casualties among the defenders began to
mount up.' 28	 These casualties were almost exclusively Indian on the
British side and became a source of some anxiety to Wilson and his
subordinate commanders. For one thing, the hospital units of the
Indian army proved quite incapable of dealing even with this limited
number of wounded because of 'shortage and defects of equipment.' 27
Still more worrying for the authorities was the nature of the wounds
themselves, for many of these bore all the classic hall-marks of having
been self-inflicted, since 'the proportion of those wounded in the left
hand' was 'very large'. 26 According to an India Office report upon
this very subject if a right-handed soldier shoots himself he will
usually do so in his left hand, and 'there is an extraordinary well
marked preponderance of wounds of the hand in certain classes of
fighting.' 29
26 Ibid., p.4. 1 The Official History gives a good account of the
battle itself (pp.37-52) but makes no mention of any anxiety about
the British troops engaged.
27	 W.D. No.5 Indian General Hospital 12 Feb. 1915,W.O. 95/4743.
26 W.D. No.8 Indian General Hospital 12 Feb. 1915,W.O. 95/4743.
29 
'An analysis of 1,000 wounds and injuries received in action with
special reference to the theory of self-infliction' by Col. Seton,
L/MIL/ 17/5/2402.
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Clearly, therefore, Indian troops were not performing well under fire in
Egypt and the India Office admitted in 1918 that there had been
trouble' with some of their troops in Egypt in 1915. ° The extent to
which these problems amongst the Indian troops influenced the British
high command can be shown by General Bingley's later assertion
that anxiety about the uncertain loyalty and fighting-spirit of these
men caused Wilson to be most cautious in any serious pursuit of the
retreating enemy forces. '
3°	
'Employment of Pathans in Palestine' by Gen. Barrow 7 Feb. 1918,
L/NIL/5/733.
31	 Gen. Bingley to McMunn 18 Nov. 1925,CAB 45/78.
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THE FAILURE TO PURSUE THE RETREATING ENEMY FORCE
One major point at issue concerning the Turkish attack upon the
Canal is whether Maxwell missed a chance to inflict a more serious
defeat upon his opponents. There was certainly a feeling running
through all the ranks of the Force in Egypt immediately after the battle
that the invaders had been 'very cheaply let off and might have been far
more effectively cut up as they retreated.' 32	 Naturally1 Sir John
himself was not unaware of this air of criticism and it still bothered
him exactly a year later;	 nevertheless1 he felt the complaints were
unfair because he considered that he had faithfully executed the
instructions given to him by Lord Kitchener before the battle. This
line of argument has been followed by at least one historian who claimed
that the Secretary of State for War ought to take the reponsibility for
the British failure in February because he ordered Maxwell to avoid a
serious reverse. 3d
In order to make an accurate assessment of this matter we need to
examine briefly the course of events after the battle died down on the
afternoon of 3 February 1915. On the morning of the following day the
British troops holding positions around Toussoum were genuinely
astonished to discover that the Turks had slipped away in the night.
Now, it would seem, was the time for Maxwell to counter-attack by
pursuing in strength a defeated and demoralised enemy struggling back
across the Sinai.
32	 R. Storre to Fitzgerald 12 Feb. 1915,PRO 30/57/47.
Maxwell to Henry Wilson 8 Feb. 1915,Henry Wilson papers 73/1/20.
C.R.N.F.Cruttwell, A History of the Great War. 1914-1918. 	 2nd. ed.
(cx<eora, 1936), p.35l: 'Maxwell... was hampered by Kitchener's
instructions.'
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Orders were, in fact, issued for a reconnaisance in force to be
made on 5 February from Ismailia; unfortunately this never took place
because information gained from Turkish prisoners caused General Wilson
to believe that 'considerable reinforcements of the enemy were expected
and might be at hand.' The problem was that the British were
convinced Kress would attack again and in greater strength with heavier
guns. The cause of this miscalculation was due to two factors:
firstly,Wilson's staff simply could not accept that the Turks would come
such a distance only to try one attack on the Canal; secondly, and more
importantly, the French seaplanes which Maxwell relied upon as his only
truly reliable source of information as to enemy troop movements
suddenly broke down s so that a large concentration at Beersheba went
unnoticed. The existence of this concentration of enemy troops so
far in the rear proved that Kress had not committed his reserves and,
therefore, the inevitable conclusion must be that he did not intend to
make a second attack; but Sir John knew none of this. The British
were further hindered in their attempt to gain accurate information as
to the movements of the Turkish forces by a dust storm on the day of the
battle and a ridge 12 miles to the east of the Suez Canal that obscured
all further observation and allowed Kress to move his men to fresh
positions undetected. It is not hard to see why Maxwell might have
seen the enemy's retreat as a ruse designed to draw his forces out of
their prepared positions and into the open before they came face to face
with a second attack.
Field Operations No. O.G.18 report by A. Wilson 11 Feb. 1915,W.O.
33/796. The Official History (p.49) incorrectly gives the date
for this planned reconnaissance as 6 Feb. 1915.
W.D. No.10 Field Company 2nd Q.V.O. Sappers and Miners 4 Feb. 1915,
W.O. 95/4410. Diary entry reads: 'The G 0 C is now acting on the
assumption that... the enemy will probably return shortly with
heavier guns.'
Precis No. A.H. 223/55/G4 5 Feb. 1915,W.0. 95/4360.
Maxwell to Kitchener 4 Feb. 1915,W.O. 33/731.
P.G. Elgood, Egypt and the army (London, 1924), p. 136.
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Since the situation was by no means clear and his troops had nothing
other than bottles to carry water for operations in the desert he
decided 'to take no risks'. '° This, then, would seem to be the extent
of the influence of Kitchener's instructions in February 1915; they
made an already unpromising situation seem possibly threatening if any
rapid offensive action was taken by British forces in the Sinai against
an enemy whose size and location could not be accurately calculated.
We should not be surprised, consequently, that the Official History
exonerates Maxwell of any blame in this affair. '
But, unfortunately f or Maxwell's reputation as a military
commander, this is not the end of the matter by any means. Sir John
can be criticized for his choice of officer to command at the Canal.
Although officially he was full of praise for General Wilson's conduct
in the battle, in private his opinion was somewhat different. 42 He
seems to have expressed his true feelings on the matter in a letter to
Callwell who passed on the information to General Robertson in France:
'Maxwell wrote me privately that with a little more push on the part of
the general on the spot, the whole of the Ottoman force which made the
attack on the Canal... would have been bagged, or at all events would
have lost all its guns and impedimenta.' 43
° Notes by Maxwell on attack on CanalCAB 45/79.
'	 Official History, p.49.
42 Maxwell to War Office 16 Feb. 1915,W.O. 33/796.
Caliwell to Robertson 15 Apr. 1915Robertson papers 1/8/20.
Interestingly enough, the possibility of Maxwell intervening rapidly, or
even of Wilson making a sudden decision to pursue, may be largely
academic, for Turkish artillery fire cut the telegraph and telephone
lines on the western bank of the Canal so that communication between
Ismailia, the site of Wilson's HQ, and Toussoum was impossible; under
such conditions it is hard to believe that the Indian cavalry could have
been ordered to move in time. ' Perhaps, therefore, much of the cause
of the British failure to do more damage to Kress von Kressestein's
force in February was due to a faulty command-structure: Maxwell, the
senior officer, remained at Cairo while his subordinate was left to
fight a battle of vital importance to Egypt;	 in these circumstances
Wilson was hardly likely to take any chances without being sure of his
chief's support. In a remarkable way these problems presaghe
difficulties confronted by General Murray once he began the advance into
the Sinai in 1916 and, it could be argued, much of the failure of
British military policy in this region up to June 1917 was due to an
inability to solve the problem of command: both Maxwell and Murray
struggled with the issue and never really found an acceptable solution.
We might, therefore, be a little more charitable in our evaluation of
General Maxwell's performance in February 1915 and agree with Lord
Cromer, who remarked: 'Maxwell is a very good fellow... But his
military achievements when the Turks made their attack were certainly
not remarkable.'
Notes on draft chapters by Bingley,CAB 45/78.
Cromer to Balfour 12 Dec. 1915WO 79/64.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE
In the immediate aftermath of the battle the British appeared to
have much to be thankful for. 	 For example, it soon became clear that
the Turks had received a 'severer defeat' than was first thought!
Although the enemy's casualties in the battle itself were not high,
their losses incurred through desertion were, and the retreat became
chaotic as the expedition struggled back to Syria. ° The incident was
a blow to Turkish prestige, moreover, which made things a good deal
easier for Maxwell in Egypt.
On the other hand, Kress and his Turkish soldiers did not leave the
vicinity of the Canal empty-handed. For one thing, he and his men had
proved to the world that they could cross the Sinai and mount a serious
attack upon the British position8 along the Canal; in London and Egypt,
consequently, attention in the future would have to be given to the
possibility of a second advance in the Sinai which might be on an even
larger scale. Kress von Kressenstein certainly believed that his
expedition increased British anxiety over the security of Egypt and even
kept in that country troops who might otherwise have been used elsewhere
- especially in France.
'	 Cumberbatch to Said Pasha Shoucair 22 Feb. 1915, CAB 37/126/19.
50 Maxwell to Kitchener 7 Feb. 1915,WO 159/13. 	 The Official History
(p.SO) estimates the Turkish losses at over 2,000.
'	 Grey to McMahon 8 Feb. 1915.
Kress von Kressenstein, art,cit., p.505,
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He was probably correct; for example, at the War Council meeting of 24
Februry 1915 Kitchener expressed the opinion that another attack upon
Egypt should be expected, while Lord Haldane suggested - surely as a
result of recent events - that the country ought to become a great
'place d' armes' for British troops. Whet 18 more, at the same meeting
the Secretary of State for War decided that a brigade of Indian troops
he had promised for Mesopotamia could not be spared from Egypt after
all. This decision infuriated General Barrow at the India office
who believed that 'the situation in the Persian Gulf and India demanded
more reinforcements.' '
Perhaps still more worrying f or the British - though they did not
realise it at the time - was the false impression they seemed to have
gained of the Turkish infantry from the battle. In the subsequent
reports on the action circulated to the War Council great stress was
laid upon the effectiveness of the naval gunfire employed which, it was
claimed, 'contributed in no small measure, both morally as well as
practically, to the success of these operations.' Such arguments
seemed to be substantiated by intelligence reports from Syria which
stressed the 'very great effect' caused by the shell fire of the ships
and field artillery of the Suez Canal Defences amongst the Turkish
troops.
War Council meeting 24 Feb. 1915,CAB 42/1/42.
Barrow to Curzon 22 Feb. 1915,	 Curzon papers Eur 1455 F 112/114a.
'Defence of the Suez Canal. 	 Narrative of events 25 Ian. - 8 Feb.
1915.'	 Mar. 1915,CAB 37/125/15.
Report from French Admiral, 	 Syrian Coast 28 Apr. 1915,WO 157/690.
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In spite of these obvious facts, however, the general opinion amongst
the higher ranks of the Force in Egypt after the events of 3 February
1915 was that Indian troops, under British officers, were 'in every way
superior to the class of Turkish troops which have so far been brought
against them.' 59 We should not be surprised, as a result, that in
London Caliwell now believed that the Turks were 'not fighting at all
well.' °
Since there was already a body of opinion in existence from pre-war
days amongst the British military establishment that considered the
Turkish army of questionable value the experiences along the Canal
appeared to confirm, and, indeed, strengthen such views. Moreover
there is strong evidence to suggest that the somewhat misleading
experience at the Canal tended to depreciate still further London's
opinion of the fighting value of the Turkish army and, consequently,
caused the British to underestimate what Ottoman forces might be capable
of doing at Gallipoli.
GOC, No. 1 Section, Canal Defences to Chief Staff Officer, Canal
Defences 25 Mar. 1915W.O. 95/4360.
° Caliwell to Robertson 15 Apr. 1915, 	 Robertson papers 1/8/20.
61	 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli I (London, 1929),
pp.65 & 135.
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EGYPT, GALLIPOLI AND SYRIA: FEBRUARY - AUGUST 1915
'There is always a multitude of reasons both in favour of doing a thing
and against doing it. The art of debate lies in presenting them; the
art of life lies in neglecting ninety-nine hundredths of them.'
Mark Rutherford
EGYPT AND THE START OF THE GALLIPOLI OPERATIONS
On 20 February 1915 Maxwell was officially informed that a naval
squadron had begun to bombard the Turkish ports in the Dardanelles with
the intention of trying to force the straits and strike at the Ottoman
capital. General Maxwell now found himself ordered to prepare a force
of some 30,000 Australian and New Zealand troops should the naval attack
require more infantry support than the 2,000 Marines already assigned to
the expedition. ' Thus the stage was set for Egypt's role in the coming
months: supporting the operations at Gallipoli. But this was not
exclusively the case, and nor were these months without interest
strategically because some attention was again given to the coast of
Palest inS.
Initially the British in Egypt were enthusiastic about an attempt
upon the Dardanelles for it seemed to them that such an operation would
draw enemy troops away from the Canal and so make another attack on the
country in the east less likely. 2 Those with a nose f or the political
atmosphere in Egypt could also s,netlthe benefits of a success at the
Dardanelles which would impress the Egyptian population to the extent
that they might not cause any trouble in the future. 	 Unfortunately,
those hopes were to be dashed.
1 Official History, pp. 54-55.2 Clayton to Wingate 3 Mar. 1915, Wingate papers 134/3/1.
• McMahon to Nicoleon 8 Mar. 1915,FO 800/377.
The failure of a full naval assault at the Dardanelles on 18 March
1915 convinced General Hamilton, the commander of the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force, which had been formed f or action at Gallipoli, that
a major amphibious assault was going to be needed if these straits were
ever to be forced. The consequences of this decision proved monumental
f or Maxwell and his officers, for it soon became apparent that Egypt
would now act as the main base f or these troops, and by the end of March
the MEF began to land in the country.
Egypt simply was not equipped to cope with this fresh influx of
troops, especially since everything had to be done so rapidly. Many of
the units of the MEF needed to be disembarked in the country and then
re-embarked in preparation f or the coming landings almost immediately.
Inevitably chaos ensued at Alexandric as one officer admitted: 'There
have been several cases of over-carriage of stores destined for Egypt
both from England and India, though considering the situation of Egypt
this is not to be wondered at.' ' Problems like these were often caused
by the fact that many ships' officers did not know who, or indeed
what, was actually on board their ships. But matters were made still
worse by the subsequent over-crowding of the harbour at Alexandria which
meant embarkation dates were often delayed while the troops themselves
even missed their rations. S However, probably the worst chaos of
all was caused by the War Office itself when it decided to change its
orders or when those orders never reached the units concerned; for
example, because of confusion of this very kind, some Australian troops
left Egypt without their ammunition. •
In reality, Egypt was far from ideal as a military base.	 The
country offered all the traditional temptations to which the soldier
4	 'Sea Transport' by Quartermaster Genera]., Ismailia, 29 March 1915,
W.O. 95/4417.
I W.D. G.Branch. Army HQ Egypt. 6-7 Apr. 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
Ibid,1 May 1915. The (ast Lancashire Division's transport was left
in Egypt because of a sudder change in orders.
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usually succumbs: alcohol was freely available and often appeared to be
drugged, and prostitutes abounded, which caused some to demand more
energetic action from the authorities who did not appear to be taking
these problems seriously enough. Moreover, the 'strangeness' of Egypt
seemed to fascinate the troops and made them much harder to control.
The Australian troops were particularly guilty when it came to street
disturbances and it was not uncommon for the Force in Egypt's HQ to
record the following when reporting such incidents, 'Australians chiefly
implicated'.
Nor was the Egyptian climate ideal for good training. Poor roads
in a hot and dusty country sapped the morale of the soldiers who had to
march from their ships. These conditions were not appreciated by the
lower ranks and they were quite ready to let their officers know what
they thought: 'The cream of the British Army is getting bloody well
curdled' was one comment picked up by General Marshall, for example.
• Marching in heat was, in fact, the least of the problems, for there
was always the fear of disease, a fear that was a constant source of
anxiety to Maxwell, who was only too aware of the feeble nature of his
Indian troops who seemed to become infected by some illness or other on
a regular basis. 10
G. Thornton, With the Anzacs in Cairo: the tale of a greoXfight
(London, 1918) pp. 66 and 105. D. Doul, With the Anzacs in Egypt
(Sydney, 1916) p. 22.
S	 2 Apr. 1915,W.0. 95/4360. See also W.3, Deputy Assistant Adjutant
General Suez Canal Defences 18 Feb. 1915, W.0. 95/4417. 	 New
Zealand troops could cause trouble, 	 o, as on this day when they
ecame involved in an affray on the Canal at El Kubri. For more
etails on this subject generally see K. Fewster, 'The Wazza riots,
1915', Journal of the Australian War Memorial,IV (1984) pp. 47-53.
W. Marshall, Memories of four fronts (London, 1929), p.51.
10 GOC Army of Occupation
	 Egypt to C in C India 6 May 1915
L/MIL/17/5/3900.
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TENSION BETWEEN MAXWELL AND HAMILTON
On 24 April 1915 the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force launched
itself in an amphibious assault upon the Ga]lipoli Peninsula.
Meanwhile, in Egypt the facilities for supporting the MEF had started to
take on a degree of permanence. Brigadier-General McGrigor was made
commander of the MEF's own base in the country; but this decision in
itself was not likely to lead to successful co-operation with the Force
in Egypt. This was largely due to the possible confusion likely to be
caused by such a scheme, since McGrigor naturally received his orders
from Hamilton and yet his command was situated in a country under the
jurisdiction of Maxwell. McGrigor himself later admitted that it was a
'curious arrangement' and yet it worked 'extraordinarily well' because
of all the help given to him by Maxwell. 11 Remarkably, therefore, this
became an example of a most poorly-designed scheme of command that was
made to work by the good-will of the officers involved, a most unusual
occurrence in the history of British military policy in Egypt, as we
shall discover as our account continues.
Although McGrigor and Maxwell co-operated successfully, the same
cannot be said for Hamilton and Maxwell. Their failure was probably
largely due to the divergence in their respective objectives: Sir rohn
was always aware of the need to maintain the security of Egypt, while the
Commander in Chief of the MEF saw any move in this direction involving
the retention of troops in Egypt as an action that would deprive him of
much-needed reinforcements at Gallipoli. Officially, of course, there
is little evidence of the stormy relationship that developed between the
two men. The Official History, for example, talks only of the 'valuable
assistance proffered by Maxwell in so many directions' on behalf of the
11 McGrigor to MacMunn 3 Aug. 1924,CAB 45/79. The Official History
(pp. 56-57) overlooks the personal aspect behind the success of
this scheme.
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MEF. In fact, even in the private correspondence between the two
generals. Hamilton often praised Maxwell for his support, even though he
was plainly frustrated by the latter's attitude. '
One of the most important issues that helped to sour the
relationship between these two men was the number of troops In Egypt.
As early as 25 March Hamilton actually described Egypt as 'stiff' with
troops and asked for some more of them to assist his operations.
Moreover, throughout his time in command of the MEF he found himself
having to remind Sir John that all available evidence suggested the
Turks had moved most of their troops to the Dardanelles so that he need
not be too concerned about the defence of Egypt. 1, In the end,
Hamilton became embittered towards Maxwell because of the lack of
support that he believed had been forthcoming from Egypt for his
operations. Writing in 1917 he argued that if one extra Indian brigade
then in Egypt had been made available for the first landings at
Gallipoli then these might have succeeded, but as this unit had not been
despatched until too late these attacks failed. t After the war Sir
Ian accused Maxwell of having 'played all he knew on Kitchener's weak
point, his love of Egypt' so that he could keep troops from Gallipoli
and in Egypt. This second charge can be substantiated to a certain
extent, for Maxwell did admit after the war that his task in Egypt was
made much easier by Kitchener upon whom he knew he could always rely
for adequate troops to defend the country. •, Hamilton even became
convinced, what is more, that the Secretary of State f or War
deliberately treated Maxwell and himself as equals in order that his own
Influence upon the conduct of the operations In the region was not In
1* Official History, p. 116.
'1 See, for example, Hamilton to Maxwell 23 May 1915, Hamilton papers
5/12.
14 Hamilton to Kitchener 29 Mar. 1915, Hamilton papers 5/1.
Hamilton to Maxwell 8 June 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
1	 Hamilton to Nevinson 14 Aug. 1917, Hamilton papers 32/1/2.
17 Hamilton to Churchill 8 Feb. 1922, Hamilton papers 1/15.
'S Notes by Maxwell on draft chapters of Official History,CAB 45/79.
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any way diminished: 'Kitchener liked to run the show himself and for
that reason kept Maxwell and myself equal on purpose so that things must
be referred to him'. t A comment such as this may help to explain why
Kitchener was so enthusiastic at the end of 1915 for a system of dual-
command to be adopted In Egypt even though most of his military advis•rs
were adamantly opposed to the plan.
To be fair to both Maxwell and Kitchener the Issue did not seem
quite so clear-cut from their perspective. For one thing, it was not
easy to push troops to Gallipoli because of the chaos in the Egyptian
ports. Moreover, once the transport ships had left Alexandria, Maxwell
had no idea who was responsible for them or their safety until they
reached Hamilton' s command! ° Nor was Hamilton aware of the
problems that faced Sir John in Egypt.
While the MEF struggled at Gallipoli, the military authorities In
Egypt were concerned about the lack of men available early in May to
patrol the west bank of the Suez Canal. This was a very real problem,
for only with adequate patrolling could the small Turkish raiding
parties, armed with mines and seeking to block the Canal, be stopped,
and it was no small task since the length of the front at the Canal was
some 87 miles. 21 As a result, once Hamilton's demands for troops
increased In both their regularity and intensity Maxwell began to show
his frustration,as Is apparent In a letter of 4 July 1915: 'You have
bled me to the very limit of safety, and I have no margin left for
ordinary casualties'. 23 In fact, by the end of the same month, Sir
John was actually being ordered to give up his last formation of British
troops In Egypt. 2$
19 HamIlton to Churchill 28 June 1923, Hamilton papers 1/15.
° Maxwell to Hamilton 2 June 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
ai	 MaJ.-Gen. Wilson to G.S. Army HQ 1 May 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
Maxwell to Hamilton 4 July 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
3 Official History, p. 59.
8But Maxwell's difficulties were not purely military. The eyes of
the world seemed to be upon the events at Gallipoli and a defeat, or
indeed any failure, there might cause the population of Egypt to re-
consider their loyalties, or at least so argued many in London and
Cairo. This explains why Kitchener flew into such a rage and claimed
that there would be a possible revolt in Egypt when he learnt that the
largest battleship at the Dardanelles, HMS 'Elizabeth', was to be
withdrawn. 24 Meanwhile, the lack of any substantial reports reaching
Egypt as to the progress of operations on Gallipoli caused McMahon some
anxiety, for it appeared as if defeats were being concealed. Egypt,
therefore, started to issue its own communiqués about events at
Gallipoli in order to quell any such thoughts. Unfortunately for
Hamilton, however, these tended to be more optimistic than events at the
peninsula really merited, with the result that he became concerned that
his own credibility with the MEF would ccrseq1uer+ty sttffer. 28
Maxwell also had other anxieties.	 In May and June he received
reports that trouble could be expected from Sayed Ahmed, the Senussi, to
the west who had received German agents. As it turned out there was
no trouble with the Senussi for the present, but Sir John remained most
concerned about the leader and told Kitchener so: 'I am most concerned
about the Senussi... There is no doubt that if he declared against us,
we would have an infinity of trouble, and no one can foresee where it
would end.' Moreover, problems in the Sudan had also arisen and,
although Sir Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar, dealt with them most ably,
Maxwell had promised to send any troops if needed. Finally, in June he
lost the 28th Indian Brigade because the Indian Government wanted to
send an expedition against Sheikh Said, 100 miles west of Aden.
24 War Council meeting 14 May 1915, CAB 42/2/19.
28 McMahon to Grey 10 May 1915, FO 800/48.
26 Hamilton to Maxwell 20 June 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
27	 9 and 10 May 1915, W.0. 95/4360.
Maxwell to Kitchener 24 June 1915, PRO 30/57/47.
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EVENTS ON EGYPT' S EASTERN FRONTIER
A serious problem for Maxwell caused by the Gallipoli operations
was the removal of the naval seaplanes at Port Said by the Admiralty. 2
These planes had been the eyes of the Force in Egypt since they had
enabled Sir John to observe ereMy troop movements in the Sinai and
Syria. Although Maxwell did manage to get some more efficient seaplanes
from the French in April there nonetheless was a period of 'blindness
f or Cairo as to Turkish troop movements in March 1915. 30
Maxwell had expected another enemy attack after the one in February
and his lack of accurate information now made him still more cautious.
Moreover, early in April he began to receive reports that suggested
another attack was contemplated by the enemy. Unfortunately such
information was quite incorrect for, as Hamilton consistently argued,
the Turks had begun moving their men north to mass at the Dardanelles
and no serious attack was intended on the Canal at all. According to
the Military Intelligence Office at Cairo the enemy sought to frighten
the British with 'sham attacks' and 'by rumours of great things
impending'. It followed, therefore, that the evidence collected so far
of a coming attack was all part of a Turkish 'bluff' designed to keep as
many British troops in Egypt as possible. Since Diemal Pasha now
only had about 15,000 troops in Syria the best way for him to execute
such a policy was simply to place small units in the Sinai at new
positions which were soon noticed by the British and so give the
impression that fresh troops had entered the desert.
2	 Maxwell to Vice-Admiral Egyptian Waters 13 Mar. 1915., 	 W.O.
95/4360.
30	 Arthur, p. 179.
Intelligence report 8 Apr. 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
Notes on Turkish formations by Military Intelligence Office, Cairo
4 May 1915, W.O. 157/691.
Crewe to Sir F. Bertie 3 July 1915, FO 371/2477/91609. For
examples of new enemy posts discovered in the Sinai see
22 June 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
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In fact, as operations continued at Gallipoli and the drain on both
sides increased there, Diemal found himself having to enlist 'larger
numbers of Arab tribesmen.., to carry on patrolling and communication'
work in the Sinai because of his own shortage of men. '
But the Force In Egypt was not wedded to a purely passive defence
of the Canal. On the contrary, its officers were drawn to more
offensive action in the Sinai by the very Arab tribesmen whom the Turks
had started to enlist. For example, it was known that the Bedouin of
the Sinai all went to El Arish to buy and sell food, with the result
that the enemy gained the benefit of these men's inside knowledge of the
peninsula. Consequently it was suggested that a grain store and bazaar
might be built outside Qantara to attract these nomads so that the
British could gain their friendship and glean all of their expert
knowledge of the desert themselves.
At GHQ in Cairo, moreover, there were those who were not satisfied
with merely enticing Arabs to the Canal. In a paper addressed to
Maxwell and dated 18 March 1915 the following objective of the Force in
Egypt was plainly stated: 'It has now become a question whether we
cannot pursue a somewhat more active policy in our conduct of operations
on the East bank of the Canal.' The reason for wanting to adopt a
more active policy was two-fold: firstly, it was believed this
would 'give confidence to those Arabs who have remained friendly to us';
secondly, such a policy would prevent aggressive patrolling by the enemy
in the Sinai. In order to execute this objective it was argued that a
camel force was needed to patrol the area east of the Canal and a
landing ground would be required so that planes could watch the tracks
in the region. That both these suggestions could best be facilitated
26 July 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
G 0 C	 29 Brigade to C G S	 Canal Defences 5 Mar. 1915,
W.0. 95/4360.
Secret GS/10 A/15 18 Mar.	 1915,	 addressed to Maxwell,
W.0. 95/4360.
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only by a permanent base in the Sinai was the inevitable conclusion.
Although nothing came of these suggestions f or the present due to the
demands of the Gallipo].i operations which denuded Maxwell of the
necessary troops needed for offensive action, they nonetheless
demonstrate that officers in Egypt wanted to move into the Sinai even as
early as March 1915.
Meanwhile events in the Sinai during the period from March to
August 1915 largely consisted in the Turks making a number of raids, of
various sizes, against the Canal and the British responding with the
necessary counter-measures. On 23 March 1915 the enemy advanced with a
force of 400 men to just north of El Kubri (in the southern section of
the Suez Canal). In fact, this was only part of a force of 800
infantry, 1,200 cavalry and some guns encamped 8 miles east of the
Canal. Moreover, at the time the situation seemed more disquieting than
it actually was, since there was also a Turkish force at Nekhl in the
Sinai and it seemed as if these moves could be the preliminaries to a
major assault. A force was despatched to catch the enemy troops who had
appeared at El Kubri but this was unable to move fast enough to cut off
their retreat.
The most important result of this little action was that the
British, once again, failed to catch a retreating force in the Sinai
even though they despatched a force to do just this. The same thing
happened again on 28 April 1915; a force of about 300 Turks and Bedouins
was sighted east of Ismailia Ferry Port but, in spite of good aerial
reconnaissance and a mobile column, it slipped away. Although these
experiences were frustrating, they were not entirely wasted for the
British were starting to learn about operating in the Sinai desert. For
one thing, their experience of marching in the desert convinced some
officers that infantry would have to be nursed in such an environment if
Ibid.
Official HIstory, pp. 61-63. 22-23 Mar. 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
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they were expected to be 'fighting fit' on reaching the enemy's
positions. One officer estimated that his men could not march more
than two miles an hour in the desert, while another argued that his
troops could not cover more than four miles on the same day if an attack
was to be carried out 'with any prospect of success'. The British
were starting to learn just how much of a problem the Sinai Peninsula
was going to be for their troops if they ever attempted serious
offensive operations in the region.
As we have already seen, the Turks did attempt a series of very
small raids against the Canal in this period which were extremely
difficult to counter. What is more, one tactic adopted by the enemy was
to combine a small raid with the movement of a larger force in the Sinai
designed to distract the British and so facilitate the laying of mines
in the Canal by the smaller unit. ° Thanks to these methods
Djemal's men actually succeeded in blocking the Canal for a brief period
when a liner hit one of these mines on 30 June 1915. " This was all
very embarrassing for General Maxwell, since it was one of his briefs
to keep the Canal open and free from enemy interference. In order to
counter these tactics by the enemy the Force in Egypt adopted some
remarkable expedients: for example, one method attempted was actually
to leave any mines located in place in the hope that the Turks would
return to them! 42
Although Maxwell lost the use of most of the warships that had so
nobly assisted him in February to the Dardanelles, there nonetheless
remained some vessels available to bombard enemy positions. 	 French
Col. F.A.Smith to G.S.0. Canal Defences 9 July 1915 and 'comments
on movements on 6,7 and 8 July 1915' by Lt.-Col. LBLow,-
W. 0. 95/4360.
'° 10 Apr. 1915, W.0. 95/4360: 'The movement of the cavalry towards
Qantara had evidently been made to divert attention from the
operations of the mine party.'
"	 Official History, p. 64.
42 31 May - 1 June 1915, W.O. 95/4360.
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ships shelled El Arish on 16 April 1915 and according to subsequent
reports the enemy suffered 'heavy losses of material' in consequence.
This was followed by a similar bombardment of Gaza on the very next day.
In the same month, moreover, British planes bombed Turkish positions in
the Sinai as if to emphasise that Maxwell was not entirely satisfied
with a purely defensive attitude on the part of his forces.
Unfortunately McMahon was none too happy about this offensive action by
the French, for he feared it demonstrated a desire by Paris to press her
political claims to Syria rather than any intention of any serious
military action in the future.
PLANNING TO STRIKE ON THE COAST OF SYRIA
The decision to strike at the Dardanelles indirectly drew more
attention than ever to the coastline of Syria. The reason for this was
fairly straightforward: once London had decided to strike in the
eastern Mediterranean it had to consider what territorial demands it
would make if the expedition was successful and the Ottoman Empire was
defeated, because it was obvious that her allies, France and Russia,
were certain to make sweeping claims. The War Council therefore set
up a committee to draw up what ought to be British desiderata in the
Middle East and it issued its report on 30 June 1915, entitled 'Asiatic
Turkey. Report of a Committee'.	 Upon this committee sat two men who
had an important role to play in British strategy - Hankey and Callwell.
The initiation of this committee naturally created a great deal of
speculation and various departments and individuals started to outline
16-17 Apr.	 1915,	 W.O.	 95/4360.	 Intelligence Bulletin
16 Apr. 1915, W.O. 157/690.
Sir H. McMahon to Foreign Office 16 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2484/30729.
' War Council meeting 10 Mar. 1915, CAB 42/2/5. For full details
see A.S.Klieman, 'British war aims in the Middle East in 1915',
Journal of Contemporary History. III (1968), pp. 237-251.
'Asiatic Turkey.
	 Report of a Committee' 30 June 1915,
CAB 42/3/12.
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what they thought ought to be Britain's territorial desiderata in the
Near East. The Admiralty, for instance, considered it of vital
importance to have a naval base at Alexandretta after the war to counter
possible Russian influence in the Mediterranean. 	 Kitchener also
entered the fray. He, foo 1 advocated Alexandretta as a British
possession and his vision of a post-war defensive scheme for Egypt based
upon the Sinai, with a position on the Syrian coast, bore a striking
similarity to the C.I.D. plans of 1909.	 Churchill even quoted a
German Admiral, Suchow, on 10 March 1915 who had claimed that Germany
'would have gone to war in order to secure Alexandretta alone'.
Meanwhile, Hankey, who had 'decided to remain neutral' about the
importance of the town, produced a factual memorandum upon it and its
possible conversion to a naval base.
However, there was an alternative offered to Alexandretta in these
discussions - Haifa. This town had advantages over Alexandretta: it
was less likely to cause a clash with French interests in the region and
was not so much of a dangerous out-post since it was closer to Egypt.
Herbert Samuel and General Barrow both supported the annexation of Haifa
or Acre and Lloyd George also showed a preference f or Palestine over
Alexandretta. Si
- This debate in London that continued from March until the committee
reported at the end of June naturally helped to keep Alexandretta and
'Alexandretta and Mesopotamia' by Admiralty 17 Mar. 1915, 	 CAB
42/2/11.	 'Alexandretta:	 its Importance as a future base', by
Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson 18 Mar. 1915, CAB 42/2/13.
'Alexandretta and Mesopotamia' by Kitchener 16 Mar.	 1915,
CAB 42/2/10.
	
'	 Wr Council meeting 10 Mar. 1915, op. cit.
Hankey Diary 16 and 17 Mar. 1915, HNKY 1/1. 'Alexandretta'. Note
by Secretary 17 Mar. 1915, CAB 42/2/12.
' 'Palestine' by H.Samuel Mar. 1915, CAB 37/126/1. 'The future
settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia and Arabia' by A.HIrtzel,
14 Mar. 1915. Note by General Barrow 16 Mar. 1915, CAB 42/2/8.
War Council meeting 10 Mar. 1915, op.clt.
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Haifa in the minds of the members of the War Council and the men of the
War Office and Admiralty, even though the operations at Gallipoli
continued to demand more and more attention as they Intensified and did
not produce the Immediate success that they had seemed to offer.
Moreover, even the military questions raised by the actions of the
MEF tended to focus attention on the Syrian coast, for if these had
not been totally successful then the possibility had to be raised
that perhaps further action elsewhere might assist them more effectively
than additional attacks on the peninsula.
Initially there had been talk of using the Alexandretta or Haifa
options as a feint to disguise the move on Gallipoli. For example,
Hankey felt that the first moves of the operations at the Dardanelles
should have been handled in this way:
While the bombardment was commencing the transports ought to have
appeared at some entirely different point on the Turkish coast,
such as Alexandretta or Haifa... Then the troops ought to have come
in as a bolt from the blue.
In fact, Hankey had even gone one step further than this: he had
actually suggested that the MEF might have been embarked and then re-
embarked at Alexandretta or Haifa, all as part of an elaborate feint.
Because he had not been happy with the way in which the early moves
of the Dardanelles attack had been executed, Hankey started to get cold
feet about the entire affair. He therefore tried to influence Admiral
Fisher, the First Sea Lord, to change the destination of the MEF so that
it would go to Haifa, from where Damascus could be captured and the
Turkish army in Syria destroyed. ' Fisher was Impressed by this scheme
52 Hankey to Esher 15 Mar. 1915, Hankey papers 4/7.
Hankey to Crewe 19 May 1915, CAB 63/5.
M.GIlbert, Winston Spencer ChurchilL III (London, 1971), p. 389.
Captain Richmond to Fisher 8 Apr. 1915. Hankey persuaded Richmond
to write to Fisher.
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and suggested it to Churchill, who promptly rejected it. According to
Hankey the War Office were unwilling to consider the proposal because it
would take a very long time to collect sufficient land transport
necessary for such an operation, while it was assumed that far less
transport ought to be required for a landing at Gallipoli.
Fisher and Hankey did not give up, even after the first landings
had been made, however. Fisher was after Churchill's job and he let it
be known that if he became the next First Lord of the Admiralty he would
evacuate Gallipoli and move the troops to Haifa. While Hankey
himself was only too aware of all the logistical problems entailed in
moving entrenched troops at Gallipoli to the coast of Palestine, he felt
it was a risk worth taking: 	 'I have constantly kept in mind the
possibility of transferring the Gallipoli Force to Haifa. I am sure if
Hlndenburg were in Kitchener's place he would do it.' Whether or not
Hindenburg would have taken the gamble we shall never know; but it W86
certainly a risk. Apart from all the problems which the British would
face in executing such an operation, the Turks had not been entirely
idle.	 As early as 1 April 1915 Cairo had	 er+i4eo a troop
concentration at Haifa which they could only explain in terms of enemy
anxiety over a possible Allied landing there. Still worse was to
follow, however; French naval reconnaissance of the Syrian coast
revealed that the Turks had fortified Jaffa, Haifa and Bert so that
'if an Expedition is going to be made in... Syria one must not leave
them [the Turks) time to organise, otherwise large forces will have to
be sent where a small force would have been sufficient a little
earlier.' The opportunity f or a landing at Haifa seemed to be
slipping away; but it should be made clear that these Turkish defences
in Syria were nothing compared to those now organised along the
' Hankey to Crews 19 May 1915, op. cit.
Gilbert, III, p. 452. Fisher to Crews 18 May 1915.
b	 Hankey to Crews 19 May 1915. op. cit.
Intelligence Bulletin.
	
'Present position of Turkish forces.
1 Apr. 1915, W.O. 157/690.
Intelligence Summary 28 Apr. 1915, W.O. 157/690.
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Dardanelles. Moreover, other information also suggested that the Turks
had their eyes very much on the Alexandretta area and feared an attack
there. 60 Nonetheless, Cairo still appeared to believe that both Haifa
and Alexandretta were the 'only two ports worth considering' on the
Syrian coast. 61 Nor were Haifa and Alexandretta the only positions
along the Syrian coast considered for amphibious operations while the
Gallipoli operations were in progress. In Cairo, for instance, plans
were outlined for a landing at Ladakiya (south of Alexandretta) which,
it was hoped, would come as an 'entire surprise' to the enemy. The
theory was that since the coastal defences there were so weak a force of
two mounted divisions and one infantry division could threaten Aleppo,
Hama and places as far as 90 miles inland. Thus, Turkish forces from
the Caucasus and the Dardanelles would have to be diverted to meet the
new threat, while enemy forces in Palestine could be expected to
withdraw so 'enabling the Canal Defence force to move forward without
difficulty and thus relieve altogether the particularly annoying species
of warfare now going on there. 62
The French, too, were starting to look beyond Gallipoli. Early in
May, for instance, the British learnt that two French admirals were
compiling a report advocating the transfer of 30,000 men from the
Dardanelles to Ayas Bay in the region of Alexandretta. They seemed to
be hoping f or a joint expedition with the British and saw the aim of the
scheme to 'cut all communications and so immobilise Turkish forces'. 63
As stalemate continued at the Dardanelles so Hankey, at least, saw
the need to prepare in detail 'some alternative offensive operation' if
complete success was not achieved there. 	 His favourite option remained
60 Daily Intelligence Bulletin by T.E.Lawrence, 3 June 1915,
W.O. 157/692.
'	 Special	 Reports by Intelligence Office,	 Cairo	 1914-1915.
Memorandum on railways in Syria and Mesopotamia, W.0. 157/689.
62 Ibid. Paper on possible expedition to Syria, no date, but probably
the summer of 1915.
63 Wooley to Newcombe 4 May 1915, Clayton papers 693/9/2.
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an attack in Syria since the Turkish forces had largely recoiled upon
Constantinople and Allied forces in the Levant were, he believed, large
enough to occupy Damascus and 'cut off' the whole of Syria and Arabia.
64
These arguments continued to be pressed as the months passed. Some
began to talk of enormous forces being landed in Asia Minor to support
the troops at Gallipoli; this could be done only by bringing large
numbers of fresh men from England and reserves from France and Italy,
and the hope was that such a move would so shock the Turks that they
would capitulate 'without even waiting for the final deathblow'. 65 At
the end of August, however, Hankey, after a visit to the Gallipoli
position, wrote a memorandum in which he suggested a possible
alternative to a withdrawal:
An attractive alternative would be to make a dash into Syria, to
capture Damascus, cut the Hejaz railway, and occupy Syria. The
?ors which had conquered both Bagdad and Damascus would hardly be
without prestige in the East even if they had failed to take
Constantinople itself. 66
Hankey saw the seizure of Damascus as a way of maintaining British
prestige in the East, therefore, if Gallipoli had to be evacuated.
Moreover, according to Cairo there were less than 3,000 men at this city
and it was only used anyway as a training camp. 6 Henry Wilson got
to hear of these suggestions of Hankey but he confided to his diary that
since Hamilton was not in favour of them nothing would come of thea 65
He was correct.
64 Paper by Hankey 16 June 1915 CAB 63/5.
66 
'The	 critical	 urgency	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Campaign'	 by
C.E.Heathcote-Smith, 24 Aug. 1915, CAB 63/9.
60 




'The Turkish Army in Syria and Sinai.
	 Movements of Troops',
Aug. 1915, V.0. 157/694.
60 Henry Wilson Diary 1 Sep. 1915.
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One reason for Hankey's optimism about offensive action In Syria
was his belief that there was 'at no time much enthusiasm for Turkey in
Syria'. ' That the Turks were not popular in Syria had not been lost
on the British and 0$ formulated subsidiary operations or
alternatives to the Dardanelles they hoped for the support of the
indigenous population. And the information they received about the
Syrian peoples was most encouraging. Towards the end of April Egypt
started to obtain reports of Turkish troops being assigned to watch
the Druse tribesmen of the Hauran, and of the Turks even being
'somewhat afraid' of them. '° Moreover, the common opinion was that the
Druse were 'comparatively well armed' and would side with Christian
forces 'If the Allies would help', ?1
Then there were the Armenians. In April the Russians informed the
British that the Armenians offered to send 1,000 men via Canada to
co-operate In any operations in Cilicia undertaken by the Allies. The
offer was politely declined; but this was not the end of the story.
In July an Armenian committee handed General Maxwell a note
saying a volunteer drive had started in the United States to recruit men
for a force to be formed at Cyprus with the intention of landing small
units on the coast of Cilicia to paralyse Turkish communications. The
Armenians said they could gather up to 10,000 men at Cyprus; but they
would need arms, transport and perhaps a small Allied force as well.
Foreign Office reaction to this proposal was a good deal more
favourable: 'The scheme proposed... is not over ambitious and might be
Paper by Hankey 16 June 1915, op. cit.
° Intelligence bulletin 26 Apr. 1915 and Intelligence summary 27 Apr.
1915 ) W.O. 157/690.
71	
'The Druse of Lebanon'	 by	 oseph 0. Salawach,	 no date,
V.0. 157/689.
72 Sir C. Spring Rice to F.O. 24 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2485/4961b and F 0.
to Spring Rice 29 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2485/51438.
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successful, if only in creating a diversion'. Others, too, saw the
advantages of landing trained Armenian irregulars behind enemy lines and
considered that the damage they might do could have some influence upon
the Dardanelles if matters there reached a crisis point.
Unfortunately there were political complications with all of this for
the Egyptian authorities were none too happy about training the
Armenians in Egypt because of its possible impact upon Muslim feeling in
the country. But the idea continued to be raised. Mark Sykes raised
the subject with Maxwell while the former was in Egypt and it now became
clear that all the Armenians wanted was to be armed and trained in
Cyprus and then landed in the Cilicia region so they could then create
disorder amongst the Turkish communications to Syria. Maxwell seemed
keen about this though he was only thinking in terms of small raiding
groups of Armenians. " Meanwhile, reports had reached Cairo that there
were disturbances among the Armenians in Cilicia; unfortunately, when a
French odmiral rescued some of these people and brought them to Egypt
they did not make a very good impression,f or they seemed to do very
little except remain dirty!
McMahon to Grey 27 July 1915 and F.O. minute 5 Aug. 1915,
F. 0. 371/2485/106769.
R.Adelson, Mark Sykes: 	 portrait of an amateur (London, 1975),
p. 189.
A.Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian question. 1915-1923 (London,
1984), p. 92.
Sykes to Maxwell 3 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371/2485/11586.
" Arthur, pp. 218-9. Maxwell to Kitchener 27 Sep. 1915.
Intelligence Summary. The Armenian rising in Jebel Musa. 14 Sep.
1915, W.0. 157/695. Official History, p. 86: 'The Armenians have
virtues, but... most of the refugees were lazy, dirty,
insubordinate and disinclined to undertake any enterprise in the
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CHAPTER 6
THE EVACUATION OF THE DARDANELLES AND FEAR OF
A FRESH ATTACK UPON EGYPT: SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1915
'Then he got some sheets of paper and drew me a
plan of the dispositions of the Turkish forces...
The troops released from Gallipoli wanted a
lot of refitment, and would be slow in reaching
the Transcaucasian frontier, where the Russians
were threatening. The Army of Syria was pretty
nearly a rabble under the lunatic Djemal. There
wasn't the foggiest chance of a serious invasion
of Egypt being undertaken.'
John Buchan, Greenmantle
GALLIPOLI INCREASES THE STRAIN UPON MAXWELL
Although the Suvia Bay landing had not succeeded the Gallipoli
campaign was to drag on until December and it continued to dictate
affairs in Egypt throughout this period. On 11 August 1915, for
example, Kitchener asked Maxwell if the latter could not find more
men for Hamilton from Egypt. Though Maxwell was prepared to do all
he could he started to protest when the War Office offered the MEF
part of the 28th Indian Brigade. His reasons for objecting to the
loss of still more of his garrison were the demands made upon his
men in their defence of the Suez Canal. 2 Indeed, so concerned was
the genera]. by the number of troops he had given up to the MEF that
he told Lord Kitchener he crd his men were living on a bluff in
Egypt. 3 Nor were Maxwell's limited number of troops in especially
good condition. His Indian troops were in a particularly bad way
and in August he complained to India that although some of their men
1 Official History, pp.59-7O.
2 Maxwell to Hamilton 2k Sept. 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
3 Arthur, pp.210-219; Maxwell to Kitchener 27 Sept. 1915.
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had been in Egypt for nearly eight months they had yet to receive
a complete set of new bootel Meanwhile, he also found himself
having to ask India for more medical personnel for other Indian
'4.
units.
In fact Gallipoli was beginning to create an unbearable strain
upon the Egyptian authorities; the problem was not so much the
material demands of the campaign - though these were onerous
enough - as the damage being done to British prestige in the minds
of the population. McMahon feared that the failure at Suvia could
seriously influence the people even though much of the truth was
concealed and little information leaked out, since, with the regular
arrival of wounded at Alexandria from the Peninsula, it was clear
to even the most uninformed observer that all was not going well
for Hamilton's men. 5 Merely finding suitable accommodation for the
wounded caused Maxwell a serious headache; hotels had to be used to
reduce the burden upon existing facilities. 6 But the real problem
caused by these wounded men lay in the stories they spread about
conditions at Gallipoli and the defeats inflicted on the MEF. More-
over, their lenient treatment by the Egyptian medical personnel
engendered bitter feeling amongst the MEF - many of whom had to
fight on, though in a worse condition than men in Egypt who were
subsequently shipped home. 7 In short, a defeated army was starting
to influence affairs adversely.
To Maxwell it seemed as if matters might be coming to a head.
k GOC Egypt to Quartermaster-General, India 9 Aug. 1915,
L/MIL/17/5/3903; W.D. IEF 'G' 3 ifept. 1915, L/MIL/17/5/3953.
5 McMahon to Grey 26 Aug. 1915, FO 800/k8.
6 Maxwell to Hamilton 18 Aug. 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
7 Hamilton to Maxwell 2k Sept. 1915 and Hamilton to Maxwell
1 Oct. 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
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In September an Egyptian Works Battalion in support of the MEF on
the Gallipoli Peninsula mutinied. In itself this may not have been
too serious, although the British saw it as proof of revolutionary
societies being at work amongst the Egyptian population. Of far
importance, however, was the manner in which the military dealt
with the incident, because nine of the men had been shot and seven
wounded on the orders of a British officer. It would be no easy
business to keep the entire affair secret. 8 And all the time while
disconcerting news such as this was reaching Sir John he was
glancing ever more nervously over his shoulder at his western
border, where trouble seemed to be brewing. He became convinced
that the Senussi was in collusion with the Turks, which meant he
could not allow his military strength in Egypt to run down too much.
To cap it all, he fell quite seriously ill early in September.9
Although open hostilities did not break out between the British and
Sayed. Ahmed until the middle of November, from August it was plain
to see what direction affairs were moving in - a fact noted by
Kitchener in London, who was becoming increasingly anxious about
developments both inside Egypt and on her western frontier. 1 ° As
far as the Secretary of State for War was concerned the Senussi
constituted a serious threat to the security of Egypt, especially
were he to time his move to coincide with a Turkish attack upon the
Suez Canal. Kitchener talked openly of 25,000 Arabs being available
to Sayed Ahmed at the Dardanelles Committee in December, when
London's attention was fixed firmly upon the Turkish danger on
Egypt's eastern frontier.11
8 Wingate to Herbert 1k Sept. 1915, Hamilton papers 3/30.
9 Maxwell to Hamilton 8 Sept. 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12.
10 Dardanelles Committee meeting 2k Sept. 1915, CAB k2/3/30.
11 Dardanelles Committee meeting 6 Dec. 1915, CAB k2/6/k.
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Some detail has been given here to the deterioration in the
internal situation in Egypt and on its western border so that the
anxieties of Maxwell and Kitchener for Egypt's security, which may
seem a little foolish in retrospect, can be appreciated more fully.
In many ways, as we have seen, they had good reason to be worried
and their fears undoubtedly added reality to the predictions that
would soon be produced by intelligence officers warning of a major
Turkish assault upon Egypt - predictions that also received
apparent confirmation from the activities of the Senussi.12
Meanwhile, events in September in the Balkans complicated
Egypt's role as a base for the Gallipoli operations still further
and led to a reorganization of the administration of supplies in
the country. The Bulgarian army mobilized with the obvious intention
of attacking Serbia in the rear while that gallant country faced
Austrian forces to the north. The Serbs called for help on the
Greeks, who, in turn, requested the Allies to send troops so that
Greece could provide the necessary support to an embattled Serbia.
The result was yet another Allied campaign; in October British and
French troops began to disembark in Salonica. The effect of this
fresh development upon Egypt was the formation of the Levant Base
by the War Office. This was a reorganized and enlarged version of
the base that had already been created at Alexandria to meet the
requirements of the MEF, the difference being that there was now
the campaign in Macedonia also to consider; in order to prevent
undue friction in Egypt the new base was placed directly under the
12 The emergence of the Senussi as a hostile force to the west of
Egypt in November and the knowledge that Sayed Ahmed was
negotiating with Turkish and German emissaries must have
convinced the British than an attack in the east was likely at
any time, thus creating two fronts to cover - yet this factor
in the evaluation of Turkish strategy by London and Cairo has
largely been ignored. For full details of the history of the
Senussi see E. Evans-Pritchard, The Janusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford,19k9).
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War Office via its commander, Lieutenant- general Altham. While it
is probably correct to say that this piece of reorganization was
'the only way out of the supply business at that time and was
entirely suitable', it caused problems of its own and stored up
difficulties for the future. 13 The great benefit the Levant Base
brought to the distribution of supplies in Egypt was the direct
control of the War Office: it could allocate supplies and stores to
the commanders of the different campaigns (including Egypt) of its
own accord, thus reducing the friction created by the competition
of various generals for the same resources. There remained an
anomaly, however; the Levant Base did not organize the purchase of
local stores in Egypt - the Force in Egypt continued to do this, so
that Maxwell and his men remained the only exception as far as the
Base's jurisdiction was concerned.1k Moreover, with the evacuation
of Gallipoli it ceased to be of such usefulness, and once an
efficient base had been set up at Salonica its job was done; but its
lingering presence in Egypt during December 1915 and the early months
of 1916 caused confusion. General Aitham, writing in December,
concluded that if the Levant Base continued to perform its original
role in Egypt it would mean, in administrative terms at least,
'confusion, misunderstanding and conflict of erders... a tangle
which will lead to disaster.'15
13 G. MacMunn, Behind the scenes in many wars (London, 1930),
p.178.
1k Official History, p.75.
15 'Memorandum on administrative responsibility for the armies
operating in the Levant' by Aitham 28 Dec. 1915, Robertson
papers 1/35/2/2.
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ANXIETY ABOUT A TURKISH ATTACK ON EGYPT
It was inevitable that the policymakers in London would have
to consider the question of the evacuation of the MEF from Gallipoli
if no further successes were achieved on the Peninsula or even
seemed likely. Kitchener finally decided to face reality and on 11
October 1915 he asked Hamilton what he considered would be his
losses if he were ordered to evacuate his positions. Events now
moved rapidly, for on 15 October the unfortunate Hamilton received
instructions to return home, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Monro
being appointed to replace him.
In part, the decision seriously to consider evacuation had
been forced on the Secretary of State by changes in the strategic
situation precipitated by German successes in the Balkans. Now that
Bulgaria had entered the war and the Serbians had been forced away
from the Constantinople railway it suddenly became much easier for
Berlin to stiffen the Turkish armies with reinforcements and modern
equipment; seen in this light, the MEF appeared most vulnerable
perched on the Gallipoli Peninsula.16 But Egypt looked equally at
risk should the MEl be withdrawn, for the huge numbers of Turkish
troops concentrated around the Dardanelles would suddenly be freed
to take part in a fresh attack upon the Sues Canal. 17 This, of
course, partly explains why there remained a strong body of opinion
which advocated holding the MEl in position and so avoiding further
damage to British prestige. Others argued, nevertheless, that to
16 Memorandum by W. S. Churchill 21 Aug. 1915, CAB 12/3/31.
17 Dardanelles Committee meeting 6 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/3.
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cut one's losses and. get out before being destroyed was surely the
lesser of two evils in terms of the possible damage to British
prestige: 'If we go now, we can "save face", for we can plead the
Balkan situation... If the Balkan situation goes against us, and
we are driven out, then our face is blackened throughout the
East.' 18
Prospects seemed none too rosy for Egypt in October 1915,
therefore. But there was worse to come. Information available to
Maxwell suggested that the enemy's communications had been improved.
Much work had been done on the railway in Asia Minor, although the
gaps round the Gulf of Iskanderun were still not filled. The real
change, however, had come in Palestine, where the enemy had
directed a braich railway line from Affula to Jerusalem southwards;
by October it had reached Beersheba and from there a road was
constructed to El Auja on the Egyptian border. This railway was only
a single line of narrow gauge, but - to the British, at least - it
seemed greatly to increase the importance of Beersheba as a base for
an attack upon the Suez Canal. If Gallipoli were evacuated, this new
line could present 'a serious menace', it was believed.19
This railway played a remarkable role in the formation of
British strategy in Egypt and the Sinai quite out of proportion to
its actual military significance. At the meeting of the Dardanelles
Committee on 2k September 1915 the Prime Minister appeared most
agitated by newspaper reports about this very line: 'he had read an
alarming statement as to the construction by the Turks of the desert
18 Lovat Fraser to Curzon 6 Oct. 1915, Curzon papers MSS Eur
Fl 12/109.
19 Official History, pp.76-77.
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railway.., and that, according to the newspaper, it was said to be
complete to within 30 miles of the Egyptian frontier.' 2° Asquith's
information was somewhat inaccurate, as General Caliwell explained,
since the railway only reached to Beersheba, but this report came at
an awkward time. The members of the Dardanelles Committee had
already expressed concern for the internal condition of Egypt at the
same meeting, and news of the Beersheba railway seemed to confirm
Egypt's precarious position; the committee therefore demanded a
report upon the progress of this new railway and the enemy's
preparations for an assault on Egypt. 21 Nor did Asquith let the
matter slip; he had clearly been rattled by the sudden revelation
and on 29 September he pressed Lord Kitchener on the subject of any
further information received by the War Office concerning the
22
railway, but the Secretary of State knew nothing more.
The subject simply would not disappear in London from now on,
because the politicians had got it into their heads that the military
had been caught out by this development and they were determined to
discover the full truth of the matter. Unfortunately, the existence
of the railway seemed to add reality to the Turkish threat to Egypt
and when, early in November, Lloyd George asked the CIGS, now
Lieutenant-General Murray, for details of events in the Sinai he
was told that 'the railway had proceeded as far as Beersheba, which
20 Dardanelles Committee meeting 2k Sept. 1915, CAB k2/3/30.
21 Ibid. This proves the Official History (p.76) wrong, for it
claims that Kitchener asked for a report on the railway after
he raised the question of evacuation with Hamilton, whereas
the minutes of the Dardanelles Committee demonstrate that this
had already been done.
22 Dardanelles Committee meeting 29 Sept. 1915, CAB k2/3/3k.
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was about 130 miles from the Port Said end of the Sues Canal, and
that the Thrco-Germans evidently meant business.' 23
 Meanwhile, the
Beersheba railway had become a topic of general conversation in the
privileged upper-reaches of London society, so that in mid-December
Lady Northoliffe was heard to talk openly of the matter.2k Even the
Germans seemed to have taken an interest in the subject, and Austen
Chamberlain circulated a copy of a public lecture given by a German
academic early in December to his colleagues in the War Committee
(which had replaced the Dardanelles Committee as Britain's highest
level decision-making body for the war) which appeared to hint at
current Turkish intentions: 'If Turkey completes the railway to the
immediate neighbourhood of Egypt... then we have such a point of
pressure against England, and can compel her to yield at any time.'25
Even the railway itself seemed more threatening as 1915 came to an
end, for reports began to reach the British that a water pipeline
was being laid alongside it; this news lent a still greater degree
of reality to the claim that this was part of a fresh enemy assault
26
on Egypt.
But all this frantic anxiety about the Beersheba railway over-
looked what Egyptian Intelligence continued to say on the subject.
For example, as early as 19 August 1915 - long before the railway
was even known about in London - their summaries reported that even
23 War Committee meeting 5 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/3.
2k T. Wilson (ed.), The political diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-
1928 (London, 1970), p.l60. 11-15 Dec. 1915.
25 'Germany and the Middle East': copy of lecture by Dr Paul
Rohrback 3 Dec. 1915, circulated by A. Chamberlain 27 Dec. 1915
CAB 37/139/56.
26 War Committee meeting 5 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/3.
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if the Turks won a major success at the Dardanelles and decided to
launch a fresh attack upon Egypt the railway would be of 'little
use' to them since they were very short of coal. More importantly
still, Cairo realized that for the Turks the railway was not only a
military venture: 'The railway is used as a bogie to impress
Syrians and Bedouins that a time will come when the Turks will
indeed succeed in their end.eavours to take Egypt... It is also an
excuse for delay of action.' 27 Lord Kitchener appeared to hold a.
similar view of the matter, for at the Dardanelles Committee
meeting of 21f September when the entire affair first reared its ugly
head in London he had dismissed the railway as a scare, and nothing
more. In fact, one main reason for the concern shown in Whitehall
was the belief that the line was being laid beyond Beersheba and
into the Sinai. This fear was based upon a faulty interpretation of
the information available because, although earth-works had been
commenced beyond Beersheba, no rails were immediately available to
28the Turks to lay upon these foundationsL Even if it were the
enemy's intention to extend the line across the Sinai and right up
to the Canal, and they were able to obtain sufficient rails, the
General Staff estimated in October that this could not even be
started before early December 1915, since the necessary materials
would have to be concentrated. As the distance from Beersheba to the
Canal was 150 miles such a project would take three and a half
months: thus, the middle of March 1916 was the earliest a Turkish
27 Intelligence Summary 19 Aug. 1915. Railways in Egypt and
Palestine, WO 157/69k.
28 Elgood, p.266; Ismailia Intelligence Report 16 Dec. 1915,
WO 157/699.
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railway could possibly approach anywhere near Egypt. 29 What the
General Staff did not say, but which remained fairly obvious, was
that a railway such as this would require elaborate defensive
arrangements to protect it from raids into the Sinai by the British
troops in Egypt. The water pipeline that was being constructed
along with the railway need not have worried Egypt or London unduly
as the Force in Egypt was aware of it at the end of October;
according to their information it had not 'answered expectations'
and, so far, the Turkish engineers had only managed to dam a
stream 3O
The greatest problem generated by the existence of the
Beersheba railway was the distortion it created in British
estimates concerning a fresh Turkish attack upon the Sues Canal.
During September Cairo and Whitehall were inundated by reports
claiming that there almost certainly would be ahother assault in
November or at some point during the winter. 31 These reports,
however, seemed to be flying in the face of the known positions of
the Turkish army: 'Reports from Syria are persistent that the Turks
intend to undertake another offensive against the Canal. Every
available man in Syria appears, however, to have been sent North
32
and the troops in Sinai are few.' 	 What the British had picked up,
29 The present and prospective situation in Syria and Mesopotamia
by General Staff and Admiralty War Staff 19 Oct. 1915. Appendix
II: Notes on railways, CAB k2/k/13.
30 Summary of intelligence received October 1915, WO 95/fk17.
31 Examples: Intelligence Summary 30 Sept. 1915, Wa 157/695;
Information through French agency 18 Sept. 1915, Wa 157/736;
Mr Howard to F.O. 16 Sept. 1915, FO 371/2357/133125; Sir A.
Hardinge to F.O. 25 Sept. 1915, P0 371/2357/138787.
32 Intelligence Summary 22 Oct. 1915, WO 157/696.
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therefore, was the Turks' long-term aim - to retake Egypt, an
objective which had been given a degree of reality by deliberate
enemy propaganda and attempts to mislead. 33 Djemal Pasha, for
example, declared an the Turkish Parliament in October that the
attack on Egypt of February 1915 had only been a reconnaissance to
lay the basis for a second and far stronger attempt.3k But political
speeches did not prove military intent in 1915; the trouble was that
the British were beginning to believe that what remained a. vague
objective for the Turks at this stage - a second attack on Egypt -
was in fact a certainty. Enemy attempts to deceive Cairo and London
continued into November 1915 with the Germans seeking to exaggerate
the numbers of Turkish reinforcements available to face the British
forces. 35 The success of these ruses was due not so much to their
credibility as to the existence of the Beersheba railway, which
appeared to lend substance to them by seeming to support the threat
with tangible evidence. The failure of any attack to materialize in
November or December did not invalidate the reports, for another
factor came to bear: if Gallipoli were evacuated large numbers of
Ottoman troops would be released, so the construction of the
Beersheba railway appeared to prove that their destination would be
the Sinai. Thus was British intelligence distorted - and in a most
remarkable manner. Cairo was aware by December that Turkish
preparations against Egypt were 'too tardy' for 'a colossal
expedition'; if Djemal Pasha remained in Syria, however, a small
expedition, like that of February, might be tried at any time, it
33 Intelligence Summary 1f June 1915, WO 157/692. Captured Turkish
officers deliberately exaggerated the numbers of troops
threatening Egypt.
3k Official History, p.78.
35 Note by A. Chamberlain to Curzon 19 Nov. 1915, Eur MSS P112/ilk.
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was argued. 6 Unfortunately, the new railway, the expected
evacuation of Gallipoli and concern over Egypt's internal condition,
along with fear of the Senussi, tended to smother the more
dispassionate musings of Cairo's intelligence officers. 37
 The effect
produced massive estimates of the size of the Turkish army believed
to be concentrated to invade Egypt across the Sinai with German
assistance.
Consequently, in October the General Staff talked of 'a
considerable army' of Turks collecting to attack Egypt if the
British left the Dardanelles. 8 In November the War Office was
prepared to put a figure on this army; after careful ca),culation it
seemed that the total number of troops available for operations
against Egypt was 326,000, and these would probably be accompanied
by at least one German division. 39 As Murray confessed after the war
the War Office's estimates were 'sufficiently serious to give one
+0food for thought.'	 Although forecasts of the precise numbers
varied as the men of Whitehall considered the different factors that
would influence or hinder a Turkish build-up in the Sinai, they
36 Intelligence Summary 31 Dec. 1915, WO 157/698.
37 Another factor behind the failure of Cairo's estimates to gain
a fair hearing in London may have been the War Committee's
increasing frustration with General Maxwell and an inability on
his part to communicate adequately with London using the inform-
ation gathered by his Intelligence Department. This led to
criticism of Egyptian Intelligence in the War Committee meeting
of 20 November 1915 (CAB k2/5/17) and a call for it to be
organized from London by Lloyd George.
38 The present and prospective situation in Syria and Mesropotamia,
op.cit.
39 'German-Turkish concentration on Sinai frontier' 25 Nov. 1915,
Murray papers 79/k8/3.
1iO Aldershot lecture by Murray, op,cit.
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continued to be enormous or, as the Official History puts it,
'unduly pessimistic.tkl In December their expectations were as
follows: by the end of January 1916 a maximum of 200,000 men would
be concentrated on the Egyptian frontier, a number which, by the
end of February, could be increased to 3OO,0O0.42 The weakness of
all these calculations lay in their failure - due to the factors
already outlined - to take into account the basic dynamics of the
Ottoman Empire's military strategy in the war. She was not solely
involved in a drive to occupy Egypt; she had also to contend with
the demands of her Berlin allies, which could mean sending troops
to the Balkans as well as her own campaigns in the Caucasus and
Mesopotamia. In fact, early in November Egypt informed IEF Force D
in Mesopotamia that the enemy seemed to be moving troops towards
them.	 As time passed and no attack materialized against Egypt
others began to believe that the Turkish preparations had been only
'a huge bluff' or even an attempt to cover an attack in Mesopotamia
kk
or elsewhere.	 As it turned out, this was a far more realistic
understanding of Turkish intentions than that of the General Staff.
ki Official History, p.89.
k2 'Estimate of rate at which Turkish or German troops can be
transferred from the vicinity of Constantinople, Srnyrna or
Erzeroun to the south of Palestine', WO 79/6k.
11.3 W.D. GSOI 3 & 1k Nov. 1915, WO 157/781.
14  Wingate to Wigram 28 Dec. 1915, Wingate papers 135/7/187.
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SPECULATION ABOUT ACTION ON THE SYRIAN COAST
The strong possibility of' having to abort the Gaflipoli venture
and the intense concentration on Turkish communications in Asia
Minor and Syria led to great attention being paid by the British to
the Alexandretta region in the final months of 1915. Since the
affair centred on how best to defend Egypt in the light of the
retirement from Gallipoli one would have expected the initial
impulse in the direction of Alexandretta to come from Egypt - and it
did, but not from General Maxwefl. 5It was in fact the High
Commissioner who made the first move - but not because he expected
evacuation at Gallipoli. Wir Henry McMahon suggested a sudden
attack at Alexandretta on 2k September because he feared there
would be no further operations by the MEF that winter and, there-
fore, any offensive action on the Syrian coast could provide a
necessary boost to British prestige.k6 McMahon was not thinking in
purely political terms, because only two days earlr he had argued
for a landing at Alexandretta as it would 'afford opportunity of
k7employing mounted troops'.
	 The High Commissioner passed on his
suggestions to General Maxwell and asked for his views; the GOC
Egypt agreed with McMahon's ideas, though he explained that he did
not know for sure that inactivity at the Dardanelles was
'+8
contemplated during the winter.
	 This uncertainty was precisely
what had bothered McMahon: 'It was the absence of any news of
k5 The Official History is incorrect in giving the impression
that Maxwell first suggested the Alexandretta option at this
time (p.78).
'+6 McMahon to P.O. 2k Sept. 1915, P0 371/2k8O/138051.
'+7 McMahon to P.O. 22 Sept. 1915, Clayton papers 693/9/k.
'+8 McMahon to Maxwell 23 Sept. 1915, Clayton papers 693/9/5;
Maxwell to McMahon 23 Sept. 1915, ibid.
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probable activity this winter that made me suggest a raid on
Alexandretta so as to relieve the tension here and further East.'
Meanwhile, in early October as speculation increased about the
possibility of an evacuation from Gallipoli, the strategists in
London began to turn seriously to thoughts of an amphibious raid. to
supplement whatever might befall the MEF. In one sense, the
contemplation of retirement by the MEF seemed to add a degree of
fluidity to British strategy in the eastern Mediterranean; it was
as if the foundations had suddenly been removed and fresh ones
needed to be laid.
At the Dardanelles Committee meeting of 7 October 1915 this
new fluidity was all too apparent. Grey, Balfour and Carson - who
actually made mention of McMahon's telegram of 2k September - all
raised the question of the Alexandretta option; but it was not the
only alternative considered by any means. Grey certainly saw
Alexandretta as a necessary move if Gallipoli were abandoned, but
he also put forward Do€dcL' in Asia Minor as another site for a
potential landing to cover the MEF's retreat. 5° The uncertainty
present at the meeting of 7 October remained. Hankey, while sure
that the Dardanelles ought to be evacuated, started to write a
memorandum advocating just this combined with an amphibious
operation, but he could not bring himself to fill in the location
of this landing or finish the paper itself. 51 In his diary, however,
he confided that he was thinking of either Haifa or Alexandretta as
k9 McMahon to Fitzgerald 5 Oct. 1915, PRO 3O/57/k7.
50 Dardanelles Committee meeting 7 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/k.
51 Unfinished memorandum on the Dardanelles 8 Oct. 1915,
CAB 63/.
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the probable location; he also wrote that even General Robertson,
then CGS to the BEF, was 'not so strongly opposed to this as I
expected.' 52 It would seem that even Robertson could see some
advantages to operations on the Syrian coast in the autumn and
winter of 1915. Kitchener, too, was unsure of the best course of
action and remained in two minds, but if he did decide to withdraw
the MEP then he wanted 'an offensive operation at Alexandretta or
elsewhere.' 53 These views of Kitchener, stated in a private note,
are significant because they come prior to the Dardanelles
Committee meeting of 11 October, at which he came down very strongly
against any evacuation from Gallipoli, describing it as 'the most
disastrous event in the history of the Empire.' In spite of these
protestations, however, the course of the meeting followed the
Secretary of State's true feelings, since it reflected the indecision
of Britain's strategists. The meeting's ultimate decision was, in
fact, no decision at all: fresh forces were to be sent to Egypt
'without prejudice to their ultimate destination or action, and
for this purpose neither Alexandretta nor Salonica nor the A.aiatic
side of the Straits would be ruled out.' 	 Privately Lloyd George
seems to have been perplexed by these events, although it would
appear that he was now convinced that,since Serbia was doomed and
Gallipoli was about to be abandoned 	 British forces would assault
Alexandretta.55
52 Hankey Diary 12 Oct. 1915.
53 Notes by Kitchener 9 Oct. 1915, WO 159/k.
5k Dardanelles Committee meeting 11 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/6.
55 Rough note by Lloyd George made at a Cabinet meeting 1915,
Lloyd George papers D/21/1/27. The contents of this note suggest
that it originates from just before or after the meeting of
11 Oct. 1915.
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Alexandretta, or at least a landing along the Syrian coast at
some point, remained the favourite amongst the various alternative
amphibious operations being considered because of further
developments elsewhere. In Mesopotamia General Townshend had
defeated the Turks at Kut el Amara on 28 September. Suddenly the
capture of Baghdad seemed a real possibility to some in London. In
fact, such an attempt was fraught with risks, and the British
campaign in Mesopotamia would be frustrated anyway by a fresh
Turkish move in that direction along with one towards Egypt. On 1k
October, consequently, Balfour suggested that the General Staff
might consider whether the occupation of Alexandretta would block
the road to both Egypt and Baghdad. 6
 Balfour's idea was taken up
by the Dardanelles Committee and the result was a substantial study
of the matter by the General Staff and the Admiralty War Staff,
entitled 'The Present and Prospective Situation in Syria and
Mesopotarnia' and dated 19 October 1915.
In this most important and wide-ranging memorandum the military
advisers presented their opinion on the best strategy to be adopted
in the Mediterranean and the Near East. Significantly, the General
Staff gave a great deal of attention to the enemy's rail system in
Asia Minor and Syria as they assessed the most appropriate site for
a landing on the Syrian coast designed to disrupt this very system.
Although they finally decided upon Alexandretta in this context it
was not their only option; they examined other coastal towns
including Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, Acre and even Jaffa, but
none of them was thought to offer such a good anchorage as
56 Dardanelles Committee meeting 1k Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/9.
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Alexandretta in the Gulf of Iskanderun. Not surprisingly the
possibility of hitting the new Beersheba railway was given some
thought. This could probably have been undertaken only from one of
the more southern coastal towns, such as Haifa, but the project was
rejected in any case as 'too hazardous and difficult.' Alexandretta,
on the other hand, had the added advantage of offering the possibility
of disrupting communications with Mesopotamia as we have already
seen. The General Staff accepted this and even argued that no
serious advance ought to be made upon Baghdad unless the
Alexandretta operation took place. As for the logistics of such a
landing they suggested a force of 100,000 men, who would cut all
communications between the Cilician Gates in the west and Marash and
Aleppo in the east.57
As it turned out, however, most of this was academic, for the
same paper concluded by arguing that the MEF should be concentrated
in Egypt, from where the defence of that country could most
effectively be organized. The General Staff had therefore outlined
the basic dilemma facing London - to defend Egypt in Syria or at
the Suez Canal. The military saw the Alexandretta option as
involving a permanent occupation designed to keep the Turkish lines
of communication closed, thus depriving France of 100,000 men
initially, and possibly more in the future. On the other hand, a
move to Egypt would give Cairo time to arrange defensive positions
along the Canal, and it did not altogether rule out operations
against the Syrian coast, for these, it was argued, might prove
most useful in the form of raids against the enemy's communications
with the aim of inducing him to detach troops to cover his supply
57 The present and prospective situation in Syria, op.cit.
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lines. This latter, then, was the 'tactical defensive' option.'8
Although this advice - to defend Egypt at the Canal - would
ultimately be followed it did not carry the day automatically in
October 1915 in London. On the contrary, it caused something of a
storm. Kitchener let it be known that he did not agree with the
findings of the memorandum by writing a short note at the end of the
paper itself and saying so at the Dardanelles Committee. 59 Nor did
the paper of 19 October terminate all debate on the matter. On 25
October, for example, at the Dardanelles Committee Lloyd George
suggested that Alexandretta might offer a large command for the
French General Sarrail and that the British ought soon to raise
'the whole question of alternative operations, Gallipoli, the
Asiatic shore, Syria, Alexandretta and so 	 For one thing a
policy of defending Egypt along the Suez Canal looked unattractive
because it gave the impression that London would fill the country
with men who could be better employed elsewhere. The French
certainly began to see things this way and were not averse to
offering advice to London on the subject. For example, General
Gallieni told Esher that he had 'grave doubts' about such a policy,
and added: 'In the East the defensive is never the most prudent
form of military action.t61
58 Op.cit. The fact that this memorandum did not rule out raids on
the Syrian coast (while it advocated a passive defence of
Egypt) is often overlooked. (Official History, p.78.)
59 Note by Kitchener 20 Oct. 1915 at end of Curzon's copy of 'The
present and prospective situation in Syria', MSS Eur 1112/158;
Dardanelles Committee meeting 21 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/15.
60 Dardanelles Committee meeting 25 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/15.
61 Notes by Lord Esher of a conversation with Gen. Gallieni
27 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/19.
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Meanwhile, events in the Mediterranean were gaining a momentum
all of their own that Whitehall could no longer control. On the
final day of October General Monro, whose role it was to give his
opinion as to the situation at Gallipoli, recommended evacuation
and the transfer of the MEF to Egypt.62 But the Secretary of State
for War would not capitu'ate just yet; fortified by a firm letter
from Maxwell deprecating the effect on Egypt of a total evacuation,
he wrote to the Prime Minister to register his protest and to Monro
asking the general if he had considered the damage that could be
done to Egypt by such action and whether he had looked at 'where the
Turks can be engaged elsewhere.'6
These were more or less Kitchener's final actions on the matter
before leaving for France and then the Mediterranean to examine the
situation for himself. On 10 November he arrived at Mudros and with
McMahon, Maxwell, Monro, Admiral de Robeck and General Birdwood
commenced an examination of the military prospects in the region.
Not surprisingly his conclusion took the form of further suggestions
6kfor a landing at Alexandretta. In this Kitchener was strongly
supported by McMahon, who informed Grey that after 'thorough
discussion' with naval and military experts he was convinced that
the best way to defend Egypt was from outside and 'at some point as
65far distant as possible,' i.e., Alexandretta.
In London, however, they were horrified by this turn of events.
At first some members of the War Committee (the renamed Dardanelles
62 Monro to Kitchener 31 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/5/20.
63 Kitchener to Asquith 1 Nov. 1915, Asquith Mss 121F.12;
Kitchener to Monro 1 Nov. 1915, PRO 30/57/6k.
6k Official History, pp.79-80.
65 McMahon to Grey 11 Nov. 1915, FO 800/k8.
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Committee) were confused by Kitchener's intentions and failed fully
to grasp the meaning of his telegram until Asquith clarified it. He
explained that the men at Mudros advocated a 'conditional
evacuation' of Gaflipoli provided that, before it was completed, it
would be possible to strike elsewhere. In short, Kitchener was
prepared to allow the evacuation of the Suv].a and Anzac positions
on the Peninsula while retaining that of Cape Helles and landing
men at Alexandretta in Ayas Bay. The CIGS, not given to expressing
his true feelings in public, admitted that this new scheme 'rather
frightened' him, and there followed a sharp exchange of telegrams
between the War Office and the Secretary of State on the sub3ect.66
General Murray's reaction was not unique, for Kitchener's proposals
seem to have thrown the War Office into turmoil. Maurice Hankey
described the meeting of 12 November as 'appallingly bad' and noted
in his diary that Asquith had 'experienced surprise' in the after-
noon that Hankey had been 'able to evolve any conclusions at all'
f/Porn the	 The General Staff was certainly confused.
On 11 November, for example, General Caliwell was not sure, when
asked, whether Kitchener's intention was to employ fresh troops at
Alexanciretta or to use those from Gallipoli. As the days passed,
however, it became clearer that the Secretary of State actually
wanted more divisions from France for action at Alexandretta, which,
68in the opinion of Henry Wilson, made him 'as mad as an ass.'
With Kitchener absent in the Mediterran gan the War Office were
determined to oppose advice they considered potentially disastrous,
and this they did. The General Staff argued that there were numerous
66 War Committee meeting 12 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/8.
67 Hankey Diary 12 Nov. 1915, HNKY 1/1.
68 Henry Wilson Diary 11-1k Nov. 1915.
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ojections to the proposal, among which the following were the most
cogent: The expedition would have to force its way 25 miles inland
and hold a perimeter of about 50 miles, an enterprise which could
require at least 150,000 troops; such an operation would not weaken
Germany in the main theatre of war at all; even if only for a while,
Britain would find herself engaged n the Gallipoli, Macedonia and
Alexandretta campaigns simultaneously; finally, the Navy objected
since it was unlikely that enough small craft could be assembled
for such a venture, and, even if they could, the creation of a new
transport route of koo miles (from Port Said) would be a heavy
additional burden.
One further ob3ection to action in the Ayas Bay region was
ultimately to prove perhaps the most formidable - Paris. The
General Staff paper had quoted the views of both the French General
Staff and their Admiralty, not only because they happened to
coincide with those of the War Office, but also for reasons of
diplomacy. Syria remained an area of national interest to the
French and they were sensitive to any unilateral action by the
British in this region. General Murray was cautioned by the French
Military Attach6 in London along these lines in November and
70informed that Paris wished for consultion on the subject. 	 The
Foreign Office therefore urged the need for an Anglo-French
conference and this duly took place on 16 November. The Prime
Minister afterwards informed Kitchener that the Government had
69 'A statement of military considerations as to the advisability
of undertaking an expedition... for the purpose of severing...
the Turkish communications from Asia Minor... to Syria and
Egypt' 16 Nov. 1915 by General Staff and Admiralty War Staff,
wo 106/1570.
70 Note for Gen. Sir A. Murray 13 Nov. 1915 by French Military
Attach in London,CAB k2//1O.
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71decided to reject his scheme.	 Paris effectively killed off any
chance the expedition had of being implemented: it demanded that
any Liuied force which landed in the region of Alexandretta must be
two-thirds French, and they could not spare so many men at this
stage. For some it was frustrating, but, as General Callwell
explained, the whole affair demonstrated the realities of fighting
in an alliance: 'we have got to keep in with our infernal Lilies'
he is reported to have remarked.72
Even a decision so apparently final did not prevent continual
speculation about operations along the Syrian coast. In part this
was due to geography: 'Alexandretta is so enticing, and looks so
plausible on the map, that it warps perspective.' 73
 A glance at the
map during the months of October and November 1915 ebcouraged. many
an amateur strategist to make suggestions for British policy in
Syria and Asia Minor. Colonel Pepington, for example, a journalist
and close friend of many of the leading soldiers, managed to gain
Bonar Law's attention with a long letter that seems to have
impressed the Conservative leader at the end of November. Repington
was dissatisfied by a passive defence of Egypt; he wanted to raid
every point along the Syrian coast in orddr to tie the enemy to
coastal defence, and if the Turks continued to advance he advocated
leaving 150,000 men on the Canal while cutting in behind the
attacking force by amphibious operations with 350,000 men at 'El
Arish, Haifa, Beirut, Alexandretta or wherever I could best
influence and ruin the Turkish expedition.'
71 F.O. to Bertie 1k Nov. 1915,FO 371/2k80/171220.
72 Parker to Clayton 19 Nov. 19 1 5, Clayton papers 135/6/13.
73 Lovat Fraser to Curzon 15 Nov. 1915,MSS Eur P112/110.
7k Repington to Bonar Law 2k Nov. 1915,Bonar Law papers 51/5/kk.
C. Repington, The First World War, 191k-1918 (London, 1920),
I, p.69.
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Another strategist who was amateur in the sense that he had. no
direct role in the formulation of official thinking on the defence
of Egypt was Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar of the Sudan. He drew up
a scheme more ambitious than even Repington's. His grand strategy
for the Allies in the Near East consisted of an immediate landing
at Alexandretta (he was writing in November) to 'hold the neck of
the bottle' while the British in Mesopotamia advanced beyond
Baghdad and the army in Egypt either marched north to Jaffa of
Haifa or landed at these points to support the army at klexandretta;
finally, Britain's Allies would lend a hand - French forces would
land at Smyrna and Beirut or Tripoli while the Russians would push
for Trebifond. Wingate wanted to remain at Gallipoli as well and
intended to use Indian troops and cavalry from France for these
operations as they were wasted on the Western Front. How simple it
all seemed on paper75
Mark Sykes, an M.P. and Middle Eastern expert, cherished an
equally ambitious aim, involving the opportunity to occupy
'practically the whole of the Arab speaking provinces of the Ottoman
Empire.' This was to be effected initially by three steps: forces
were to be landed at Alexandretta, the Cilician Gates would then
be taken and finally an additional force would be disembarked at
Haifa. Like Wingate, Sykes mentioned the unique aspects of a
campaign in Syria against the Turks. Because they fought well from
defensive positions, Sykes insisted, Turkish troops should be
assaulted 'in the open on the offensive by mobile manoeuvre.'6
75 Note on the Near East, Nov. 1915,PRO 30/57/k7. This appears to
be the original pencil-written version with a hand-drawn map.
Wingate or someone had the paper typed, for there is another
version in the Curon papers: see MSS Eur F112/11O.
76 Policy in the Middle East. Memorandum by M. Sykes, and covering
letter Sykes to Caliwell 15 Nov. 1915,Bonar Law papers 56/XI/3.
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Cavalry would, of course, be ideal for such operations.
At the end of November Gertrude Bell, a noted Arabist who was
then in Egypt helping with intelligence work, drew up a long and
detailed letter arguing most strongly for the Ayas Bay option. She
believed that an amphibious operation at Alexandretta might
actually be more economical in troop numbers than any defence based
along the Suez Canal. 77 This was more significant than it might have
appeared at first blush, for others with a more influential role in
British strategy were still most interested in action at Alexandretta
and remained prepared to state their case. McMahon continued to
press for it in the strongest terms: 'I feel it my duty to urge most
strongly that alternative policy of meeting Turco-German advance in
Cilicia may be considered.' 8 Even the General Staff was not entirely
the rigid monolith of uniform opinion that it seemed. Sir Archibald
Murray himself actually advocated staying at Cape Helles on Gallipoli
79
and seems to have seen some sense ].nAkyas Bay scheme.
With all these various schemes flying round in Egypt and London
it is not surprising that the possibility of offensive action in
Syria stayed on the agenda into December. At the War Committee
meeting of 2 December 19 1 5, for instance, the question of
Alexandretta was raised in the context of covering the evacuation of
the Dardane].les. Bonar Law, surely influenced by Repington and
perhaps others, 'asked if it was possible to take Damascus by a
sudden coup and hold it temporarily, as a counterfoil to the
77 G. Bell to Cromer 29 Nov. 1915,WO 79/6k.
78 McMahon to Bertie 28 Nov. 1915,PRO 30/57/k7.
79 War Committee meeting 16 Nov. 1915 CAB k2/5/lk . Lecture by
Murray at Aldershot 26 Feb. 1936, Murray papers 79/k8/2.
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evacuation of the Peninsula.' Kitchener's response was that his
Ayas Bay scheme would be better, but Bonar Law's outburst
demonstrates both the influence of the amateur strategists and the
general shift in many quarters towards a more offensive stance in
the Near East.	 And this attitude continued into the middle of
December. At the War Committee on 16 December, for example,
Kitchener, Crewe and Lloyd George all showed enthusiasm for action
in the Alexandretta region and Asquith found himself having to
demand a decision from his colleagues 'at once.' On the other hand,
at the same meeting Admiral Jackson expressed his personal
preference for Beirut and Haifa as positions from which to strike
at the Turks, with Haifa as the better of the two.81 Nor was the
admiral alone in London in looking to areaa other than the region
of Ayas Bay for amphibious operations in Syria. Leo Amery, for
one, advocated 'a counter-stroke at Haifa or Alexandretta' to
82
cover Egypt iC it were attacked.
Attention paid' to offensive action in Syria was not confined
to the possible execution of amphibious operations. By December
Mark Sykes was in favour of a land offensive from Egypt across the
Sinai and into Palestine as far as Acre. 8 General Hamilton had not
been idle since his return to London from the Mediterranean: he
sought Asquith's support for a similar, but still more ambitious
venture, as he explained to Churchill later in the war:
80 War Committee meeting 2 Dec. 1915,CAB k2/6/2. Kitchener was
still arguing at this time that Alexandretta was not in France's
sphere of influence in Syria at all.
81 War Committee meeting 16 Dec. 1915CAB k2/6/9.
82 Note on the General Staff memorandum by Amery 13 Dec. 1915,
Murray papers 79/k8/2.
83 War Committee meeting 16 Dec. 1915,CAB k2/6/9.
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'Egypt had to be organised to support a great Anglo-Indian army
with munitions as well as food, and a steady advance of large forces
had to be commenced at once through the Holy Land to the straits.'8'
It is remarkable that even though the British were about to
evacuate Gallipoli and were reeling from what seemed to be a major
failure in the war against the Turk there could be so much advocacy
for offensive action in Syria.
DEFENDING EGYPT ALONG THE CANAL
The official decision by H.M. Government to abandon further
planning for an expedition to the Ayas Bay region naturally meant
that much attention was suddenly focussed upon the Suez Canal
defences in Egypt and their strength and adequacy to meet a serious
enemy attack. In fact this shift of attention had begun before mid.-
November. At the War Committee on 5 November Lloyd George asked for
details of the measures taken to defend the Canal; in reply General
Murray could say little other than that the defence would be
conducted by holding ground east of the Cana1. 8 The War Committee
was clearly not satisfied with the information offered by the CIGS
and so it requested a full report from General Maxwell; at the
instigation of Balfour it was also decided to send an officer
'acquainted with the latest principles and practices in the
construction of entrenchments' to advise Maxwell.
I-
8k Hamilton to Churchill 11 July 1917, Hamilton papers 1/15.
85 Murray had very little to go on other than a vague comment by
Maxwell in a telegram in Oct. that the defence would be similar
to that of Feb. and a brief W.O. paper of the same month. See
Official History, p.77 and 'The defence of Egypt' 22 Oct. 1915,
wo 1o6/k2 C3/35.
86 War Committee meeting 5 Nov. 19 1 5 CAB k2/5/3.
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Whitehall's lack of knowledge concerning the true state of
defensive preparations at the Suez Canal was symptomatic of the way
in which this whole matter had been neglected because of the Gallipoli
operation and the uncertainty over British strategy in October and
November. By the beginning of November, consequently, Egypt was
defended by what has been described as 'a lightly held line.., on
the Suez Canal.' This line was held by about one division of Indian
troops supplemented by defensive positions on the Canal's east bank
to cover bridges and ferries; between these positions small inter-
mediate posts had been established from which the east bank was
patrolled. 8 And this was all that had been done. The real situation
was worse. Early in November Egypt had no information about the
number of troops who might be allotted to these defences in the
future, nor had any definite line of defence actually been decided
upon. No organization existed to carry out any serious expansion of
the works and the Yorce in Egypt had only one company of sappers and
miners and six engineer officers in the entire country.88
But the men in London were becoming frustrated at their lack of
information and they expressed their exasperation that they still had'
not heard from Maxwell on 13 November. Nonetheless, they could discusa
something of substance concerning the Egyptian defences; Brigadier-
General Grant, who had been sent out to Gallipoli to advise on
bombproof shelters, had gone to Egypt and would, it was hoped,
provide Sir John with expert advice regarding the construction of
defensive works. But Balfour, who took a keen interest in this matter
87 Report of Engineer works in Egypt I Jan. 1916-31 Dec. 1916,
Murray papers 79/k8/2.
88 Report on water supply to the Egyptian Field Force, Murray
papers 79/k8/2.
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and had many useful suggestions to make whenever it was considered,
looked beyond a mere passive defence of the Canal. He now raised
the idea of using armoured cars in the Sinai with the intention of
striking at the Turkish railway believed to be under construction
beyond Beersheba. The CIGS seemed to like the idea and recommended
that Maxwell be asked how many men he would need to form mobile
coiumns. 8
 Balfour reiterated this desire to strike at the enemy's
preparations for an attack across the Sinai at the 20 November
meeting and it was taken up by the Prime Minister three days later.9°
To the politicians in London it appeared inconceivable that some
such attempt should not be tried - but they were quite unaware of
the true situation at the Canal.91
Meanwhile, General Maxwell had finally entered the fray. He had,
of course, left Egypt to consult with Kitchener and other generals
concerning the evacuation of Gallipoli and the defence of Egypt, but
on 16 November he found time to telegraph Cairo and order the defence
of the Canal to be 'taken up in depth' by indenting for stores and
material in anticipation of the line that would be adopted 'after
study.' 92 It was hardly the ideal start to the job, but it was, at
least, a start. Maxwell did not, in fact, return to Egypt until 25
November 1915, but on the very afternoon of his arrival he called a
conference and ordered the doubling of the railway to Ismailia which
would facilitate defensive preparations in the future. 93 In the mean-
time Lord Kitchener had contacted the War Office and outlined he
material requirements necessary for a serious defensive line east
of the Canal, and it was now obvious in London that materials and
89 War Committee meeting 13 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/10.
90 War Committee meeting 20 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/3/17; War Committee
meeting 23 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/20.
91 Cromer to Balfour 12 Dec. 1915, W0 79/6k.
92 Report of Engineer works, op cit. and Maxwell to GOC Egypt 16
Nov. 1915, Murray papers 79/48/2.





munitions were needed on 'a huge scale.' 	 At the War Committee
Murray told his colleagues that he was depressed by the news he had
received from Egypt, for it appeared that 'practically nothing had
been done'before this .
There was depression, too, in Egypt. According to McMahon,
Maxwell's staff were 'despondent about doing what should be done
within the time available' as far as the new defences were
concerned. 6 And although Maxwell told Kitchener that he was going
'full steam ahead' with all preparations others were less optimistic
and confessed that it would be 'a race to get things ready in
time.' 97 This gloom was caused not merely by the paucity of
defensive work done previously, but also by the shortage of troops
to man the new defences. By the end of November there were only
about 60,000 men in Egypt, most of them details of various formations
and untrained recruits from Australia and New Zealand. The shortage
resulted partly from the loss of the 28th Indian Brigade and other
Indian units to Basra, where events had deteriorated after General
Townshend's pyrrhic victory at Ctesiphon.
Meanwhile Maxwell had responded fully to the War Committee's
demands about his requirements for his command's security. He
estimated that Egypt needed 12 infantry divisions, a cavalry division
and 20 batteries of heavy and siege artillery for the eastern front
9k Official History, p.8k.
95 War Committee meeting 23 Nov. 1915, CAB k5/5/20.
96 McMahon to Grey 30 Nov. 1915, FO 800/k8.
97 Maxwell to Kitchener 11 Dec. 1915, Murray papers 79/k8/2.
McMahon to Grey 1k Dec. 1915, Lloyd George papers D/19/k/3.
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alone, and he expected that the enemy would be able to commence
operations early in February 1916, a fact which explained the urgency
felt by hs staff officers. 8
 At the War Office there was horror at
these figures, but no definite opinion on a more accurate estimate.
For example, in October a War Office paper had calculated the
numbers needed at only four divisions. 99
 This now appeared woefully
inadequate and Caliwell reckoned it best to work on the assumption
that seven divisions would be necessary until March 1916.100 The
final General Staff estimate of 11 December 1915, however, put the
numbers required for the Canal front at eight infantry divisions and
five mounted brigades.101
The General Staff's contribution to this matter reveals two
important factors which influenced London at this time. The first is
the very real anxiety felt for Egypt. Both Kitchener (who was known
to be in a panic about the country) and the future CIGS, General
Robertson, shared this anxiety; on 11 December Robertson wrote:
'The defence of Egypt gives me considerable anxiety just now because
Egypt is the one place where perhaps we can be rather badly hit.'102
Secondly, as the General Staff admitted in their paper, they could
not be certain about their estimate. This confession by the War
Office helps us to see the immediate events in London in the correct
perspective. Kitchener returned to England and sought advice on the
defence of Egypt wherever he could find it. As it turned out General
98 Official History, p.83. Maxwell was clearly influenced by his
fear of a large Turkish attack that seemed all the more threaten-
ing on account of the weaknesses of his defensive arrangements.
99 'The defence of Egypt', op.cit.
100 Callwell to Wilson 10 Dec. 1915, Henry Wilson papers 73/1/18.
101 'Estimate by the General Staff of forces required for defence of
Egypt' by A. Murray. 11 Dec. 1915, WO 106/15k2.
102 Robertson to Wigram 11 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/12/29.
131
Haig was in the capital and the Secretary of State asked him to
examine the question in detail. Since Haig knew little about Egypt
he asked for the War Office's advice, so his resulting memorandum
reflected the General Staff's desire to produce an estimate lower
than Maxwell's and their view on how the defence should be laid out.103
The General Staff wanted the Force in Egypt to occupy Qatia in
the Sinai, thereby denying vital water supplies to an attacking
force and so limiting its size; this would reduce the numbers needed
to garrison Egypt. Maxwell, on the other hand, supported by General
Home (whom Kitchener had despatched to the Canal to scrutinize the
new defensive line), believed that there was no time available for
such an ambitious project, and he felt he ought to concentrate on
the main defences 1nstead.1	 This rift between London and Cairo
became so serious that it emerged as a matter for discussion at the
War Committee on 15 December. 105 Although Kitchener and Murray were
agreed that Qatia should be occupied, they could not overrule the
views of the men on the spot; any such advance, therefore, had to be
106postponed for the moment. 	 Any number of detailed memoranda in
London were unable to resolve the problem of Egypt's defence: the
solution lay rather in appointing a responsible officer from London
107
who could take the matter in hand at once in Egypt itself.
103 Callwellto Robertson 9 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/8/38.
For Haig's memorandum see 'Estimate of forces required for the
immediate defence of a second line to protect the Canal against
attack from the east', WO 106/711.
10k W.O. to Maxwell 27 Nov. 1915 and Maxwell to W.O. 29 Nov. 1915,
Murray papers 79/k8/3.
105 War Committee meeting 15 Dec. 1915, CAB k2/6/8.
106 Official History, p.90.
107 Robertson to Caliwell 11 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/8/39.
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British concern with Egypt, meanwhile, was beginning to cause
some tension with Paris. At the Calais Anglo-French Conference on 5
December 1915, for instance, the French expressed their doubts as to
the reality of the thrust to Egypt and the prospect of troops being
108
withdrawn from Salonica to secure Egypt's defence. 	 They were even
more sensitive to any reports of British troops being transferred
from France to Egypt. 109 But these signs of possible strife with
France did not discourage Kitchener in his determination to
strengthen Egypt, and he arranged for two divisions from France and
one from the United Kingdom to be assigned to Maxwell in order to
ensure security before the MEF started to arrive 'en masse'. So
unhappy was General Robertson, now CIGS, about this decision to
deprive the BEF of men that he felt it necessary to apologise to
Haig and to explain the true nature of the situation in Egypt:
'Commanders, staffs and troops have been so chopped and changed
during the last few weeks that no one can tell me where any one is,
or make even a rough shot at an order of battle.' 11 ° Of course, in
part this confusion was due to the arrival of troops from Gallipoli.
The evacuation of the Anzac and Suvia positions was completed by the
morning of 20 December and the MEF's final hold on the Peninsula, at
Cape Helles, was relinquished on 8 January 1916. Troops now began to
pour into Egypt and the country entered a new phase of its role in
the war.
108 'Conseil franco-anglais tenu 	 Calais, le 5 dcembre 1915',
CAB a8/i.
109 Grey to Kitchener 6 Dec. 1915, FO 800/102.
110 Robertson to Haig 26 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/22/3. The
promised two divisions from France were never actually sent to
Egypt.
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CHANGES IN THE COMMAND IN EGYPT
The concentration of attention on the Egyptian defences in
November and December 1915 proved most damaging for Maxwell's
reputation in London. Repeated talk of sending an expert on modern
trench warfare to Egypt tended to undermine Sir John's standing at
the War Committee by lending the impression that he was incapable of
adapting to modern warfare. Perhaps more damaging still was what was
considered to be the scandalous state of the Suez Canal defences in
November. Lest this be thought too strong a. description of the feeling
held towards Maxwell in London we quote the enlightening comment of
Lord Cromer: 'It is really almost criminal on the part of Maxwell not
111to have prepared plans for the defence of Egypt.' 	 And, of course,
the commander of the Force in Egypt was still unable to throw off the
criticisms of his performance during the Turkish attack on the Canal
in February - criticisms which now began to be raised again.2
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that one finds mention in
the minutes of the War Committee of discussions concerning General
Maxwell on at least three separate occasions in November and early
113
December.	 Voices now started to be raised in favour of a change of
command in Egypt. At the meeting of 20 November, for example, Lloyd
George asked the Prime Minister if Lord Kitchener had considered
this very thing. Asquith replied that he had not - but even the
Prime Minister was beginning to think along these lines himself, for
111 Cromer to Curzon 20 Dec. 1915, MSS Eur F112/11O.
112 Cromer to Balfour 12 Dec. 1915, WO 79/6k.
113 See War Committee meeting 13 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/1O; War
Committee meeting 20 Nov. 1915, CAB k2/5/7; War Committee
meeting 15 Dec. 1915, CAB k2/6/8.
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on 23 November he told the War Committee that he wanted Kitchener
ilk
to send a more efficient officer than Maxwell to Egypt.	 There
was an acknowledged problem here: the Secretary of State remained
most loyal to Sir John, who had been one of his prot4gs before
the war and whom he trusted to govern Egypt successfully.
But Kitchener could not entirely ignore the mounting pressure
for some sort of change. By November Egypt had gained such a high
profile in British strategy that there were calls for an officer of
the highest calibre to assume command of its defence and, indeed,
the whole situation in the Mediterranean that required the strong
direction of a single directing hand. 115 The Secretary of State
believed, however, that he had found a way to keep Maxwell in Egypt
while bowing to the pressure which demanded a new hand at the helm
of that country's defences. His compromise, if it can be called
that, was reached not only because of his loyalty to Maxwell but
also as a result of the actual situation in Egypt itself.
As early as November 191k concern had been expressed in Egypt
that one man simply could not administer the country and command its
armed forces alone. This argument had really been proved by Maxwell's
behaviour in February 1915 when be permitted his subordinate on the
Canal to direct operations against the attacking Turks. This
division of responsibility seems to have been recognized unofficially
before December because the GOC Suez Canal Defences was being
addressed separately from Maxwell by authorities outside the country
116
as a matter of course as early as October.	 McMahon suggested the
ilk Ibid.
115 Robertson to Callwell 11 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/8/39.
116 C in C India to GOC Canal Defences and GOC Egypt 27 Oct. 1915,
L/MIL/1 7/5/3905.
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official recognition of this division of responsibility to Kitchener
at Mudros in November so that there might be an independent
commander at the Suez Canal. 117 Kitchener grasped at this and
pressed for Maxwell to remain in Egypt while Monro, who had
completed his task at Gallipoli, took over at the Canal. But events
in London were to alter his choice of personnel somewhat and lead
to a serious clash of wills in Whitehall.
During December General Sir William Robertson was appointed
CIGS in place of Murray. The Prime Minister, Kitchener and
Robertson were faced with the difficulty of what Murray should be
offered in compensation, for there existed a general feeling that
he had been poorly treated. The new CIGS believed Sir Archibald
deserved 'good employment' so he suggested offering him command of
118
an Army Corps in France. 	 It appears that this offer was made to
the departing CIGS but received an unfavourable response; he
'blustered so much' that an alternative arrangement had to be
sought. 9 That decided upon emerged after, in Hankey's words,
'poor Murray' had had a 'trying interview' on 16 December with the
Prime Minister. 120 It would seem that at this interview the idea
of sending Sir Archibald to Egypt emerged for the first time,
proving most acceptable to the ex-CIGS. He wrote to Hankey the next
day declaring he would be glad to go to the Mediterranean, though
he believed his removal was most unfair. 121 Although sentiment
117 McMahon to Grey 28 Dec. 1915, F0 800/k8.
118 Robertson to Kitchener 12 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/13/32.
119 Henry Wilson Diary 19 Dec. 1915.
120 Hankey Diary 16 Dec. 1915, HNKY 1/1.
121 Murray to Hankey 17 Dec. 1915, Hankey papers HNKY Li./7.
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clearly played a part in this decision of Asquith and its subsequent
ratification by Robertson and Kitchener this does not mean that
122Murray was unsuitable for his new job.	 (a CIGS he had been at the
very centre of much of the strategic thinking on the evacuation of
the Dardanelles, Alexandretta, Salonica and the defence of Egypt;
indeed, it might be argued that he was perhaps as qualified as
anyone for his new command. So it was General Murray who obtained
the new job in the eastern Mediterranean and not Monro. And what a
jobZ Robertson described it as a 'Commander-in-Chief in the
123Mediterranean' with his headquarters in Egypt.
While the new CIGS was prepared to allow his predecessor to
transfer to Egypt, however, he was none too happy with the intended
command-structure. He was anxious about the prospect of two generals
having responsibility for Egypt's defence and in a subtle move he
tried to get the Foreign Office to recommend that Maxwell become a
mere military administrator of martial law attached to the High
ommissioner.124 Unfortunately, Kitchener would not budge and his
position was strengthened by the support of MeMahon in Egypt who
disapproved of the proposal to strip Maxwell of so many of his
powers. 125 The dispute between the CIGS and the Secretary of State
inflicted a certain degree of paralysis on Egypt since the matter
was 'hung up' for several days while both parties refused to
compromise.126 Finally, after having spent two hours daily
122 Percy to Henry Wilson 22 Dec. 1915, Henry Wilson papers 73/1/19.
123 Robertson to Wigram 11 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers I/12/^9.
12k F.O. to McMahon 2k Dec. 1915, F 800/k8.
125 McMahon to P.O. 28 Dec. 1915, P0 800/k8.
126 Robertson to Haig 26 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/22/3.
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discussing the problem for nearly a week with Kitchener, Robertson
was unable to prevent the Secretary of State from going to Asquith
and threatening to resign if his proposal for two separate
commanders in Egypt was not accepted. 127
 Kitchener had won the day
although Robertson had made sure that he had taken a written
protest against the proposal with him when he went to see the Prime
Minister. In this note the CIGS explained his objections to the
proposed decision to allow Maxwell to retain responsibility for
internal affairs in Egypt and the security of its western frontier
while Murray assumed command at the Canal; he was convinced that it
'lead to trouble', he explained, because much of the Allies' ill-
success in the war so far could be laid at the door of a lack of
unity of command and, with a major attack expected against Egypt,
128
this new arrangement could cause 'grave difficulties.' 	 He was to
be proved correct very soon.
127 Robertson to Haig 31 Dec. 1915, Robertson papers 1/22/k.
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CHAPTER 7
EGYPT AND THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES:
AUGUST 191k - DECEMBER 1915
'It was the most unfortunate date in my life
when I was left in charge of the Arab move-
ment... it is nothing to do with me: it is a.
purely military business.'
Sir Henry McMahon 12 September 1916
THE WAR OFFICE AND THE PEOPLES OF SYRIk AND ARABIA BEFORE 191k
Whether the British could expect support and assistance from
the indigenous population of the Ottoman Empire had been a subject
of considerable debate before the war. During the CID's consideration
of the defence of Egypt in the period prior to 1909, for example,
the General Staff concluded that it would be satisfied to gain
'active assistance of a certain kind' from disaffected members of
1the Syrian population. In line with this kind of thinking the
soldiers in London had turned their gaze towards the Arab nomads of
the desert to the east of Syria who were believed to be 'sufficiently
organised for raiding and guerilla warfare, but not able to under-
2
take any sustained campaign against the Turkish army.' The
possibility of a general revolt in Syria against Ottoman rule was
not totally ignored although the War Office remained somewhat
nervous about any uncontrolled fanaticism. Significantly, therefore,
I 'Scheme for an attack on Haifa. Part I. Strategical', no date,
wo 106/k2 C3/lkB.
2 Military report on Arabia by General Staff 190k, WO 33/331.
See Motp N0 2 Tkc.. d sf"	 o A4ri Le s , Lcoe.+1j c&&pfer.
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if tribes such as the Beni Sakhr were to be contacted the officers
concerned would have to be careful to ensure that general raids
into the settled urbal centres of Syria were discouraged. It was
argued that these potential tribal allies ought rather to be used
to attack the Hejaz railway, which ran from Damascus to Mecca,
between Deraa and Amman in the east of Syria so as to disrupt enemy
troop movements.3
It had been thought possible that any British military
operations in Syria in defence of Egypt could spark off a general
rebellion in Arabia. It was believed, however, that such events
would be of only secondary importance, because they were unlikely to
provide direct assistance to any action in Syria. The role of Arabia
in any future clash between Britain and Turkey was expected to be
like that of Spain in the Napoleonic wars: 'an ulcer of malignant
14.
growth', but not a decisive factor. Indeed, it would seem likely
that the War Office did not even consider the Arabs of the Hejaz as
so militarily formidable as those of Syria. The general opinion was
that a revolt in Arabia would fail unless Turkey was already involved
in fighting a European power, wheras the tribes to the east of Syria
were reported as being 'constantly in revolt against the Sultan.'5
Moreover, the tribes of the Heja were said to be short of the
6
'material' of war but those of Syria were described as 'well armed.'
The lasting influence of these prewar reports on the usefulness of
3 Reconnaissance of Syria from the coast eastwards. June 1908,
WO 33/k56.
k Notes on Arabia. Jan. 1907, WO 33/k29.
5 Ibid.
6 Military report on Syria and the Eastern Littoral of the Red
Sea. 1906, WO 33/kOk.
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Arab allies can be demonstrated by reference to a most revealing
fact: General Robertson, who later became CIGS, was in the Intelli-
gence Division of the War Office during this period and wrote one of
these studies.7
Yet it was not from the Syrian Arabs that the War Office hoped
to gain the greatest support of all. This was expected to come from
the Druse tribes of the Hauran and Lebanon. These heretical Moslems
were considered to be well trained in arms and 'more than a match'
for any Arabs they met in battle. 8
 It was estimated that the Druse
of the Hauran region alone could raise 10,000 men with Martini-Henry
rifles who might disrupt Turkish communications and attack the
railway junction at Deraa. Meanwhile, the Druse who lived in Lebanon
and near Acre were expected to cover the left flank of any British
advance in the vicinity of Acre. 9 The War Office's confidence in
Druse support can be traced to the events of i86i, when Britain had
intervened to prevent the French from punishing these tribesmen.10
Evidence of their warlike behaviour was not lacking: in 1910 the
Turks were forced to collect 21,000 troops in order to make an
example of them after a series of incidents.	 In addition to the
Druse, the Lebanese Christians, or Maronites, were similarly
expected to provide assistance to the British, though their military
value was reckoned significantly lower than that of the Druse.1
7 Military report on Syria, op.cit.
8 Reconnaissance of Syria from the coast, op.cit. See also
A. Kirkbride, An awakening (u.P. of Arabia, 1971), p.87.
9 Reconnaissance of Syria, op.cit.
10 J. T. Parfit, Among the Druzes of Lebanon and Bashan (London, 1917),
pp.k-5.
11 H. V. F. Winstone, The illicit adventure (London, 1982), pp.63-65.
12 Reconnaissance of Syria, op.cit.
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THE ARABS AND THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT
After Britain and France had declared war on Turkey a new
dimension was almost immediately added to the Great War by the Sultan.
On 1k November 191 he proclaimed a Holy War against all those who
were at war with Turkey and her allies; it constituted an order to
all Moslems to unite against their common enemies. The Arab tribes
of eastern Syria and Arabia were important objects of this declaration
and if they decided to adopt a hostile attitude towards the British
matters could become difficult in Egypt. There was a sense in which
Egypt could be described as an island surrounded by .seas of water
and 'far less navigable oceans of waterless sand'; because of this
fact, Arab tribesmen were of crucial import to any attack upon the
country, since they could provide the necessary camels to facilitate
a move across the Sinai, or deny them.13
Turkey's Arabian strategy involved uniting the different tribes
in a very ambitious attempt to support an attack upon Egypt. There
were basically four main tribal leaders whose support the Turks
sought: Ibn Saud, whose territory covered the centre of Arabia and
backed on to the Persian Gulf; Ibn Rashid to the north of Ibn Saud;
the Sherif of Mecca to the west, whose territory stretched along the
coast of the Red Sea; and Nun Slialaan, to the north of Ibn Rashid,
but, more importantly, to the east of Syria. Although all these men
lived within the confines of the Ottoman Empire they often behaved
as 'independent' powers, to the exasperation of their Turkish over-
lords and the advantage of Great Britain. Thus, Ibn Saud and other
Arab chieftains around the Persian Gulf had been in close contact
13 Storra, p.1k8.
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with the British before the war, while the Sherif of Mecca's son,
Prince Abduflah, negotiated on behalf of his father with Lord
Kitchener in Egypt. Unfortunately for London, the most immediately
useful tribe to any operations in and around Egypt, Nun Shalaan's
1kAnazeh, were also the least accessible..
	 The Anazeh tended to be
very nomadic in their habits, moving their 'capital' regularly;
they also lacked the educational background of the Sherif and his
family; they could not 'be reached by naval activity, as could Ibn
Saud. British Arabian policy was therefore vitally restrained by
the dictates of geography.
Fears of 'a Turco-Arabian coalition, which would... constitute
a danger to Egypt' was an important motive in the decision to send
a small expeditionary force to the Persian Gulf from India in
September 191k. 15 General Barrow at the India Office went so far as
to claim that if a British army landed in Mesopotamia the impact of
the action would encourage the Arabs to transfer their allegiance to
London, thus making a Holy War unsuccessful while 'the support of
the Arabs would utterly destroy all prospect of Turkish success...
16in Egypt.'	 Barrow had made specific reference to Ibn Saud,
explaining that this chief had already been approached by the Turks;
this was in September. Moreover, in October Enver Pasha, the leading
Turkish minister, sent Ibn Saud a letter 'asking him to bring up a
ik Official History, p.209. The authors merely mention Nun in a
footnote, implying thereby that he was certainly not in the same
category as the Sherif or Ibn Saud, yet he was regarded as most
significant by Cairo during the war.
15 'Mesopotamia' by Maj. Paddon 12 Sept. 1916, WO 106/898.
16 Minute by the ilitary Secretary, India Office 26 Sept. 191k,
L/MIL/5/768.
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force to Syria to assist the Turkish Government against the
"English".' 17 Ibn Saud politely declined the request, but the
enemy's intentions were becoming clear. Britain's agent in eastern
Arabia, and Ibn Saud's close friend, Captain Shakespear, gleaned
further information about the Turkish plan: Ibn Saud was to defend
Basra, Ibn Rashid and the Anaeh were to advance on Egypt, via the
Sinai, in conjunction with the Sherif of Mecca, along with the
Senussi in the west. Unfortunately for Turkey, the Arabs did not
play their part: 'This plan was upset by Binsaud, Sherif of Mecca
and Anazeh tribe deciding to hold together, and last named joining
Binsaud against Binrashid, who, then attacked, could not advance
Egypt.18 Indian Intelligence, however, did not have the full story,
for Ibn Rashici actually defeated Ibn Saud in battle in January 1915
and Captain Shakespear had been killed. Britain's Arabian strategy
had been dealt a serious blow, and her attention, therefore, would
begin to shift away from Ibn Saud. Neverthless, Ibn Saud had
fulfilled a 'useful purpose' in distracting Ibn Rashid from Egypt at
a time when General Barrow could describe the military position
among the tribes as 'getting serious.'19
Turkish overtures were not confined to the greater chieftains
in their search for assistance in an attack on Egypt. They
recruited 'irab irregulars' from amongst the Howeytat, Ibn Injail,
17 Lt.-Col. Grey to Political Resident in Persian Gulp 27 Oct.
191k, L/P&S/1 1/86/5020.
18 CGS India to W.O. 19 Jan. 1915 repeated to GOC Egypt,
L/P&S/1 1/87/276.
19 Ibid., draft telegram, no date, no name, and note by Gen. Barrow
upon letter of 21 Jan. 1915. Ibn Rashid was regarded as a
nuisance rather than a threat; see minute by Under-Secretary,
India Office, no date: 'As to potential danger to Egypt he is
surely negligible.'
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Beni Sakhr and similar smaller tribes from northern Arabia. In
fact, Turkish representatives signed a treaty with the Howeytat in
the third week of September, providing up to 10,000 arms for the
tribesmen. With these Arabs were mixed some Kurdish horsemen, whom
Egyptian Intelligence considered 'better fighters' than the
Bedouin Arabs riding with them.2°
Given these Turkish intrigues it was hardly surprising that
the Egyptian authorities took a very keen interest in all matters
Arabiah. A careful study of the tribes to the immediate east of
Egypt was drawn up for the use of Intelligence. Written by Captain
Newcombe and a certain T. E. Lawrence, it was based upon their
survey of the area conducted in the spring of 191k. This report
gave details of each of the tribes, their size, intentions and
military capabilities. 21 The British were not at all ignorant about
the tribes in the Sinai, therefore, and although the enemy seem to
have fairly successfully enlisted the tribesmen of the peninsula,
even to the extent of clothing them with uniforms, this does not
mean that Cairo enjoyed no success with the people of the region.
Their military prowess was dismissed: they were absolutely useless
as soldiers.' 22 Moreover, during an engagement in the Sinai in
November 1915 a well-known Bedouin leader in the area, Sheikh
Ridalla Selim Dadur, was killed and this event had a great effect
23so that for a time the local Arabs did not trouble the British.
20 'Report re Turkish military preparations and political intrigues
having an attack on Egypt as their object' by P. P. Graves 10
Nov. 191k, WO 157/689.
21 'Notes on Arabs south of Gaza, Beersheba and Dead Sea to Aqaba
and east of the Sinai frontier' by Newcombe, no date, WO 157/689.
22 Summary of intelligence for the period 1k to 21 Dec. 1915,
WO 157/689. The tribesmen did not want uniforms as they feared
they might be enlisted for operations elsewhere, but the Turks
gave modern rifles only if uniforms were wornL
23 Official History, p.72.
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As it turned out, this very leader had been responsible for several
mine-laying raids against the Canal: it was a fairly frequent
occurrence for the Turks to utilise mixed forces of regular troops
and Arab auxiliaries in the Sinai. But not all the Bedouin of the
peninsula were satisfied with the Turks. For example, in December
1915 General Maxwell informed Kitchener that Hamid El Sufid Pasha
of El Arish wanted to change sides because he was tired of the
Turks, and he was bringing 3,000 Bedouin with him.2f
The soldiers tended to be most enthusiastic about Arab tribes-
men if they seemed to offer the possibility of direct co-operation
of some kind with a particular operation. For example, Lord Cromer
had suggested as early as October 191k that a raid of some kind
might be made against the Hejaz railway in the vicinity of Maan.25
The most suitable way to execute such a plan would be through an
amphibious landing at Aqaba in the Sinai. Caliwell in November
suggested occupying Aqaba with a small force in order to encourage
the local Arabs 26 Early in January this idea was taken up again,
for an advance from Aqaba to Maan still looked attractive to some
at the War Office. 27 Maxwell lacked enthusiasm for such an operation,
however, because he believed that it did not offer much in the way
of returns for the British war-effort. One cannot but agree, since
until the Arabs of the Hejaz openly declared themselves in revolt
against the Turks this railway was not very important, in that its
2k Maxwell to Kitchener 31 Dec. 1915, FO 371/2668/868.
25 Memorandum by Cromer respecting the steps to be taken in event
of war with Turkey 16 Oct. 191k, CAB 37/121/12k.
26 Note by Callwell 28 Nov. 191k, WO 106/1k69.
27 'Syria' by Capt. Skeffington-Sxnyth Jan. 1915, WO 106/1569.
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chief strategic role was to connect Medina, where there was a
trag Ottoman garrison, with yria.28
For those who advocated a landing in the vicinity of Haifa
the prospect of assistance from the Maronites and Druse tribesmen
seemed real enough, even to the extent of possibly produding a
force of up to 20,000 rifles 29
 Hopes of support from the peoples
of Syria, however, proved to be somewhat overoptimistic; in this
area, at least, the prewar experts were incorrect. The Druse did
not prove to be the asset that had been expected and Egypt began
to receive reports that those of them around Lebanon would probably
ride with the Turks in January. 3° By March it was clear that many
Druse tribesmen were actually enlisting at Damascus to serve
alongside Turkish troops as volunteers. 31 Indeed, so long as there
was no serious British incursion into Syria there was little
chance of gaining allies from among the Druse and Maronites, for
these peoples were much more vulnerable to Turkish reprisals than
the nomadic Arabs to the east, whom Djemal Pasha would have to
find before he could punish.
As attention in London and Egypt switched to the Alexandretta
region of Syria enthusiasm for obtaining the support of local
people was rekindled. For example, a detailed examination of all
the different nationalities in the region was made; they included
a tribe which worshipped the genital organs I Fortunately these were
28 Arthur, p.153. Maxwell to Kitchener k Dec. 191k.
29 'Syria' by Skeffington-Smyth, op.cit.
30 'The Lebanon' 8 Jan. 1915, WO 157/689.
31 Vice-Consul P. Abela to Consul-General Cumberbatch 11 Mar.
1915, L/P&S/91/136.
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not the only people in the area, since Kurds lived locally and
were believed to be pro-British, while Armenians could provide
guides although their desire to fight was not so encouraging, as
they probably wished to 'pay off old scores.' Significantly, the
scale of help that could be expected from these peoples was
thought to be small, largely involving 'guerilla help' to any
32British force.	 Other evaluations in Egypt, however, were more
optimistic than this, argng that the local Armenians might be
able to raise a force of k - 5,000 rifles, while followers of the
Aga Khan in the vicinity would obey instructions issued by their
leader. Yet far more was hoped for even than this:
We have been informed.., that the Germans in command
in Syria dread nothing so much as a landing by us in
the North of Syria - they say themselves that this
would be followed by a general defection of their
Arab troops. There is no doubt that this fear is well-
founded, and that a general Arab revolt, directed by
the pan Arab military league would be the immediate
result of our occupation of Alexandretta following on
a defeat of the Turkish forces in the South. 33
Hopes of a defection by Turkey's Arab regular troops were to prove
illusory, for Constantinople was aware of the danger and moved
these men to other fronts. Indeed, many hopes were to be dashed
during the coming months.
Nonetheless, information being received still appeared to
give grounds for optimism about Arab action until July 1915. For
example, in February McMahon actually confessed to Grey that he
was concerned about a general revolt breaking out in Syria and so
forcing London's hand prematurely into a permanent occupation of
32 Notes on Alexandretta: supplied by Catoni & Kennedy 20 Jan.
1915, WO 157/689.
33 Paper by Intelligence Department, Cairo 5 Jan. 1915, Clayton
pc.pers 69k/3/7.
149
3kthe country.	 By April, moreover, there even talk of the Sherif
of Mecca moving up from the Hejaz in order to 'have a hand in the
conquest of Syria.' 35 Meanwhile, encouraging news was received of
Nun Shalaan in June; apparently he had sent word to the Arabs of
the Jerusalem area, who had chosen to side with the Turks, 'pointin
out to them that the part they are taking in this war is altogether
against the interests of the Arabs.' 6
 Cairo was most impressed by
the importance of Nun Shalaan in the middle of 1915; the
generally accepted opinion appears to have been that if Britain
intended any action in Syria then preliminary moves ought to be
made 'to gain the hearts' of the nomadic Arabs and especially
Nun Shalaan's.37
These encouraging reports led some to devise remarkably
ambitious plans involving the use of Arab irregulars in Syria. In
June, for instance, Captain Bray, an Arab expert, suggested that
Damascus could be seized by an exclusively Arab force if this had
been trained and organized initially by British officers, since
the city was exposed to the east, a direction from which the Turks
did not expect an attack. The beauty of Bray's scheme was that
British prestige would not be adversely affected if the attempt
failed or the occupation proved only temporary; on the other hand,
any such action would be a source of 'great embarrassment' to both
the Turks and Germans. 8 Bray's suggestions were significant, for
3k McMahon to Grey 15 Feb. 1915, FO 371/2k80/23865.
35 Presented in Apr. 1915 by Syrians in Cairo, Clayton papers
69k/3/kl.
36 Intelligence Summary 3 June 1915, Wa 157/692.
37 Intelligence Summary 12 July 1915, WO 157/693.
38 Memorandum by Capt. Bray 30 June 1915, L/P&S/11/9k/2520.
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they included an important point: effective Arab action could be
expected only if British officers were able to train the tribesmen
and Bray had recommended this being done by using officers from
the campaign in Mesopotamia where direct contact with some Arabs
was possible.39
Unfortunately, British experience of Arab tribesmen in
Mesopotamia was unfavourable and this influenced the attitudes of
many to these unusual allies. What is more, when the Turks
invaded Aden in 1915 the British despatched a small expeditionary
force to assist the friendly Arab chief in the area only to find
on arrival that this leader had decided to join the Turks.
Expressing his frustration at this kind of behaviour, Caliwell
explained his real feelings in a letter to Henry Wilson in July:
'It is very tiresome of the Arabs that when you go out depending
on them to be on your side, they turn out to be on the enemy's
side - one's appreciation of the military situation then turns
out to be faulty.'	 Herein lay the true problem for the British:
there existed a massive cultural chasm between nomadic Arab tribes-
men who came and went as they pleased and English staff officers
who expected all operations to be conducted according to a strict
timetable. Ideally, of course, Cairo would have preferred' the
active co-operation of groups such as the Naronites or the
educated urban Arabs of Syria, for they would have understood
British requests - but these peoples were too much under the
thumb of their Turkish masters. Moreover, it was possible for the
39 Ibid.
kO Caliwell to Henry Wilson 9 July 1915, Henry Wilson papers
73/1 / 18.
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British to misinterpret anformation they collected as to Arab
attitudes in Syria as a result; in fact, much of the disaffection
amongst Syrians in the Turkish army was caused by a desire for
better pay rather than revolutionary enthusiasm and many Arabs in
the armed forces found security there that they had never known
previously.
THE ARABS AND THE EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI
In October 1915 British relations with the Arabs of the
Ottoman Empire seemed to have reached something of a watershed.
At the Dardanelles Committee on 21 October 1915 Kitchener explained
to his colleagues that if they could be assured of Arab support
this would 'assist immensely' the British war.effort. At this
meeting there was some talk of offering the Arabs Baghdad, which
the Committee hoped might soon be captured, in order to win them
over, because Grey believed they were 'at the parting of the ways
whether to act with the Turks or against them.12 Although
mention was made of the committee of Arab officers in the Turkish
army who, it was thought, 'knew what they were talking about', the
British were, in fact, already in secret negotiation with a senior
Arab leader, the Sherif of Mecca.
Sherif Hussein was an important figure for a number of
reasons. He was the ruler of the Hejaz that contained two of Islam's
holiest places, Mecca and Medina. Moreover, Hussein was descended
from Mohammed himself, the founder of Islam. The geographical
Li. i Information from Turkish prisoners of war at Aden 23 July 1915,
Sykep papers.
k2 Dardane].les Committee meeting 21 Oct. 1915, CAB k2/k/15.
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location of his territory was significant in that it included a
vast expanse of the Red Sea coast past which British ships had to
pass on the way to the Suez Canal, and the Hejaz railway that kept
the Turkish garrisons of western Arabia in touch with Syria.13
When McMahon had arrived lb gypt in January 1915 he was under
instructions from the Foreign Office to foster friendship with the
Sherif after Kitchener had authorised a message being sent to the
ruler of the Hejaz on the day Turkey declared war on Britain in
which Hussein was promised the independence of his own territory
and that of the Arabs generally if he actively supported London in
the conflict. Hussein had declined to declare himself openly
against Turkey as early as this, but he did do Egypt a great
service by refusing to support the proclamation of a Holy War,
thus hugely reducing its effect. However, by the middle of 1915 he
reopened negotiations and tried to extract from the High
Commissioner a guarantee that Britain would support the independence
of all Arab lands if they were to revolt against Turkish rule.
By October, therefore, McMahon informed London that the
Sherif was unhappy with London's attitude which he felt was luke-
warm, for the High Commissioner had declined to make any specific
promises. Maxwell was none too happy with this state of affairs,
either, for he believed Britain should encourage Hussein to act.1
Meanwhile, at Gallipoli an Arab officer serving with the Turks,
Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi, deserted to the British. Early in
October he talked with Clayton and McMahon in Egypt and told them
11.3 For additional arguments of the Sherif's importance see
G. Troeller, 'Ibn Said and Sliarif Husain: a comparison in
importance in the early years of the First World War',
Historical Journal, XIV (1971), pp.627-33.
114 Arthur, pp.218-9. Maxwell to Kitchener 27 Sept. 1915.
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of Arab secret societies in the Turkish army, which, he claimed,
were very strong. He alleged that the Turks and Germans were already
negotiating with these societies, who were favourable to Britain,
but wanted a definite statement of sympathy from London. Faruqi
explained that the Sherif was in contact with these groups but was
uneasy about the general situation and wanted tangible offers from
the British. Finally, and this was the key, Faruqi admitted that
if London rejected the Arabs row, or even delayed, then they would
go over to the enemy. Maxwell reported these opinions to Kitchener
and added his own conclusion: 'the active assistance which the
Arabs would render in return for our support would be of the
greatest value in Arabia and Mesopotamia, Syria and paiestine.k5
McMahon was enthusiastic as well, telling the Foreign Office that
the Arabs seemed 'ready to work actively with us, which will
greatly influence the course of Mesopotamia and Syrian campaigns.k6
A further factor added a still greater degree of urgency to the
Arab question: at Gallipoli by the middle of October all was not
well and the possibility of a withdrawal had been raised, so that
General Hamilton asked for any assistance from Arabs in the
k7Ottoman Empire that could be encouraged.	 For a while there
appeared to be some likelihood of this, because there were many
Arab soldiers in the Turkish ranks at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia
14.5 Paraphrase GOC Egypt to Secretary of State for War, FO 371/
2k86/1 50309.
14-6 McMahon to F.O. 18 Oct. 1915, FO 371/214-86/153014.5. It is not
clear what McNahon means here by the 'Syrian' campaign, unless
he is thinking of a possible landing at Alexandretta.
k7 E. Kedourie, The Chatham House version and other Middle
Eastern studies (London, 1970), p.1k.
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and Kitchener, for one, was keen to seek to win them over to the
k8
British side.	 Speaking about these events nearly a year later
McMahon gave some inkling of the pressure he had been under from
the military authorities to engineer an Arab revolt: 'We had
nothing to do with it; we were forced to do it at the military
request, to assist Gallipoli and Mesopotamia and also as a relief
for Egypt." Mention of Egypt is significant for it was thought
that if the Arabs joined the Allies this would greatly decrease
the importance of an attack upon the Canal in the autumn and
50
winter of 1915.
And so we return to the Dardanelles Committee meeting of
21 October 1915 at which, as a result of these events, Grey
authorised McMahon to make Hussein an offer of an 'independent
Arabia'. 51 The High Commissioner subsequently wrote to the Sherif
agreeing to recognize the independence of the Arabs within
certain areas and according to certain reservations that have been
disputed ever since. What concerns us here is not the precise
nature of these assurances, but rather the value that the British
military attached to Arab assistance in the autumn and the extent
to which they were prepared to go in order to obtain it.
k8 Minute by Kitchener, no date, FO 371/2k86/15kk23.
k9 Conference at Ismailia laSept. 1916, wa 158/602.
50 Memorandum by Aubrey Herbert 30 Oct. 1915, MSS Eur F 112/110.
51 Dardanelles Committee meeting 21 Oct. 1915, op.cit.
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Meanwhile, other developments were to emphasize til1 further
in the minds of the men in London and Cairo the importance of the
Arab factor. Any Arab movement against Turkey would involve the
interests of France in Syria, so the British now considered it
necessary to enter into talks with Paris to define the precise
claims of both countries in the Middle East. Mark Sykes was there-
fore deputed to negotiate with a French diplomat, Georges Picot,
and come to an agreement prior to any Arab action. Again the exact
details of what later became known as the Sykes-Picot treaty do
not concern us here, except to say that it divided the Middle East
into a complicated series of spheres of influence, which included
the claims of Russia as well as those of Britain and France. What
was important about these events, so far as we are concerned, was
the urgency of the situation, because London remained desperate
for an agreement as soon as possible so that it could move the
Arabs with French approval. This militarily dictated urgency
unsettled some at the Foreign Office who believed that Picot was
using this as a lever to force London to accept France's
'preposterous claims' in the region. 52 It was in Picot's interests
to play down the scale and strength of Arab nationalism, and this,
in a remarkable way, actually encouraged some in London to believe
even more fervently in the Arabs' potential influence. Callwell,
on learning of Picot's comments, informed the Foreign Office that
this movement had 'great force' and there was 'a chance.., of
using it as a powerful weapon against the Turks', and he knew this
because he had access to information from Cairo that Paris knew
52 Minute by U.R.C. 11 Dec. 1915, FO 371/2k86/189073.
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nothing of.53
With the possibility of Arab action having quite suddenly
become a major issue for the strategists in London we ought not
to be surprised that many now began to speculate as how best they
could facilitate an Arab revolt. Although it was hoped that the
Sherif possessed sufficient authority to declare a revolt, the
strategists looked to Syria, not the Hejaz, for tangible Arab
co-operation. Developments were anticipated in Syria in the coming
months: it was thought likely that Turkish forces would soon start
to move down from the Dardanelles and into Syria, with the result
that any potential Arab movement must be crushed. So Wingate could
state in mid-November that 'a revolt in Syria... cannot be
5k
successful without our active military co-operation.'
	
The
question arose, consequently, what military co-operation would
most successfully assist the Arabs.
The immediate alternatives suggested were a direct invasion
by land from Egypt into Syria, an expedition to Aqaba and a landing
on the Syrian coast. According to Major Gabriel, who submitted two
memoranda in mid-November, an attack at Alexandretta offered the
best prospect of all: from here, he argued, the southward thrust
of the Turks could be halted and the Arab revolt controlled and
organized. 55 Colonel Parker, who had been involved in the early
negotiations with Picot before Sykes took them over, also urged
53 Note on the Arab movement by Caliwell 29 Nov. 1915,
FO 371/2k86/189073.
5k Governor-General, Khartoum to Clayton, Cairo 15 Nov. 1915,
FO 882/12/117157.
55 Memoranda by Maj. Gabriel 13 and 17 Nov. 1915,
P0 371/2k86/177016.
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action at Alexandretta, but he recommended an initial advance into
Syria by land by one division to attract any Turkish reinforcements
away from northern Syria before the assault on Alexandretta took
place. 6 Gertrude Bell hoped that operations at Alexandretta would
enable Aleppo to be seized on behalf of the Arabs. 57
 Additional
emphasis was given to action at Alexandretta by the fear of
Turkish moves to massacre the Christian population of Syria and so
prevent any possible co-operation between these peoples and the
58Arab Moslems of the region.
Strong arguments were presented in favour of an amphibious
attack on the Syrian coast to support the Arab cause, therefore.
So convinced was McMahon that he told the Foreign Office on the
last day of November that if no such action were taken it would
'jeopardise any attempt to secure Arab co-operation.' 59 The
decision finally taken to defend Egypt along the line of the Suez
Canal was extremely unpopular among those who aw potential in an
Arab revolt. But they did not give up. In fact, Clayton in Egypt
argued that securing the Arabs' friendship was now 'rendered more
important' although it would, of course, be much harder, since
their confidence in eventual British success would be seriously
60impaired. He explained precisely why he held these views in a
56 Note on Arab movement by A. C. Parker. Covering letter
22 Nov. 1915, P0 371/2k86/177016.
57 G. Bell to Lord Cromer 29 Nov. 1915, WO 79/6k.
58 McMahon to Grey 28 Nov. 1915, CAB 37/138/23.
59 NcMahon to P.O. 30 Nov. 1915, P0 371/2k86/18183k.
60 Notes by Clayton 8 Dec. 1915, P0 882/2.
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letter to Colonel Parker on 10 December 1915:
I think rather too much stress has been laid on
what I may call the 'positive' advantages of an
alliance with the Arabs, and that the very great
'negative' advantages of denying them to the
Germans and Turks have been rather overlooked. 61
As the General Staff began seriously to examine the defence of
Egypt they realized that this, too, had an Arab dimension, for if
the enemy could obtain sufficient camels from nomadic tribes of
Arabia they might be able to cross the Sinai in force by the central
or southern routes, thereby avoiding Qatia altogether. This was a
most worrying possibility, and made the 'co-operation, or other-
wise, of the Arab tribes with the enemy... a factor of extreme
importance.. 62
Discussion of Arab affairs did not end with the decision to
defend Egypt at the Canal, therefore, In London, moreover, Sykes
gave a great boost to this subject when he was called to give
evidence at the War Committee early in December. Although he argued
passionately for an offensive from Egypt by land to assist the
Arabs, a course of action that was extremely unlikely given the
current strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean, Sykes
succeeded in getting the committee members talking of offensive
action in Syria once more. He clearly impressed them with the
importance and urgency of the Arab question. Perhaps most important
of all, Sykes made a most significant observation about Arab
nationalism: the 'spiritual fire' of this movement lay in Arabia,
61 Clayton to Parker 10 Dec. 1915, Sykes papers.
62 'Notes on the War Office Estimate of rate of Turkish movement
from Constantinople to Palestine', Murray papers 79/48/3.
1I9
he argued, but the 'intellect and organizing power' lay in yria.6
From now on the British would have to rely upon this 'spiritual
fire' for, by remaining at the Canal, they had forfeited any
chance of exploiting the 'intellect and organizing power' of
Syria.
63 Evidence of N. Sykes on the Arab Question 16 Dec. 1915,
CAB k2/6/1O and War Committee meeting 16 Dec. 1915, CAB k2/6/9.
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HAF'T} 8
JRRAY ASSUMES CO+IMAND IN EGYPT: JANUARY - APRIL 1916
And the Egyptians will I give into the hand of a cruel lord; and a
fierce king shall rule over them, saith the Lord, the Lord of hosts.'
Isaiah 19 v 4
CONFUSION IN EGYPT: JANUARY - MARCH 1916
Affairs in Egypt were nothing short of chaotic early in January of
1916. Troops poured into the country from Gallipoli; and into this
confused mass of soldiers, sailors and civilians came the GHQ of the
MEF. 1	 In fact, the MEF had been under the impression that they
would take over Egypt on arrival;
	 but they were soon to discover
otherwise. 2 General Maxwell would have none of it; he claimed he
had not been informed of any such scheme by London, and the War Office
soon confirmed that Maxwell was to remain in command of all troops in
Egypt until the arrival of General Murray. This was a far from
satisfactory state of affairs for the MEFs staff since once they
arrived In Egypt they - and all their troops - passed under Maxwell's
control;	 hence, they found themselves in a position of some
'embarrassment and impotence' with their own usefulness having been
reduced 'almost to zero'. Such a state of affairs created a
dangerous paralysis at the highest level of the MEF: 'Here in Egypt
is absolute chaos, and nothing can be done until Murray arrives with
definite instructions'. 	 Even If the MEF's staff had wanted to work
they could not as they discovered with some horror that they had no
furniture In the offices assigned to them. Nor did they take kindly
to the atmosphere of idleness which seemed to pervade Cairo and the
insensitivity to the events at the Dardanelles; for on the night of
the final evacuation of the peninsula (8 January 1916) a dance was
1	 Official History, p. 154, gives some idea of the great number of
troops entering the country, but it fails to describe the
confusion at the highest level or the condition of the men.
* Clayton to Wingate 1 Jan. 1916, Wingate papers 136/1/35.
•	 W.D. GHQ MEF 1-3 Jan. 1916,W.O. 95/4360.
Brig.-Gen. Koe to Long 3 Jan. 1916W.O. 107/22.
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held at the very hotel in which the MEF's staff were staying! •
The number of troops entering the country almost daily during the
first six weeks of the New Year caused all sorts of problems and gave
an unreal air to the Egyptian towns. It was thought there were now
as many as 90 generals in the country; indeed, so prevalent did these
senior officers appear to be that they had 'to be treated just like
men' with the result that they were soon forming queues at tram
stations, for example. With so many different units disembarking
at the same time lines of communications between their various
commands could become strained; and this is what happened, for India
lost contact with the GOC of its own troops in Egypt and had to ask
Maxwell for help to contact him!
	 Even if troops were landed in
Egypt according to orders (while still in contact with their GHQ)
problems could arise. One Indian unit, for instance, unloaded its
men minus their kits, because these had been badly loaded and to
unpack them would waste too much time as the ships were on their way
to Basra. •	 Events like these were not conducive to administrative
efficiency or swift reorganisation; in fact, the MEF was still
further handicapped by its complete ignorance of Egyptian
peculiarities and consequently found itself swamped by paper work.
But there was a still more serious problem arising in Egypt - lack
of food. By the end of January the MEF was 'living rather from hand
to mouth' and soon discovered that it was short of bread and hay. °
4 & 8 Jan. 1916, W.0. 95/4360.
S S. de V. Loder to Father 4 Feb. 1916,	 Loder papers.	 Note 10
Jan. 1916, Wirigate papers 136/1/63.
7 C in C India to GOC Egypt 21 Jan. 1916, L/MIL/17/5/3908.
Adjutant General in India to GOC, Force 'D' 31 Dec. 1915,
L/MIL/ 17/5/3908.
9 Clayton to Wingate 17 Jan. 1916,Wingate papers 136/1/96. GHQ MEF
3 Feb. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
I0 Brig. -Gen. F. Koe to Director of Supplies and Transport, War Office
25 Jan. 1916, W.O. 107/22.
So serious did the situation become that the military authorities in
Egypt had to order massive shipments of food from India in March
because existing facilities in Egypt simply could not cope with the
influx of fighting troops from the Dardanelles. 11
Into this 'maelstrom' came Murray on 8 January 1916 and he
succeeded to command of the M E F two days later. 12 Although his
arrival sent a sigh of relief through the MEF staff it did not end the
existing confusion automatically. For one thing, Murray found he had
no GHQ to stay at and was forced to accept the hospitality of the High
Commissioner until he could establish his GHQ about two miles from
Ismailia in a French hospital on the Suez Canal on 22 January. '
Murray reached Egypt armed with instructions intended to outline
precisely what his role was to be; 	 this was precisely what they did
not do! Sir Archibald himself later described his instructions as
'considerably indefinite', which is a most interesting criticism since
he actually drafted them himself under the close supervision of Lord
Kitchener, and In the face of the opposition of the CIGS who still
believed they were unworkable in practice. 1 The Secretary of
State's instructions placed Murray in command of the troops assembling
and refitting in Egypt and made him responsible for the safety of the
Suez Canal.	 Their fatal flaw lay in the arrangements to be made with
General Maxwell and the already existing Force in Egypt: 	 Murray
was 'to make his own arrangements' with
11 CGS India to G.O.A. L.B., Cairo 18 Mar. 1916, L/MIL/17/5/3910.
12 Murray diary 8 & 10 Jan. 1916.	 The Official History (p.95)
incorrectly gives the date of his arrival as 9 Jan. 1916.
13 McMahon to Grey 11 Jan. 1916, FO 800/48.
1* Lecture by Murray at Aldershot 23 Feb. 1932, Murray papers
79/48/3.	 Robertson to Aitham 10 Jan. 1916,	 Robertson papers
1/35/3.	 Robertson to Edmonds 29 Dec. 1925, CAB 45/80.
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Sir John as to which troops were to remain under the Force in Egypt's
supervision and as to the line of demarcation between the two forces.
" In fact, matters were potentially still more complex even than
this, as Egypt actually contained a third command, the Levant Base;
however, in this area at least the instructions were clear - General
Aitham and his command were to come under Murray's jurisdiction.
A scheme such as this which envisaged a dual command in Egypt
could only have worked at all if there had existed a surfeit of good-
will between the two generals concerned.	 Unfortunately, this was not
the case.	 Maxwell was furious that everyone else in Egypt seemed to
have been informed of the new scheme except himself and he felt that
because Murray was to be independent he ought to resign. 	 This was
hardly an auspicious start - and things soon deteriorated. 	 Maxwell
complained to all his friends: he told Wingate that he was 'very
hurt' at the way he had been treated, while to General Rawlinson he
allowed some of his bitterness towards Murray to emerge: 'I am in a
back wash. Murray has for some occult reason been sent here to take
the bread out of my mouth.' 17 These personal feelings - smouldering
below the surface for the present - would soon erupt and make any co-
operation between the two men almost impossible. 	 But for the moment
all seemed tranquil officially.
	 On 12 January the two men held a
conference and outlined the precise details of their respective
spheres of command apparently without any friction. 0 Murray was
obviously pleased with the results of this conference for two days
later he informed Robertson that he now had a 'satisfactory division
of responsibility' with Maxwell. '
	
In fact, he had 'shown every
'	 Official History, p.95.
16 Arthur, p. 239.
17 Maxwell to Wingate 22 Jan 1916, Wingate papers 199/1/135.
ie 'Extract from Proceedings of Conference held on 12 Jan. 1916',
W.O. 158/601.
'	 Chief Medforce to GIGS 14 Jan. 1916, W.O. 95/4360.
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desire to meet Maxwell's wishes', according to McMahon; but a further
fly was about to make itself felt in the ointment. Maxwell refused
to accept the agreement already drawn up because Murray had been
awarded the temporary rank of full General, thus making him senior to
Maxwell, and it was only when McMahon managed to gain a similiar
concession for Sir John that the agreement was again operational. 20
Although Maxwell did not realise it he was in fact using up the
last vestiges of support that existed for him in London by these
disruptive tactics. Kitchener had wanted to keep him in Egypt to
guide the country through a difficult time by making use of his great
experience of Egyptian idiosyncrasies and in this argument he had been
supported by Grey, and McMahori in Egypt. 21 However, the High
Commissioner had become exasperated by Maxwell's behaviour compared to
that of the more dignified Murray - and he reported this to Grey.
More serious still for
	 Sir John was the attitude of Kitchener, which
had begun to change, as Robertson explained to Murray: 'Between
ourselves Lord K. is about tired of Maxwell and if there is any more
bother there may be a change.' 22
More trouble there certainly was. Although the CIGS had told
Murray that 'if anyone can make it a go you will' it soon became clear
the dual command of Egypt could not function with one of the two
commanders actively frustrating the arrangement. 23 Maxwell caused
friction between the two men by trying to hold on to control of the
53rd and 54th Divisions even though the CIGS made it clear to him that
these were to be released to Murray when he requested them. 24 In
the words of the 1€F's War Diary, this proved that he was 'anxious to
keep as many troops under his own control as possible and very loath
20 McMahon to Grey 15 Jan. 1916 and Grey to McMahon 18 Jan 1916,
FO 800/48.
' Robertson to Altham 10 Jan. 1916, Robertson papers 1/35/3.
2Z Robertson to Murray 26 Jan 1916, BM Add. MS 52461.
Ibid.
a. Chief London to Chief Superflux 12 Feb. 1916, W.0. 95/4361.
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to give them up once he has got them.' Meanwhile, with two
commanders and two staffs in the country farcical situations could
arise; as, for example, the soldier who was assigned to a base depot
by the MEF which, for matters of discipline alone, was under the Force
in Egypt, so that when the man committed a crime he was tried by
Maxwell's men but committed to a prison administered by the MEF on the
order of Sir John himself! 2S The ironies of the situation were not
lost upon the troops themselves and some of them even committed their
opinions to paper in the form of verse - a fact of which Robertson was
aware because he showed Bonar Law a mock creed parodying the position
of the three generals in Egypt, Murray, Maxwell and Aitham:
So Maxwell is GOC, Murray is GOC and Aitham is GOC. And yet there
cannot be three COG's but one GOC. So likewise Maxwell Is
boss, Murray is boss and Altham is boss... f or Murray descended
into Alexandria: rose again the second day with a disordered
brain: he ascended into Cairo: he sitteth on the top of Maxwell
hitherto COG almighty: whence he shall come to take troops, the
trained and the untrained.
Clearly the structure of command in Egypt was causing the generals to
lose the respect of their men - an intolerable state of affairs.
Maxwell was not averse to complaining to the GIGS of the problems
he faced in Egypt; but Murray, a pouter and more cultured man, was
more restrained and tried to give the impression that matters could be
successfully sorted out. • Robertson, who had never liked the
arrangement, was especially concerned about what might happen if there
was any serious fighting with the Turks at the Canal: 'I am horrified
14 Feb. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
Murray to Maxwell 21 Feb. 1916, BM Add. MS 52461.
27 Robertson to Bonar Law 24 Feb. 1916, Bon4r Law papers 52/3/25.
2 Maxwell to Robertson 8 Feb. 1916, Robertson papers 1/35/85.
Murray Robertson 7 Feb. 1916, BM Add. MS 52461.
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as to the idea of what might happen In that event.'
	 He therefore
asked both men for their opinions as to the suitability of the
arrangement and was pleased to receive the desired response:
	 the
current situation was not acceptable. •° Suitably strengthened by
the opinions of both generals the CIGS was able to abolish the dual
command system in Egypt and General Murray took over as the commander
of all troops In the country.
	 This change brought with it a number
of further reorganisatlons: the MEF and the Force in Egypt were
renamed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, while the Levant Base soon
ceased to exist and General Altham became the EEF's Inspector General
of Communications.	 It had been hoped to appoint Brigadier-General
Asser to Murray's HQ to work alongside McMahon and be responsible for
Internal affairs and the supervision of martial law.
	 However Asser
was not available so Kitchener suggested Lieutenant-Colonel Clayton.
•	 Murray and McMahon agreed to the appointment of Clayton; but in
so doing they made a serious error that would cause increasing trouble
in the future. It was not that Clayton was unsuitable for the job;
the problem was that he now had far too many responsibilities and soon
found himself dangerously over-worked because of this additional
burden.	 This was far more serious than it at first appeared, for
Murray's command was now enormous and he would rely heavily upon those
who clearly had experience of the internal workings of Egypt.
	 A
tension	 existed,	 therefore,	 between the demands
	 of	 the
2 Robertson to Maxwell 21 Feb. 1916, Robertson papers 1/35/86.
•O Draft letter by Robertson to Murray and Maxwell 24 Feb. 1916,
Robertson papers 1/32/6/1. Official History (p.96) gives the
impression relations between the two generals were good and seems
to suggest that dual command was ended because of administrative
difficulties when, In fact, Robertson's real concern was the
defence of Egypt In the east.
$1 F.O. to McMahon 7 Mar. 1916 and F.O. to McMahon 13 Mar. 1916,FO
800/48.
* Clayton to WIngate 31 Mar. 1916, Wingate papers 136/3/92.
Clayton had a remarkable number of additional responsibilities:
head of Political Intelligence, liaison with staff of Naval C In
C, Wingate's representative In Egypt, and he even supervised the
Arab Bureau.
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administration of Egypt and Murray's desire to prosecute matters
vigorously on his eastern front. However, at this stage he had
little Inclination to be involved in Egyptian politics and saw his
role as quite distinct:	 'Whoever commands in Egypt should, during
war, live and command from outside Cairo, where he can be in touch
with his fighting troops.' • Clayton, whose office was in Cairo,
therefore, had to travel to the EEF GHQ at Ismailia once a week in
order to brief Sir Archibald, which was hardly an ideal state of
affairs for either of them. • For the moment this arrangement just
about worked, but when hostilities opened on the eastern front once
again it would start to fall apart and force the C In C to make
further changes.
When Murray was made the sole commander of Egypt he inherited the
direction of the campaign against the Senussi on the western frontier.
Although we are not here concerned with the events in the Western
Desert in any detail they deserve mention, since they added
significantly to the C in C's already onerous burdens. In fact, he
later described the campaign in the following terms: 'Though it
never realised at home, I am quite sure that in 1916 the Senussi
problem was equally, If not more, important than the Turkish problem
in Sinai.' U Murray soon discovered that he had to acquainjhlmself
with affairs in the Western Desert and issue orders to his forces
there - forces which, of course, had previously been under Maxwell's
exclusive control.	 On 23 March 1916, therefore, he had a conference
with the officers concerned at Cairo to outline future policy against
the Senussi. • This, In itself, was significant; the campaign in
the Western Desert would draw Murray away from the eastern front and
make his job still more complicated as he sought to prosecute an
energetic advance in the Sinai.
	 In fact, when the EEF fought its
first serious engagement in the Sinai at QatIc in April the C in C
• Murray to Robertson 29 Feb. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/8.
a4 Clayton to Wlngate 31 Mar. 1916, Wingate papers 136/3/93.
3 Aldershot lecture by Murray, op.clt.
•	 Notes on a visit to Cairo on 23 Mar. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
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was actually on the western front inspecting his men and had to dash
back across Egypt. ' While the campaign against the Senussi
continued to demand attention even into 1917 affairs in the Sudan
caused concern to the British and forced Murray to consider them also.
A further demand upon Sir Archibald's attention was made by the
British forces at Salonica. Kitchener's instructions allocated
Murray 'general supervision' of these troops; but as to exactly what
this meant nobody was quite sure. • Murray may, in fact, have been
under the impression that he was expected to take full command in
Greece, for while he was in transit to Egypt from London he actually
telegraphed the War Office about sending additional troops to
Salonica. 40 However, matters were soon to crystalise. On 9
January Murray was informed that General Sarrail would command the
British force in Greece operationally; Egypt's role would be purely
admInistrative. 41	 Nevertheless, the administrative supervision of
any campaign is onerous, especially if It is removed from the
officiating GHQ by the Mediterranean!	 Salonica was no exception and
Murray later commented that this extra burden on his staff was
'extremely heavy'. 	 42 Nor were matters greatly facilitated by some
confusion over telegrams between Egypt and Salonica. a Murray's
involvement with administrative matters in Macedonia lasted until
September 1916 when the campaign therefinally became independent.
,7 Murray diary 23 & 24 Apr. 1916.
Notes on a visit to Cairo on 23 Mar. 1916, op.cit.
9 Official History, p.95.
4° 2 Jan. 1916, W.O. 95/4360.
4 Chief London to Gen. Mahon 10 Jan. 1916, W.O. 95/4360.
4* A. Murray, Sir Archibald Murray's despatches 	 <London, 1920),
First Despatch. 1 June 1916, p.30.
4 Chief Medforce to Chief SalonIca 12 Feb. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
Gen. Mahon in Salonica was intriic+c4 to repeat all his telegrams
to London to Egypt, but he did not always do this.
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MURRAY RESTORES ORDER
Along with the instructions signed by Lord Kitchener General
Murray also brought an additional set penned by the CIGS. Robertson
explained that Murray was to regard his forces as 'a general
strategical reserve for the Empire' since it was still not clear
exactly where the Turks might strike next; however, he reminded his
colleague that France was still the main theatre of war, so that once
the situation in the east had been cleared up after the confusion of
the evacuation of the Dardanelles, no more troops should be retained
in Egypt than would be 'absolutely necessary'.
	 In the meantime, he
was to reorganise and refit all the troops in Egypt and prepare them
for the field. These instructions were almost the very first
piece of staff work drawn up by the new CIGS and reflect his
determination to extend his authority over military affairs generally;
in fact, he demanded a daily communiqué from Murray each evening
'whether there is anything special to report or not' and rounded off
the whole memorandum in the following terms: 	 'All communications
regarding military operations.., should be addressed to me.'
Robertson's instructions were not in the least bit ambiguous,
therefore, unlike those by Kitchener. Murray could be in no doubt
as to what was expected of him, consequently, and he promptly got on
with the job with a great deal of success.
In many ways Murray was regarded as an ideal choice for this new
job. He was considered to be an excellent trainer of men and arrived
in Egypt preceded by his reputation as a 'brilliant' soldier; indeed,
one can detect in the reaction to his arrival amongst some of the men
in Egypt a certain degree of awe at the presence of this man
Supplementary Instructions to Sir A. Murray from Sir W. Robertson
29 Dec. 1910 Official History, pp.99-100.
Instructions to Murray 31 Nov. 1916, Murray papers 79/48/3.
This would appear to be the final version of the text quoted in
the Official History and it includes orders that are not present
in the Official History's version.
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who only recently had been at the head of British military planning.
4 Meanwhile, the enemy certainly saw his appointment as a very wise
attempt to sort out the confusion in Egypt:
A strong arm was needed to restore order and to put an end to the
present state of affairs... General Murray is famous f or his
strictness and military spirit. Whether even he will be able to
cleanse the Augean stable Is doubtful.
Murray set about his huge task with energy and enthusiasm.. On
only 20 January 1916 he Issued orders that set the tone of his command
in Egypt:
he [Murray] trusts that everyone will.., be so fully employed in
training himself for war that the sight of large numbers of
officers and men walking about the streets and sitting about in
hotels and cafés all hours of the day with apparently nothing to
do will be a thing of the past. '
Murray combined strict orders with a vigorous series of inspections
throughout Egypt designed to stimulate his troops. Nor did he
stop at only orders and inspections in his determination to sort out
the chaos in Egypt; 	 he took action of a most definite nature -
attendance at the races was prohibited f or British military personnel
and the hotels In Cairo were cleared of inactive officers. °
Although he was a staff officer himself, Murray was especially severe
on any of his units that had a surplus of such officers and instituted
an examination as to their employment. ' 	 It is hard f or us looking
Derby to Bonar Law 1 Oct. 1917, 	 Bonar Law papers 82/5/1.
Elgood, p. 229.
'	 Extract from 'Daily Review of the Foreign Press' 1 Apr. 1916.
From 'Krleg Zeitung, Murray papers 79/48/3.
' GHQ, MEF to GOC all Army Corps. 20 Jan. 1916, W.0. 95/4360.
' Murray diary 31 Jan. - 3 Feb. 1916.
° Loder to Father 29 July 1916, BM Add. !' 52461.
Murray to Robertson 15 Apr. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/20.
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back upon these events to understand the kind of impact that Sir
Archibald had upon Egypt in the early months of 1916 - but an impact
he certainly did have and it was something like General Allenby's when
he first arrived in the same country in June 1917. Indeed, Murray's
own contemporaries were quite clear as to his achievements, Robertson,
not a man given to hyperbole, expressed his admiration in the middle
of February in the following glowing terms: 	 'You are simply doing
wonders, and in a few weeks all will be well I am sure. 	 It is a very
good thing you were sent out.'	 Nor was the GIGS alone in noticing
these attainments. Lloyd George praised Murray to the War Committee
for the way in which the 'slack state of affairs' in Egypt had been
'improved' under his liership. '
In his reorganisation of the troops massing In Egypt Murray soon
discovered that some units could not be treated with the sort of
thoroughness he would have liked because of Imperial politics. The
ex-CIGS had a significant number of Australian and New Zealand troops
under his command early in 1916 and his experiences of these men led
him to adopt a somewhat ambiguous opinion as to their value: 'Their
magniflc 2ánt physique and inherent soldierly qualities were... greatly
marred by their indiscipline and resentment of authority.' "
Indiscipline there certainly was; this was one reason for Murray's
decision to move the Australian troops then in Cairo out to a camp at
Tel el Kebir, since such a move would decrease the spread of venereal
disease amongst the men caused by their contact with Egyptian
prostitutes; in fact there was also talk of a more serious infection
.4
amongst the troopscerebro-spInal-meningitIs. which, It was thought,
might be more easily contracted in a city. The population of
Cairo breathed a sigh of relief when the Australians left; they had
come to regard these soldiers as 'a kind of wild beast and only
F2 Robertson to Murray 16 Feb. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/3.
War Committee meeting 11 July 1916, CAB 42/16/5.
F4 Murray to Editor, 'The Times' 1 Apr. 1937, Murray papers 79148/4.
' Murray to Force in Egypt 20 Jan. 1916 and Memorandum by N.R.
House, Director of Medical Services 16 Jan. 1916, W.0. 95/4360.
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partially human' - but they were not alone in their utter failure to
comprehend or control these men f or 1 as one observer admitted: 'Nobody
knows in the least how to deal with them, their own officers
included.'
Because Murray was so determined to enforce strict discipline upon
the men under his command it is hardly surprising that he became an
unpopular figure with the Australians - a fact which is reflected In
the many Australian accounts of this period. Nevertheless, his
methods were undoubtedly justified and absolutely necessary if the
Australian and New Zealand troops were to be prepared for further
action. Murray was determined not only to enforce military
discipline amongst these men, but also to reorganise their units,
Egypt was receiving so many Australian troops that these could not be
absorbed into existing units; on the other hand, they needed to be
assigned to formations 'with the least possible delay, both f or
reasons of discipline and training'.	 He had spoken to General
Birdwood and they had agreed that with the extra troops two new
Australian divisions should be formed. • Robertson, in London,
viewed these developments with some concern and he impressed upon
Murray that he did not want an Australian Army formed just yet, but
wanted something 'more flexible'. As a loyal subordinate the new
Chief of the MEF agreed not to raise this subject himself and only
passed on to Birdwood Robertson's promise that he would consider the
subject of an army in the future.	 S	 In fact, Murray went out of
his way not to offend Australian susceptibilities by showing Birdwood
the contents of this very letter from the CIGS. ' Murray was
dependent upon Birdwood for any contact with the Australian Government
at this stage and he had agreed to allow Birdwood to negotiate the
matter of the two new divisions on his behalf. 	 He need not have
Loder to Mother 29 Feb. 1916, Loder papers.
W7 Chief Medforce to Chief London 21 Jan. 1916, W.O. 95/4360.
Robertson to Murray 26 Jan. 1916 and Murray to Robertson no date,
BM Add. MS 52461.
Birdwood to Fitzgerald 7 Feb. 1916, PRO 30/57/64.
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worried, f or he was soon informed of their agreement. 0 But New
Zealand did not always fit in with the wishes of Australia and Sir
Archibald began to experience the problems of dealing with two
separate governments (in addition to that of London) and Wellington
demanded new information before it would sanction the formation of two
more Australian divisions. I Meanwhile, it was agreed to place
Birdwood in general administrative control of all the Australian
troops and to appoint him commander of the first ANZAC Corps, with
General Godley to have the second.	 However1 even these steps
could not be taken for granted. Robertson telegraphed Egypt and
explained that Godley was not popular with the Australian authorities
and since their Prime Minister was at that very moment in London the
timing was all wrong for such an appointment. 	 Murray was not over
joyed by this turn of affairs; he considered Godley to have done well
and believed that the whole matter was one of internal politics. In
fact, Godley was close to Wellington and since there was a certain
degree of jealousy between the two governments this was not a popular
position. •
Birdwood was not fully satisfied with all that had happened; he
still cherished hopes of an Australian Army and he now started to push
for an Australian Army HQ in London. 64 Blrdwood had expressed his
fear that Murray intended to seize control of the Australian and New
Zealand troops in Egypt. This was precisely what Murray hoped for
when Birdwood went to France with the First ANZAC Corps in March thus
enabling Egypt to deal directly with the Australian and New Zealand
governments and not via an intermediary. •6 Blrdwood objected to
this and sought to retain control of the Australian troops in Egypt
which led Murray to express some exasperation at the General's
behaviour:	 'He wants to remain at the end of the war
° Murray diary 4 Feb. 1916.
Trooper to Chief Medforce 5 Feb. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
Chief Medforce 8 Feb. 1916, W.O. 9514361.
C3 Robertson to Murray 7 Mar. 1916. 	 Murray to Robertson 9 Mar.
1916, W.O. 95/4361.
'4 Birdwood to Fitzgerald 17 Mar. 1916, PRO 30/57/64.
•6 14 Mar. 1916. 21 Mar. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
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everything to Australia and New Zealand if he can gather it out of
Godley's hands.' • 	 Indeed, the whole affair had created a certain
air of distrust between Murray and the Australians. He was now
extremely suspicious of Birdwood's motives - a feeling that lasted
deep into 1916 so that in August we find him complaining to the CIGS:
'1 have indisputable proof that Birdwood has been trying to get GHQ in
France to agitate to have some of my ANZAC Mounted Division
reinforcements sent to France. • • Personal animosity and distrust
of this kind inflamed an already extremely complex and sensitive
matter - and Murray was to experience further problems with the
Australian authorities and troops in spite of his realisation that
they needed 'peculiar handling' by a general 'full of tact.'
Reorganisation, training and re-fitting of the disparate bodies in
Egypt was not Murray's only role in the first months of 1916. His
instructions also clearly laid out that he was to retain no more men
in the country than was absolutely necessary - and this was precisely
what he set out to do. 	 Even if he had not been especially
enthusiastic about this aspect of his new Job the CIGS left him in no
doubt as to its urgency. As early as 9 February Robertson instructed
his subordinate to forecast which six divisions he could transfer if
needed since it was hoped some of them might be ready in March.
It is hardly surprising that the CIGS was so concerned about getting
men moved from Egypt, for there were between three and four hundred
thousand troops in the country - a fact which did not escape the
notice of Britain's allies, thereby causing Robertson some
embarrassment. 70 There has been much criticism of this concentration
" Murray to Robertson 23 Mar. 1916, BM Add. MS 52462.
Chief Egypforce to Chief London 22 Aug. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
0 Egypt to CIGS 21 Oct. 1916, W.O. 33/905.
E Gen. Robertson to Gen. Murray 9 Feb. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
70 Loder to Mother 26 Mar. 1916; Henry Wilson diary 7 Apr. 1916.
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of forces in Egypt 1 but we need to remember the positive benefits of
such a policy; it enabled Egypt to be used as a 'remarkable centre'
from where debilitated troops could be recouped and then redistributed
to 'the corners of the world and 'my general reserve', as Robertson
called it, actually did work, so that when pressure began to build up
at Verdun and the French started to cry out for greater British
efforts on the Western front, he could promise five divisions from
Egypt.
Robertson and Murray certainly could not be criticised for holding
men in Egypt for too long or of taking an over-cautious attitude
toward the security oc thc.t country; on the contrary, both remained
committed to the demands of France,and when Murray learnt of London's
need for men he reassured the GIGS that he would 'spare... every man
from here... even if we have to run some risks.' 7 This was no idle
promise by Murray; Robertson soon expressed his delight at the way in
which Egypt kept sending men home - but the EEF's staff were not
nearly so pleased by this kind of loyalty, for they were aware of the
true extent to which Murray really was risking things in Egypt.
Clayton, for example, complained that men were leaving the country so
rapidly that the number would soon be down to the 'irreducible
minimum' needed for the internal security of a country containing many
potential spies and enemy agents. 74 Indeed, Murray himself became
concerned about this problem and even feared a crisis in Egypt similar
to that of the current troubles in Ireland. 7	 And yet, loyal to his
friend and colleague in London, the Chief of the EEF
4o MMr	 15 Mar. iqi., g It3* paitrs
71 G. MacMunn, Behind the scenes in many wars (London, 1930), p.202.L
7* Murray to Robertson 26 Mar 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/16.
1$ Robertson to Murray 3 May 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/24.
74 Clayton to Wingate 29 May 1916, Wingate papers 136/6/153.
' Murray to Robertson 26 May 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/29.
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continued to despatch troops to France so that by July over 232,000
men had been sent to other theatres - a remarkable achievement and one
that lends force to the argument that attention should be given to the
speed with which soldiers were moved from Egypt rather thanAthe huge
numbers stationed there. In fact, of the fourteeen divisions that
were formed in Egypt, six had gone before the end of April and another
four had left by the end of June; and it should be remembered
divisions were taken according to their value, so that the best troops
were denied to Murray, who found himself left with only four
Territorial divisions. So well had Murray done his Job of
clearing Egypt that he became worried about his own future in the
country, expecting to be replaced and sent home with some of his men.
Robertson, however, would have none of this and reassured him as to
the security of his position early in June:
	 'I must again repeat how
glad I am to have you in Egypt. We feel that matters have improved
enormously since you went there and we are gradually beginning to find
out how we really stand.' "
But Murray had correctly ascertained that by June the command in Egypt
had reached the end of a phase; its role as a strategic reserve for
the empire was over, and from on now most of its attention would be
fixed upon the Sinai.
7' Murray Despatches.	 4th Despatch. 28 June 1917, p. 136. Official
History, pp. 97-98.7? Murray to Robertson 6 June 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/31 and
Robertson to Murray 7 June 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/33.
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DEFENDING EGYPT IN EARLY 1916
Robertson's instructions for Murray had, as we have already seen,
made it clear that Egypt lay very much within the overall make-up of
imperial strategy and the large numbers of men in the country
accentuated the importance of Egypt to the Allied cause.
Consequently, Egypt was discussed at some length in London in the
early days of 1916. The attraction of the subject was simply the
sheer number of men in the country which, it was felt, might be used
offensively in the east before they had to be returned to France.
This was the way Balf our's mind started to work at the War Committee;
he felt Britain needed 'a great succest' in Egypt and believed that it
was possible to 'reconcile vigorous action in the East in the early
spring, and a sufficiency of men f or operations on the Western Front'.
Balf our received some support from Lloyd George who wanted the
military to 'sit tight' in France and take the offensive in either
Egypt, Mesopotamia or Salonica. 7	 Baif our had outlined his thoughts
in more detail in a memorandum dated 27 December 1915; in it he
deprecated a merely passive defence of Egypt since this would allow
the Turks to bring troops through Syria and so massacre the Syrian
Christians and bring the Arabs to heel;	 his answer was to keep
sufficient forces in the country to 'smash' its enemy. Nor was
Baif our the only man thinking along these lines in London, for Mark
Sykes saw the large forces in Egypt as a tremendous asset for
Britain's position in the East: 'At present our best political and
military assets of an Oriental kind lie in Egypt, where a large army
maintains our prestige and causes us to be regarded as potential
aggressors.' •o Sykes wanted a Viceroy appointed in Egypt to co-
ordinate British policy at every level for the MEF, Mesopotamia, Egypt
and Arabia and to ease co-operation with her Allies in the region.
In fact, he believed that the concentration in Egypt was already
71 War Committee meeting 13 Jan. 1916, CAB 42/7/5.
7 Memorandum by Balf our 27 Dec. 1915, CAB 42/7/5.
•• Memorandum by Sykes 30 Jan 1916, Esher papers ESHR 4/6.
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having an impact in the region and he was under the impression that
the secret negotiations he was then engaged upon with the French were
the prelude to a military offensive into Syria from Egypt. *1
Unfortunately, those advocates of an offensive from Egypt in
London were to be frustrated by military practicalities and the
demands of other fronts. As far as Kitchener was concerned, for
example, Baif our's plan to shift troops across the Mediterranean was
totally impracticable,for it failed to take account of the inadequate
shipping available and the enormity of the task envisaged, as he
explained: 'Again, the First Lord does not seem to realise the amount
of time required to re-equip the troops, to transport them from Egypt
to France, and to prepare an attack on a great scale.' $2'
And if Baif our had seen the scenes of chaos that greeted Murray's
arrival in Egypt it is almost certain he would not have advocated
plans that - unbeknown to him at the time - were quite impracticable.
Other factors also militated against the offensive use of the
troops in Egypt. The very nature of Robertson's policy of an
imperial strategic reserve meant that Egypt only had temporary use of
the men within its frontiers; 	 and these same men could be removed
from the country with astonishing rapidity. We have already seen how
the crisis at Verdun caused the GIGS to call upon Murray's troops
almost immediately - and Verdun was not the only crisis facing the
Allies in the early months of 1916. At the meeting of the War
Committee on 26 January, for instance, Chamberlain, and then Baif our,
both pushed for troops to be sent to Mesopotamia from Egypt in the
$1 R. Adelson, Mark Sykes:
	 portrait of an amateur (London, 1975),
p. 202.
•2' Note by Secretary of State for War 8 Jan. 1916, CAB 42/7/5.
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light of the need to defend Kut after the pyrrhic victory at
Ctesiphon. • The 13th Division was actually despatched to
Mesopotamia from Egypt on 15 February, but only after it had been re-
fitted and inspected to everyone's satisfaction in Egypt- aquite
superb piece of organisation done under 'exceptional sttess'. •4
India was also in need of troops; at the War Committee on the very
last day of February the decision was taken to designate two divisions
for transfer to the Subcontinent 'in the event of a general rising on
the frontier accompanied by hostilities on the part of Afghanistan'.
H These divisions were never actually shipped to India, for the
demands of the Western Front soon swallowed them, but the subject was
raised again in April and once again it was affirmed that two
divisions were 'earmarked' for India. • 	 Since an offensive was not
possible attention inevitably switched to the Canal front in Egypt.
Kitchener's instructions to Murray had made it clear that the
security of Egypt was to be a priority f or téhe new commander, and the
most immediate way in which he could perform this duty was by
completing the defensive works already started by General Maxwell.
Although the official account leads us to believe that the work upon
the Canal Defences was 'fast progressing' when Sir Archibald took them
under his charge this is not the impression one receives from the
contemporary accounts. •i On 26 3anuary, two days after the MEF took
over the Canal Defences, Murray inspected some of the positions and
confided to his diary a damning indictment of the work already done in
these words: 'very backward' •	 He therefore threw himself into a
frantic attempt to finish what had been started and modify what he
disliked.	 In order to hasten the work he embarked upon a rigorous
programme of personal tours of inspection which he greatly enjoyed:
H War Committee meeting 26 Jan. 1916, CAB 42/7/13.
•4 C.E. Caliwell, The life of Sir Stpnley Maude
	
(London, 1920),
pp. 192-194.	 Murray diary 14 Feb. 1916.
3f War Committee meeting 29 Feb. 1916, CAB 42/9/7.
War Committee meeting 7 April 1916, CAB 42/12/7.
3? Official History, p. 155.
H Murray Diary 26 Jan. 1916.
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'This long eastern front wants a soldier, and an active one. I am in
the desert on an average three or four hours a day, much to the
benefit of my health and, I think, the defences.' •
Much of Murray's travelling about the Canal was done, not in a staff
car, but in the saddle: 'I have never been so fit in my life as I am
now', was his comment upon this aspect of his work. 9° He combined
these lightning tours with a series of orders designed to pass on to
his officers the need for urgency. In his enthusiasm he may have
expected a little too much from some of his subordinates, but he
certainly instilled a fresh sense of energy into the proceedings.
Of course there were still many problems. It was no easy job to
build trenches in the sand of Sinai and nobody quite realised what it
meant to support troops in such conditions beyond the Immediate
vicinity of the Canal - but these were difficulties that could be
overcome given time and the luxury of an absent enemy; having solved
these problems, moreover, Murray and his staff would be able to move
their men into the heart of Sinai some months later.
Although Murray inherited the scheme of defence instituted by
Maxwell he nevertheless stamped his own personality very firmly upon
It and was not afraid to make changes where changes were needed. He
divided the Canal Defences Into three sections and made sure each
section reported to GHQ daily. 3 As to the actual siting of the
defensive works themselves he was concerned kf the experiences of
the Western Front led to undue emphasis upon concealment and
entrenchment, thus obscuring the opportunity 'for inflicting the
greatest loss on an advancing enemy, and for supporting an active
9 Murray to Robertson 29 Feb. 1916,
	 Robertson papers 1/32/8.
90 Murray to Robertson 21 Feb. 1916,
	 Robertson papers 1/32/5.
91 Brig.-Gen. Koe to Director of Supplies W.O. 24 Jan. 1916.
	 Murray
clearly was not 'a very tired man' as the Australian Official
History (p.335) claims about this period of his command.
9Z Report of Engineer Works in Egypt,
	 Murray papers 79/48/2.
93 Force Order No.3 by Murray 27 Jan. 1916,
	 Murray papers79/48/3.
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defence'. Murray remained dissatisfied with a merely passive
defence of the Canal and as time passed and it began to seem less and
less likely that there might be a serious attack upon Egypt he made
more drastic alterations to the scheme of defence. This time he
outlined a defensive system based upon mobility; the first line was
only to be held in outposts while a newly-constituted Mobile Force
would now form the basis of the defence. H
These efforts to modify the defensive scheme he inherited from
Maxwell reflect a basic antipathy on Murray's part f or the whole
concept of the Suez Canal Defences. He described them as 'wasteful'
to Robertson in the middle of February and it is hard to disagree with
this assessment when one discovers that in 1917 groups of labourers
were employed for many months in dismantling the works themselves and
salving the machinery and water piping. H While it probably is true
that the construction of the defensive preparations along the Canal
are 'of value as a military and administrative study' and have perhaps
been unfairly overshadowed by the more dramatic crossing of the Sinai,
neither of these points of view can have been of much comfort to Sir
Archibald either at the time or afterwards. 7 In fact, perhaps the
greatest value of the work done upon the defences lay in the
experience that Murray's men gained of life in the Sinai desert -
experience that would prove invaluable in the months ahead. Somewhat
less obviously it also seems that the construction of defences on
Egypt's eastern border helped to unite the country to a certain extent,
f or the Sultan actually offered to help pay for the work! •5
94 Lynden-Bell to GOC ANZAC Army Corps 10 Feb. 1916, W.0. 95/4361.
H Memorandum from GHQ MEF to Corps. Principles with regard to
defence by Lynden-Bell 6 Mar. 1916, W.O. 158/892.
Murray to CIGS 15 Feb. 1916, 	 W.O. 95/4361.	 Report on Water
Supply, Murray papers 79/48/2.
97 MacMunn, pp.200-201. MacMunn was an expert in logistics and
obviously found the subject of great interest, which explains why
he covers it in such great detail in the Official History, pp.89-
94.
9* McM4ho to F.O. 30 Jan. 1916, FO 371/2671/18728. The Sultan
offered £500,000 but, in fact, the Egyptian finances could not
cope with such a sum according to McMahon; so much for Egyptian
generosity!
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The decision to strengthen the Canal Defences was based upon an
assessment of Turkish intentions and capabilities that Murray
inherited on his arrival in Egypt. The basic expectation was of an
attack upon the country by as many as 250,000 of the enemy; but, as
Murray later admitted, this estimate was 'by no means certain'.
Moreover, he now began to receive reports that called it seriously
into question. For example, the railway that the Turks had begun to
construct up to and beyond Beersheba in 1915 and had caused such
consternation in London no longer appeared as such a threat under
closer examination; it had only been built, it seemed, to meet local
needs in the area and not to threaten Egypt. aoo	 In fact, opinions
were starting to be aired that the so-called Turkish preparations for
an attack were 'only a blind'. Nor were affairs in Syria
favourable f or the massing of such an attack - reports of serious food
shortages and disturbances reached the British and made it seem
unlikely that the Turks could support an army of anywhere near 250,000
in the country.
And yet, not everyone was convinced. General Birdwood felt sure
that such apparent preparations would not be made without some
intention to attack - especially since this was not the Teutonic way
of doing things: 'I do not think the Germans would make the elaborate
arrangements they have done f or months past now without meaning
business.' IO Fear of the German influence upon the Turks was
great; this was caused partly by reports of big guns being sent by
Berlin towards Egypt, and also by concern over the completion of the
Ammans tunnel which was due to be opened in March, thus making the
direct route from Germany to Syria via the Baghdad railway far easier
when the tunnels through the Taurus were finished - and there
99 Murray Despatches. First Despatch 1 June 1916, p. 10.
100 Intelligence Memorandum.	 The Turkish railway to the Egyptian
Frontier. 12 Ian. 1916,
	
W.0. 157/700.
Rodd to Grey 15 Jan. 1916. FO 371/2767/1477.
102 Statement of Shakir ibn Raji Mahniud Niamah.	 19 Sept. 1916,
L/P+S/I1/112/4459.	 Intelligence Summary 5, 11 Jan. 1916.
10, Birdwood to Hankey 13 Feb. 1916, Hankey papers HNKY 4/8.
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was information that work on these had been renewed. t04 But Egypt
need not have worried about the Baghdad railway, for its capacity was
soon absorbed in moving troops towards the Caucasus and not Egypt.
The Grand Duke Nicholas had been conducting a successful campaign and
on 15 February he captured the fortress of Erzerum, and then in April
he took Trebizond, a harbour on the Black Sea coast. 	 These events
naturally caused the Turks to turn their attention away from Egypt.
tOE	 Moreover, there were also fresh indications that the enemy was
actually massing men for a fresh advance in Mesopotamia. 106
Somewhat ironically the British need not have worried unduly about
German influence upon the Turks. In reality the Germans were
'woefully short of factual information' about the situation in Egypt
and were not even aware of the new Canal Defences. ID?	 Nor could
Berlin bend Constantinople to its way of thinking as easily as the
British often assumed;	 on the contrary, there was considerable
friction between the Germans and Turks at this time caused by serious
disagreements as to strategy. Berlin seemed none too enthusiastic
about a further attempt upon Egypt, at least at the present, and would
not release the necessary troops the Turks demanded for such an
operation. O$	 Nevertheless, such a project was still 'slumbering'
in the minds of the strategists in Berlin and the British picked
up some evidence that an attack might be made in the summer - a piece
of information that would prove totally accurate. •09
104 R.V. Stewart to Fitzgerald 3 Jan. 1916, PRO 30/57/48.	 •Note on
the Railway from Adana to Beersheba with a view to possible
demolition '
	
by Clayton	 16	 Jan.	 1916,	 W.O.	 158/923.
Intelligence Summary 9 Jan. 1916, W.O. 157/700.
•	 Murray Despatches, First Despatch 1 June 1916, p. 13.	 Official
History, p. 159.
06 
'Criticism of the Turkish attack on Egypt' 8 Jan. 1916, 	 W.O.
106/714. Notes by Col. Bird 10 Jan. 1916, W. 0. 106/885:
'Evidence is accumulating that theT,rco-Germans mean to make a
greater effort in Mesopotamia than against Egypt.'
107 Weber, pp. 180-181.
i.e W.D. Intelligence Section 9 Feb. 1916, 	 W.O. 157/701.
t	 Weber, p. 179.	 Mr. Findlay to Grey 8 Feb. 1916, CAB 37/143/22.
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THE FIRST MOVES INTO THE SINAI
Even though much of Murray's time was taken up in reorganising
troops, despatching them to France and completing the Canal Defences
he had his eyes fixed on a more ambitious scheme: 'From the day I
landed in Egypt I always had in view the reoccupation of the whole of
the Sinai Peninsula.' $10	 This was a 'stupendous conception' and
beyond the bounds of duty, f or his orders were merely to make Egypt
secure - nothing had been said about an advance of this kind. 111 As
early as 25 January 1916 he informed Robertson that 'the occupation of
El Arish itself seems to me one of the principal essentials in
connection with the defence of Egypt from the East. 112 In fact, he
and his staff now began to consider the possibility of an early
movement towards El Arish; it was thought that a move might be made
to the Qatia region by a force of one division and two mounted
brigades after which a further advance could be attempted upon El
Arish with the additional aid of supply by s&¼ along the Sinai coast.
I3 However, the Royal Navy did not waste much time is squashing
such a plan since, In their considered opinion, the coast was not
suitable for the loading of supplies and any advance towards El Arish
would, therefore, have to rely upon a railway being constructed across
the Sinai. 11+
With these fresh developments in mind Murray wrote to Robertson
early in February and explained that he hoped to make the occupation
of Qatia possible by running a railway to it from Qantara; and then
his objective would be El Arish if the line could be still
I0 Aldershot lecture by Murray, op.cit.
Elgood, p.229.
" Murray to CIGS 25 Ian. 1916, W.O. 95/4360.
11$ Dawnay to CGS 30 Jan. 1916,Murray papers 79/48/3, 	 Proceedings
of Joint Naval and Military Conference, 31 Jan. 1916,
	 W.0.
95/436 1.
I4 Proceedings of Joint Naval and Military Conference, 4 Feb. 1916,
W.0. 95/4361.
185
further extended, '' He followed this private letter with a long
official memorandum to the CIGS dated 15 February in which he outlined
his intentions for the future and explained his requirements; in this
appreciation Murray repeated his aims as expressed in his private
letter earlier in the month to push on for Qatia, with El Arish as
his ultimate objective. However1 he now described in more detail
exactly what he intended at El Arish - a permanent base to halt any
advances towards Egypt and from which 'rapid offensive operation&
could be launched against enemy concentrations in southern Palestine.
This appreciation remained the corner-stone of all Murray's thinking
upon the defence of Egypt and he referred to it again and again
throughout his time as C in C of the EEF. Crucially, he estimated
the number of divisions he would need to make the country secure on
the eastern front - four divisions and three mounted brigades all at
full strength was the requirement, he believed. '' Sir Archibald's
keen desire to get on the offensive in the Sinai can be judged by a
subsequent request he made of the GIGS; although he remained loyal to
the demands of London whenever divisions were taken from him he
nevertheless asked if he might keep one good division for the push on
Qatia. ii? London's response to Egypt's plans was encouraging as far
as the occupation of Qatia was concerned, but the occupation of El
Arish was considered 'a doubtful matter' by the CIGS and he would look
at it again later. '' The occupation of Qatia appealed to London
because they picked up Murray's argument that its capture would reduce
the threat to Egypt and so enable the War Office to transfer troops
rapidly from Murray's command to France; and, of course, it
' I ' Murray to Robertson 7 Feb. 1916, BM Add. MS 52462.
C Murray to Robertson 15 Feb. 1916, W.O. 95/4361. The Official
History (pp. 170-174) repeats the full text of this appreciation
but fails to mention the planning for an advance to El Arish prior
to this.
"7 Murray to Robertson 21 Feb. 1916,Robertson papers 1/32/5.	 This
request was denied by the CIGS.
uS Chief London to Chief Medforce 27 Feb. 1916.
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was the policy that had been recommended to Maxwell by the War Office
at the end of 1915. '1
Meanwhile, the troops in Egypt were steeling themselves for an
advance into the Sinai and even Maxwell - about to leave the country -
caught something of the general enthusiasm Instilled by the new
Chief's determination to act offensively, because he wrote to a
friend: 'Murray can now exercise his undoubted abilities on visionary
possibilities.' 120	 The railway line from Quantara was soon begun
and in four weeks sixteen miles had been laid. Once it started to
proceed beyond the outer rim of the new defences at the Canal it
became necessary to establish permanent positions to protect the line
from enemy attack.	 The troops of the 5th Mounted Brigade under
Brigadier-General Wiggins were assigned this task.	 GHQ saw this as
an excellent opportunity to get the Yeomanry 'acquainted with the
country' and their horses accustomed to the conditions; in fact,
nobody was quite sure how far the mounted troops could even operate in
such conditions, so the staff at Ismailla were anxious to learn the
truth. Indeed, one needs to remember that during these early
days in the Sinai GHQ was forced into an experimental period as it
tried to ascertain just what the men could do under desert conditions,
a fact that is given still more significance by a comment of Murray's
that he had been told operations in the Sinai after 1 April were
Impossible. '
Numbers necessary for the defence of Egypt, Feb. 1916, 	 W.O.
106/713. This paper contains a handwritten note outlining the
timetable for the withdrawal of divisions from Egypt until 1 June
1916 which more or less became the policy followed.
120 Maxwell to Wilson 16 Mar. 1916, 	 Henry Wilson papers73/1/20.
•a, Reconnaissance of Qatio 	 by Dawnay 15 Mar. 1916,W.O. 95/4361.
Reconnaissance of Urn Mukjheit 16 Mar. 1916, V.0. 95/4520.
122. Murray to Robertson 25 Apr. 1916, 	 Robertson papers 1/32/22.
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In the early days of April confidence was high at GHQ. The C in C
declared himself 'pleased' with the reconnaissance work done and
expressed his pleasure in still more glowing terms to Robertson: 'We
have been very active the last week or so... The Qatia District is
completely under our control and to the south we have pushed forward
reconnaissances... They are excellent training for the raw Yeomanry,'
' In fact, the Yeomanry had gone beyond Qati4 to Bir el Abd, a
position twenty miles further east and 'a very long way further than
anyone else has been', as one of their own number proudly confessed.
124 Meanwhile, the Australian Light Horse conducted a very
successful raid to Jif,Jafa where they captured an enemy well-boring
plant.
However, Murray soon discovered that he would not be allowed to
give all his attention to events in the Sinai, for happenings hundreds
of miles away were about to make some strange demands upon his
command. At the War Committee on 13 April Asquith told his
colleagues that Mark Sykes had confided to him that the Grand Duke was
nervous about the Turkish reinforcements descending upon his army.
The question therefore arose as to whether the British might be able
to arrange a diversion to assist their Russian allies, and Robertson
mentioned the possibility of 'some form of menace, possibly on the
Syrian Coast.' I2 The Russians were certainly hoping that London
might consider a landing at Alexandretta by troops stationed in Egypt,
for their Foreign Minister mentioned it 'more than once' to the
British ambassador early in April. 	 7	 The Alexandretta option wa
one that never seemed to die completely throughout 1916;	 Lloyd
George suggested it in January to aid the Russians while Pétain
12$ GHQ to 15th Corps. 4 Apr. 1916, W.O. 95/4362. 	 Murray to
Robertson 4 Apr. 1916, BM Add. MS 52461.
124 McGrigor Diary 2 Apr. 1916.
12C Official History, p. 160.
l2 War Committee meeting 13 Apr. 1916, CAB 42112/8.
12.7 Sir 0. Buchanan to F.0. 4 Apr. 1916, FO 371/2777/114891.
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mentioned it in a private conversation at the end of March. The
Russians continued to press for British action at Alexandretta all
through the month of April so that early in May the EEF found itself
having to consider such an operation seriously. In a long paper on
the subject D'nay rejected the scheme principally because it could
not guarantee success in drawing sufficient forces away from the
Russian front and would require eight divisions which could only be
obtained by diverting troops earmarked in Egypt for France and
utilising most of the British forces in Macedonia. 20 Robertson was
never going to countenance such a severe drain upon his resources,
especially since it might keep precious divisions from the Western
Front - an opinion shared by Joffre for the French.
Although London and Egypt rejected a major amphibious landing at
Alexandretta this was not the end of the affair for Murray. The
Russians needed a diversion and Sykes - ever inventive - suggested a
classic bluff; a base would be built at Cyprus in order to give the
Turks every Impression that the intention was to land troops in the
Alexandretta region ad so divert 30,000 additional enemy men to Syria
and away from the Grand Duke. Robertson liked the idea and asked
Sir Archibald to give an 'air of reality' to the preparations on
Cyprus on 14 AprIl. 132. Murray was not over-enthusiastic about this
scheme but he nonetheless made sure all was well organised; in fact,
the ruse was entered into in great detail with stores and cases being
marked 'Alexandretta' and false information deliberately being
12. T. Wilson (ed.), The political diaries of C. P. Scott. 1911-1928
(London, 1970), p. 177, 28 Jan. 1916. Repington, p. 160, 31 Mar.
1916.
120 Memorandum regarding operations in the Gulf of Iskanderun by
Dawnay, 3 May 1916,
	 W.0. 95/4362.
IO Military assistance for Russia by Robertson, no date, and Joffre
to CIGS 25 Apr. 1916, 	 CAB 42/13/2.
The potential offensive against the Ottoman Empire by Sykes 13
Apr. 1916,	 W.0. 106/731.
'	 Chief London to Chief Egyptforce 14 Apr. 1916,
	 W.0. 95/4362.
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spread by Egyptian Intelligence. ' Somewhat ironically, even
though the intention was to distract the Turks, the real effect of the
plan may have been to divert the attention of the EEF's GHQ at a
crucial time, for the battalion of troops assigned to Cyprus left
Egypt on 22 April 1916 with staff officers ordered to give the
impression the force was in fact far larger; but this was the day
before the defeat at Qatia and must have diverted some of GHQ's
attention.
The bluff at Cyprus was not the only way in which the Grand Duke's
demands for help affected Murray's operations. Robertson felt
constrained by Russia's pressure to stimulate the EEF to further
action in the Sinai since this was the only practical way in which
London could offer indirect military support to its ally. He
consequently started to take a keen interest in Murray's operations
around the Qatia region 'as the Russians are pressing us to do
everything in our power to retain the Turks in Asia Minor'. S4 But
other pressures were at work upon the CIGS; matters were coming to a
head at Kut and there now seemed no chance of saving the beleaguered
British garrison. As a consequence of this impending disaster
Robertson desperately sought help from his colleague in Egypt: 'any
success you can achieve during the next few days will be most
valuable.' ' Again the timing was all wrong; this request reached
Sir Archibald only two days after his cavalry had suffered a serious
reverse at Qatia, so there was no way in which he could fulfil the
GIGS's wishes for the moment. It is ironic that Murray's
determination to start an advance into Sinai as soon as possible
actually placed him under greater scrutiny from London and meant that
more was expected of him than he could ever offer.
1	 Note by Maj. Nugent 23 Apr. 1916. and Note 27 Apr. 1916, W.0.
157/ 703.
'$4 GIGS to GOC in C Egypt 13 Apr. 1916, W. 0. 106/715.
'•W Chief London to Chief Egyptforce 25 Apr. 1916, W.0. 95/4362.
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In spite of these mounting pressures upon the EEF Murray continued
with his intention of occupying Qatia. As early as the end of March
he made it plain to his subordinates that the capture of this position
was to be permanent and part of the extended defence of Egypt. "
By the middle of April, moreover, we find him informing Robertson that
he hoped to secure the Qatia area by the end of the same month. •WT
But Qatia was not intended solely as a defensive base; the EEF had
become increasingly concerned about the appearance of new German
aircraft which outclassed their own and, therefore, it hoped to create
an advanced landing ground at Qatia so that these machines could be
knocked out by a surprise RFC raid upon Beersheba where they were
based. '	 Enemy aerial activity had become increasingly intense and
regular raids upon shipping in the Suez Canal had caused some
consternation at GHQ; so much so, in fact, that the issue was
mentioned in a memorandum drawn up f or the War Committee meeting of 4
May. '' But this was a problem that continued to dog the EEF - and
it was a serious one, f or operations in the Sinai could be greatly
hampered by enemy aerial activity - until General Allenby succeeded to
its command .nd received from the War Office modern machines that gave
him the air supremacy Murray had always lacked.
GOC to 15th Army Corps 28 Mar. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 14 Apr. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
UI Conference at GHQ with RFC and Intelligence 19 Apr. 1916,W.0.
157/703.
I$ Memorandum on anti-aircraft guns, no date, CAB 42/13/4.
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THE SHOCK AT QATIA: 23 APRIL 1916
The first suggestion GHQ received that its troops beyond the
railhead might be in trouble was a wire from 52nd Division to the
effect that the infantry post at Dueldar was under attack. '° This
post was actually the least extended of the outposts covering the
railhead and news that it was being attacked did not bode well for the
mounted troops encamped to the east, a fact which was confirmed by a
message from General Lawrence, then in command of the No.3 Section
Canal Defence (under whose command the British troops being engaged
fell), who admitted that his men at Oghratina and Qatia were •in
difficulties' according to reports from Romani. " Oghratina, a
small oasis to the east of Qatia, marked the furthest eastward
extension of the EEF's men, and was held by two squadrons of the
Worcester Yeomanry, whileAQatia (a far larger oasis) one squadron of
the Gloucester Hussars was in place. 	 Perhaps crucially for the fate
of both outposts the Yeomanry each had dismounted detachments with
them. Meanwhile at Romani to the north of Qatia a force of
Gloucester Hussars was entrenched, but played no part in the
engagement.
In spite of the obviously developing battle around Qatia the
accounts which reached GHQ still remained 'not clear' throughout 23
April. '4	 This was reflected by a telegram that was despatched to
London that very day; in it mention was made of the attack upon
Dueidar and Qatla, but the impression given was that the Yeomanry had
managed to withdraw - an announcement that would soon be proved quite
wrong. 4' Although GHQ had only a sketchy idea of what was going on
in the Sinai it nevertheless sought to take some kind of action
immediately by ordering the RFC to bomb Qatia at dawn the following
23 Apr. 1916, W.O. 95/4362.
H.A. Lawrence to GHQ 23 Apr. 1916, W.0. 95/4362.
142 23 Apr. 1916, W.O. 157/703.
'4' 23 Apr. 1916, W.O.95/4362.
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day. 144 In fact, although much was later made of this aerial attack
as a way in which the EEF could retaliate at the enemy, the whole
affair was a fiasco; by the time the raid was made the Turks had left
the area and the planes actually bombed the Yeomanry's empty front
lines!
It was only during 24 April that GHQ began to realise what had
happened in the Sinai and in a second wire to London about the
engagement explained that the fighting seemed to have been 'of a more
severe nature than the first reports showed' in which the Yeomanry had
'suffered heavily' 14	 GHQ had been hampered during this crisis by
the absence of its Chief. On 23 April Murray had attended Holy
Communion at 7.30 a.m., for it was Easter Sunday (which lends strength
to the argument that this was a well-orchestrated Turkish operation
owing much to Teutonic thoroughness and not unlike the Arab attempt
to catch the Israelis off-guard on the Day of Atonement in 1973).
He left Ismailia by special train and travelled with a number of his
staff to a little-known station on Egypt's western frontier called El
Alamein to see off a column f or action against the Senussi.
According to his diary he did not receive news of the fighting until
24 April after which he immediately returned to Ismailia; and on 25
April he had a very early interview with General Lawrence to gain the
fullest details of exactly what had transpired. 147
This, then, was GHQ's perspective upon the action at Qatia;
but what actually happened in the Sinai, and why? One word is enough
to describe these events as far as the EEF is concerned:
144 GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 23 Apr. 1916, 	 W.O. 95/4362.
Murray Despatches, 1st Despatch 1 June 1916, p.27. Murray
described the raid as 'extremely successful' so that 'the enemy
was made to pay a heavy price' for the battle at Qatia. For the
real effects of this raid see Qatia Patrol Report, 25 Apr. 1916,
W.O. 95/4520.
A Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 24 April 1916, W.O. 95/4362.
'" Murray Dairy 23, 24 and 25 Apr. 1916.
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surprise.	 Although the official account goes out of its way to
defend the Yeomanry against any charges of laxity in defence it is not
wholly convincing. ' In reality, the truth was deliberately
obscured by the official historians who had been correctly informed
about the true course of the battle, thus leaving themselves open to
the charge of having produced an 'apologia' for the entire affair. '°
According to Kress von Kressenstein, he learnt of the progress of
the railway from Qantara in March, and led a 'reconnaissance In force'
against DueIdar and Qatia with about 3,500 men. 15$ Kress went to
great trouble to ensure that his men escaped detection by the RFC by
hiding them amongst palm trees, not pitching tents and moving by
night. 152	 Measures such as these enabled Kress to strike a blow
which 'for combined speed, skill, daring and success Is hardly to be
matched... in the campaign'. " Nonetheless, the RFC has picked up
evidence of Increased Turkish activity in the Sinai over the past
three weeks and on the evening of 22 April a report was made
suggesting that 'an advance on Qatia itself was impending'. 164
Since the enemy attack was made early on 23 April this warning may not
have been of much help to the Yeomanry even if they had received it -
which they do not seem to have done - although General Chauvel seems
to have got wind of this information. 185
Good though the preparations and execution of the enemy attack
" Official HIstory, p.169: 	 'ThIs information.., tends to relieve
the Yeomanry of the charge of having been completely surprised.'
'° Chaytor to Director, Historical Section Military Branch, 22 Oct.
1925, CAB 45/78.
'	 Kress von Kressenstein, art.cit., p.505. Official History, p.170.
152 GHQ to GOC No.3 SectIon, 6 May 1916, W.0. 95/4362.
'	 Official History, p.162.
RFC Weekly Summary 29 Apr. 1916,	 W.O. 157/703.
155 Hill, p.70. There seems to have been a break-down In
communications between GHQ and its forward units not unlike a
similiar failure which took place at the First Battle of Gaza.
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certainly were it was assisted by a series of miscalculations on the
part of the British.	 The Yeomanry probably did not give enough
attention to their own security; 	 they did not manage to keep the
enemy under observation and little had been done to prepare a
defensive position at Qatia when the battle finally commenced.
This failure was itself accentuated by a thick mist which helped to
conceal Kress's precise movements and prevented any RFC reconnaissance
flights.
The dispositions of the Yeomanry could also be criticised, as one
contemporary commented: 'Someone should surely get into trouble for
allowing a small force to be right out into the blue and not being
aware of the massing of the enemy.' ' There was little, if no,
communications between the isolated outposts at Qatia, Oghratlna and
Romani so that Kress was able to attack each one at his leisure.
These advanced posts were also too far forward,which made their rapid
reinforcement very difficult when they came under attack. Murray
himself had expressed the opinion in March that mounted troops could
be placed too far forward.
Both at Qatia and Oghratina the Yeomanry were overwhelmed by
superior numbers and heavier firepower - being forced to surrender
only after a stiff fight at both positions. And yet even then the
mounted troops were not doomed; they did have the opportunity of
escape because of their greater speed, but they did not take advantage
of this.	 After the battle Murray criticised his troops for holding
their position for too long and so allowing the bulk of their horses
to be shelled, thus making retreat impossible. ° It may have been
that the commanders at Qatia and Oghratina were concerned for the
detachments of engineers and dismounted details assigned to their
'	 Chaytor to Director, Historical Section 22 Oct. 1925, c cf
Loder to Father, 1 May, 1916, Loder papers.
181 McGrigor Diary 26 Apr. 1916.
18* Kearsey, p. 56.
'	 Lynden-Bell to GOC 9th Army Corps 6 Mar. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
160 Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 25 Apr. 1916, W.O. 95/4362,
Murray to Robertson 14 May 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/26.
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forces because to have evacuated their posts speedily would have meant
abandoning these men; however, when the equivalent units at Romani
and Dueidar retired from their posts they left behind the railway
construction party they were supposed to be protecting and when it
turned up at the railhead it was initially mistaken for a Turkish
unit! 161 Moreover, GHQ itself, although most critical of the
Yeomanry' s behaviour, may have been to a certain extent responsible
for it. While General Lawrence did not intend his cavalry to hold
their ground if heavily pressed at Qatia this was, nonetheless, the
ultimate objective of GHQ, as had been explained by Lynden-Bell at the
end of March: 'It is not intended to fight a mere delaying action in
that district (i.e. Qatia] as a preliminary to a main action along the
line of the Canal Defence.' 2 The aim was, as always, the
permanent occupation of Qatia and it is possible that the Worcester
and Gloucester Yeomanry may have been subconsciously influenced by
such orders even in April.
In sheer military terms the actions at Qatia, Oghratina and
Dueldar were small affairs, while the losses incurred by the EEF -
three and a half squadrons of Yeomanry - were hardly likely to
diminish the effectiveness of Murray's army. However, the Official
History is quite wrong to suggest that all of this had no effect,
except to delay the railways for a few days. On the contrary,
what took place on 23 April sent shock-waves through the EEF so that
some officers at GHQ found themselves performing a strange role a few
days later: 'The day was chiefly spent in endeavouring to counteract
the pernicious effect of several "panic" wires sent by officers... as
regards the Qatia fighting, to ladies and friends in Cairo.' 164
Because of these irresponsible actions the population of Egypt refused
to believe the official communiqués circulated by the EEF and the
popular belief remained that the British had been heavily
161 Chaytor to Director, Historical Section, Military Branch, 22 Oct.
1925, op cif.
'	 Lynden-Bell to GOC 15th Army Corps. 28 Mar. 1916, W.O. 95/4361.
163 Official History, p. 169.
164 26 Apr. 1916, W.O. 157/703.
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defeated. Although Lynden-Bell tried to put a brave face on things
and even suggested that the raids had 'bucked up' the British troops
who had begun to believe that the existence of the enemy was a 'myth'
his Chief'8 confidence had taken a serious knock.
	 , On the other
hand, the entire incident 'raised the confidence' of the Turkish
troops to 'a remarkable degree'. IC Quite remarkably the affair
gained an influence far beyond its importance In a country as volatile
as Egypt and the High Commissioner, then negotiating with the Sherif
of Mecca In an attempt to hasten his entry into the war on the Allied
side, could not detach himself from his surroundings. He therefore
telegraphed the Foreign Office and recommended an alteration in the
text of the next letter to be sent to Sherif Hussein in order that no
suggestion be given that the Turks had actually given up their
offensive intentions against Egypt,a line of argument fully supported
in London 'after the recent attack on us, and capture of our troops
within a few miles of the Canal.' '
Events at Qatia certainly made the EEF rethink Its tactics in the
Sinai and GHQ Instructed its forces to construct strong and 'self-
contained' outposts manned by infantry; the mounted troops were to
engage In constant reconnssance and only rest in their positions -
on no account were they to occupy trenches and so lose their mobility.
Meanwhile, Murray instituted an inquiry into the affair and
demanded detailed answers to nine precise questions about the events
of 23 April from General Lawrence's staff.
" Clayton to Wingate 29 May 1916, Wingate papers 136/6/154.
Australian Official History, p.q3.
' Djemal Pasha, p. 170.
167 McMahon to F.O. 3 May 1916.	 Minute by GRC 4 May 1916 	 FO
371/2768/84129.
' S GHQ to GOC 9th Army Corps, 2nd ANZAC, No.3 Section 26 Apr. 1916,
W.O. 95/4362.
" GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 30 Apr. 1916, W.O. 95/4362.
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The lessons of this 'lamentable occurrence' were not lost on GHQ,
therefore, and this was reflected in the decisions taken after the
skirmish.	 Major-General Chauvel, commanding the ANZAC Mounted
Division	 was made responsible for the advanced positions and
although Romani was reoccupied on 24 April he did not follow the
tactics of his predecessor by maintaining isolated units at a number
of oases; rather, he created a substantial fortified camp at Romani
and maintained vigorous patrolling. The railway was continued
behind this covering screen and by 19 May it was open f or traffic
right up to Romani itself, so that the position could be garrisoned by
infantry on a serious scale.
	 This was in line with orders that
Lawrence had previously received from GHQ to strongly fortify Romani
once the ralihead reached that position. The EEF would soon be
permantly ensconced in the heart of the Sinai desert, therefore, and
only a major attack by the enemy would now be able to dislodge it.
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HAJ -r R
PLANNING, PREPARING AND FIGHTING THE
BATTLE OF ROMANI: MURRAY IN THE SINAI
MAY - AUGUST 1916
'In very truth the gods bestow not on the same men all their gifts;
you know how to gain a victory:
you know not how to use one.'
Maharbal to Hannibal
SECURING THE ROMANI POSITION AND DISCUSSIONS AS TO FURTHER ADVANCES IN
THE SINAI
From the middle of May onwards the 52nd Division was moved to
Romani so that by 4 June 1916 it was in position. Work was now started
upon defensive positions at Romani and Mahaxndiyah (on the coast to the
north) to cover the raithead. The entire position was, in fact,
supplied by t.'o railways, the main line from Qantara that came directly
to Romani and a narrow-gauge line from Port Said which ran along the
coast to Mahamdiyah. A water pipe-line was also under construction
from Qantara, but by 4 June it had only progressed 17 miles beyond its
starting-place so that the troops at Romani were supplied with water by
trucks and convoys of camels only. 1
All of this had been carefully orchestrated by Murray at GHQ and
was according to arrangements agreed upon at a conference on 17 May. 2
The Chief took a very close interest in the precise arrangements for the
fortified camps at the Roinani position and requested General Lawrence's
presence in person at GHQ to explain his proposals with the aid of a map
and en accompanying staff officer. •	 Murray was determined to make
1	 There was water at Romani but it proved too salty for the British
troops to drink.
*	 Report of Conference held at GHQ 17 May 1916,W.O. 95/4362.
GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 22 May 1916 and COS to General Lawrence 23
May 1915,W.O. 95/4362.
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sure that there were no further lapses like those at Qatia; but his
constant scrutiny and examination of the smallest details of his
subordinate's plans was to lead to friction within the EEF, and to a
serious personality clash.
A further conference was held at GHQ on 7 June which Sir Archibald
described in the following terms: 'Most unsatisfactory. Nothing but
opposition on the part of General Lawrence to my plans and
arrangements. • * What had happened to cause this rift between the C in
C and his subordinate who was to conduct operations in the Sinai? 	 We
know that this meeting went on for some considerable time and that
Murray then consulted Lynden-Bell in the early evening. 	 Moreover, June
was an extremely hot month and Sir Archibald consistently complathect
about this in his diary. 	 Neither of these factors were likely to keep
the C in C in the best of tempers, therefore, even if there had been no
disagreements with General Lawrence.	 But there had been - and there
would be more in the future. Murray favoured the construction of an
entrenched position at Urn Ugba - some miles to the east of Roinani and
much closer to Turkish forces - since he believed such a location could
most successfully prevent the enemy assembling forces in the Qatia
district.	 Lawrence, however, 'strongly expressed' the opinion that so
advanced a position would be 'unsafe' because of his shortage of troops,
and he prekrred to construct defences around Romani. 	 Remarkably,
Murray bowed to the obstinacy of his subordinate - though not without
making sure that his disagreement was placed on the record. 	 That
Murray did not pull rank
Murray Diary 7 June 1916. This entry is all the more remarkable
since Murray's diary Is usually totally devoid of comment, so that
we must conclude he was more than a little angry!
McGrigor Diary 7 June 1916. Murray Diary 5 & 20 June 1916.
McGrigor was made a temporary ADC to Lynden-Bell for a few weeks in
June so his diary gives us a useful insight Into the workings of
GHQ In this period.
GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 9 June 1916, W.0. 95/4363.
201
on Lawrence and demand his submission reflects not so much that he
actually agreed with the other' s plans and would not admit it, but
rather demonstrates his style of command: Murray saw his role as
dispensing the general policy required from GHQ while Lawrence executed
this in detail according to his greater knowledge of the situation
because he was the man on the spot. Such a division of command might
work if there was a good understanding between the two senior officers
concerned - which there was not - and if the EEF did not become
seriously engaged with the enemy - which it did.
But if Lawrence objected to having his Chief looking over his
shoulder and interfering with his every plan then he could take some
comfort from the fact that Murray 1 like himself, had similar
difficulties with his superior - the dOS. We have already seen how
events conspired to place pressure upon the Commander of the EEF in
April to produce success for London to counter-balance the disaster at
Kut and to draw Turkish troops away from the Grand Duke. But this sort
of prompting did not cease as the year progressed; for example, early
in May Robertson noticed that according to the War Office there was a
concentration of Turks to the east of the Canal and he wondered if this
Li!
did not offer an opportunity for the EEF to strikeA the enemy. '
However, matters became still worse on 5 June with the outbreak of the
Arab Rvolt in the Hejaz. Although we will consider the precise effect
of this new factor upon Murray's operations in more detail elsewhere it
requires a brief mention here because it had en immediate impact upon
events in the Sinai even as early as this.
Robertson had unofficially at least, been optimistic about whet
Murray might be able to do in the winter even before June, as he
explained in a private letter in mid-May: 'It is not unlikely that you
may have plenty to do... next cold weather... there is no telling what
the winter may bring forth.'
This letter may well have suggested to Murray that the CIGS was becoming
CIGS to GOd in C Egypt 2 May 1916,W.O. 106/715.
0	 Robertson to Murray 18 May 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/28.
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more enthusiastic about a serious offensive in the Sinai towards El
Arish - but there are no details mentioned and one is left feeling that
Robertson is still hedging his bets and is not prepared to commit
himself - at least not quite. But by 14 Iune his attitude had changed
and he telegraphed Sir Archibald to ask him if he might not consider the
feasibility of occupying El Arish as he had suggested in his memorandum
of 15 February. 10 Murray's reply to this fresh burst of enthusiasm by
the CIGS was consistent and prediable: he said that he still held the
views he had expressed in his paper of February, and because of this he
once again requested a force of two mobile divisions and two mounted
brigades in addition to three divisions and two further mounted brigades
along the Canal - a total which Robertson still had not agreed to even
though he had offered the EEF an extra division in his most recent
telegram. Sir Archibald considered such a force a 'minimum' for
operations towards El Arish since he feared that he might become 'pinned
down' there unless he had sufficient strength. ''
Robertson's next message stated his views more clearly; arguments
for 'preparing to make a forward movement' had been'strengthened' by
developments in the Sherif's rising, he explained, so that the British
could take advantage of his success or offer him some assistance by such
action. Although there would be no more than the single division
already offered, the CIGS did explain that Murray would not be expected
to advance before October; but he would be expected to make the
necessary preparations in the meantime. sa Murray was far happier with
this telegram and expressed his full agreement with the outlined policy;
even so, part of his response reflected some of the pressure that such a
strategy was placing upon him:	 'I intend to push on the railway daily
until I am too weak and exhausted to go further.' 13
10 CIGS to Murray 14 June 1916, W.O. 106/715. 	 The CIGS does not
mention the Arab Revolt in this telegram.
Murray to CIGS 26 June 1916,W.O. 106/715.
12 CIGS to Murray 28 Tune 1916,W0. 106/715.
'3 Murray to CIGS 29 June 1916,W.O. 106/715.
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While London was not officially demanding an El Arish advance before
October there was a good deal more behind Robertson's promptings than
this, f or in his private letters to Sir Archibald he continued to hint
at more than only the occupation of this position, and it is hard not to
believe that he is thinking of the February memorandum and its
suggestion of attacks into Syria once El Arish had been occupied. In
fact, he even hinted at more reinforcements for the EEF - but it was
still only hints:	 'Next winter you may require a good deal of help.
On the other hand you may not.	 We shall see later on. 	 The great
thing is to push on the El Arish railway as quickly as you can.'
Meanwhile, Whitehall had become obsessed with the progress of this
railway. At the War Committee meeting of 6 July concern was expressed
that it was not advancing as fast as possible, while Robertson nudged
his subordinate regularly as to its progress and its requirements.
The extent to which this kind of high-level pressure influenced Murray's
strategy in Sinai is clearly shown in his official communications with
General Lawrence. For example, on 12 July he requested a full
appreciation from the harassed general as to the next stage of the
advance in the light of the Government's desire for rapid progress and
the capture of El Arish. '
The EEF had not been inactive in June and an operation had been
carried out by units of No.2 Section of the Canal Defences to deny the
enemy supplies of water east of the Little Bitter Lake which the Turks
had used in their attack upon the Canal in February 1915. Cisterns at
Wadi Urn Mukhsheib and Moiya Harab were pumped dry by the troops and
explosives were used to destroy natural wells. 	 These operations
" Robertson to Murray 10 July 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/38.
War Committee meeting 4 July 1916,CAB 42/16/1.	 dOS to Murray 11
July 1916,W.O. 105/715.
' GHQ to GOd No.3 Section 12 July 1916,W.O. 95/4364. The Official
History (p. 178) gives no hint of the extent to which this pressure
influenced Murray at this time.
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were far more significant than their small scale suggests; as Murray
explained to Robertson, they now made it 'almost impossible f or the
enemy to act in strength against any part of my line south of Ismailia
during the summer months.' 17 Consequently the EEF was now free to
concentrate all of its energies upon the advance across Sinai by the
coastal route towards El Arish.
But in spite of London's fondest hopes this advance was by no
means a certainty. The C in C informed his Engineer in Chief early in
July that he intended to proceed from Romani towards El Arish with one
mounted division and two infantry divisions in October if possible: he
therefore requested that the necessary stores be prepared. $ However,
all was not nearly so straight-forward as this suggested and the
Engineer in Chief's subsequent arrangements for the advance were
described as 'quite inadequate' because they did not take account of the
EEF's water supply; in fact, not only were these plans insufficient for
an advance beyond Romani, they could not even cope with a concentration
at that position on the scale of three divisions.
	 Because of these
realities Murray found himself in a most frustrating position:
The forces detailed for the advance on El Arish were immediately
available; the railway had reached Romani and could be extended,
but nothing except the experience gained in the past six months
were available for use on the new water supply system required.
An entirely new installation on the west bank of the Canal was required,
therefore, to make possible the 96 mile advance to El Arish. Getting
wind of these plans and blissfully unaware of the full extent of the
17 Murray to Robertson 17 June 1916,
	 Robertson papers 1/32/34.
Official History, p. 178.
G}IQ to Engineer in Chief 2 July 1916,W.O. 95/4364.
1	 Report on water supply,
	 Murray papers 79/48/2.
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existing obstacles, the off icers of the EEF were filled with enthusiasm
at the thought that at last 'the big offensive seems to have begun.'
With so much expected of him Murray was not going to allow
operations to develop in the Sinai without his closest attention.
Consequently he made a detailed personal inspection of the Roinani and
Mahamdiyah district over a three- day period and concluded his tour with
an interview with General Lawrence 'to discuss... in detail the various
questions in connection with the present and future policy in the
northern section.' *1 He followed this visit with a series of notes
designed to improve matters at Romani, paying special attention to the
water requirements of the troops and the construction of a railway
junction at Romani. *2
Lawrence was ordered to produce an appreciation as to how he
intended to conduct the next stage of his advance.
	 His reply on 14
July was detailed, precise and prophetic. To a remarkable extent
Lawrence and his staff correctly predicted the enemy's intentions who,
they believed, was carefully watching the EEF's progress and 'given a
reasonable chance of success... may at any time attempt to overwhelm the
head of this advance' by 'a rapid blow followed by an equally rapid
retirement.' In the light of these predictions Lawrence admitted
that he was none too enthusiastic about a premature move beyond Romani
since it might leave him with two positions to defend, both of which
were insufficiently strong enough to deal with a serious Turkish attack.
After a further conference between the two men Murray responded to
this memorandum in most favourable terms - more favourably, probably,
than Lawrence ever expected. 	 He a3reed that there should be no
20 McGrigor Diary 3 July 1916.
21	 C in C's tour to Romani and Mahamdiyah 5-7 July,W.O. 95/4364.
2* G. S. to D Q 14 G 7 July 1916 and Murray to CGS 7 July 1916, W. 0.
95/4364.
2	 GOC No.3 Section to CGS GHQ 14 July 1916W.O. 95/4364.
Ibid.
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further advance until the defensive works and the entire position had
been completed at Romani; once this had been accomplished a fresh
defensive position was to be constructed at El Rabah, to the east, to
cover the next stage of the railway's progress deeper into the Sinai.
Lawrence, although he did not yet realise it, had almost exactly
predicted the Turks' next move and Murray - not allowing his own
feelings to cloud his Judgement - agreed with his subordinate to the
extent of allowing his frantic advance to be delayed somewhat in spite
of the pressure from London. 	 Early in August both would be vindicated.
25 Murray Diary 18 July 1916.	 GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 19 July 1916,
W.O. 9514364.
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PREPARING FOR THE TURKISH ATTACK
On 19 July GHQ was passed information that, f or the moment at
least, altered all of Murray's preparations f or a further advance.
Lawrence had been correct.	 The RFC had picked up evidence of a Turkish
advance in the Sinai. The news caused a sensation at GHQ; one officer
conunented upon the 'great excitement' of all concerned at the thought of
another enemy raid upon the Canal which, this time, would 'knock up
against a very powerful force.' Here surely, at long last, was the
EEF's opportunity to avenge Qatia and to provide London with a success
that it so desperately craved; it all seemed too good to be true!
The troops already available to General Lawrence for the coming
engagement were the 52nd Division and the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division,
less one brigade. However, Murray was not satisfied that Lawrence had
sufficient men and he at once provided him with reinforcements that, he
believed, would be especially beneficial to the latter's needs.
Consequently, on 19 July four regiments were moved by train to Qantara
at four hours notice only and on 20 July a brigade of the 53rd Division
was rushed to Romani and, in order to increase the firepower available
to Lawrence's troops without placing too great a strain upon his
inadequate water resources, Murray sent two machine-gun companies up the
line as well. The C in C could barely restrain his excitement in
his communications with Lawrence: he asked if there was anything more
he could possibly do for No.3 Section, gave a little advice and then
outlined the way in which he saw the conflict developing if it was
handled correctly. Even as early as this he foresaw what would
determine the course of the battle: he suggested to Lawrence that the
RFC be ordered to hit the Turkish camels so as to reduce their army's
mobility; that the A. and N.Z. mounted infantry save their horses as
' Murray Diary 19 July 1916.	 McGrigor Diary 19 July 1916.
27 McGrigor Diary 19 July 1916.	 Official History, pp. 179-181.
Murray to CIGS 21 July 1916,W.O. 95/4364.
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much as possible at this stage; and that the enemy should be induced to
advance on to ground already prepared for defence by No.3 Section
because 'it is all to our advantage to allow him to do so, and not to
launch mobile striking force until he is committed against Romani
defences.'	 The C in C also noticed a weakness in Lawrence's
command-structure that he did not like; since the action might well
depend upon rapid decisions, he explained, he thought it better for the
0CC of No.3 Section either to move his command post closer to Romani or
to delegate operations on the spot to a single subordinate commander so
that there would not be any unnecessary delays once the battle started.
Meanwhile, the enemy refused to do what GHQ expected of them.
They did not come on in a rapid advance followed by a sudden attack as
expected;	 rather, their movement appeared 'very slow' and their men
seemed to be 'resting'. ° They had, in fact, halted about eleven
miles from Romani and were entrenching, an activity which led GHQ to
believe that their intention might only be to block a further advance of
the Sinai railway.	 The Turks were actually awaiting the arrival of
their heavy artillery which had to be moved over the loose sand by means
of wooden planks. at But Murray could not be sure this was the only
reason; he had to consider the possibility that the enemy would now sit
still for good and entrench, while awaiting further reinforcements and
daring the British to move them.
I GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 20 July 1916,W.O. 9.5/4364.
2	 GHQ to 0CC No.3 Section 22 July 1916, W.O. 95/4364.
30 Murray Diary 21 July 1916.
I	 GHQ to 0CC No.3 Section 24 July 1916,W.O. 95/4364.
3Z W.D. Intelligence Section GSEEF 30 July 1916,W.O. 157/706. This
proves that GHQ was aware of the reason for the Turkish delay and
wo$ not totally bemused by it as the Official History (p. 182)
suggests.
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Sir Archibald now informed the GIGS of these most recent developments
and seemed to assume that he would not attempt to assault these newly-
entrenched Turkish foward positions; indeed, he actually claimed that if
the enemy decided to strengthen this forward post with troops from their
reserves in Gallipoli and Constantinople then the EEF 'will be giving
the Russians and Arabs adequate help'. .a Unfortunately, all of this
did not cut ice with Robertson who reversed the C in C's arguments and
threw them back in his face:
It is not likely that the enemy can bring any large force against
you owing to the continual successes of the Russians in the
Caucasus and the Arab rising, and the general situation makes it
undesirable to adopt a passive attitude.
So once again the EEF's commander was under pressure - and he agreed to
fit in with the CIGS's demands and act offensively. Events in the
Sinai had not gone unnoticed in London and the War Committee watched
with interest the movement of the Turkish force; Balfour, for one, was
most enthusiGstic and 'asked if there was any chance of our being able
to give the Turks a drubbing.'	 Robertson replied to Baif our's
suggestion positively and in a private letter to Murray he more or less
repeated the elderly statesman's statement;
	 'I hope the Turk will4
receive sharp lesson for being so audacious as to present himself in
front of your troops.' 	 But the men of Whitehall had no conception
Murray to CIGS 22 July 1916,W.O. 106/715.
'4 CIGS to Murray 23 July 1916,W.O. 106/715.
•g Murray to GIGS, WO 106/715. This exchange of telegrams is
significant for it demonstrates that the GIGS was responsible for
Murray considering an attack upon the Turks and not Murray himself,
as the Official History claims (p. 182).
•' War Committee meeting 28 July 1916,CAB 42/16/11.
	 Robertson to
Murray 1 Aug. 1916,	 BM Add. MS 52461.
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of the true nature of conditions in the Sinai or indeed what was
actually about to transpire there. The CIGS, for one, was sure that
the enemy 'would never be so mad as to dream of attacking you in your
prepared positions' (an opinion that would soon be proved totally
incorrect), and he still failed to understand how it was that Ottoman
infantry could make do in the Sinai without elaborate preparations for
the supply of water while their British counterparts could not.
Given the attitude of his superiors across the water Murray had
little option but to alter his strategy by planning to attack the
stationary enemy force which seemed to be mocking him. He repeated
Robertson's arguments to Lawrence, therefore, and instructed him to
commence preparations necessary for an attack upon the enemy as soon,
and as decisively, as possible. • The General Staff of No.3 Section
Canal Defence suddenly found themselves desperately trying to arrange
mobility f or sufficient numbers of their troops to make an attack upon
the enemy position possible, therefore. 9 But it was a desperate
move, as Murray himself acknowledged in a private letter to Robertson.
While he agreed he had to attack if the enemy did not move,the only plan
he could offer was a straight assault by his infantry that might drive
the Turks out of their trenches and so expose them to the ANZAC cavalry;
but he was not enthusiastic about this: 'possibly I may fail because of
my not having knocked the machine-guns out, broken the wire, or that the
quality of my Territorial Infantry is not good enough.' 40	 These were
fl Robertson to Murray 1 Aug. 1916,BM Add. MS 52461. On the subject
of water see CIGS to Murray 23 July 1916, and the following comment
by Murray: 'How these... Turks are getting on with Qetia water
beats me.'	 Murray to Robertson 22 July 1916,Robertson papers
1/32/40.	 The British still failed to realise, it seems, that they
were not fighting a European opponent; the Turks did not care
about the suffering caused to their men and their men, in turn,
were accustomed to such harsh conditions.
•	 GHQ to GOC No.3 Section 24 July 1916,W.O. 95/4364.
BGGS No.3 Section to 5 Mounted Brigade 25 Iuly 1916,W.O. 95/4429.
40 Murray to Robertson 27 July 1916,BM Add. MS 52461.
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hardly the words of a man filled with enthusiasm for this venture and
he more or less admitted as much by explaining that he would much rather
he were attacked at Romani by double the current Turkish strength than
have to make such an assault. And this sudden alteration in the EEF's
objectives was creating friction and tension amongst its senior
officers; the clash between Lawrence and Murray that had lain dormant
for some weeks erupted once again as the pressure grew; indeed, so bad
was this problem that Sir Archibald told Robertson Lawrence was 'jumpy'
and if there was any doubt as to his state of mind then he would be
replaced by General Dobell for the coming battle. 41 The pressure from
London was telling; Murray had lost confidence in his senior commander
and was in open dispute with him once more while the decision to attack
that had been forced upon him filled him with little enthusiasm.	 It
was not a happy state of affairs. Nonetheless he fixed the date for
the attack as 13 August, thus giving himself plenty of time to prepare
and allowing his infantry the best chance of coping with the conditions
since 'the moon will be favourable for an advance in the cool hours.' 4
He also ordered the commander of No.2 Section to form a mobile column
based upon the Imperial Camel Corps and intended to be available to
threaten the enemy's left and rear. The suggestion was sound, but it
had not been fully thought through because Murray had not made it clear
who was responsible for this new unit; for example, he informed
Lawrence that he was 'at liberty to suggest any movement'f or this force
but that it would remain under No. 2 Section. '4
4'	 Ibid.
42 Murray Diary 23 July 1916: 	 'stormy interview with Lt. -Gen.
Lawrence at 4.45 pm.'
'	 Summary of principal events in July 1916,W.O. 95/4364.
'	 GHQ to No.2 Section 28 July 1916 and GHQ to No.3 Section 29 July
1916, W.O. 95/4364.
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The C in C made one set of arrangements of an offensive nature
about which be was most enthusiastic. He knew th re, was a Turkish force
of some one or two thousand men at El Arish and he therefore proposed
an amphibious raid to destroy the town as a base,f or two reasons: 'If
successfully carried out... such an operation should materially assist
Hejaz operations and also my own offensive against the Turkish Qatia
force whose main line c1 supply would be interrupted.' ' 	 One can see
the attraction of such a raid for Murray: he would have been in
occupation of - if only briefly - the very place that everyone was now
urging him to reach; it was a daring venture, but not without very real
advantages, for if the frontal assault upon the enemy position at Qatia
failed then the EEF would still have a real achievement to offer the War
Committee.	 But, of course, there were problems; 	 Admiral We,1s
raised objections to fe scheme - the difficulties inherent in landing
and then re-embarking a force of over 3,000 men were,, he felt, too great.
Nonetheless, Murray still considered the element of r'k 'well justified'
and even Robertson liked the look of the scheme.	 However, at the
War Committee meeting of 5 August when the CIGS broached the subject of
the El Arih raid Admiral Jackson expressed similar concernS to those af
Wemys and only conditional approval was granted, the attack only being
allowed if it could be carried out successfully according to the local
conditions as adjudged by Wemyss and Murray. £7 Unfortunately, the
entire scheme had little future once the Turks finally attacked the
British at Romani and were repulsed,since they retired on El Arish, thus
making any raid there quite impractic4te 4	Nevertheless, the scheme
Murray to CIGS 1 Aug. 1916,WO 10/715.
Chief Egyptitt.to Chief London 3 Aug. 1916,WO 95/4365.
	 CIGS to
Murray 4 Aug. 1916, CAB 42/17/3.
" War Committee meeting SAug. 1916,CAB 42/17/5.
Murray to CIGS 7 Aug. 1916, WO 106/715. The Official History
(p. 182) rather overates the case, for it claims that the CIGS
'cordially approved of the proposal' and only 'agreed with
reluctance' to its pIorment; in fact, the dOS always
maintained that the raid could only be allowed If it offered
prospects of success.
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continued to influence those at the very highest reaches of British
strategy f or in mid .
 September Balf our was still under the impression
that the advance to El Arish was to be by sea, and not land.
The developments that destroyed Murray's cherished amphibious raid
upon El Arish actually saved him from having to launch a desperate
frontal assault upon Qatia which surely would have failed. And for this
he had the enemy to thank. On 28 uly there had been a 'distinct
change' in the situation, for the Turks had started to renew their
advance. ° Although up to the evening of 2 August it was still not
clear whether the EEF or the enemy would strike first, by 3 August it
was; the Turks were going to attack: 'the best possible thing that could
happen to us' was the general opinion at GHQ.
What, then, was the nature of the plan drawn up by the British to
deal with this fresh eventuality? The plan adopted was to be along the
same lines as that already worked out by Murray and Lawrence before the
Turks had halted. It was an elaborate plan - elaborate at least in so
far as it was designed to entice the enemy into the EEF's clutches;
though, as it transpired, such elaboration was scarcely necessary, for
the Turks seemed determined to march straight into this well-laid trap.
Ignorant of this fact, GHQ ordered the RFC to keep the advancing enemy
under observation 'without in any way interfering with their progress',
while the forward movement of its freshly-created mobile column of No.2
Section was deliberately delayed until 4 August in order not to 'attract
the enemy's attention to the presence of troops on his southern flank.'
Measures such as these certainly encouraged the enemy in
4	 War Committee meeting 18 Sep. 1916,CAB 42/20/3.
ro Mcorlgor Diary 28 July 1916.
" Murray's Despatches.	 Second Despatch 1 Oct. 1916,p.63.
	 McGrigor
Diary 3 Aug. 1916.
Z 'Despotch dealing with the work of the RFC on the Suez Canal front
during the operations between 19 July and 12 Aug. 1916' 17 Aug.
1916 and 'Operations carried out in No.2 Section during August
1916' by General Dallas 11 Sept. 1916,W.0. 95/4449.
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his advance, but they also brought with them certain disadvantages: the
initial advance by the Turks was on a larger scale than had been
expected, which consequently placed greater pressure upon the EEF's
screen of mounted troops In front of Romani; moreover, the delayed
movement of the mobile column was destined seriously to restrict its
role in the coming battle. 5)
Once the enemy were enticed on to the British defences at Romani
then further measures had been planned to channel the Turks to precisely
where GHQ wanted them. The obvious weak point in the EEF's position
was what appeared to be its open right flank and the deliberate
intention was to lead the enemy towards this right flank. In this area
the plans stressed the need for a 'gap' between the Katib Gannit
position and Dueidar so as to invite the enemy to become involved amidst
the dunes in this region, thus making any subsequent retirement by them
far more difficult. 4 Once the Turks were heavily committed in the
attack they were to be taken in the flank by No.3 Section's mounted
troops and the 3rd L.H. Brigade while the mobile column moved to
threaten their flank and rear.	 In order to give reality to the 'gap'
in the British line on its right flank the continuance of the line was
concealed. No trenches were dug along four miles of the line at this
point so that nothing could be observed from the air, but telephone
lines had been laid arid the officers of the let and 2nd L.H. Brigades
had acquainted themselves with the terrain. Major-General Chauvel had
command of these units and upon him lay the responsibility of holding
the enemy up until the rest of the mounted troops attacked the enemy's
flank.
J Murray has been criticised f or keeping the mobile column too far
back but in fact this was, as we have seen, his deliberate
intention. See Hill, p.74. Hill fails to grasp Murray's
deliberate intention.
•4 'Tactical comments on the action at Romani, 4 and 5 Aug.' by
Lynden-Bell 26 Aug 1916,	 Murray papers 79/48/3.
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This, then,was the plan - and it was a good one, but there is some
doubt as to who originally devised it. The Official History calls it
'Murray's plan', while a claim has been made for General Lawrence's
authorship. Lawrence's authorship seems a little unlikely since he
certainly did not abide by it in the final analysis, as we shall see,
and his consistent attitude seems to have been one of caution, wk,Ie the
plan did not allow for fi'sLthe part of the senior commander involved.
Nor is the plan clearly Murray's invention, for there is strong evidence
to suggest that Guy Dwnay had quite a bit to do with the 'skilful
dispositions' taken up by the British troops while Lawrence's own staff
undoubtedly did some of the more detailed work on the ground. ' What
seems to have happened is that the final plan was drawn up after a
considerable number of conferences and meetings between Murray and
Lawrence and their respective staffs. '' Nonetheless, the C in C was
ultimately responsible for the adoption of any plan, and he always
remained absolutely clear as to what he hopedAfrom the battle and how he
saw it developing so, to a great extent, the Official History has got it
right and Sir Archibald deserves praise for the successful manner by
which he and his staff created such a good plan.
Just how good this plan was can be proved by a brief examination of
the intentions and actions of the enemy. All accounts of the battle
argue that Murray's anticipation at Romani was 'exceptional' and some
have even been driven to hyperbole in order to describe his success on
Official History, p.l83.
	 S.H. Kershaw, 'The battle of Romani, 4
Aug. 1916', Army Quarttd
	
XXXVII (1938).
G. Garsia, A key to victory:
	 a study of war planniqg (London,
1940), pp.56-57.	 Fergusson to D'Ewes 6 Aug. 1916,Fergusson papers
DEF/4.
Murray Diary.
	 See entries mid-July - early Aug. 1916 for all
these conferences.
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4 August before a shot had been fired:
History scarcely presents an example of such complete conformity by
an enemy taking the offensive to the plans and wishes of the
defender. At Romani Murray and his leaders in the field
anticipated in detail the course followed by the Turks.
As if Kress von Kressenstein, who commanded the Turkish forces, had read
the same script of a play In which both he and Murray were acting he
seemed 'fully prepared to play the role allotted' to him by GHQ so that
his plan of attack turned out to be precisely what had been expected at
Roinani and Ismailia. ' He intended to shell the defensive works at
Roniani and launch only a weak infantry assault against them while his
main attack would be against the EEF's right and rear.
	 But Kress was
labouring under a series of disadvantages. His Intelligence was doubly
at fault - and this nearly proved fatal to the survival of his force:
firstly, the strength and nature of the British troops at Romani were
grossly under-estimated with the consequence that captured Turkish
troops claimed they had only expected cavalry; secondly, Kress and his
staff clearly had little idea of the true extent of the actual position
at Romani and, ironically, (according to a captured German officer's
map) did not reali8e that the 'gap' on the British right was not
genuine, but merely a creation of Murray's to lead the enemy to their
doom. 60 Kress amd his men, had, therefore, been most successfully
deceived by Sir Archibald's elaborate plan and they marched straight
into a trap.
Australian Official History, pp.117 & 131. Hill, p.76. The
expressed views of Hill and the Australian Official History are
doubly significant since neither account is particularly favourable
to Murray elsewhere - as one would expect, given the Australian
perspective of both works - and yet both praise the C in C
extravagantly at this stage.
Official History, pp. 184-185.
so	
'Intel].igece notes on the engagement at Qatia.'
	 July - Aug. 1916,
Murray papers 79/48/3.	 W.D. Intelligence Section.
	 G.S. EEF 7
Aug. 1916 , W.0. 157/707.
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But why march at all in the middle of the summer when the Sinai was
a blistering wilderness? What was Kress up to? GHQ certainly found
difficulty in deciding what the Turks were really trying to do and
admitted, after the battle, 'there is no indication of what the enemy
really intended to do in attacking us. • • 	 This inability to discover
what the Germans and Turks intended causedthe British to dismiss the
expedition as some kind of futile gesture or 'a forlorn hope', as
Robertson later described it. 02 Comments like these have led writers
to play down the importance of the Turkish attack when, in fact, the
events of early August 1916 marked a turning-point in the Sinai
campaign, for never again would the Turks take the offensive in this
theatre. 6$
Nonethless, the EEF believed they could make out some of the
enemy's intentions once the engagement had ended: • The general idea
seems to have been to defeat our troops at Romani and establish a port
there.	 By this the enemy would prevent us sending any more troops to
any other front and might be able at least temporarily to interfere with
navigations through the Canal'. '4 To take the best point first -
interference with the Canal - this was not so outlandish as it might
initially seem,f or the enemy force was known to be well-equipped with
heavy artillery that would have been able to shell the Canal and harass
its shipping from some distance; and only a few hours heavy bombardment
might potentially have done a great deal of damage.
	 . As for keeping
British troops in Egypt, this was a consistent objective of German
policy in the region. It seems most unlikely, therefore, that the
objective of the enterprise was to throw the British back over the
Canal, as Kress
"	 'Intelligence notes on the engagement at Qati&, op. cit.
•* Robertson II, p. 152.
Official History, p.369. From now on the Turks had lost the
initiative in the Sinai and they never regained it from the EEF,
which subsequently dictated the course of events.
'4 W.D. Intelligence Section No.2 Section 6 Aug. 1916,W.O. 157/742.
•6	 'Report of an inhabitant of Athilt, Mount Carmel, Syria' 1 Nov.
1916, L/MIL/5/735.
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later claimed. '	 Correctly divining German and Turkish intentions is
made especially difficult by the degree of friction that had arisen
between Djemal Pasha and Kress. 	 According to the Turkish commander the
attack was Kress's idea because the troops under his command had become
frustrated by the long wait f or action. This version of events
seems to find confirmation in the information gleaned from enemy
prisoners after the battle who believed that the attack had been made
prematurely and should not have really taken place until October but for
the fact that Kress had forced an early advance upon DiemoI by the
threat of his resignation. '•	 Significantly, therefore, Murray could
take comfort from the fact that his was not the only command that
suffered from serious friction caused by personality clashes; his
opponents had similar problems, although their difficulties were
exacerbated by a clash of nationalities, but unlike the EEF's
difficulties their disagreements reached such a level that they became
public knowledge, even as far away as Cairo!
But there were other elements to the Turkish attack of 4 August
that gave it a more threatening appearance. One reason given for the
advance by the population of Egypt was that the Turks 'confidently
relied on co-operation from within Egypt'. 70 And they were correct;
in May 1916 British officers uncovered a plot to organise a rising in
Egypt simultaneously with a Turkish attack in the Sinai, while early in
Iuly the British received news that the Egyptian people would be asked
to create disturbances in their country to assist their Ottoman allies.
So seriously did Sir Archibald take this threat that he immediately
" Kress, p. 506.
Djemal Pasha, p. 171.
'	 'Intelligence notes on the engagement at Qatla,' op.cit.
22 Aug. 1916,W.O. 157/707.	 Clayton to Wingate 24 Aug.
1916 Wingate papers 139/6/21. According to reports received at
Cairo) Kress had to face a Turkish court of inquiry after the
battle!
70 'What Is said in the Bazaars on the recent action at Qatia,' by
Captain Beales 9 Aug. 1916,	 Murray papers 79/48/3.
7	 E. Elath, N. Bentwlch, D. May (eds.), Memories of Sir Wyndhem
Deedes. (London, 1958), p.17.	 W.0. 158/602: Report of Captain
Cornwallis on mission to Jeddah,8 July 1916.
219
warned his Inspector General of Communications to be ready to stop all
leave and keep his men available in case of 'internal trouble' on 20
July, the day after Kress's force was observed for the first time.
In fact, the Turkish advance to battle at the end of July and
stretching into August should be seen as a dangerous threat to the EEF
in its quest of clearing the Sinai. For one thing, the Turkish
soldier was far more able to adjust to the intense heat of the Sinai in
the summer than his British opponent and the chances are that if the EEF
had not been so well-prepared at Romani they might well have found
themselves in serious difficulties against the tenacious enemy infantry.
Moreover, there can be little doubt that in such circumstances the
potential British assault, if ever launched, would surely have been a
fiasco. Nor was the strength of Kress's force to be sniffed at; it
was a formidable unit and has not received the recognition it deserves
because it met a still more formidable opponent in prepared positions.
Kress's total strength was about 15,000, including a stiffening of
German troops from a unit code-named 'Pasha' with a machine-gun
battalion and heavy artillery; there was also an Austrian contingent of
two mounted howitzer batteries. 7* The EEF was aware of the German
contingent in Kress'8 force although it was initially confused by its
size to such an extent that the suggestion was seriously made that the
Turkish soldiers were wearing German helmets! '4
C in C to I.G.C. 20 July 1916W.0. 95/4364.
Official History, p.202.
29 July 1916,W.O. 157/742. Murray to CIGS 4 Aug. 1916,CAB 42/17/3.
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FIGHTING THE BATTLE OF ROMANI AND THE FAILURE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCE
The battle itself began at about 2 a.m. on 4 August when the
Turkish attack upon the British position at Romani commenced. As day
dawned the sunlight revealed to the enemy just how lightly held was the
EEF's right flank and Kress pushed his men forward with increased vigour
into the much-vaunted 'gap'. Matters became worrying f or the mounted
troops covering this region of the British line since the enemy was
coming forward with more strength than had been expected; but even so
Kress's men were now tired and after an energetic attack had consumed
most of their water - and crucially, they were also heavily involved
with the British right flank.
Meanwhile at 8 a.m. Kress launched a frontal attack upon the main
position held by the 52nd Division commanded by Major-General W.E.B.
Smith. This attack soon ground to a halt and made little headway.
General Lawrence at Qantara, becoming aware of the developing situation,
began to issue his orders, but given the strength of the Turkish attack
he decided to alter his dispositions and not follow the original plan of
battle. At 7.25 a.m. the COG No.3 Section ordered his additional
mounted troops in reserve (intended to strike the enemy in the flank) to
positions designed to strengthen the hard-pressed Light Horse Brigades
who had borne the brunt of the fighting so far; this 'had the effect of
considerably weakening our powers to strike behind the outer flank and
at the rear of the enemy's enveloping attack', since all the mounted
troops now engaged the Turks frontally.
At 10 a.m. General Chauvel requested whether the 156th Brigade of
the 52nd Division in reserve at Romani could not move up to relieve his
mounted troops so that they might water their horses and then swing
round Kress's left flank, but these fresh Infantry would not budge since
they were under the CCC of the 53rd Division and awaited his order to
7	 'Tactical comments on the action at Romani, 4 and 5 Aug. 1916' by
Lynden-Bell	 26 Aug. 1916,	 Murray papers 79/48/3.
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counter-attack.
Nevertheless, as the reinforcements of mounted troops made their
way forward the British were able to move on to the offensive. By 6
p.m. New Zealander and Yeomanry cavalry, supported by the leading
battalions of the 127th Brigade of the 42nd Division, that had made
their way forward from Pelusium Station, captured a strong Turkish force
after a stiff fight on the Turkish left. In conjunction with this
attack by the mounted troops General Smith ordered the 156th Brigade
forward for an assault upon the Turkish position to the left of the
mounted troops on a feature known as Wellington Ridge. But encroaching
darkness and heavy enemy defensive fire caused this attack to be halted
until the following day.
So ended the first day of the Battle of Romani - and it ended quite
favourably for the British. Writing the day after, Dawnay admitted
that on 4. August the Turkish left had seemed doomed and it looked as if
'the whole Turkish force might have been u scupperedsll . " Murray
certainly agreed with Dawnay for he telephoned Lawrence and stressed the
need for troops to be pushed forward so that Kress's flank could be
threatened and his chance of escape blocked. 	 Other encouraging news
was reaching GHQ as well;	 according to the latest estimates 1,000
Turkish troops had been captured and these men 'appeared to be worn out
and very ready to surrender'. On the other hand, Lawrence offered a
more cautious view of future developments; he explained to the C in C
that the heavy ground, exhausted horses and lack of water made any
strong encircling movement of the enemy forces 'difficult' - but he
promised to do his best 'wherever possible'. 	 '	 Lawrence's
misgivings were significant
' Dawnay diary 5 Aug. 1916.
"7 Telephone message to No.3 Section 4 Aug. 1916 and Narrative of
Operations 4 Aug. 1916. Received by telephone from No.3 Section 4
Aug. 1916,W.O. 95/4365.
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and .would play an important role in future events.
	 Meanwhile,
arrangements for the re-organisatton and watering of all units ready for
a rapid advance on 5 August were collapsing under the pressure. For
example, some of the mounted troops withdrew to PelusiuM Station on the
evening of 4 August where, at the same time and in the same place, the
brigades of the 42nd Division were assembling; predictably the result
was chaotic, as the War Diary of the 125th Brigade records: 'The night
being dark, the watering arrangements inadequate, and no arrangements
having been made to allot areas to larger formations beforehand, there
was a good deal of confusion.' 71 So although from GHQ's perspective
there was 'yet a possibility of destroying the opposing force', at No.3
Section's HQ at Qantera the problems were mounting as the need f or rapid
action became more urgent.
Lawrence issued orders for a general advance at 4 a.m. on 5 August.
The Wellington Ridge position was taken, but it now became clear that
this had been manned by only a rear guard force and that the enemy was
now in full retreat. The general mounted advance did not begin until
10.30 a.m. because the men were scattered after their watering of the
night before.	 But the infantry were delayed still further and their
advance in the sand and heat became a nightmare. It would not be too
strong a statement to make to say that the 42nd Division started to
disintegrate under these conditions; it was made up of a lot of men of
less than average height who found they were unable to carry their full
equipment in the heavy sand, and others who had been gassed and who - it
was believed - would benefit from the Sinai climate; needless to say
they did not.	 That the EEF had to make use of such a unit in such a
vital role reveals just how desperately short of troops Murray really
was.	 According to the division's official records the 125th Brigade
71 W.D. 14Q 125th Infantry Brigade, 42nd Division 4 Aug. 1916, W.0.
95/4594.
Official History, p. 190.
O Chaytor to Director, Historical Section, C.I.D. 26 Oct. 1925,CAB
45/78.
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alone had lost 300 men to heat exhaustion by 11. 15 a. in. on 5 August. •$
The 52nd Division, although generally a much fitter unit, also suffered
in these conditions and, in fact, from now on the British infantry
played little part in the subsequent pursuit of the enemy. On 6
August, for example, Lawrence ordered both divisions to support the
mounted troops as they engaged a strong Turkish force at Oghratina;
but, in the words of the Official History, 'there was never the remotest
chance' they would be able to do this. • Nevertheless, for the 42nd
Division this meant a further nightmarish march and one brigade had to
leave nearly 1,000 men behind since they were 'not considered fit enough
for desert operations.' •2	 It was all that the infantry could do to
reach the line assigned to them; 	 they could go no further.	 The
condition of the infantry continued to be a source of some anxiety for
the GOC No.3 Section and his entire force, Search parties had to be
organised to search for the men who had fallen out due to heat
exhaustion and not arrived at the front line; some of these started to
turn up at Felusium, Romani and Qantara throughout August. •4 Murray
tried to play down the extent of the failure of his infantry and in a
telegram to the GIGS sent on 8 August he described the situation as
'quite satisfactory', and the health of the troops as 'good but there
will be a reaction'. 5'
0$ 5 Aug. 1916, W. 0. 95/4594, op. cit. The Official History (pp. 192-
193) is remarkably candid about the failure of the British
infantry, perhaps because it was so obvious!
•2.	 Official History, p. 195.
03	 5 Aug. 1916,W.O. 95/4594,op.cit.
•4 W.D. HQ 42nd Division Administrative ('A' Branch) 7 & 8 Aug. 1916,
W.O. 95/4591.
0 Murray to CIGS 8 Aug. 1916 Murray papers 79/48/3. Murray did
refer to the poor condition of his infantry in this telegram but
the general tenor of the message is optimistic; significantly, the
Official History quotes this telegram but omits the section which
mentions the infantry (p.201).
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Meanwhile the mounted troops had continued the pursuit and attacked
a strong Turkish rear guard at Qatia on 5 August. But the enemy were
too well supported and Chauvel's men could not make an impression
without the support of the infantry.	 Events took a similar course on 7
August as the cavalry were unable to overcome the Turks at Oghratina,
who had retired further east since the action at Qatia. Finally, on 9
August Chauvel tried to catch the enemy now at Bir el Abd but once
again, the mounted troops did not have the firepower to overwhelm the
Turks, who were able to evacuate the position and return to El Arish.
So ended the battle of Romani.
Immediate reaction to Romani was mixed. There were those who were
mightily impressed with the EEF's achievements at Romani - and said so.
Murray received congratulations from an illustrious group of men
including King George, the GIGS, General Haig, the Sultan of Egypt and
the entire War Committee. 8 In Mesopotamia, moreover, the Intelligence
Section of the Indian Expeditionary Force seemed to be over-awed at the
number of prisoners captured by the EEF in the battle and, according to
the same source, the Turkish 3rd Division was 'nearly destroyed' as a
result. • But even success created problems, since this fresh influx
of over 3,000 prisoners into Egypt necessitated the extension of the
existing p.o.w. camps because they were not large enough to cope with so
many men. •
IS Official congratulations on the engagement at Romani from the King,
Sultan of Egypt, GIGS, Sirdar of the Sudan, Egyptian Minister of
War, General Haig and the War Committee, Murray papers 79/48/3.
If W.D. Intelligence Section GHQ IEFD 8 & 29 Aug. 1916,W.0. 157/790.
11 Director of Works, EEF, to Ma.J.-Gen. Scott-Moncrieff 10 Sept. 1916,
W.O. 161/36.
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In terms of casualties alone,then,Kress had certainly been dealt a
serious blow, for he seems to have lost as many as 9,000 men to the
EEF's 1,130. • Nevertheless, Sir Archibald committed his true
feelings to paper in a private note written after the battle was over:
'I am bitterly disappointed', was his conclusion. 90 Murray's
disappointment was tinged with bitterness because he considered one man
- and one man alone - responsible for the failure of the EEF to
annihilate an enemy force that 'had given itself into his hands'; 	 that
man was General Lawrence.	 Although Murray mentioned none of his
misgivings in his official despatch this did not mean that his
criticisms of the man were not real and considerable. 0$ Privately,
Sir Archibald believed Lawrence had been timid and reluctant to move;
he had placed his reserves too far in the rear in spite of 'repeated
advice' to bring them further up; he had failed to inculcate the
necessary 'spirit of offensive' into his men; and, most reprehensible
of all, he had had 'more than a fortnight to prepare for an attack which
came exactly as anticipated' and yet he still did not manage to succeed.
9t	 Moreover, while Lawrence's performance has been defended, he
himself actually admitted that he had made a number of mistakes. 93
But Lawrence could not be blamed for everything - nor should he be.
For example, he has been blamed f or failing to move the
•0 Official History, p. 199. 	 The Germans claimed the losses at Romani
were only 6,000, which is interesting, since this is the figure
Murray gave initially before upgrading it to 9,000. 	 See Murray to
Robertson 12 Aug. 1916 	 B.M. Add. MS 52461 and Murray to CIGS 17
Aug. 1916,Murray papers 79/48/3.
9	 General Herbert A. Lawrence.	 Note by Murray Aug. 1916,	 Murray
papers 79/48/3.
9$ Murray Despatches. 2nd. Despatch 1 Oct. 19l6,p.73.
fl Gen. Herbert A. Lawrence. Note by Murray, op.cit.
93 Kershaw, art.cit.	 Lawrence to Lynden-Bell 28 Aug. 1916, Murray
papers 79/48/3. Lawrence's admission of culpability is not
direct, but is inherent in his statement that Lynden-Bell's
memorandum on Romani giving Murray's version of the battle was
'substantially correct'. 	 See 'Tactical comments on the action at
Romani', op.cit.
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42nd Division further forward before the battle; but this was largely
academic since, as we have seen, these men proved incapable of fighting
a serious engagement in desert conditions;	 indeed, Murray could be
crited for ever wanting to use this division at all. The collapse of
the infantry was an important factor in Lawrence's failure to destroy
the retiring enemy for it robbed the mounted troops of desperately
needed support in any attack upon entrenched forces.
	 Moreover, Kress
organised a very skilful retreat based upon successive lines of defence
which helped to protect his men from the British cavalry. Nor was the
climate exactly conducive to a rapid pursuit by any of Lawrence's
troops, especially when many of these men were quite unprepared for the
heat that greeted them (100° in the shade),
	 while their opponents had
at least more experience of these conditions.
Murray, himself, also made some mistakes. He can be criticised
for adopting a somewhat ambiguous attitude to the command of the battle,
for although he had delegated this to Lawrence he nonetheless constantly
sought to be involved by urging his advice upon the general over the
phone. What is more, Lawrence did not even have over-all command of
all the EEF's forces involved at Romani,f or the mobile column remained
under No.2 Section and consequently did not co-operate adequately with
the main forces; we ought not to be surprised, therefore, that this
unit played only a negligible part in the battle. •* General Chauvel
did not get everything right either, and his handling of the mounted
troops is open to some criticism his tactics were not all they could
have been and in the pursuit his men tended to lose touch too easily
with the enemy so that the enemy's rear-guard was able to slip away
twice. f	 Finally, the operations of the EEF during this battle were
•4 Hill, p. 83.	 These are the views of General Chauvel and therefore
are of	 value since he was the third most important figure in
the battle on the British side after Murray and Lawrence.
6 Memorandum by Gen. Street 22 Aug. 1916,W.0. 95/4429.
2/
bedevilled by poor communications between various units thus making the
co-ordination of attacks most difficult and causing vital delays in the
execution of the most urgent orders. • It is one of the features of
the EEF up to April 1917 that its communication network was not all it
should have been.
	 The most obvious explanation for this is a lack of
experienced staff officers; but whatever its cause,its effect was to
aggravate still further any existing defects in the command-structure -
a point of some importance, for Murray would soon alter his entire
scheme of command in Egypt and the Sinai, thus placing a greater than
ever pressure upon the EEF's staff officers.
'	 A. ICearsey, The operations in Egypt and Palestine illustrating the
Field Service Regulations (London. 1929), p.74.
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THE CONSEQUENCES CF THE ENGAGE1ENT
Much to the surprise of GHQ the Battle of Romanl caused a
considerable amount of tension with the Australian troops of the EEF.
One cause of this tension seems to have been a failure in the facilities
provided f or the Australian wounded after the battle. According to the
Australian Official History the arrangements for the transport of its
wounded men from the ralihead to Qantara were 'deplorable' and a repeat
of the 'Mesopotamia scandals' on a 'small scale'. • What seems to
have particularly angered the Australians was that their wounded were
evacuated in open trucks while the enemy prisoners used normal trains.
However, the charge that No.3 Section was solely responsible f or this
iniquitous state of affairs cannot be sustained, for there also appears
to have been a collapse in the regimental machinery amongst the
Australian units so that their own medical teams were not doing all they
could. •g In reality, all the medical services did none too well
during and after Romani and it was not only the Australian troops who
suffered. For example, those units which used the Egyptian Labour Corps
to provide stretcher bearers soon discovered that they had made a
mistake, for these men were 'not reliable under fire' Moreover, the
42nd Division discovered that their Field Ambulances were left behind
once the advance began because these units simply could not move fast
enough. be Even more worrying for the troops, if only they had known,
was that there was only one consulting surgeon in the whole of Egypt and
he was assigned to the General Hospital at Port Said! '° 	 Finally
- and herein lay
Australian Official History, p. 162.
•	 Falls to MacMunn. MS note no date and Chaytor to Director,
Historical Section 22 Oct. 1925,CAB 45/78.
ø	 Lt.Gen. No.3 Section to CGS GHQ 20 Aug. 1916,W.O. 95/4429.
W.D. Assistant Director Medical Services 42nd Division 5 Aug. 1916,
W.O. 95/4591.
lOf Col. Tulby to Curzon 12 Sept. 1916,Curzon papers MSS Eur F112/112a.
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real shades of Mesopotamia - there had been an outbreak of cholera
amongst the troops after the battle and a conference was held at which
precautions were outlined and the organisation of a vaccination
programme laid down. 1O.
But there was a second and perhaps still more galling incident that
soured relations still further between GHQ and the Australian contingent
of the EEF. Even though Murray praised these men lavishly for their
role in the Battle of Romani in telegrams that described their 'great
steadfastness, gallantry and untiring energy', a feeling arose in the
EEF that Chauvel's men did not gain the recognition for their efforts
that they deserved - a feeling held very strongly by Chauvel's men
themselves, of course! 10$ In fact, this may have been a reaction to
Sir Archibald's style of command; he did not seem to relish personal
interviews and often left his C G S , Lynden-Bell, the task of
congratulating senior off icers,so that the officers concerned could be
left with the impression that Murray had not even been interested. 10*
But the Australian complaint went deeper than this. They felt that in
his official despatch of October 1916 the C in C gave the impression
that the brunt of the fighting at Romani had been borne by the British
infantry; this made them doubly angry, f or their senior officers knew
of Murray's telegrams of praise. 1O Another matter that rankled with
Chauvel and his men was the way in which they received no recognition
for their efforts at Romani in the form of awards; however, in truth
this had partly been caused by Chauvel himself, who had refused to be
decorated once he became aware of the slight he considered his men
101 10 & 11 Aug. 1916,W.O. 95/4591. 	 Cholera was probably contracted
by drinking dirty water in the Sinai.	 See GHQ to GOC No.3 Section
13 Aug. 1916.
103 Murray papers 79/48/3:Murray to Governor-General, Melbourne 21 Aug.
1916.
104 It seems Chauve]. himself suffered in just this manner and his
comment is revealing:	 'I think that the Commander-in-Chief might




Australian Official History, p.192. 	 Murray's
Despatches, Second Despatch 1 Oct. 1916, pp.73-74.
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had received in the official despatch. Even when Chauvel was awarded
the K.C.M.G. early in 1917 no mention was made of Romani, so that the
bitterness remained. torn
But what, then,of the enemy for whom the action had been intended,
after all? Mark Sykes, viewing events from London, put his finger on
the results of this failure of Lawrence to catch Kress:
The Turks will lay stress on the fact that the action was
offensive, and fought on enemy soil; should, however, the fighting
result in the destruction of their expedition, movement in Syria
may be expected. IOV
But the expedition was not destroyed and it was able to carry its own
version of the battle back to Syria. Worse still, it soon became clear
that the enemy had 'evidently not been much demoralised by the losses
they sustained in the reconnaisance at Romani' 1O With considerable
skill the Turks even managed to turn the one tangible evidence of a
British success at Romani - the large numbers of enemy prisoners - to
their advantage in the propaganda war. General Townshend, a prisoner
of the enemy himself after the defeat of his Indian army at Kut, wrote
to Lord Curzon explaining that Ottoman officials had complained to him
about the way in which their men in Egypt were being treated.
	 This was
a matter of some concern for the British,since the remnants of
Townshend's army were prisoners of the Turks and they feared their men
could become the victims of reprisals if the poor treatment in Egypt
continued.	 Townshend, therefore, asked Curzon to raise the matter in
London. 1O In fact, there was no truth in the Turkish charges, as
Townshend himself suspected, since Murray went out of his way to
treat
1O	 Hill, pp.94-95.
' .7 'Appreciation of attached Arab Report No.IV' by Sykes 9 Aug. 1916,
CAB 17/177.
'•3 'Appreciation of attached Arab Report No. VII' by Sykes 30 Aug.
1916,CAB 17/177.
IO Townshend to Curzon 15 Oct. 1916, Curzon papers MSS Eur
Fl 12/1 12k.
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his prisoners in a most gentlemanly fashion. And, although
Townshend did not realise it, his men were already suffering under
horrible conditions that would kill many of them; so the entire affair
actually changed little, though to a European democracy concerned about
its image the matter seemed more serious than it was.
The British, just like the Turks, tried to gain the maximum
propaganda value from Roman!. Robertson told Murray he expected that
such a battle would 'have a good effect in rendering Egypt a fairly easy
place to look after for some time to come.' '$ Nor was Murray unaware
of his duty to milk Roman! for every ounce of propaganda: 'I have been
most careful to make the most of the result obtained with the Delta
population, the Senussi and the Sherif.' "
The large number of prisoners captured by the EEF at Romani proved
of some value to the British because they offered a fresh source of
intelligence upon enemy intentions and troop movements. The new
information obtained from these men was shared with the Indian force in
Mesopotamia in an attempt to gain an overall impression of the location
of all Turkish units in the Sinai, Syria and Mesopotamia, and an
understanding of the nature of these units. $13 Mesopotamia and Egypt
co-operated in this manner in an effort to assist the war against the
Turk - a war that relied upon accurate intelligence since it took place
over vast and differing geographical regions amongst peoples of various
cultures and languages.
'° McGrigor Diary 5 Aug. 1916.
11	 Robertson to Murray 15 Aug. 1916,, Robertson papers 1/32/43.
Iti Murray to Robertson 12 Aug. 1916B.M. !cLMS 52461.
"3 C in C India to 6ff icer in charge Intelligence, Cairo 14 Aug. 1916.
Officer in charge Intelligence, Cairo to C in C India 17 Aug. 1916.
GOC in C Egypt to C in C India 28 Aug. 1916, L/MIL/17/5/3913.
232
The immediate impact of Romani upon the EEF was not dramatic. 	 The
Sinai railway was delayed for only 24 days. In fact, Murray told
General Lawrence as early as 8 August that the result of the battle had
'in no way altered' his policy of a gradual forward movement across the
Sinai. 11* But there had been a significant change, one that meant a
phase of the Sinai campaign had come to an end. For, as it
subsequently transpired, the enemy had made their final assault upon
Egypt and even their final advance into Sinai; there would never again
be a battle like Romani in this campaign with the Turks on the
offensive; from now on Murray would be on the offensive at all times.
The battle also seemed to have a most encouraging effect amongst
the British troops in France who tended to see it as one more example of
the gradual and inevitable success of the Allies as they slowly pushed
the Germans back at the Somxne. tiC In London, moreover, the War
Committee appeared uncommonly pleased with the battle and the CIGS was
requested to wire Murray 'expressing... satisfaction with the complete
success of his recent operations against the Turkish forces.'
$14 GHQ to 0CC No3 Section 8 Aug. 1916,W.O. 95/4365.
tic A, Home, The Diary of a World War I Cavalry Officer (London, 1985),
p. 117. Home was a cavalry officer and, therefore, very interested
in Romani as a cavalry action.
iS War Committee meeting 18 Aug. 1916,CAB 42/17/11.
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CHAPTER 10
)JRRAY COMPLETES THE OCCUPATION OF SINAI:
SEPTEMBER 1916 - JANUARY 1917
'I had no great opinion of him as a general, however, though he deserves
full credit for his organisation of the advance across Sinai; and I have
said so.'
General Wavell on Murray 2 February 1939
THE REORGANISATION OF THE EEF AFTER ROMANI AND THE MOVE OF GHQ TO CAIRO
No sooner had the sand settled after the Battle of Romani than
Murray initiated a major and far-reaching reorganisation of the EEF. He
informed Robertson that he intended to move his headquarters from
Ismailia to Cairo and to create a complete corps headquarters for the
command of the troops in the Sinai to replace the Improvised section
headquarters which had fought the actions at Qatia and Romani. 1 This
was no sudden decision,as indeed might be suggested by the speed with
which it followed Romani; rather it was one that had been forced upon
the C in C by pressure of work and the overwhelmingly consistent advice
of his subordinates at GHQ and the civilian authorities in Egypt. He
had warned the CIGS before Romani - on 2 August - that he saw no reason
why he should not move his GHQ to Cairo once the current operations had
been successfully concluded and the enemy had been driven back to the
edge of the Sinai. This, then, was one reason f or the particular timing
of the decision to move GHQ - a decision, in fact, that did not bear
Murray t Robertson 18 Aug. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/45. There
is some confusion as to date on this subject; the Official History
(p. 243) gives 17 Aug. as the date on which Murray informed London of
his decision - but this Is problematical since the letter of 18 Aug.
cited above Is unofficial and designed to ascertain the CIGS's private
feelings upon the matter before Murray raised It officially.
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fruit until 23 October 1916, when GHQ finally opened in Cairo. 2 Part
of the cause for this delay was the fact that the Egyptian Government
and the High Commissioner were on holiday in Alexandria; another was
that Murray had to secure the War Office's approval for his scheme,
which proved to be no problem since the CIGS gave the C in C a free hand
to do what he considered most suitable for his command, though he did
admit that he had been unaware Ismailia 'was not considered the best
place for your GHQ'.
This was a dramatic about-face, for the C in C who in the early days
of his time In Egypt had strongly advocated and indeed practised the
role of an energetic leader moving amongst his men at the front line; in
fact, even in early August he still talked as if this was attitude to
generalship: 'If I had not been... in close touch with the operations
on the Eastern Frontier, things would never have reached the advanced
stage they have. I personally know every inch of the Sinai front...
without personal supervision and hard driving not a fraction of the work
done... would have been accomplished'. ' What had happened then, to
change his mind and make him amenable to a new style of leadership?
One factor was undoubtedly the pressure of work forced upon him by
the internal affairs of Egypt. Once the immediate danger of invasiond
subsided the foreign representatives demanded the full exercise of their
rights in Egypt even when these clashed with the requirements of martial
law - and it was, of course, Murray's job to administer martial law.
But these problems were intensified by the EEF's staff. Since the large
Murray to Robertson 2 Aug. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/42. Again
there are problems with the date; the EEF War Diary gives the date
for the move of GHQ given in the text above (see 23 Oct. 1916, •
W.O. 95/4366), while the Official History states that the GHQ opened
in Cairo on 18 Oct. (p. 244). The solution to this discrepancy may
lie in the fact that GHQ took a number of days to move all of its
personnel and offices to Cairo.
o Robertson to Murray 15 Aug. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/43.
Murray to Robertson 2 Aug. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/42.
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number of troops originally stationed in Egypt early in 1916 had
dwindled to a relatively small number in August and September 1916 they
found themselves with a great deal of spare time, spare time they could
use to tighten up and straighten out the enforcement of martial law in
detail. There followed a series of cases Im which foreign nationals
were arrested under martial law, after which their representatives
protested to the C in C. They protested not so much at Murray's right
to enforce martial law, but at the determination of his staff to enforce
it in the most trivial circumstances. All this 'proved too much for the
patience of our C in C and produced an outburst on his part'. In
fact, the EEF was convinced it was being treated very poorly indeed
owing to the 'intransigent attitude' of the foreign representatives:
'Protest after protest has been levelled at our heads on every
conceivable action'. B
In order to deal with such confrontations the C in C and some of
his staff found themselves having to travel to Alexandria or Cairo to
meet the protesters in person. This was hardly conducive to successful
operations in the Sinai, nor did it lead to a settled policy towards
foreign nationals and the implementation of martial law in Egypt ; it
was, in other words, a complete fiasco. Meanwhile, the C in C's health
was suffering under the intense pressure of work he found himsel+
facing; in September one eyewitness described him as badly in need of a
rest, while another thought Murray was 'fagged out' because of far too
much work Clearly the existing system was destroying the well-being
of the C in C - and he was not the only one suffering. Clayton found
himself becoming a sort of shuttlecock between the demands of GHQ and
those of the High Commissioner, who also tended to be involved in the
affairs of foreign nationals. e He also objected to the nature of his
McMahon to Grey 22 Sep. 1916. McMahon to F.O. 24 Sep. 1916. McMahon
to Grey 29 Sep. 1916, FO 800/48.
B W.D. Intelligence Section 1 Oct. 1916, W.O. 157/708.
Herbert to Wingate 28 Sep. 1916,	 Wingate papers 140/8/73. V.
Marshall, Memories of Four fronts 	 (London, 1929), p. 180.
Wingate to Clayton 13 Sep. 1916, Clayton papers 470/3/61.
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job, which forced him either to contact Murray and McMahon by phone or
visit them by train, which was more satisfactory but far more demanding
in terms of time expended. To Clayton the whole affair seemed absurd
when 'the real centre of everything' was Cairo (where he was based) -
and yet the C in C resided at Ismailia while the High Commissioner, much
to Clayton's disgust, spent the summer at Alexandria on holiday: 'I
really think that the seaside might be sacrificed in war time' was his
opinion of thi4ehaviour. Clayton, therefore, overwhelmed by work and
in an impossible position was desperate for an immediate transfer of GHQ
to Cairo and so was Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar of the Sudan, to whom
Clayton poured out his heart in very long unofficial letters. Wingate -
who was destined to be the next High Commissioner - felt that if Murray
had positioned his GHQ at Cairo right from the start (le. once Maxwell
had departed) then 'a good deal of trouble and friction would have been
avoided'. 10 Both Wthgate and Clayton hoped to increase their influence
at GHQ, if it moved to Cairo, moreover. ''
Another factor involved in the transfer of GHQ may have been the
personality of Murray's chief staff officer, Lynden-Bell. The EEF's COS
was a somewhat eccentric man who, by the very nature of his personal
taste, did not find Ismailia, which lacked many of the common luxuries
of life, to his liking. 'The CGS appears to be the most extraordinary
particular fellow about his food and drink I have ever struck... (he]
wants careful catering for. Flies are the CGS's pet aversion, and one
or two buzzing about him nearly send him crazy.' 12 Lynden-Bell also
seems to have liked to keep up on all the gossip of the military
establishments in Egypt and London - and this very fact caused even Sir
Archibald some anxiety. ' 	 None of this is intended to suggest that
Clayton to Wingate 3 Aug. 1916, 	 Clayton papers (St. Antony's
College).
10 Wingate to Parker 19 July 1916, Clayton papers 470/3/9.
11 Wingate to Clayton 1 Oct. 1916, Clayton papers 470/4/3.
12 McGrigor diary 11 June 1916.
' Robertson to Murray 20 June 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/36.
Apparently Lynden-Bell had told Murray that he had heard Murray
might be replaced.
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Lynden-Bell was not an efficient CGS, for he most certainly was; but it
is intended to demonstrate that Ismailia did not appeal to him and that
he was quite capable of manipulating both the C in C and others into
seeing things from his perspective. Nor was General Murray invulnerable
to this sort of manipulation, since whenever he travelled by train from
Ismailia to Cairo or the western frontier he did so in conditions of
comparative luxury that overawed those who accompanied him. '
Moreover, while at Ismailia there had been a conference over the
allocation of electric fans,since the number was strictly limited (due
to the lack of sufficient electricity) to no more than twelve; this
caused some dispute as to which departments and officers would get at
least one! 18 This lack of amenities at Ismailia made the transfer of
GHQ to Cairo very attractive to Lynden-Bell and his staff, for, after
all, how could efficient staff work be done under such difficult
circumstances - or so they must have argued.
The Official History refrains from making a judgement as to whether
or not the transfer of the EEF's GHQ was justified although it does make
the point that, with the headquarters at Cairo, Murray was no longer in
touch with his troops. 18 The decision to move GHQ has almost entirely
been seen by subsequent commentators in the light of this criticism and
the dramatic change that seemed to come over the EEF when Allenby moved
GHQ back to the eastern front in 1917 - and yet, as we have already
seen, there were strong legitimate reasons for the transfer. Even this
criticism is not entirely fair and could be described as somewhat
simplistic.
Sir Archibald remained most sensitive towards criticism of this
decision, and the debate over its justification continued well after the
First World War had come to an end - and even into the next World War!
McGrigor diary 14 July 1916.
	
Fergusson to D'Ewe.s 27 Oct. 1916,
Fergusson papers DEF/4.
McGrigor diary 18 June 1916.
16 Official History, p. 244.
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In 1942 a letter appeared in 'The Times' commenting upon the actions of
General Auchinleck who had found it necessary to take personal command
of his troops in the Western Desert and so leave his GHQ at Cairo; but
the real sting in this letter came next - this proved, it claimed, that
Murray's decision to base his GHQ at Cairo had clearly been wrong, for
Auchinleck had discovered this under the pressure of active military
command. Murray, still alive and very much aware of events, felt
sufficiently angered by this letter to reply in defence of his 1916
decision. His defence rested upon the fact that he had to cope with far
more than merely events on the eastern front and, he suspecteI,
Auchinleck would return to Cairo once his immediate crisis was over;
this would add a further degree of similarity to the actions of the two
generals, since Sir Archibald only moved his staff to Cairo once he had
cleared up the immediate crisis on his eastern front.
Murray's 1942 defence remains valid today. He still had a very
complex command - far more complex than just the eastern front - and the
move of GHQ to Cairo actually initiated a far more wide-reaching
reorganisation of the EEF. There were now four sections to the army:
the Eastern Force f or operations in the Sinai, the Western Force for
actions against the Senussi, Delta District and Alexandria District for
Egypt's internal security. These changes were made 'sufficiently
elastic' to allow 4orsohiefkxltIFI+y and so make possible any drastic
alterations in times of crisis. ' As far as the eastern front was
concerned one might well argue that the transfer of GHQ actually cleared
up a nebulous situation in the Sinai and greatly improved a most
deficient command-structure that had proved its failings at Romani.
General Lawrence had been given a temporary and under-manned HQ to
command No 3 Section Canal Defences for the Romani campaign. But for
continued operations In the Sinai it was clear such an ad hoc
'	 Murray to Mr Savage 10 July 1942, Murray papers 79/48/4. Savage
was a biographer of Allenby.
'	 Director of Works, EEF to Maj.-Gen. Scott-Moncrieff 8 Nov. 1916,
W.0. 161/39.
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arrangement could not last. A full staff was needed and a permanent
reorganisation of the force required so that it could more effectively
operate as an offensive unit beyond Romani. A change in personnel was
necessary also. Lawrence's chief staff officer had been proven to be
unsatisfactory and was replaced,while Lawrence himself, having lost two
eons in France and the confidence of his C in C in Egypt, returned home
to an illustrious career with the BEF in the future. " Murray
therefore appointed Major-General Sir Charles Dobell to command what now
became known as Eastern Force. 20 Dobell's reputation was good; he had
been successful in the Cameroons and as commander of Egypt's Western
Frontier Force. His arrival and the creation of this new force was
greeted with great enthusiasm by the men of the EEF, not least by as
capable a member as Dawnay,who was impressed by Dobell and whose not
inconsiderable skills as a staff officer were to be available to Eastern
Force from now on as its CGS. Indeed, in October of 1916 Dobell seemed
the ideal man to achieve that rapport with the men that began to
disappear as Murray had been distracted more and more by the internal
affairs of Egypt. Dawnoy described the new commander in the following
glowing terms: 'He is a really fine fellow.., hard as nails and of
consuming energy... Very able, and very quick, a soldier to the core;
absolutely selfless - regardless of anything except Hthe good of the
show".' 2 It would appear, therefore, that Murray had, in fact,
organised his forces in such a way as to maintain a strongly offensive
spirit in the Sinai with a far better command-structure, while making
possible the closer administration of Egypt and enabling his own GHQ to
cope more effectively with the many and varied demands made upon its
time. He had learnt the lesson of Romani and had acted upon it; he
correctly discerned that he must either delegate still further in the
Murray to Robertson 22 Sep. 1916, B.M. Add.MS 52462.
20 The correct title was 'Eastern Frontier Force' but it was soon
generally shortened to 'Eastern Force'.
21 Dawnay diary 17 Oct. 1916. Dawnay was an excellent choice for the
Eastern Force's CGS since he had been doing the staff work and
planning for the Sinai operations at GHQ since January 1916.
241
Sinai and make this delegation feasible by improving the staff available
to such a command, or he ought to take personal command himself - he
chose the former and gave Dobell an almost independent command. 22
Having GHQ at Cairo certainly proved a great benefit in a number of
ways. Clayton admitted that it seemed as if he now would have 'a good
deal taken off my hands' and so be able to devote more time to his other
work. 23 Egypt certainly benefitted; an 'intimate relationship' grew up
between the EEF and the Egyptian Government, while the close contact of
military and civilian affairs reduced the friction caused by the demands
made upon the country in order to facilitate the war effort, a factor
which became a serious problem when Allenby moved GHQ out of Egypt and
failed to communicate sufficiently with its authorities in 1917 and
1918. 24 From October 1916, therefore, troubled waters were stilled in
Egypt and Inter-departmental friction was reduced, although not
eradicated. In fact, the men at the Foreign Office were most unhappy
about the course of events in Egypt. They were convinced that Murray
had moved his GHQ to maintain his own personal control over martial law
in Egypt which he believed ought to be a solely military matter. 25
This was, naturally, a matter of some concern to the Foreign Office
since it could mean that the High Commissioner of Egypt might be unable
to exercise some of his responsibilities if Murray became too energetic
in the defence of his rights. 2 Yet this was a still more complex and
pressing problem for another reason - a new High Commissioner was soon
to be appointed. Sir Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar of the Sudan, would
22 The Australian Official History (p. 196) tries to argue somewhat
unconvincingly that Murray failed to learn from his experience at
Romani, since his delegation to Lawrence had allowed the Turks to
escape; but this misses a crucial point - Lawrence might have
succeeded if he had been more energetic and had had overall command.
Murray believed Dobell was the former and he made sure he had the
latter!
23 Clayton to Wingate 9 Oct. 1916, Wingate papers 141/3/34.
24 Elgood, pp. 312-320.
25 Memorandum by Ronald Graham 13 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2672/255232.
26 Minute by Ronald Graham 28 Nov. 1916, FO 371/2930/4445.
2replace Sir Henry McMahon and potentially could cause a storm In Egypt
for two reasons: he wanted to take over as the nominal C in C in the
country and administer martial law himself. 27 These demands were not
as outlandish as they sounded, for Wingate was in fact a more senior
general than Murray and was still on the Army List. GHQ was, of course,
not unaware of Wingate's rank and its possible ramifications and all of
its members were eager for the slightest hint as to the new High
Commissioner's intentions: 'No one at GHQ cares in the least what is
happening on the Eastern or Western front, as their whole interest
centres on the question whether or not the Sirdar will come here in
uniform'. 20 Such developments filled the men at the Foreign Office
with horror and they deprecated any attempt by Wingate to pull rank in
Egypt since they feared it might lead to Murray's resignation. They
preferred a more subtle approach; the question of martial law should be
raised privately, at first, and then, when Sir Archibald had 'his hands
full' with active operations at El Arish, a transfer of power might be
made to the new High Commissioner. ° That there was no breakdown in
relations between the EEF and Wingate was due ultimately to the strong
friendship that developed between the two men, and not to the under-hand
machinations of London's career diplomats. These developments
demonstrate an inherent weakness in moving GHQ to Cairo, for it placed
the C in C at the very centre of Egyptian political affairs and drew
Murray into them to an extent he had never anticipated.
27 Wingate to Grey 23 Nov. 1916, FO 371/2672/255232.
20 Memorandum by Ronald Graham, op.cit.
' Ibid.
30 Minute by G.R.C. 6 Nov. 1916, FO 371/2672/222836.
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CROSSING THE SINAI
Although Murray and his staff moved to Cairo this in no way
prevented the C in C from giving the most precise attention to the
support of his troops in the Sinai throughout the rest of 1916. This
remained his chief priority. Indeed it would be quite wrong to outline
the course of British operations in the Sinai without pausing to make
some mention of the immense achievement involved in moving a modern
European army across such hostile terrain. Because General Allenby was
to win dramatic victories in 1917 and 1918 the crossing of the Sinai has
been overshadowed; and, after all, the laying of a railway and pipe-line
hardly stirs the soul like a daring cavalry charge or a victorious
infantry assault! And yet the traversing of the Sinai was not without a
certain 'romance'. Nor should the importance of this achievement be
overlooked; for, as one observer later wrote, the history of the
Palestine campaign 'is incomplete without the story of the dark and
struggling days in the Desert of Sinai'. 32 Murray's advance across the
Sinai has even been viewed in biblical terms: 'I have a personal
knowledge of your great work in the Desert of Sinai, and have always
contended that in the matter of overthrowing the Turkish Empire... you
must be considered for your stupendous preparatory work... You were the
Moses who led the EEF to the borders of the Promised Land'. In order
to grasp fully the true extent of Sir Archibald's achievement - and,
indeed, that of the EEF and its men - we need to make ourselves
conversant with the particular difficulties created by an advance across
the Sinai and the measures adopted by Murray and his staff to overcome
them and to transform what otherwise could merely have been a period of
frustration into a time of great creativity and imaginative
improvisation.
' Maxse to Murray 6 Apr. 1933, Murray papers 79/48/3. Maxse calls the
crossing of the Sinai 'a romance and an achievement'.
32 Col. E.A.Watkin6 to Murray 25 Jan. 1929, Murray papers 79/48/4.
Ibid.
1928, Murray papers 79/48/4.
BM Add. ! 52461.
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Perhaps Murray's greatest concern while his men crossed the Sinai
waslvs fear of 'a catastropheas the world would never forgive' caused by
a failure of the EEF's water supply, which would leave British troops to
fend for themselves under extremely trying circumstances. °' If one
remembers what happened to the British infantry during the action at
Romani these were no idle fears - especially since both the Gallipoli
and Mesopotamia campaigns led to inquiries into failures, so that Murray
quite legitimately feared a similar public execution at the hands of the
press and the politicians. He certainly felt the pressure daily, as he
admitted: 'To cross the Sinai Peninsula with, say, 100,000 men and
maintain them there with an adequate supply of water is an anxiety which
no one who has not undertaken it can ever realise'. To the British
soldier the Sinai was rather like an alien landscape, quite unlike
anything he had experienced previously and not easy to become accustomed
to. Perhaps worst of all was the sheer physical effort needed to move
over areas of loose sand; in fact, it was estimated that in terms of
energy expended 10 miles in the Sinai was equivalent to 25 miles
anywhere else - and this did not take account of the other problems such
as lack of water, food and shade, and, of course, the heat. Murray
was obviously concerned that Robertson in London did not fully grasp the
difficulties created by loose sand so, in order to correct this, he
actually enclosed a photograph of the Qatia region in a private letter
to the CIGS and explained that it waa most difficult to dig or construct
anything in such conditions: 'it is like digging water, and one sand
storm and you can't find your work'. 	 Loose sand disturbed by a storm
could become a serious matter and it was not unknown for trains to be
derailed by such weather conditions as they crossed the Sinai. 3 But
it was the heat that did the real damage to the EEF; it cut into the
ranks of the British troops already exhausted by having to move over
Murray to Col. E.A.Watkins 10 Oct.
Ibid.
Dawnay diary 5 Aug. 1916.
Murray to Robertson 14 June 1916,
30 Dawnay diary 24 ran. 1917.
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deep sand; temperatures could reach 123° Farenheit inside a tent and
even the equipment began to fail in such heat; for example, a new type
of shell experimented with by the EEF was found to melt under conditions
of extreme heat. ' These difficulties were accentuated by Murray's
lack of troops experienced in desert warfare - a fact which Wingate
commented upon as late as .July 1916. '°
Murray certainly felt that what had been achieved in the Sinai was
unique. He compared the campaign with Kitchener's expedition across the
Sudan only to demonstrate that the EEF's position was far different in
that there had been no long period of preparation before the move into
the Sinai and the troops had to make do with what could be constructed
as they advanced. " With some irony Sir Archibald made the comment
that when the history of his operations in the Sinai was written the
GIGS would be surprised at what had been accomplished because all of
Kitchener's efforts in the Sudan were only 'a fleabite' compared to the
efforts of the EEF. Not only did the C in C consider his army 4 a
achievements in the Sinai unique, but he found the whole affair of
getting a European force, used to certain everyday comforts, Ccross the
Sinai a most intellectually stimulating - if not exciting - affair: 'If
my operations were not quite of a secondary nature they would interest
the world immensely. The conquest of the Sinai by rail and pipe-line is
rather fascinating'.	 This sort of interest led Murray to examine the
different historical accounts of previous crossings of the Sinai and to
decide on his route accordingly. ' Because the C in C remained
enthusiastic about his task he never allowed matters to stagnate while
the EEF was in the Sinai so that after the war his efforts could be
quite fairly described as an 'energetic offensive'.
' Lynden-Bell to War Office 24 Aug. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
40 Wingate to Clayton July 1916, Clayton papers 470/3/11.
Murray Despatches. Second Despatch 1 Oct. 1916, p. 51.
42 Murray to Robertson 2 Aug. 1916, Robertson papers 1/32/42.
' Murray to Robertson 2 Nov. 1916, BM Add. t' 52462.
" Lecture by Murray at Aldershot, op. cit.
'& M.G.E.Bowman-Manif old, An Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine
Campaigns 1914-1918	 (London, 1920), p. 34.
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Supplying the EEF with water whilst advancing in the Sinai
certainly offered Sir Archibald a 'fascinating' problem that fully
occupied his undoubted intellectual abilities. Once Romani was secured
a reservoir was constructed there - and nearly all the water drunk by
the troops was drawn by tank trucks from this reservoir to storage tanks
at the railhead to the east. When the pipe-line was laid to Bir ci Abd
another reservoir was completed there and the whole process repeated.
The pipe-line did not reach El Arish until 5 February 1917, by which
time it had nearly caught up with the railway and had made possible the
crossing of the wilderness by British troops - but such a description
gives a most false impression that the entire enterprise was fairly
straightforward; it certainly was not. Personnel could be a real
headache. Because the Royal Engineers were so busy they had to make use
of Egyptian labourers who had no idea how to screw the pipes together,
so that 'it looked as if the work would never have been completed'; even
though the labourers gradually became more proficient at this job they
created a further problem by their very existence because they had to be
fed and the EEF already used all the existing transport facilities.
Equipment did not always meet the requirements made upon it any more
than did the personnel; the pump machinery intended to move the water of
the Sweet Water Canal through filters and up to the port was 'not always
equal to the task allotted to it', f or example. Nor was haste always
the best policy, for the first pipe-line laid beyond Romani was
constructed so rapidly that when it filled with water serious leaks were
soon observed and water was wasted: 'The inference is that too much was
attempted', concluded an official report on the matter. Because of
these problems the C in C asked London for a technical expert to
advise on the best and most economical methods of laying a water
Official History, pp. 271-272.
Report on Water Supply to the Egyptian Field Force 1914-July 1917,
Murray papers 79/48/2.
'Report of the Engineer Works in Egypt', Murray papers 79/48/2.
'Report of an Inspection of Water Supply Arrangements In No 3
Section, Canal Defences' by Maj.-Gen. Wright and Col. Sir Murdoch
MacDonald 20 Nov. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
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pipe-line across the Sinai. Meanwhile, the War Office sought to do all
it could to help and sent an agent to America to purchase the necessary
equipment needed while Britain was scoured for pump machinery, and ships
from the United States carrying the all-important pipes were specially
escorted through the Mediterranean by the Royal Navy. 50 Nonetheless,
water never ceased to be a cause of concern to Murray and it was an
important influence upon his strategy; indeed, there were times when he
even considered reducing the number of troops on the eastern front
simply because the amount of water required to keep them fully active
took up so many trains on the railway that it was hindering the entire
advance.
The key to the material advance of the EEF was undoubtedly the
Sinai railway which, ultimately, would reach Deir el Belan in Palestine
.4 wMch
in April 1917, the continued constructionAwas delayed by the liquid
demands of the troops. London had a sort of fixation about the
railway and seemed to desire to be involved in every aspect of its
progress, so that when Murray explained that Egypt could not supply him
with the rails he needed the War Office and the Foreign Office decided
to lend a hand and make it quite clear to the civilian authorities in
Egypt that the EEF's requirements were an absolute priority. This
entire affair became linked in the minds of the politicians in Britain
with what they believed to be a lack of war atmosphere in Egypt; this
laxdazical attitude was, they assumed, delaying Murray's advance. '
While there was some truth in this accusation the difficulties facing
the C in C were far more complex than this. The progress of the railway
could, for instance, be determined by the nature of the terrain over
which it was being laid, so that beyond El Arish the railway failed by
50 
'Report on Water Supply', op. cit.
' Murray to Robertson 22 Sep. 1916, BM Add. MS 52462.
52 Report of Engineer in Chief after visit to No 3 Section
20 Aug. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
Gen. MacDonagh to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs,
22 July 1916 and Minute by ORG 26 July 1916, FO 371/2672/143563.
' War Committee meeting 6 July 1916, CAB 42/16/1.
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about a month to meet its deadline due to difficulties caused by sand
dunes. Another factor influencing the progress of the railway was
the activity of enemy aircraft; the Egyptian labourers employed to lay
the rails refused to work by day while Turkish planes bombed the line,
4Ki.
and they did little by night at such times withAinevitable result that
progress was 'extremely slow'. The only way the construction workers
could be induced to continue working at all was by maintaining
continuous air cover over the railway, an operation that caused a heavy
drain upon Murray's scanty aerial resources. Moreover, even when the
necessary rails for continued construction could be obtained (since
Britain had none available) - from India - they were not of sufficient
quality to satisfy Sir Archibald; and he always remained short of
certain vital pieces of equipment. In spite of these numerous
frustrations the C In C saw remarkable progress on the railway under his
leadership: 'extraordinary it seems', was one observer's comment on the
subject.
The difficulties posed by the Sinai were a stimulation to the
Intellectual activity of the EEF's staff and much attention was given to
how movement over loose sand could be facilitated. The use of rabbit
wire as a firm foundation upon which Infantry boots could grip made life
easier - but miracles were needed If all the hinCrances of desert
conditions were to be overcome, as Guy Dawnay ruefully admitted: 'All
we want now is (a) water In a tabloid form! and (b) some good means of
enabling wheels to get over sand'. 60 The continuous frustration of the
troops' lack of mobility in the Sinai led GHQ to experiment in other
ways. A deliberate decision was made to increase the number of camels
Lynden-Bell to Chetwode 29 Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folderl.
56 Chetwode to HQ East Force 16 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4471.
Murray to Wingate 25 Jan. 1917, W.O. 158/627.
Secretary of State for War, War Office to C in C IndIa 5 Feb. 1917.
C in C India to War Office 8 Feb. 1917. War Office to C in C India
16 Feb. 1917. Diary note 28 Feb. 1917, L/MIL/17/5/3915.
McGrigor diary 10 Oct. 1916.
60 Dawnay diary 19 Dec. 1916.
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used by the EEF for transport; and steps were then taken to form a Camel
Corps of fighting troops mounted upon camels so that a more heavily-
armed force would 1 in future1 be available to augment the firepower of
the existing lightly-equipped mounted troops. Ultimately these
experiments would lead to the formation of the Imperial Camel Corps that
would serve with distinction in the Palestine campaign. ' At the same
time Murray instituted a course of training at Zeitoun in Egypt to
provide 'special instruction' for cavalry units so that they would be
better able to meet the demands made upon them during active operations
in the Sinai. 2
But the most remarkable and imaginative developments encouraged by
Sir Archibald during the EEF's period in the Sinai came in a most
unexpected area - aerial photography and mapping. In actual fact this
was nothing new for Egypt, since Maxwell had made a number of
experiments in this sphere in 1915. In part this had been caused by his
having to rely more heavily than was usual upon aerial reconnaissance
over the Sinai due to the Turkish strategy of making a series of small
advances towards the Canal.	 However, Sir John had certainly been
impressed by what his planes could do, for in August 1915 he
recommended a similar policy to General Hamilton, who was then
struggling to hold his positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Maxwell
sent Hamilton the results of 'some experiments' by his planes over the
Sinai and then included some startling advice to the embattled Chief of
the MEF: 'It appears to me that in a very short time with adequate
encouragement you can have the whole of the Gallipoli Peninsula
absolutely accurately mapped showing every trench and gun position'.
The first steps taken in this direction were not forgotten when the
MEF took over operations in the Sinai from the Force in Egypt in January
GHQ to MaJ
.
-Gen. Chauvel 22 Aug. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
Note by Capt. Williams 24 Sep. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
6 Maxwell to Hamilton 18 Aug. 1915, Hamilton papers 5/12
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of 1916.	 They soon discovered that aerial photographs provided
'excellent details' of the enemy's permanent works in the Sinai.
Moreover, these same photographs proved an excellent check upon the
reports of some of the Arab agents used by the British whose estimates
as to the size of a Turkish force frequently betrayed 'a tendency to
megalomania'! Consequently great care was taken to ensure that accurate
maps of important positions were drawn by outlining instructions for the
pilots and observers involved so that the photgraphs were taken
vertically from a uniform height; it was also important that the
photographs overlapped to prevent any area being missed. Meanwhile,
serious topographical work in the Sinai had already begun; the first
squadrons of Yeomanry despatched into the Sinai were sent not only as a
'step forward' towards the ultimate occupation of Qatia, but also to
cover survey teams mapping the terrain. 66 As the months passed this
policy was continued and with such energy and enthusiam that survey
teams followed the retreating Turks after the battle at Romani. A
Topographical Section of the Intelligence Branch co-ordinated all of
this work so that the survey teams on the ground and the aerial
photographers complemented each other with the result that standardised
tactical maps of the Sinai were printed and distributed to the EEF.
Murray himself was under no illusions as to the value of this work as he
explained in his official despatch 1 Tune 1916: 'I believe that the map
based on this survey is the first map entirely constructed on this
principle'. These mapping expeditions were continued until the final
months of Sir Archibald's time in Egypt: in May 1917 a Topographical
Survey Section was despatched to Northern Sinai to sketch the area which
had not been fully mapped previously because of the dash to El Arish
and Gaza.	 The methods developed in these surveys by land and air
64 Egypt Command Intelligence Summary 26 	 an. - 2 Feb. 1916,
W.O. 157/700.
Intelligence Summary 16 Apr. 1916, W.0. 157/703.
66 15 Army Corps to GHQ 20 Feb. 1916, W.0. 95/4361.
67 W.D. Intelligence Section 31 Aug. 1916, W.0. 157/707.
GB Murray Despatches. First despatch 1 June 1916, p. 9.
69 Southern Canal Section Order No 23 by Brig.-Gen. P. C. Palm,
W.0. 95/4450.
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proved of value operationally to the EEF; for example, aerial
photography of the Turkish defences near Rafah greatly assisted the raid
upon that position in January 1917. '° The techniques learnt in the
Sinai were used to map the whole of Palestine, so that by the end of the
war the British had an orderly map of the country on a scale of
1:40,000; this was a significant step in the history of modern
topgraphical methods and Murray must take full credit for encouraging
and facilitating its progress in its early days.
THE ADVANCE TOWARDS EL ARISH
In the immediate period after the Battle of Romani the first task
for the EEF was to rest its exhausted troops. However, as the weeks
passed a more energetic strategy was adopted and the Australian and New
Zealand mounted troops started to make regular reconnaissances into the
Sinai. This strategy led to two very similar raids being mounted by the
British - raids which would influence the EEF's policy in the desert in
the future and that demonstrated the weaknesses of such schemes however
carefully they were planned.
On 17 September 1916 a mixed force of Light Horse, Imperial Camel
Corps and artillery attacked the Turkish outpost at El Mazar on the main
coastal track to El Arish, which the enemy had occupied after the
retreat from Romani. Major-General Chauvel, in command of the
operation, had been given strict orders to break off the engagement if
the enemy were encountered in greater strength than was expected
because, explained the C in C, 'it is useless to throw away valuable
lives in attempting to capture strongly
	 held entrenchments with
mounted troops' when one could wait a few weeks to be sure of taking the
° Hill, p. 90.
71 D.Gavich, 'An account of an unrealised aerial cadstral survey in
Palestine under the British Mandate', Geographical Journal. CLIII
(1987), pp. 93-98.
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position with infantry once the general advance of the EEF reached the
area. 72 The intention of surprising the enemy was lost because the
force was spotted by Turkish aircraft; nonetheless, an assault was
attempted, but was soon called off on account of the strength of the
enemy force and the late arrival of the artillery. Although Murray
wrote of the action in glowing terms to Robertson little had been
achieved in purely military terms - though the C in C's instructions
were vindicated as the Turks evacuated El Mazar shortly afterwards.
On the other hand, some important tactical lessons had been learnt; not
the least of these was the discovery that camel forces could not move
anywhere near as fast as the cavalry, which had been proved by the late
arrival of the Camel Corps at El Mazar. The EEF was still cutting
its teeth in terms of operations under desert conditions, therefore,
even as late as September 1916 which, in itself, helps to demonstrate
Murray's very real achievements during 1916 in occupying the Sinai
Peninsula. But his army was learning all the time - and lessons about
the limitations of surprise raids that would bear fruit in later
successes. For example, El Mazar proved the difficulty of achieving
surprise and, still more important, the problems involved in
co-ordinating an attack against entrenched positions at the appointed
time after a long march.
The second operation was against Bir el Maghara, 50 miles to the
south east of Romani. Once again the instructions were clear: the
primary object was the destruction of the enemy's guns and equipment,
but 'if the... positions be stronger than anticipated the attack will be
turned into a reconnaissance in force'.
	 The attacking force was
commanded by Major-General Dallas and consisted of Light Horse,
72 GHQ to GOC No 3 Section 9 Sep. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
Official History, p. 245. Hill, pp. 197-199.
Murray to Robertson 22 Sep. 1916, BM Add.t.S 52462.
General Staff note on the Operations at El Mazar 16-17 Sep. 1916,
W.O. 95/4366.
6 Oct. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
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Yeomanry, Camel Corps and horse artillery. The entire action
followed a similar pattern to that of the operation at El Mazar - night
marches and then an attack that was not pressed home due to the strength
of the enemy's position. This engagement took place on 13 October 1916:
it emphasised the lessons learnt at El Mazar and provided the EEF with
further valuable experience in desert warfare.
It was for operations such as these, but on a larger scale, that
Murray now sought a 'special type' of commander to lead one or two
divisions and several mounted brigades; these were, in reality, the old
No 3 Section Canal Defences, and General Dallas had been given temporary
command of them until a more suitable officer was found. The C in C had
explained to the CIGS exactly the sort of man he wanted and he stressed
that it would be a 'most important' appointment and that he did not want
someone who had been over-looked in France, but a young, active, modern
soldier not obsessed with trench warfare. Robertson was feeling
generous and Murray got the very man he was after, Major-General Sir
Philip Chetwode. Chetwode was given the temporary rank of Lieutenant-
General with command of the 'Desert Column' (the new name for No 3
Section), which was to spear-head Eastern Force's advance across the
Sinai. He took over his new command on 7 December 1916 as a Corps
Commander, but subordinate to Dobell. ' From now on Chetwod4would be
responsible for raids like El Mazar and Bir el Maghara while Dobell
watched from over his shoulder.	 As if to emphasise this the new
commander soon advanced his own headquarters to Mazar,
Although there had been a brief halt in the Sinai advance after
Romani Murray was determined that his offensive would continue
Official History, pp. 245-6. Australian Official History, pp. 200-
203. The Australian work does not seem to have been aware of the
fact that Dallas was acting according to his orders when he broke
off the attack.
70 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 21 Oct. 1916, W.O. 33/905.
W.D. Eastern Force 7 Dec. 1916, W.O. 95/4449.
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undisrupted by the enemy.	 It is unfortunate that the EEF's progress
after Romani has been described as being made 'steadily and
methodically'. eo
 In one sense such a description is absolutely
correct, for Sir Archibald had to push his men forward from one position
to another according to the progress of the railway and pipeline. But,
on the other hand, the very wording of this description is unfortunate
for it gives the impression that the EEF crawled across the Sinai in a
cautious manner. This is quite incorrect: Murray consistently pushed
his men forward in order to reach El Arish as quickly as possible.
Only days after the Romani engagement had ended the C in C summoned
his generals to GHQ in order to discuss the Bir al Abd area, the next
position in the drive to El Arish, which Sir Archibald wanted
permanently occupied. GHQ soon requested detailed proposals from
No 3 Section for the permanent occupation of all the water-bearing areas
up to and including Bir el Abd and beyond Romani. Murray also made it
clear that the 'utmost economy' was to be practised in the number of
troops garrisoning these positions so that most remained available for
offensive actions; the garrisons themselves were to act as pivot centres
from which mobile troops could act offensively.
These decisions reflected the C in C's rock-like determination to
reach El Arish by the winter; when he found himself under pressure to
release troops to the Hejaz in September f or the support of the Sherif's
beleaguered forces there, he became almost ruthless in his rejection of
such a course of action: 'I have the task on my hands now of advancing
to El Arish. I am one-third of the way there and I am determined to get
to El Arish... Nothing will induce me to reduce the strength of troops
°° Official History, p. 201.
81 Murray diary 13 Aug. 1916. C in C to GOC No 3 Section 14 Aug. 1916,
Murray papers 79/48/3.
82 GHQ to GOC No 3 Section 5 Sep. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
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to carry on that plan'. The added pressure of the Arab revolt and
the demands that it began to make on the EEF (both in terms of equipment
and potential operations) seemed to strengthen Murray in his resolve to
reach El Arish come what may - and he even began to adopt a more
forthright tone in his communications with the CIGS as a result.
Murray's rigid determination to continue his planned move on El
Arish may also have been accentuated, somewhat ironically, by the EEF's
weakened condition after Romani. The necessary drafts needed to restore
his infantry to full strength were slow in coming, and he also began to
lose men to Salonica in November. 	 This drain upon his already meagre
resources went 'sorely against the grain', Murray admitted. As a
result of these losses the C in C explained to London that although he
had always estimated his needs for the capture of El Arish at five
divisions and four mounted brigades, he now had only four under-strength
divisions, although he did have six mounted brigades. S7 Sir Archibald
would have been horrified, however, had he known what was on Robertson's
mind towards the end of September, for the CIGS told Henry Wilson
privately that he hoped to get two more divisions for France from Egypt
by the spring! ee
 Angered by these developments, the C in C was stung
into pressing forward still more rapidly to achieve the goal f or which
he had been aiming since February - the occupation of El Arish.
Murray's enthusiasm for this objective was not merely based upon
his desire to secure Egypt in the east; he and his officers were more
9 Conference held at C in C's residence, Ismailia, 12 Sep. 1916,
W.O. 158/602.
Murray to Robertson 15 Sep. 1916, W.0. 158/602.
The EEF sent one mounted brigade and two Infantry battalions to
Salonica in November.
Murray to CIGS 7 Sep. 1916, W.0. 106/715.
°	 Murray to CIGS 21 Oct. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
Henry Wilson diary 21 Sep. 1916.
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ambitious than this. For example, he informed Robertson in a private
letter that from El Arish he would be able to 'seriously affect' enemy
operations in Arabia and Syria and act as a useful auxiliary to the
Russians in the Caucasus and the British forces in Mesopotamia. • The
C in C was thinking in grand strategic terms as he contemplated the
seizure of El Arish, therefore; but even this seems fairly tame compared
to the ambitious schemes being drawn up by his subordinates in the
autumn of 1916. Clayton, in Cairo, considered that an advance beyond El
Arish to a line from Gaza to the east of Beersheba with its right flank
protected by the impassable country west of the Dead Sea was without
doubt the best way f or the EEF to make its presence felt in the Middle
East since it would secure Egypt more effectively than at the Canal or
El Arish and menace all of Syria together with the enemy's
communications with the Hejaz. °
Aware that Murray was starting to develop some ambitious plans f or
the future, the CIGS decided to stop them before he lost control and was
unable to withdraw from Egypt the men he believed were needed on the
Western Front. He therefore re-emphasized what he considered were
British objectives in the region: 'Broadly speaking, and in connection
with the war as a whole.., the policy in Egypt... necessarily remains a
defensive one'. Murray was, of course, to take every effort to hurry
along the advance to El Arish but, at the same time, he was also to
increase the efficiency of his troops so that Egypt could be defended
with the minimum number of men.
Whether Robertson expected it or not Sir Archibald responded to his
re-emphasis of the EEF's objectives most pointedly. For on thing, as
far as Murray was concerned the CIGS had, for the second time,
vindicated his original memorandum of February advocating an 'active
defence 'based upon an occupation of El Arish.
	 But then he added
•! Murray to Robertson 30 Sep. 1916, BM Add. MS 52462.
° Clayton to Wingate 12 Oct. 1916, Wingate papers 141/3/50.
'P CIGS to Murray 4 Oct. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
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something that proved he was still thinking offensively: if only the
security of Egypt is sought, he wrote, then the current position at Bir
el Abd is quite satisfactory, but 'I feel strongly that our role in this
theatre demands something more... and that it is incumbent on us to do
all in our power to assist in the general plan of operations'. *2 Once
again the C in C explained that he hoped, at the very least, to prevent
the withdrawal of enemy troops from Sinai and Syria and to threaten the
Turkish line of communications to the Hejaz. Robertson's re-statement
of aims and Murray's reply are both important for the evidence they
provide as to the weaknesses in British strategy in this period. The
CIGS had hinted in August and earlier in the year that he was optimistic
about the EEF achieving real results in the winter of 1916 and 1917, as
we have already seen; now, however, as the demands of France pressed
upon him he found himself forced to stifle undue optimism in Egypt and
to state clearly that El Arish would be the limit of the advance. But
this was no solution to the problem because, as Murray stated, occupying
El Arish meant adopting a policy that went beyond merely defending
Egypt. So, although Sir Archibald interpreted the CIGS's official
communication as being a re-statement of his February 1916 memorandum,
he was being charitable; it was, In reality, the product of a man who
under intense pressure was seeking to fulfil numerous conflicting
demands and did not fully grasp the consequences of his own orders. The
GIGS had begun to to vacillate.
That the GIGS had started to give out more cautious signals about
the EEF's role was quite obvious In London. In a general review of the
war so far, written in October for the War Committee, for example,
Robertson made no mention of the intention to reach El Arish by the
winter when discussing operations In the Sinai, and only talked of 'a
further advance' beyond the Qatia region once the railway had reached
there. '	 Lloyd George was not in the least impressed by this
9	 Murray to CIGS 21 Oct. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
93 'A General Review of the Situation in all Theatres of War', by GIGS
Oct. 1916, CAB 42/22/15.
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and detected the undertones of 'nothing more just yet' f or the EEF
that seemed to pervade Robertson's attitude towards the Sinai at this
stage. 4 Nonetheless, Murray continued true to form to execute the
policy that he had always advocated and that most certainly meant
something more than simply securing Egypt from attack. In November he
telegraphed the GIGS and declared his intentions once at El Arish: he
would harass the Turks in Syria with his mobile forces based at the town
and so hope to attract enemy forces to his front from the Caucasus,
Mesopotamia or the Hejaz; he called this policy 'defensive - offensive'
and added that if the EEF was reduced below its current strength he
would be forced to adopt a purely defensive role which might lead to the
force being ignored by the enemy, thus meaning that London would not get
full value from his army. •
By November, as the prospect of the El Arish operation loomed
larger, however, Robertson began to change his attitude somewhat. This
was partly because various members of the War Committee had 'expressed
satisfaction' that El Arish might finally be occupied and had urge4he
4.
GIGS to make sure 	 was executed as soon as possible. But the main
reason for the CIGS's volte face' was more subtle than this. He wished
to prevent the despatch of any British troops to Rabegh on the coast of
the Hejaz and he realised that he could most effectively do this by
playing on the politicians' delight at the El Arish operation while
simultaneously explaining that if they sanctioned the Rabegh landing
El Arish would become impossible. He was therefore prepared now to talk
of the El Arish plan as 'an offensive measure' making possible raids
into Syria - all of which appealed to the men of the War Committee. He
also emphasized the importance attached to the El Arish operations by
the Russians. That Robertson succeeded in elevating the importance
of the occupation of El Arish in the eyes of the members of the War
Committee can be seen by the conclusions of the Committee's meeting of
94 Lloyd George I, p. 538.
Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 12 Nov. 1916, W.O. 158/627.
P 'The Occupation of El Arish' by CIGS 19 Nov. 1916, CAB 42/24/8.
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20 November 1916: 'There was general agreement... that the abandonment
of this carefully prepared expedition was highly undesirable'. "
Of course, internal politics in London and the personal ambitions
of General Murray could all be of merely academic interest if the
Ottoman Empire decided to disrupt proceedings in the Sinai. And there
seemed to be some chance of this - at least, so it appeared in September
and October. The Allies were not the only ones to draw a connection
between the campaign in the Caucasus and that in the Sinai; it was not
impossible, therefore, mused the General Staff in London, that
Constantinopl4night decide to transfer some of the divisions in the
Caucasus to the Sinai at the end of October, since from November until
late March no operations were possible in the Caucasus due to the snow,
and were such a policy followed eight fresh enemy divisions could start
arriving on Murray's front in November. •The C in C examined these
alarming predictions in his long official memorandum to the CIGS of 21
October 1916, where he argued that at an 'outside estimate' it was
possible the Turks could have 55,000 men in total to face him early in
1917 (including potential Caucasus reinforcements) - but he would surely
be aware if any such concentration were taking place. The C in C's
confidence was based upon the success of his intelligence sevices that
had perfected the interception of the enemy's wireless messages and
could read their ciphers even when they were altered. '°° However, this
did not mean that there were no problems; for example, early in December
it was common knowledge at GHQ that two enemy divisions had been 'lost
sight of' and were thought to be on the way to El Arish. 101 Moreover,
the Germans were believed to be keen on another attack upon the Suez
Canal and would push for one if the troops became available. 102 But
•1 War Committee meeting 20 Nov. 1916, CAB 42/24/13.
P Problematical reinforcement of the Sinai force from divisions in
the Caucasus 13 Sep. 1916 by M.I.2, W.O. 106/1511.
9	 Murray to CIGS 21 Oct. 1916, W. 0. 106/715.
	 Sdic 1e'bee,
100 W.D. Intelligence Section 28 and 29 Sep. 1916, W.O. 157/7O8.I'I6,Pl(57/7tt.
101 McGrlgor diary 5 Dec. 1916.
102 W.D. Intelligence Section GHQ IEFD 15 Oct. 1916, W.O. 157/792.
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German and Turkish views diverged; Berlin looked to Egypt as the goal of
the future offensive operations by Constantinople while the Turkish saw
the Hejaz as of far more importance; it was, after all, part of the
Ottoman Empire and they were in danger of losing it. 103 As it turned
out, Berlin failed; there was no attack upon Egypt in the winter of
1916-1917 and no large transfer of troops from the Caucasus - but the
threat remained at the back of the mind of the men at GHQ since there
was still talk of an attack in the spring of 1917. 104. This explains
why Sir Archibald added a caveat to his plan of campaign towards El
Arish of October: if his own strength was materially reduced or if the
enemy were heavily reinforced then he would have to reconsider his
options.
Meanwhile, in Egypt and the Sinai specific preparations were being
made for the occupation of El Arish as early as October. On 8 October
the C in C asked Admiral Wemyss if the Royal Navy might not be able to
help the EEF by supplying El Arish from the sea once the town had been
taken; most significant of all was the C in C's reason for asking for
this additional support: 'my future plans by no means end with the
occupation of El Arish, and... these plans would be severely handicapped
if no additional supply route by sea is possible'. 106 It was estimated
that the EEF would reach El Arish during December - but for a while at
the end of October and early in November it seemed as if the town might
fall to Murray far earlier than this. A number of unconfirmed reports
were received that El Arish had been evacuated and, although the RFC
remained unable to ascertain whether this information was correct during
the last days of October, two companies were moved to Qantara 'with a
view to a move on El Arish forthwith', while preparations were made to
103 Report	 from Agent	 No. 92,	 Alexandria,	 21	 Nov.	 1916,
L/P+S/11/114/5095.
Daily Situation Summary.	 Intelligence Section IEFD 9 Nov. 1916,
W.O.	 157/793.	 From the representative of our Alexandria
organisation Basra, 28 Nov. 1916, L/P+S/11/114/5095.
Murray to CIGS 21 Oct. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
106 GHQ to Vice Admiral, East Indies 8 Oct. 1916, W.O. 95/4365.
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supply and maintain by sea the troops who were to be despatched to the
Sinai town. 107 On 4 November Dobell submitted his plans for a rapid
seizure of El Arish; his intention was to send one infantry brigade by
sea with three weeks' supplies to capture the town by a coup, while
simultaneously a cavalry regiment was to make its way by road with seven
days' supplies; this joint force would hold El Arish until the main body
reached the town, the Royal Navy supplying the defenders in the
meantime. '°S At GHQ Murray studied this plan, but rejected it as too
risky since he feared the Turks might have wl-kctr1WIdeliberately in order
to entice the British into an advanced position at El Arish from which
they could not retire. l°$ But the attempt had been seriously
considered and preparations had even been made at Qantara, so that this
affair demonstrates the offensive spirit of the EEF at this time, which
was clearly benefitting from the energy and imagination of Dobell. Nor
did this affair stop planning and preparations for the landing of
supplies at El Arish once the general advance came within striking
distance of the town. 110
SEIZING EL ARISH AND THE BAULE OF MAGHDABA
By December it was Murray's intention to make 'as large a success as
I can get at Arish', although he feared the Turks might evacuate their
position and deny the EEF a potential victory. While Murray outlined
the problems his units faced beyond El Arish he nevertheless made a
promise to the CIGS - a promise which he had every intention of keeping:
'You may rely on me... to push on as rapidly as I possibly can'. 111
107 Summary of Principal Events in October 1916 and Note 26 Oct. 1916,
W.O. 95/4366. W.D. Intelligence Section 27 and 31 Oct. 1916,
W.O. 157/709.
4 Nov. 1916, W.O. 95/4366. The Official History fails to make any
mention of this entire matter, which is surprising because one of
its authors certainly saw this War Diary.
1	 GHQ to GOC East Force 4 Nov. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
''° Lynden-Bell to GOC East Force 7 Nov. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 10 Dec. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
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This determination to push on with all haste was transmitted to Eastern
Force HQ. It is not surprising to discover 1
 therefore, that Dawnay drew
up a memorandum for the Desert Column on operations beyond El Arish
stressing these very points. Chetwode was told to 'strain every effort'
to make his mounted troops mobile and so pursue retiring Turkish units
or those positioned at Magdhaba, Abu Aweiliga, Sheikh Zowaid and Rafah.
The clear aim of such activity was to strike a blow at the enemy's
morale and so give the Turks 'an exaggerated impression of our mobility
and power to strike'. 112 It was all a case of bluffing the enemy into
believing that the EEF was better equipped and stronger than it actually
was, a policy of some risk given the nature of the terrain in which such
operations were to be conducted, the possibility of finding the enemy in
strong, prepared positions, and the chance that the new War Cabinet
might gain an inflated impression of what the EEF had actually achieved.
In fact, Dobell complained to GHQ that the Desert Column might not be
able to do anything at all beyond El Arish and would have to await
supplies; to which GHQ's reply was plain: 'The C in C is most
particularly anxious that no such pause should occur'. 113
It seemed that the best way to seize El Arish was an enveloping
attack by the British cavalry, since an elaborate infantry assault would
take too long and greatly increase the risk of an enemy evacuation
before the town could be occupied. 114 Preparations were still not
complete by 20 December; then came the news that El Arish had been
evacuated. Chetwode immediately summoned General Chauvel by phone that
morning and ordered the ANZAC Mounted Division to march on El Arish with
'	 Dawnay to GOC Desert Column 18 Dec. 1916, W.O. 95/4449.
11$ Dobell to CGS, GHQ 18 Dec. 1916 and marginal comment 1 W.O. 95/4449.
I4 Fergusson to GOC ANZAC Mounted Division 12 Dec. 1916, W,O.
95/4429. This contradicts the version in the Official History (p.
252) which states it was only decided to drop the infantry advance
once it had been discovered the Turks had left El Arish.
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the intention of surrounding it at dawn on 21 December. 116 The town
was subsequently taken with little trouble and ChauveI's men learnt that
the Turks had actually left there days earlier in the direction of
Magdhaba. On the morning of 22 December Chetwode landed on the beach at
El Arish and injected a degree of energy into preparations for a further
dash forward: 'On arrival he pointed out that it was most important to
go after the enemy at once... and that with this in view he had arranged
f or a special convoy with rations and horse feed to arrive at El
Arish'. GHQ was informed of these developments and given the good
news that the mounted troops would be able to pursue the enemy on 23
December, news which brought delight to Murray. 	 7
Meanwhile, an RFC report informed the British that there was a
strong enemy force at Magdhaba; Chetwode therefor4iecided to concentrate
all his available strength in a raid there. Chauvel led his men out of
El Arish at midnight and when dawn broke Magdhaba was in sight. For
this engagement Chauvel had at his disposal the ANZAC Mounted Division
and the Imperial Camel Brigade which was well equipped with artillery;
in fact, the Desert Column troops enjoyed a three-fold artillery
superiority in the ensuing battle and this almost certainly influenced
the final outcome. III This superiority in firepower and its influence
upon the battle was a most significant factor, for it allowed mounted
troops to capture prepared positions without heavy losses; but the
lesson seems to have been overlooked by the upper echelons of the EEF
during 1917. Ii
''	 'Operations 20 December - 24 December including the occupation of
El Arish and the attack at Bir e]. Magdhaba' by Chauvel. This
explains the discrepancy with the Official History: the original
plan for a general advance on El Arish was discarded when news of
the evacuation was received, but Desert Column already had a plan
ready that admirably suited the new situation.
1(6 'Operations 20 December - 24 December including the occupation of
El Arish', op. cit.
117 Telephone message from General Staff, Eastern Force 22 Dec. 1917.
Marginal note by Murray: 'Excellent work', W.O. 95/4449.
tS Official History, p. 258.
Eastern Force was significantly short of artillery when it tried to
seize Gaza in March.
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The Turkish position consisted of about six redoubts lying outside
the Wadi el Arish. According to information Chauvel received there were
no signs of any Turkish reinforcements in the vicinity; the only serious
problem at this stage was the lack of water, for reports had reached the
Australian general that there was none nearby, so if Magdhaba was not
captured his troops and horses would be in trouble. By 1.50 p.m.,
after he had encircled the enemy, this had become a matter of urgency
and he informed Desert Column that he intended to withdraw because there
seemed no chance of seizing Magdhaba soon enough. Chetwode, at Desert
Column HQ, was horrified by this message and suggested to Chauvel that a
greater concentration of artillery upon one point of the enemy position
followed by a bayonet charge might be successful, and it was 'strongly
urged that the fight should not be abandoned even at the cost of some
casualties'. Chetwode followed this with a second message 'strongly
urging' the seizure of Magdhaba. '° Meanwhile, some of Chauvel's men
had achieved a notable success by storming one of the redoubts with the
result that he was now able to inform his superior that victory was
possible. 2	 It was.	 By 4.30 p.m. the enemy had surrendered and
Magdhaba was occupied.	 The Desert Column's troops captured a
significant number of prisoners, including the Turkish commander, and a
great deal of equipment. Although Chauvel had gained a useful
victory he was not able to maintain his position because of a lack of
supplies for his men; in any case, he was concerned about the condition
of his troops after the exertions of the engagement. $21 Further
movements down the Wadi el Arish were therefore out of the question for
the present and Chauvel returned to El Arish.
120 'Operations 20 December - 24 December', op. cit. The Official
History fails to mention the pressure Chetwode had to place on
Chauvel (p. 256). Hill (p. 89) sIMIIdrIy osiis +ki p.i.f.
12% Chauvel telegraphed Chetwode at 2.30 p.m. after he had received
orders from HQ to press the attack.
Official History,p. 257. 	 23 Dec. 1916,W.O. 95/4366.	 There is a
dispute as to the exact numbers of prisoners: 	 Official History
says 1,282, while GHQ's War Diary says there were only about 500.
24 Dec. 1916,	 W. 0. 95/4449.	 W. T. Massey, The desert campaigns
(London, 1918), p. 102.
265
Murray was delighted with this battle, and all the more so because
some of Chetwode's troops had been disappointed at 'not getting a fight'
at El Arish. 124 However, he did not give it a great deal of attention
in his next letter to Robertson, concentrating rather on the future
prospects of the EEF. Because of the atmosphere in London, however,
the CIGS was far more excited about what had happened than his
subordinate: 'You gave us a capital show at Magdhaba and... everything
helps. The winter Is a bad time for us In general. The public become
impatient and so does the War Cabinet. 	 Your little success was
therefore all the more welcome'. 12*
Megdhaba had been a useful victory f or everyone, but it had not
been en easy operation and it only just succeeded. The Turks had
offered stubborn resistance from within a defensive position well
supplied with machine-guns; this was surely not the behaviour of an
enemy demoralised by British advances. 12$ If the Turkish infantrymen
were not demoralised by sudden British cavalry attacks the EEF's
strategy might be in danger: but for the present this was by no means
obvious to Chetwode and Dobell.
THE ACTION AT RAFAH
With the victory at Magdhaba under his belt Murray saw his next
objective as Ref ah. In a conference with Dobell to consider Eastern
Force's future movements he had outlined his hopes, which Lynden-Bell
repeated to Chetwode: 'His idea was... that if possible we should allow
the Turks to collect at Rafah, and not to attack them until our railway
was within striking distance, thus placing them at the disadvantage of
t24 Lynden-Bell to Chetwode
PWCl/Folder 1.
1** Murray to Robertson 26 Dec.
1917, BM Add. MS 52462.
14 23 Dec. 1916, W.O. 95/4366:
23 Dec.	 1916,	 Chetwode papers
1916 end Robertson to Murray 10 Jan.
'the operations were difficult'.
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operating with desert behind them while we had a railway behind
ourselves'. ' This was to be a 'systematic advance ' with a sting in
the tail, and Dobell was happy to agree. However, the C in C allowed
for a certain degree of flexibility; he did not wish to restrain Dobell
and in turn this message was passed to Chetwode at Desert Column HQ. 124
Meanwhile, the RFC reported that the enemy were entrenching near
Rafah at El Magruntein. t2 Chetwode, encouraged by this information of
a Turkish force in a somewhat isolated position and full of confidence
after his recent success, now asked permission to 'scupper' the enemy
there in a lightning raid like that of Magdhaba. Murray gave his
permission with the proviso that a 'sufficient haul' of prisoners should
be made to make the operation worth-while. This was actually a far
greater concession by Murray than might at first be obvious, for he
admitted to Robertson that he wanted to fight the Turks 'in strength' at
Rafah rather than at Gaza because the latter would be so much further
from his railhead. 1O Hence the demand for plenty of prisoners: if he
were to allow Chetwode to 'disturb' the enemy at Rafah he wanted to be
absolutely sure that the subjection of his strategy to any temporary
tactical advantage for Chetwode would not be wasted. Murray gave way
and Chetwode gained a victory at Rafah; but one cannot help speculating
what might have happened if he had vetoed the Desert Column's
commander's plan and the Turks had collected at Rafah.
127 Lynden-Bell to Chetwode 3 Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 1.
I2 Lynden-Bell to GOC Eastern Force 1 Jan. 1917,	 W.O. 95/4367.
Dawnay to Chetwode 3 Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 1.
I2	 RFC report 27 Dec. 1917, W.O. 157/711.
1O Murray to Robertson 5 Jan. 1917, BM Add.!. 52462.
1$ Murray's lack of enthusiasm for Chetwode's plan was not due to any
fear of the risks his cavalry might be taking as the Official
History suggests (p. 252); in fact, Chetwode was told by Dawnay
that such an operation 'would be worth such risks as it would be
necessary to take'. See Dawnay to Chetwode 3 Jan. 1917, Chetwode
papers PWCl/Folder 1.
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While the British infantry consolidated the position at El Arish,
Chetwode laid his plans for the coming raid. It was decided that the
troops who had captured Magdhaba were to be employed with the added
reinforcement of the 5th Mounted Brigade and No.7 Light Car Patrol. The
advance was begun on 8 January 1917 and continued into the early hours
of the following day, with the troops suffering from the intense cold of
the Sinai nights. 1 Great attention was given to secrecy so that the
Turkish troops at El Magruntein were unaware of their danger; steps were
taken to keep the Bedouin population away from the enemy and the RFC
prevented observation by Turkish aircraft. This was important, for
the enemy position was described as 'very strong' with a formidable
central position and six other redoubts; but they were weakened by a
lack of barbed wire, an oversight that 	 the British considered the
'height of lunacy'. '$4
Meanwhile, the Desert Column's troops surrounded the enemy
defences, and in doing so about half the force crossed the frontier into
Turkish Syria, while the town of Rafah was captured on the way. When
the attack was finally made, however, the lack of cover and the heavy
machine-gun fire meant that progress was slow so that even though the
assault had begun at about 10 a.m. General Chauvel, leading the attack,
called for a fresh effort at 2.30 p.m. Unfortunately, worrying
reports now started to reach Chauvel that enemy reinforcements were
approaching Rafah and, in fact, when the position was finally taken, the
Turkish relief force was only four miles away and 'on the point of
becoming engaged'. 1$ Chauvel now telephoned Chetwode, who was in
overall command of the operation, and explained that his own men seemed
to have made little progress while enemy columns were closing in from
the north.	 Chetwode was impressed by the danger and actually issued
Baird diary 14 Jan. 1917, MSS Eur B239.
$3 'Rafah Raid' by Lt.-Col. Fergusson 7 Jan. 1917, W.0. 95/4449.
*94 10 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4367. Baird diary 7 Jan. 1917.
*U Official History, p. 267.
13	 10 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
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orders for the withdrawal of his troops - but events prevented their
execution, for even as the two generals spoke some of their troops
stormed the Turkish positions. '3? It had been a 'rather ticklish
business' f or the men of the Desert Column, but now Turkish resistance
started to crumble and by 5 p.m. the position was carried; Chetwode's
plan seemed to have been vindicated. 	 A rapid British retirement
was now in order, and this was performed without undue problems from
the enemy reinforcements.
In many ways this had been a 'brilliant action' f or the British;
they captured over 1,500 of the enemy, together with a certain amount of
equipment, and had proved that their mounted troops continued to be a
formidable factor in the campaign, a factor, indeed, that the Turks
could not afford to ignore. Nevertheless the battle revealed a number
of worrying signs that tended to be ignored in the euphoria of victory.
For one thing, the margin of success had been very fine indeed.
Chetwode's nerve did not hold, nor, for that matter, did Chauvel's since
it was upon his information that the commander of the Desert Column made
his decision to retire. The reasons for the margin of success being so
fine are enlightening. The Turks seem to have put up a far stiffer
fight than had been expected and, because of this, British casualties
were higher than anticipated. *39 Moreover, although Chetwode stressed
the Importance of artillery support for the success of his attack, his
actual behaviour in the battle contradicted this, for he decided to
leave the additional ammunition carts behind at Shelkh Zowaid, with the
result that one of his batteries ran out of rounds in the afternoon, as
did some of the machine-guns of the New Zealand regiments. 140 A
137 'Action at Rafah' by Chauvel. 	 9 Jan. 1917,	 W.O. 95/4471.
Official History, p.268.
13 Fergussonto D'Ewes 10 Jan. 1917, Fergusson papers DEF/4.
13' McGrigor diary 9 and 10 Jan. 1917. Desert Column incurred nearly
500 casualties and while the Official History (p. 270) claims this
was not a high figure given the strength of the enemy position It
seems to have shocked the British. See Note 10 Jan. 1917,
W.O. 95/4449.
'40 Chetwode to HQ Eastern Force 17 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4449.
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dangerous precedent had been set because the British now believed they
could take well-defended Turkish redoubts without adequate artillery
support. Chetwode may have gained an exaggerated opinion of the ability
of his mounted troops as a result, as seems to be revealed by his report
on the engagement:
I confess that I thought the task was almost beyond the capacity of
dismounted cavalry to carry through, and it is difficult for me to
express my admiration for the dash and gallantry with which their
dismounted lines.., kept up the forward impulse, and finally
stormed the enemy position. ''
However, the action near Rafah had ramifications far beyond the
opinion of General Chetwode. Murray was so impressed that he told
Robertson he felt sure that if only he had another Cavalry Division he
could clear all of southern Palestine. Robertson, for his part,
seems to have been even more affected by the success and revealed a
surprising degree of optimism at Murray's future prospects in his
comments: 'Mounted troops are the thing. Unofficially I think you can
do a great deal with them yet, and can give the old Turk a real great
shaking. I am inclined to think it is a case of "l'audace" for
you'. 143 Nor was the high command of Eastern Force invulnerable to
this atmosphere of over-optimism. Dobell congratulated Chetwode on 10
January and confessed that he now believed the Desert Column should
strike at 'any bodies of the enemy within our range' - and more
significantly still he now saw Gaza as the next objective. " The
victory at El Magruntein stirred Dobell to produce a fresh and most
sanguine appreciation of the Eastern Force's prospects for the
future. 148 Optimism now swept the EEF and Murray wrote in the
following quite remarkable manner to Chetwode in a letter of
congratulation: 'I don't mind how far I go into Palestine. Aleppo if
you like'. "
'	 Ibid.
142 Murray to Robertson 10 Jan. 1917, BM Add.MS 52462.
Robertson to Murray 10 Jan. 1917, BM Add.MS 52462.
144 Dobell to Chetwode 10 Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 1.
145 Appreciation of the Situation 11 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4471.
148 Murray to Chetwode 11 Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 1.
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MURRAY' S ACHIEVEMENTS BY JANUARY 1917
The victory at Rafah meant that Murray was inundated with lavish
congratulations from many sources including King George V and various
Egyptian officials such as the High Commissioner, the Prime Minister and
the Sultan. 147 The battle Itself was of great significance for the C
In C: firstly, his troops actually entered Syria during the engagement
so that he could now claim that the Sinai had been cleared of the enemy;
secondly, January 1917 was, of course, the anniversary of Murray's
arrival in Egypt. Everything seemed to have come together at exactly
the right time. Sir Archibald could not resist commenting upon the fact
when he wrote to Robertson on 10 January 1917: 'I took over just one
year ago today, so It Is gratifying to me to have within the year driven
all forward bodies of Turks out of Egyptian Territory'. '
Nor were others slow to see the precise meaning of these events and
their timing. Dobell added a personal touch when he replied to Murray's
telegram of congratulation f or the success at Rafah: 'It is an
additional gratification that recent operations should have given the
Eastern Force the opportunity of furnishing the success to crown your
strenuous year's work'. ' The War Cabinet, meanwhile, authorised the
CIGS to congratulate Murray on Its behalf and Robertson took the
opportunity to praise the C in C not only for his recent victory but
also for his achievement in reoccupying the Sinai. 	 °
147 Congratulatory telegrams from the King, General Milne, the Sultan,
High Commissioner and Prime Minister of Egypt, Murray papers
79/48/3.	 Reuters telegram 12 Jan. 1917, 	 Chetwode papers
PWCl/Folder 1.	 'The Egyptian Province of Sinai is now clear of
Turkish troops'. This was not strictly true since the Turks
reoccupied positions in central Sinai briefly in February and they
still had men at Aqaba In the extreme south.
146 Murray to Robertson 10 Jan. 1917, BM Add.MS 52462.
Dobell to Murray 11 Jan. 1917, Murray papers 79/48/3.
150 War Cabinet meeting 11 Jan. 1917,	 CAB 23/1.	 CIGS to GOC in C
Egypt 11 Jan. 1917, Murray papers 79/48/3.
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Murray's star was certainly in the ascendant in London early in
1917. In fact, Robertson could not praise his friend too highly - or so
It seemed. He told Wigram that Murray had 'done very well indeed' while
Monro was Informed that the EEF had 'shaken up the Turk well'. 11 Such
timely military successes eased the CIGS' position at the War Cabinet
where the politicians continued to make life difficult for the embattled
Robertson; there was, therefore, a certain degree of deeply-felt
personal gratitude behind his expression of thanks when he explained the
circumstances to Murray: 'They are giving me a good deal of trouble.
It is very satisfactory however to know how well your operations have
worked out and may continue to do so'. 152. Maurice Hankey had also been
impressed by the EEF's accomplishments and he wrote Murray a personal
letter of congratulation along with a request for any advice for the
struggling War Cabinet in London: such was the level of Murray's
prestige at this stage of the war!
That this adulation was not merely a matter of words can be
demonstrated by what happened next. There were those In London who felt
Murray had been poorly done by so far since he was still not a
substantive full general - and representations were made to Lord Derby.
184 The result was that on 20 January 1917 Murray received a telegram
fom the Secretary of State for War informing him he had been awarded the
G. C. M. G.
This was the high point of Murray'scoPvMt4n Egypt, although he did
not know at the time, and from now on things were to go wrong; but in
January 1917 he was the toast of many - and not without reason, f or he
had achieved a great deal with the minimum of resources, both in men and
equipment.	 Almost a year later the General Staff assessed his
Rkfzv p *f tic
1B1 Robertson to WIgram 12 Jan. 1917, (I/12/31 and Robertson to Monro
31 Jan. 1917, Robertson papers I/32153.
Robertson to Murray 31 Jan. 1917, Robertson papers 1/32/54.
183 Murray to Hankey 9 Feb. 1917, HNKY 4/9.
'5+ Repington, pp. 434-6, 439, 441. 18-20 Jan. 1917.
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performance up to January 1917 in the following terms:
it must be recognised that to his skill in reorganising the forces
evacuated from Gallipoli and the administrative ability he
displayed in overcoming the difficulties of the Sinai desert 1 which
has for centuries foiled invaders.., our subsequent successes In
Palestine are largely due. '
It would be difficult not to agree with this description of Murray's
achievements. He had resolved the chaos in Egypt which greeted him in
1916; he had crossed the Sinai and laid the basis for future advances;
and In doing both these he had fulfilled his original instructions
drafted by Robertson. This was surely success by any definition of the
word and some have described his attainments more lavishly than this.
General Allenby would later write of Murray's 'brilliant' Sinai
campaign, a comment which Lynden-Bell, for one, considered to be 'no
exaggeration'. ' It is often said that 'nothing succeeds like
success', but in Murray's case it was his very success that ultimately
led to his own failure for, in a War Cabinet desperate for any morale-
boosting victory at a period when the British people were becoming war-
weary, the C in C of the EEF was almost inevitably bound to be asked to
attempt too much with too little. The tragedy was that he responded to
this fresh call: 'Sir A.M. could have rested on his laurels after the
campaign but his sense of loyalty to the Cabinet induced him to attempt
an Impossible job'. 157
One cannot help but make mention, also, of Murray's reorganisation
of the EEF after Romani which, without doubt, had been vindicated by
these events. Dobell and his Eastern Force proved the ideal weapon in
the final clearance of the Sinai Peninsula and performed as well as
Murray could ever have hoped. However, Eastern Force, too, was to be a
victim of its own success, f or in the months ahead it was to attempt,
and then be ordered to attempt, operations that were clearly beyond its
limited resources.
'	
'Review of the Military Situation in All Theatres of War during
1917.' 18 Dec. 1917, Lloyd George papers Ff4413140.




LLOYD GEORGE AND ThE WAR CABINET PUSH FOR ACTION IN SYRIA
DECEI'ER 1916 - FEBRUARY 1917
'In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria...'
Isaiah 19 v 23
PLANS FOR AN INVASION CF PALESTINE ARE LAID IN LONDON
On 7 December 1916 Lloyd George succeeded Asquith as Prime
Minister of Greet Britain with a new Government and a much smaller
decision-making body known as the War Cabinet, which replaced the
larger War Committee. The Prime Minister set the tone for the rest
of his premiership by immediately asking the CIGS to list the various
aspects of the war that needed attention. The CIGS responded with a
letter in which he suggested that Britain might enjoy 'some little
success' in Egypt and Mesopotarnia during the winter and so 'shake up
the Turk a little.' 1	 Robertson could not have been much more
cautious about the EEF's prospects; but he had mentioned Egypt and
helped to set the agenda of the new Government. Meanwhile, Maurice
Hankey had been working over time to produce a memorandum f or the
Prime Minister giving his advice as to British strategy in all
theatres of the war before the first meeting of the War Cabinet on 9
December 1916.	 If Robertson was somewhat coy about any British
prospects of success from Egypt, Hankey certainly wee not. He felt
that the Allies badly needed a victory to off-set the recent final
defeat of Rumania by the Germans after that country's accession to the
Allied cause had seemed to offer such hope in August; and he looked
to the occupation of either Jerusalem or Damascus to provide the sort
of success required which might also materially aid the Russians in
the Caucasus.	 Hankey's vision f or the EEF was a most ambitious one
1	 Robertson to Lloyd George, 8 Dec. 1916, Robertson papers 1/19/9.
Personal Memorandum by Hankey. 8 Dec. 1916, CAB 63/15.
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involving, he hoped, the transfer of divisions from Salonica and co-
operation with the Russians and British forces in Mesopotamia.
In a sense these two contrasting pieces of advice reflected the
division that was becoming apparent in London at the very highest
level of British decision-making: on the one side was Robertson
advocating the possibility of only limited successes in Egypt, while
on the other was Hankey pressing for a major campaign into Palestine,
presumably requiring heavy reinforcement for the EEF. Robertson
later admitted that the General Staff were really opposed to a major
Syrian offensive, but had to agree to it 'for the sake of peace' and
in order to win Lloyd George's consent to futher action in France; it
was all a question of 'give and take' between the CIGS and the Prime
Minister, with Murray as one of the leading pawns in the game,
therefore. •
But in another sense it was all much more complex than this rather
simplistic conclusion suggests. In his note of 8 December 1916,
Robertson hints at something he later tried to obscure - a genuine, if
rather limited, enthusiasm for Murray's prospects, an enthusiasm that
we have already seen the CIGS display in his personal correspondence
with Sir Archibald.	 Robertson had vacillated somewhat in his
attitude towards this campaign earlier in the year. In terms of the
EEF's operations the new Prime Minister's arrival on the scene and
determination to act decisively could not have been better timed, for
even as Robertson penned his reply to Lloyd George's request for
information preparations were being made in the Sinai for the move to
El Arish. Consequently, all was ready for a debate about operations
beyond the Sinai and from the perspective of Whitehall it was easy to
believe that a few discussions and telegrams constituted a major
initiative by the War Cabinet.
	 This was precisely how Hankey
recalled these events for Lloyd George in 1920:
• Robertson to Edmonds, 4 Feb. 1926, CAB 45/80.
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When you came into office this operation [El Arish] was already
decided and was to come off in a few days. Before you had been
in office three days you had stirred General Murray up about it
and had made enquiries as to the possibility of extending the
scope of the operations. •
At one level this is a correct interpretation of events in Whitehall
in early December 1916 - but only in terms of the somewhat limited
perspective of London. In reality, of course, this description is a
travesty of the truth as far as Murray was concerned, since his
operations in the Sinai had already attained a momentum of their own
that would push him to the brink of Palestine by January 1917, and
even to the vicinity of Gaza by March, regardless of deliberations in
London. Murray had been considering operations beyond El AriGh
since February 1916, and now that his plans were finally coming to
fruition he was unlikely to fail to execute them; he had, after all,
waited long enough for this moment and, moreover, as it turned out,
the period from August 1916 until the Ref ah engagement in January 1917
probably marked Murray's pinnacle of achievement in Egypt, and his
reputation in London was correspondingly high at this time, as we
have seen. It is unfortunate, therefore, that subsequent accounts of
this period of British strategy have given too much attention to a
change in leadership in Whitehall and insufficient to the bare
military facts in the Sinai. '
According to the minutes of the first meeting of the War Cabinet
on 9 December 1916, the subject of El Arish was barely mentioned; but
it seems likely that, f or reasons of secrecy, full details of a
discussion upon the subject were not recorded. • 	 Lloyd George must
4 Hankey to Lloyd George, 7 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George papers Ff24/2/8.
The knowledge of Murray's subsequent failures at Gaza has also
tended to influence accounts of his successes at the end of 1916
and, consequently, to detract from the very real prestige that he
did enjoy in London at this time.
' Var Cabinet meeting 9 Dec. 1916, CAB 23/1. 'The Narrative of War
Cabinet and War Committee Decisions in regard to Gen. Murray' s
Operations, 1916-1917', by Hankey, 7 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George
papers P124/2/8 (b).
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have pressed the CIGS about action beyond El Arish either at this very
meeting or 'immediately after', therefore. Whatever the precise
sequence of events the result was a telegram from Robertson to Murray
dated the same day; in it the CIGS explained that he had bean
approached by the Prime Minister about making the EEF's current
operations as successful as possible, and he therefore wished for an
outline of Murray's intentions beyond El Arish.
	 This telegram
undoubtedly contained a fresh degree of urgency which would seem to
reflect the Prime Minister's influence. 7 On the other hand, we
should be careful not to over-dramatise this telegram and its results;
it was 'in no sense an order for any advance beyond the El Arish
operation as originally contemplated', but rather an enquiry as to
what General Murray believed could be done in the future and what
reinforcements he required, *
Sir Archibald, sensing the urgency of his Chief's request, replied
on the following day with a lengthy telegram. His opening remarks
emphasized that the contents of Robertson's telegram had not caught
him unprepared or even unsympathetic: 	 'I have always thought
important results might be secured by an advance by us from Arish
into Syria. At the present moment I am endeevouring to make as large
a success as I can at Arish.' • As far as the immediate details of
his advance were concerned he explained that he hoped to move on
Rafah, and then he added he might make for Beersheba 'if circumstances
permit'. In his desire to reply promptly to Robertson's
communications Sir Archibald had evidently decided to lay bare before
his superior what were, at present at least, only his personal ideas
for future operations.	 No definite plans had been laid
7 CIGS to Murray, 9 Dec. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
	 On the same day the
Directorate of Military Operations at the War Office asked the EEF
when it might expect plans 'regarding further advance'. See Gen.
Maurice, D.M.O. to Gen. Lynden-Ball, GHQ Egypt, 9 Dec. 1916, W.O.
106/715.
0 'The Narrative of War Committee and War Cabinet Decisions',
op. cit.
• Murray to CIGS, 10 Dec. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
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as yet by him or his staff since, as he was at pains to make clear,
after the seizure of El Arish his advance could not be rapid due to
supply difficulties, and he also asked for the temporary loan of two
divisions from Mesopotamia. 10
Meanwhile, the War Office had not been idle and had made a rapid
assessment of the Prime Minister's hopes on the same day as Murray's
reply to the CIGS. The Military Operations Department argued that
the kind of 'far-reaching results' presumably desired by Lloyd George
and hinted at in the telegram of 9 December 1916, were only to be
obtained by an advance as far as Jerusalem. However, the first step
towards such a major offensive would have to be the occupation of the
Gaza-Beersheba line as recommended by Murray himself in his own
telegram, although this might not be so easy if the Turks managed to
avoid serious defeat at El Arish and the EEF's supply problems
continued north of the Sinai. '
Two day8 later the CIGS again contacted Murray and again it
was at the instigation of the Prime Minister. This time he explained
that Lloyd George had seen Murray's telegram of 10 December 1916 and
now wanted him to make 'the maximum possible effort during the
winter.' He also explained that any troops from Mesopotamia could not
be sent before the spring of 1917, so that if Murray wanted
reinforcements before this they would have to be drawn from either
France or Salonica. i2 According to Hankey this telegram was not
sent on the authority of the War Cabinet, since the Prime Minister had
been ill with a bad cold, and so not present at its meetings; the
CIGS must have seen him about it privately, therefore. 1* Lloyd
0 Ibid.
11 Memorandum on El Arish Operations, 10 Dec. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
12 CIGS to Murray, 12 Dec. 1916, W.0. 106/715.
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George's intentions had now become clear to Robertson, f or on the same
day he wrote to Haig and explained that the Prime Minister wished to
get to Jerusalem and wanted two divisions from the Western Front for
this very purpose that winter. ' This must have concerned the
CIGS somewhat for any drain upon British forces in France, the
decisive theatre of war as far as he believed, was a serious matter
and gave a whole new complexion to any fresh operations into Syria.
This fact no doubt helps to explain what happened next.
In the meantime Robertson and his staff had been busy and produced
a second memorandum on the subject of Murray's operations on 12
December 1916, which reflected views somewhat different to those of'
his recent telegram to the general. The CIGS argued that troops from
France could not possibly be moved to Egypt in time because of the
shipping problems in the Mediterranean. Moreover he suggested that
Sir Archibald actually had sufficient troops f or an advance to
Beersheba which was the obvious next move for the EEF and beyond which
no one need look Just yet, because the railway had to be pushed
forward to this new line. 14
1$ The Narrative of War Committee and War Cabinet Decisions, op.cit.
Robertson to Haig, 12 Dec. 1916, quoted in S. Terraine,
Douglas Haig: the educated soldier (London, 1963), p.252. No
mention had been made in the telegram to Murray about Jerusalem.
'4 Note on Proposed Operations on the Eastern Frontier of Egypt, by
CIGS 12 Dec. 1916, W.O. 106/715.
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Murray replied most promptly to Roberton's second telegram. He
now stated that he definitely needed one additional division to hold
El Arish and advance to Rafah (which was consistent with his estimate
in February 1916 that he would need 	 divisions for an advance to El
Arish), while he required an extra division for any move to Beersheba.
' Sir Archibald outlined his immediate plans in more detail in a
memorandum despatched to the CIGS on the same day as his telegram.
This paper talked of a necessary 'transition stage' for the EEF beyond
El Arish as it entered Syria and described the best route of advance
towards the Beersheba position. I	 Murray was clearly not thinking
in terms of grand strategic design, therefore.
There now followed a telegram that has caused some debate.	 The
CIGS contacted Murray on 15 December 1916 in order to explain what
was expected of the general:
In order that any possibility of misunderstanding may be removed, I
wish to make it clear that notwithstanding the instructions
recently sent to you that you should make your maximum effort
during the winter, your primary mission remains unchanged, that is
to say, it is the defence of Egypt. You will be informed if and
when the War Cabinet changes this policy. "
The CIGS also admitted that Sir Archibald would not get any extra
troops at present and ought to do all he could to economise the number
of men employed behind his front lines so that these could be released
for active operations. S This telegram was not based upon any
discussions at the War Cabinet, and may even have been sent upon the
personal authority of the CIGS alone, since Maurice Hankey could find
no evidence after the war of Robertson having seen Lloyd George, who
was again ill, privately on the matter. 19	 Murray in Egypt knew
'	 Murray to CIGS, 13 Dec. 1916, W.0. 106/715.
1C Murray to CIGS G.S. Z133/1, 13 Dec. 1916, W.0. 106/715.
'7 CIGS to Murray, 15 Dec. 1916, W.0. 106/715.
'	 Ibid.
' The Narrative of War Commitee and War Cabinet Decisions, op.cit.
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none of this, of course, and assumed that this
communication reflected a fresh decision by the Wet Cabinet, which
quite naturally tended to give him the impresssion that there was a
certain degree of confusion in London. Clearly Robertson had
become most concerned about the increasing demands for troops made by
the Prime Minister and even by his own general on the edge of Syria.
He therefore decided to restate the original intention behind the El
Arish operations and seemed to be putting a point of view that owed a
great deal to his paper of 12 December 1916. Indeed, as Hankey
himself admitted after the war, this telegram did accord with the
initial conception of the El Arish expedition as an 'offensive
defensive', since the CIGS still asked Murray to act as aggressively
as he could in the meantime. I Presumably by such words the CIGS
had in mind an advance to Beersheba even if he made no mention of any
locations in his telegram.
That Robertson was expecting an advance by the EEF of this kind
can be easily proved by reference to perhaps his most important
statement of views about this campaign so far in the war. At the end
of December the CIGS produced a detailed memorandum arguing for a
serious campaign in Syria to capture Jerusalem in the winter months of
1917, and not 1916.	 However, he inserted one most significant
condition: 'If all... of these objects are to be obtained, it is
essential that our invasion of Palestine should have made marked
progress within the next few months,' 22 He was, therefore, placing
a considerable degree of responsibility for the future success of this
campaign upon the shoulders of Murray, from whom he had only recently
withheld reinforcements.	 With considerable skill Robertson proceeded
to demolish any arguments for a serious invasion of Syria in the early
20 Murray Despatches, Fourth Despatch, 28 June 1917, p. 131.21 Notes on Murray's Despatch of 28 June 1917, by Hankey, Lloyd
George papers F/2412/8(a).
aa 'Note on a proposal to undertake a campaign in Palestine during
the winter months with the object of capturing Jerusalem', by
CIGS, 29 Dec. 1916, W.0. 106/715.
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months of 1917. He raised and then rejected the option of an
amphibious attack along the coast because of the dangers of such
action revealed at Gallipoli; consequently, he argued, the advance
could only be over land and would, as a result, be slow since the
railway had to be laid from Rafah to the Gaza line from which any
future opertions should be launched. With these assumptions in mind
he estimated that even under the most favourable circumstances the
invasion of what he called 'Lower Palestine' could not begin before
April, and so there was no chance of any operations by the EEF in the
next few months that 'would affect the course of the war as a whole.'
In order to reach Jerusalem he calculated that Murray ought to be
reinforced with three extra divisions and since any such operation
could not commence until April these troops would have to be removed
from France 'at the very time when operations of the utmost importance
were about to begin.' However, the CIGS concluded his paper with a
paragraph designed to win over the War Cabinet in which he suggested a
campaign to occupy Syria in the autumn and winter of 1917 that 'will
not be open to the same objections' as a similar one in the next few
months.	 He even put forward the possibility that this later campaign
might push the EEF as far as Beirut or Damascus. In the meantime,
Murray might be instructed to establish himself in a position he could
hold defensively in the summer and use as a 'starting point' for the
advance in the autumn. 2$
The CIGS had argued his case well, for at the meeting of the War
Cabinet on 2 January 1917 his memorandum was accepted in principle. 24
However, Sir Archibald was not informed af this decision until 11
January 1917, since Robertson had to dash off to an Allied conference
at Rome after the War Cabinet meeting and he did not return until 9
January 1917. Some days later General Nivelle, the new French C
in C, came to London and the CIGS promised to extend the British
2$ Ibid.
24. War Cabinet meeting 2 Jan. 1917, CAB 23/1.
24 Notes on Murray's Despatch, op. cit.
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line on the Western Front by the addition of an extra division from
gyp• Murray, therefore, lost the 42nd Division which sailed
from Egypt early in March; th3 was, he considered, his best division.
His response was predictable: although his task was now primarily the
defence of Egypt until the autumn he nonetheless repeated his belief
that he needed five divisions to safeguard his gains,jhich, of course,
he did not have. The CIGS, however, did not agree; on 2 January
1917 he plainly stated that Murray only needed four divisions both to
defend the country and threaten the Turks in Syria. 2
Robertson tried to explain these decisions to his subordinate in a
remarkably apologetic private letter. He indicated that he realised
Murray might find the new policy 'a little disappointing' but assured
hii4hat he had 'every intention of giving you a good show later on.'
9 On the last day of January the CIGS again wrote to Murray and in
what he described as a 'quite unofficial' letter he sought to give the
commander of the EEF some idea of what was in his mind for the autumn
since, as yet, Murray had received no definite instructions. He
asked Sir Archibald for any suggestions or requests he wanted to make
towards a campaign in the autumn and then confessed how optimistic he
really was: 'Your operations have hitherto been conducted so
successfully that I have every hope that you will give the Turk a real
big and good shaking next autumn if only I can fit you out with what
you need.' 30
Moreover, in a letter to General Monro the CIGS revealed that he saw
Murray's autumn offensive as 'a second string to our bow' if no big
success was obtained in France so as to maintain popular support for
The Narrative of War Committee and War Cabinet Decisions, op.cit.
27 Murray Despatches, Fourth Despatch, 28 June 1917, pp. 131-132.
S Note on our Future Military Policy, 2 Ian. 1917, CAB 1/22/7.
29 Robertson to Murray, 10 Jan. 1917, BM Add. MS 52462.
• Robertson to Murray, 31 Jan. 1917, Robertson papers 1/32/54.
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the war. 31 Although he was not getting sufficient troops Murray
was, nonetheless, right at the very heart of the CIGS's long-term
strategic plans early in 1917.
This kind of intense enthusiasm for a major campaign in Syria was
articulated in detail in a most secret document written by the CIGS
towards the end of February. Drawing upon the basic policy outlined
in his paper of 29 December 1916, Robertson detailed how he intended
to raise the equivalent of three extra divisions for the EEF from
various sources. If, he argued, Murray had six divisions on the
Gaza-Beersheba line by the autumn, then he could see little difficulty
in en advance to Jerusalem, although any move beyond this point would
be hampered by transport difficulties and might, therefore, be quite
slow.	 In conclusion the CIGS explained the full extent of his plans:
Generally speaking, if the War Cabinet eventually decides that,
owing to lack of success of our operations this year on the
Western Front... the campaign in Syria is to take precedence
either for a given period or f or the remainder of the war over
operations in France, the only limitation which would prevent us
from concentrating a sufficient force in Egypt to inflict upon the
Turks a serious defeat is the power of the Navy to transport and
maintain the recovery of troops. 32
With so much being hoped for in the autumn for the EEF a greater
degree of attention than ever before was bound to be given to Murray's
operations in the coming months as he advanced towards what many hoped
would be the starting-line for a major of fensive.
31 Robertson to Monro 31 Ian. 1917, Robertson papers 1/32/53.
ø Plan for a Campaign in Syria by CIGS 22 Feb. 1917, CAB 21/13,
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MURRAY PREPARES FOR HIS NE BATTLE AFTER RAFAH
Murray's confidence and that of the EEF had certainly been boosted
by the victories at Maghdhaba and Ref ah. 	 Dobell was enthusiastic
about future prospects;	 he believed he now possessed sufficient
forces to press his advance along the coast with all speed and send
his mounted troops forward to re-occupy Rafah. I But, in fact, not
everyone showed this degree of optimism and some cautionary voices
were raised in opposition to an unduly aggressive posture by the EEF.
Dawnay, for example, had misgivings about his Chief's plan; he wee
worried that the enemy might try to draw the Desert Column's cavalry
into a trap, and criticised any intention of taking Ref ab solely with
mounted troops, as Dobell had suggested. 	 Chetwode also had
misgivings; he did not want his troops to advance too far beyond the
railhead and pipe-line, nor did he accept Dobell's argument that
landing supplies from the sea could overcome such difficulties. •4
In fact, the pipe-line did not reach El Arish until 5 February 1917,
although the railway was already being laid beyond there by this date.
Murray, too, expressed his concern and sounded a cautionary note
through Lyrtden-Bell:
I think you have done quite enough damage in the way of raids, and
I do not fancy that we shell be able to repeat the experiment
again, at any rate for some time, and the Chief is all against
trying the same trick too often. •
Other factors also militated against any daring forward movements
beyond a secure base. The British were experiencing problems with
the railway amidst the sand dunes around El Arish, and these
9	 Appreciation of the Situation, 11 Jan. 1917,	 l.O. 95/4471.
Australian Official History, p.245.	 This gives the impression
that all of the EEF was now filled with boundless optimism!
4 Dawriay to GOC Desert Column, 14 Ian. 1917, and Chetwoda to HQ
Eastern Force, 16 Ian. 1917, W.O. 95/4471.
• Lynden—Bell to Chetwode, 18 Ian. 1917, Chetwode papers
PWCl/Folder 1.
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difficulties were compounded by enemy air attacks upon the Egyptian
working parties along the line. Further problems were caused by
the decision of the CIGS to remove one division from Murray for
France.	 The C in C was furious about this loss of troops and vented
his feelings about it in a letter to Chetwode:
At the same time as they withdraw my troops they' ask me to be as
active as I can.., and perhaps give them something to put in the
papers in the dull season. It is working on the principle of we
give you as little as we can and take from you as much as we can
but should like, and expect, you... to gain some success.
Not only did this decision mean Sir Archibald had lost an entire
division but it also forced upon him a necessary degree of
reorganization within the EEF so that the 53rd Division could replace
the departing 42nd.
Along with this reduction in forces was an additional problem, one
that finds no mention in the official account of this campaign, but
which undoubtedly influenced events: the problem of personalities.
The fact remains that there was a certain amount of tension within the
command-structure of the EEF.	 For example, Dawnay became concerned
that what he called his 'hectoring disposition' had made him unpopular
at GHQ. •	 Such tensions could be inflamed by any disagreement over
strategy or tactics. Dawnay was accused of being too 'self-willed'
and this may have partly been caused by a division of opinion between
Eastern Force and GHQ over the necessary reorganisation of certain
troops.	 Although there were no major changes in the senior
personnel of the EEF during the period before the Fir8t Battle of
• Murray to Robertson, 11 Feb. 1917, BM Add. MS 52462.
•7 Murray to Chetwode, 24 ian. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCIfFolder 1.
*1 Dawnay diary, 1 Jan. 1917.
• Dawnay diary, 13 Feb. 1917, 7 ian. 1917, W.O. 95/4367. This
disagreement was caused by GHQ not wishing a unit to be
reorganised at El Arish as it would use the railway at a very busy
time when the line wsneeded for construction trains.
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Gaza this does not reflect a degree of harmony;	 there could be
considerable dissension, as when General Smith of the 52nd Division
complained to Lynden-Bell about the 'undue risks' being taken by
Eastern Force with which he was 'entirely out of sympathy'.
Unfortunately for Smith, the EEF'a Chief of Staff recounted
this conversation to Murray and Dobell; even so, while Murray felt
Smith ought to be replaced, no action was taken by Dobel].. 4°
Meanwhile, a certain amount of subterfuge was being conducted at
the highest levels of command within the EEF, for Lynden-Bell agreed
with Chetwode to conceal from Dobell that they were corresponding
regularly with each other over the most sensitive matters of strategy.
Lynden-Bell even admitted to Chetwode why he did not intend to tell
Dobell of their secret correspondence:
I shall certainly not mention to Dobell that you are writing to
me; not that I want to conceal anything from Dobell, but it is of
such importance to us to get your letters that I do not wish to
raise any question with Dobell as to your communications with us
direct.	 '
With this kind of activity being condoned by Murray, one finds it hard
to bele.ve that there could be a great deal of confidence in Dobell
within GHQ. However, one reason for Chetwode's secret correspondence
was probably his friendship with the C in C, which surprised officers
of the Desert Column by its intimacy and may have clouded Murray's
better judgement. 42 On the other hand, Chetwode felt none too
secure in his position as commander of the Desert Column, himself, and
Lynden-Bell had to reassure him that Dobell would not replace him when
Eastern Force moved its HQ to El Arish. 4
4° Dobell to Chetwode, 13 Feb. 1917 Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.
' Lynden-Bell to Chetwode, 3 Jan. 1917, 	 Chetwode papers
PWCl/Folder 1.
42 Fergusson to D'Ewes, 28 Feb. 1917, Fergusson papers DEF/4.
Fergusson comments that since the two were such good friends
any inspection of the Desert Column by the C in C was a 'foregone
conclusion'.
Lynden-Bell to Chetwode, 22 Tan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder
1.
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In part, some of these tensions reflected the inherent weakness of
the command-structure of the EEF. For one thing, the Eastern Force
command had to cover the entire Sinai desert containing very difficult
terrain with a climate far from benign to troops not accustomed to its
rigours. ore serious, however, for the effective
leadership of the EEF was the actual failure of the three separate
HQ's of the army to interact with success; it was all 'very serious',
as Chetwode himself admitted, because there were a number of
anomalies:	 'Murray at Cairo... Dobell... technically over me - and
myself actually in command at the front.	 It was therefore difficult
to get approval f or things sometimes. • 4	 Murray' s distance from the
front meant that he felt it necessary to visit the troops and inspect
their progress.	 He kept his intentions secret from most of his
officers until the last minute, and arrived at El Arish on 27
February 1917, his visit lasting until 2 March. 46 Even though,,
Murray arrived with the minimum of fuss his tour of inspection caused
a certain amount of disruption simply because the senior officers
found themselves having to accompany the Chief wherever he went: 'the
presence of Nthe maximus" has rather checked serious business', was
Chetwode's assessment. 4	 Murray, Dobell and Chetwode all found the
existing hierarchy of command far from perfect, therefore.	 The C in
C must take much of the responsibility f or this but, of equal
importance, is just how much he and his officers managed to achieve in
spite of these inherent difficulties.
Meanwhile, plans were starting to form in Murray's mind. He was
determined to meet and defeat a significant Turkish force in a major
battle; this might be achieved, he believed, either by the defeat of
an enemy force in entrenched positions or by the repulse of a serious
Turkish counter-attack upon Eastern Force.
	 With the second of these
options in mind he ordered the defences at El Arish strengthened to
Dawnay diary, 18 Tan. 1917.
Chetwode to MacMunn, 25 Oct. 1925, CAB 45/78.
Murray diary, 27 Feb. 1917.
Dawnay diary, 4 Mar. 1917. Chetwode to Dobell, 2 Mar. 1917,
Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.
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such an extent that they could resist an attack by up to six Turkish
divisions - the maximum number he believed the enemy could possibly
employ against the town. He obviously considered a repeat of events
at Romani not impossible, so we should not see such preparations as
merely defensive 1 although he had always seen the occupation of El
Arish as the final action required to secure Egypt from attack. 4
As for the first option, Murray freely expressed his opinions as
to how events would unfold even to the extent of predicting the date
of his next battle. On 22 January 1917, for example, he told
Robertson that he expected to be facing a strongly entrenched Turkish
force by the first week in March. 4 In a letter written only four
days previously he had estimated the date as 'about the second week in
March', and gave the location of the expected clash: Sheikh Nuran
just east of El Shellal. °
Murray not only intended to fix the date of the coming conflict,
he also wished to determine its very nature. There was no chance of
the EEF 'hanging our heads out without due preparation' before a well-
sited defensive position, as Lynden-Bell reassured Chetwode:
	 'The
Chief and myself have seen far too many attacks against entrenched
positions to agree to such a proposal for a single moment.' He
consequently hoped to move on Sheikh Zowaid as fast as his railway
would allow in the hope that the enemy would make a stand at Sheikh
Nuran, thus allowing Eastern Force to launch a 'deliberate attack'.
He anticipated a battle lasting between two and three days with any
success being exploited by the daring use of cavalry.
	 In order to
win such an engagement Murray was determined to develop fully all
'S Murray to Chetwode, ii Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 1.
'5 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS, 22 Jan. 1917, W.O. 33/905.
' Murray to Robertson, 18 Jan. 1917, BM Add. MS 52462.
f Lyndan-Bell to Chetwode, 22 Jan. 1917, Chetwoda papers PWCl/Folder
1.
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his resources, including tanks and heavy artillery. He had long
shown a special interest in all the latest equipment available to a
British general and he now hoped to use it in an effort to fight a
most modern battle.
In October of 1916 Robertson had originally asked Murray if he
would like 10 or 12 of the new tanks for his El Arish campaign; this
was only a suggestion by the CIGS, but Murray leapt at the chance,
saying he believed they might 'very likely be the deciding factor' in
his current operations. However, problems soon started to arise;
in November the Ministry of Munitions decided that tanks were 'totally
unsuitable' for the Egyptian climate and could not be altered in time
for any action at El Arish (i.e. in December). 14 Murray, meanwhile,
seems to have made his own enquiries and later in the same month he
received a description of the tank's capabilities which stressed that
these new machines could not do half of what the 'Daily Mail' claimed
for thend But extravagant claims concerning the performance of
the tank were not a problem in Egypt since censorship was so vigorous
the EEF's officers did not even know what one looked like until early
in December. Nevertheless, in spite of these misgivings on the
part of the experts, it was decided to ship the new equipment to
Egypt, a decision which caused some consternation at GHQ as Lynden-
Bell's brief note to Eastern Force suggests: 'Will you please say
what you wish done with them on arrival.' 7 While the EEF's senior
staff officer may have been at a loss as to what to do with the tanks,
his Chief was not;	 Murray ordered them to be disembarked at Qantara,
and not at Alexandria, in order to avoid publicity, and then to be
' Murray to Chetwode, 24 Ian. 1917, op,cit.
1 CIGS to GOC in C Egypt, 20 Oct. 1916, and GOC in C Egypt to CIGS,
21 Oct. 1916, W.O. 33/905.
4 War Office to GHQ Egypt, 6 Nov. 1916, W.O. 33/905.
f Lt.-Col. Hugh Elles HQ Heavy Branch, Advanced GHQ (France) to
Murray, 20 Nov. 1916,W.O. 95/4366.
IC Fergusson to D'Ewes, 8 Dec. 1916, Fergusson papers DEF/4.
17 Lynden-Bell to COC Eastern Force, 15 Dec. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
290
moved rapidly to the Sinai f or trials 'in view of the present
uncertainty as to whether tanks" can be usefully employed in the
desert.' However, these arrangements fell through because the
trained personnel needed to assemble the tanks once disembarked had
travelled in different ships; consequently the equipment had to wait
uaelessl4in Alexandria for its personnel. The tanks failed to
arrive in time for operations at El Arish, therefore, but they were
soon moved to the Sinai and GHQ kept a close eye on their progress as
they underwent trials. ° One reason for Murray's enthusiasm for the
tanks was the successful use of caterpillar tractors to pull heavy
guns and wagons through the desert up to Romani; and he had demanded
further trials along these lines well over a month before the tanks
reached Egypt. . Since additional heavy artillery arrived in Egypt
along &Il+kL the tanks, Murray's thinking appears entirely consistent:
he wished to employ his maximum firepower against the enemyf or he saw
the importance of an effective artillery bombardment if an attack was
to be made upon prepared positions, as he anticipated.
An additional method of increasing the EEF's effectiveness in this
area was the possible use of gas. GHQ considered the subject and the
War Office actually appointed an official adviser, although it was
decided that cylinder gas would not be used, so gas shells were
ordered from London. •2 This was not a decision which could be taken
lightly because of the danger of reprisals, so the EEF at once took
steps to establish a Central Gas School with the intention of
educating its troops in the use of, end defence against, gas. ' Nor
could any decision to use gas against the Turks be made without
reference to the War Cabinet, because when the subject had previously
F. GHQ to GOC Eastern Force, 22 Dec. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
, Lynden-Bell to GOC Alexandria District, 1 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
Murray to Robertson, 5 Jan. 1917, BM Add. t# 52462.
Lynden-Bell to Chetwode, 29 Jan.	 1917, Chetwode papers
FWCl/Folder 1.
CI Lynden-Bell to GOC Eastern Force, 11 Nov. 1916, W.O. 95/4366.
•2 Lynden-Bell to GOC Eastern Force, 3 Jan. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
69	 25 Ian. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
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been raised in London during the Gallipoli campaign the politicians
had decided not to authorise its employment unless the enemy used it
first. Now, however, the War Cabinet felt 'no hesitation' in giving
Murray permission, largely due to the Turks' appalling treatment of
Allied prisoners. •'
In using tanks, gas and heavy artillery the EEF's C in C hoped to
gain superiority over an enemy force in fixed positions, with the
added advantage that such weapons suddenly unveiled could be a shock
to the Turks. •t In order to gain the full value from his new
equipment Murray remained determined only to unleash it when he faced
a major enemy concentration, so that the value of surprise should not
be wasted.
All these elaborate preparations were dependent upon one very
important fact: that the enemy would oblige by either counter-
attacking or deciding to defend a position that the EEF could assault
in strength.	 Intelligence being received at GHQ seemed to strengthen
Murray's hopes;	 it was reported that Turkish units in both
Mesopotamia and Palestine were being 'strongly reinforced' by men from
Russia or the Caucasus. 	 Moreover, reports started to come in
giving what appeared to be most reliable information that the Turks
had decided to evacuate the Hejaz. ••	 If these additional troops
reached the Turkish positions in Palestine then there could be little
doubt that they would stand their ground. 	 Murray's ambitions were
far from outlandish in the early months of 1917, therefore.
Murray, meanwhile, did not intend to remain passive in the hope
that the enemy would conform to his plans. Although he was unable to
use his conventional troops to force the Turks to fight in a position
•4 War Cabinet meeting, 19 Jan. 1917, CAB 2311.
GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 22 Jan. 1917, W.0. 33/905.
" L.ynden-Bell to GOC Eastern Force, 5 Mar. 1917, W.0. 95/4367.
ST Murray to Robertson, 26 Feb. 1917, SM Add. MS 52462.
'• Intelligence Summary, 5 Mar. 1917, W.0. 157/744.
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of his choosing he nevertheless looked to the RFC for assistance. He
ordered his aircraft to change their tactics; rather than attacking
enemy camps and troops, the target was now switched to the station and
the railway north of the Gaza to Beersheba line with the intention of
disrupting Turkish troop movements behind the lines and so, hopefully,
forcing the enemy to keep his men in position. '9 This was
imaginative use of his aerial resources by Murray, something that was
not unusual with him, for he used his aircraft with some thought
throughout his time in Egypt and always remained flexible. For
example, with the interception of enemy air attacks almost impossible
in these early days of aerial combat, Murray advocated attacks upon
the enemy aerodromes, thus reversing existing policy which had been
'not bombing the enemy unless he bombs us.' °
'9 Lynden-Bell to GOC Middle East Brigade RFC, 9 Mar. 1917, W.O.
95/4367.




THE FIRST BATTLE OF GAZA: 26 and 27 March 1917
commander's despatches may claim a victory; the historian1
reading them in a critical spirit, will ask: "If it was a victory, why
was it not followed up in this way or that way?" and may thus convict
the writer of concealing the truth. Or, by using the same method, he
may convict of ignorance a less critical predecessor who has accepted
the version of the battle given him by the same despatches.'
R.G. Colllngwood
PLANNING TO SEIZE GAZA
By 21 March the railway had reached the vicinity of Ichan Yunis,
the pipe-line was not far behind and the local water supply was
greatly improved by a nearby well. These developments meant that it
was now possible for the whole of the Eastern Force to concentrate at
Rafah - or even beyond.	 Meanwhile, enemy units had taken up
positions to meet an attack at Gaza or Beersheba. 2
Murray and Dobell had hoped that the Turks would stand and fight
at SheiNuran so that they could be forced into a serious engagement.
However, their evacuation from this position caused a 'complete change
in the situation' because they could not now be reached by the British
infantry,	 at least, not in an orthodox confrontation.
Consequently, the British made attempts to improve the mobility of
their forces so as to increase the radius of their action; this was
to be done mostly by using the Desert Column as a 'flying column'
ahead of the main body. ' In conjunction with these decisions came
another from the C in C to continue the advance along the coast
1	 Official History, pp.279-28O.
2 Kress von Kressenstein, p. 506.
Dawnay to GOC Desert Column, 5 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4449.
'Appreciation of the situation on the Eastern Front of Egypt' 9
Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
	 Col. Fergusson to A. and N.Z. Mounted
Division, 15 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4449. The mounted troops were
instructed to travel as lightly as possible and be prepared to
live off the land.
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towards Gaza rather than take advantage of the tracks running inland
in the direction of Beersheba which the EEF had now reached. 'I
decided therefore to continue for the present a methodical advance up
the coast.., together with energetic preparation... for an attack'Iñ
strength as soon as possible.' Dobell wanted no delay in this move
on Gaza and instructed his troops to make arrangements so that they
could operate 20 miles beyond the railhead. •
But one problem remained: what if the Turks decided to retire
once again as they had done previously? It was to meet this
eventuality that two separate strategies were developed by the EEF at
the same time: the Desert Column, with two divisions in close
support, was to behave as a 'powerful advance guard' and hopefully
capture Gaza with little difficulty; if, on the other hand, Eastern
Force's advance drew additional enemy units to the town then the final
forward movement would await the further advance of the railway and in
the meantime preparations were to be made 'for employing.., every
available source in a general engagement.' In fact, Murray
actually informed Dobell that he did not wish his troops to retire
from Gaza once they had taken it and, as a result, if he was
'doubtful' as to his ability to hold the town then its occupation
should be 'deferred' until it could be held in strength. S It is,
therefore, misleading to give the impression that 'a cutting-out
expedition' against Gaza, along the lines of those at Magdhaba and
Rafah, now 'appeared' the only viable course open to Eastern Force -
or, indeed, the only alternative considered. For one thing, Murray's
stipulations about the occupation of Gaza show his misgivings
concerning a premature dash towards that town, misgivings that were
Murray's Despatches.	 Fourth Despatch, 28 une 1917, p.150.
• BOGS Eastern Force to CCC Desert Column, 8 Mar. 1917, W. 0.
95/4449.
7 'Situation on the Eastern Front of Egypt', 15 Mar. 1917, WO
S Note on C in C's O.AS 31, no date, W.0. 95/4367.
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to prove all too prophetic! '
Nevertheless, enthusiasm for a dash to Gaza was growing amongst
the C in C's subordinates. One reason f or this was that the two
lines of policy could - for the time being, at least - be continued In
parallel and, moreover, they complemented each other; for if the
Turks became aware that the British were continuing a gradual advance
along the coast they might be less likely to pull their men out of
Gaza in a hurry; hence a sudden descent upon the town might catch the
garrison by surprise - or so it was argued.	 It was along these lines
that Chetwode now started to reason as he considered the options open
to his mounted troops.	 In a paper dated 15 March he laid the basic
foundations of the plan that ultimately would be adopted later in the
month. 10 Chetwode's suggestion became a draft plan composed by
Dawnay on 17 March that seems to have been appoved by GHQ almost
immediately. '' However, further suggestions submitted by Chetwode
caused a numer of changes to be made before the final copy of the plan
of battle was completed on 19 March. 12 Chetwode, therefore, was the
driving-force behind the planning of the First Battle of Gaza;
Dawnay, Dobell and Murray all made use of the suggestions he made.
' Official History, p.281. The Official History simplifies the
planning behind the First Battle of Gaza so that It is covered in
one paragraph; but, In reality, the process was far more complex.
° Note on Operations by Chetwode 15 Mar. 1917. 	 Note by Chetwode to
BOGS Eastern Force, no date, W. 0. 95/4449. As early as 11 Mar.
1917 Chetwode had suggested a similar plan in a letter to Dawnay.
See Chetwode to Dawnay 11 Mar. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder
2.
1 1	 Gen. Dawnay' s paper shown me on 17 Mar.' by Chet wade, 18 Mar.
1917.	 Lynden-Bell to Chetwode, 17 Mar. 1917,	 Chetwode papers
PCWI/Folder 2. The Official History (p.283) Incorrectly states
that the plan was approved on 19 Mar.; but this was the amended
version.
12 
'Plan of Operations - Eastern Force.	 Proposals forwarded by Gen.
Dobell undehis E.S.93', 1.9 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
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The basis of the operation was to be the action of the mounted
troops of the Desert Column. Theirs was the most dangerous task of
all, for they were to be 'thrown round to the east and north-east of
the town in order to block the escape of the enemy force in Gaza',
while the 53rd Division attacked the vital Au Muntar ridge south of
Gaza and the 54th Division covered the flank and remained in reserve.
If the Turks evacuated Gaza before the British arrived then the
cavalry would seek to harass the enemy's retreat north of Gaza while
the 53rd Division kept its communications secure. $ The attack was
set for 26 March, with the preliminary moves being made on the
previous day. The Desert Column was rearranged f or the operations so
that it now consisted of the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division, the
Imperial Mounted Division, and the 53rd Division. The remaining
troops of the Eastern Force were the Imperial Camel Brigade, the 52nd
and 54th Divisions, and the 229th Brigade.
Some comments must be made about this plan of action before we
proceed to a description of its executions Chetwode made it quite
plain on a number of occasions that such a scheme required good
intelligence; the strength of enemy troops and the very nature of the
terrain around Gaza needed to be ascertained in more detail if the
operation was to succeed. 14 Unfortunately, Eastern Force started to
come up against very serious problems in just these areas. The only
maps available for the Gaza region were those drawn up for the
Palestine Exploration Fund by Lieutenant C.R. Conder and a certain
H.H. Kitchener long before the war - hardly an ideal state of affairs
since these maps were not even contoured! if Still more worryring
was the paucity of reliable information as to Turkish intentions and
" Ibid.
t4 Note on operations, 15 Mar. 1917, op.cit.
' Official History, p.284. The RFC had photographed the vicinity
around Gaza but it was not until the Second Battle of Gaza that a
contoured map was on hand.
297
the strength of their forces at Gaza. Chetwode told. Dawnay on 11
March that his knowledge of enemy dispositions was 'woefully vague'
since deserters had stopped crossing the lines and a cordon round
Gaza prevented British agents entering the town. A few days later
IYawnay admitted that he no longer knew where the main Turkish
concentration was . 16 The vacuum of information was filled by
personal assumptions, and since the Turks had already retreated
before the advancing EEF on more than one occasion leaving only an
isolated defensive pocket it was argued they would do so once
again. 17 In fact, it was believed that the enemy were semi-
demoralised after their defeat in the Sinai and, more recently,
because of Russian successes in the Caucasus and the British capture
of Baghdad on 11 March.18 These assumptions tended to cloud the EEF's
assessment of the enemy's intentions in the Ga'a region. For example,
when a German wireless message was intercepted revealing that Kress
von Kressenstein had ordered the positions on the Gaza-Beersheba
line to be strengthened, it was thought that such an order had been
issued only 'to conceal from the troops that further retirement is
to take place.' 19 However, as the day set for the attack drew closer,
more and more reports began to reach Eastern Force, and even GHQ,
suggesting that the Turks would not retire from Gaza; this was
certainly Murray's opinion on 2k March - a stark contrast with his
subordinates' views.20
Gaza itself was not likely to prove so easy a nut to crack as
was thought. RFC reports after the middle of March indicated much
work was being done on new
16 Chetwode to Dawnay 11 Mar. 1917 & Dawnay to Chetwode 1k Mar. 1917
Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.
17 Murray to Chetwode 1k Mar. 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/'older 2.
18 'El-Kowkat' No.33 13 Mar. 1917, L/P&S/11/110.
19 W.D. Intelligence Section EEF k Mar. 1917, WO 157/7 1 3. 5 Mar.
1917, WcY 95/kkk9.
20 Murray to Robertson 2k Mar. 1917, BM Add. MS 52k62.
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trenches in the town, whichL'well laid out' with 'good use being made
of hedges... to provide cover.' 21 The mention of hedges was most
significant, f or all the approaches to the town were covered by cactus
hedges:	 these hedges were not only of great height but also very
thickso that only shelling or prolonged work with cutting tools could
force a passage through them. 	 Before these trenches and hedges to
the south and south-east of Gaza lay bare slopes largely devoid of
cover so that the whole position was far from being a weak one.
These were good reasons, therefore, f or believing that the Turks would
put up a stiff fight for Gaza, not an ideal prospect when the plan
agreed upon assumed precisely the opposite.
But not everyone was unaware of the possible difficulties that the
attack might encounter. Murray, on seeing the final version of
Dobell's scheme, suggested that the 54th Division should be pushed
further up in reserve so that the 53rd Division would have an improved
chance of reaching its objectives since it could then concentrate
solely upon these. Dobell heeded the advice of his Chief so
that Chetwode was informed that 'in the event of unexpectedly strong
opposition being met with' by the 53rd Division then the 54th Division
should be moved forward. 24 Moreover, even though the clearly-
expressed intention of the operation was to seize Gaza, Dawnay, for
one, foresaw the possibility that this element of the plan might not
be fulfilled;	 on 17 March, therefore, he talked of 'tactical
resources' in the event of an actual failure to take Gaza. 2 There
was, consequently, a subtle under-current in the minds of those who
drew up this plan of battle; while it was a most ambitious scheme
offering the prospect of dramatic results, it was so drawn as to
21 18 Mar. 1917, W.O. 157/713.	 13 & 19 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4449.
22 Official History, p.283.
23 Note by C in C on GS Z/58, 20 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4367.
24 Dawnay to GOC Desert Column 24 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4449.
28 
'The Advance on Gaza etc.' by Dawnay, 17 Mar. 1917,Chetwode papers
PWCl/Folder 2.
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a1low4r less than a total victory if events proved not so propitious.
Chetwode seemed to express this level of ambiguity when he wrote to
Dawnay on 15 March:
I can't think it can come off. But when I think of the
possibility of getting two Cavalry Divisions and our Infantry
Division... to Gaza, before the enemy has gone north it makes me
sweat with anticipation.	 I fear it is too good by far to come
off.
Chetwode to Dawnay 15 Mar. 1917, Dawnay papers 69/21/2.
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THE ATTACK ON GAZA: 26 AND 27 MARCH
By the end of 25 March the Eastern Force was concentrated close to
the Wadi Ghazze, beyond Rafah, ready for the forthcoming battle. At
2.30 a.m. on 26 March the mounted troops set out on their march to
envelop Gaza. Meanwhile, the 53rd Division - which had such a
crucial role to play in the coming drama - commenced its advance to
the start position at 1 a.m. after a severe march the previous day. '
General Dobell set up his Battle HQlJust north of In Seirat.
Chetwode also established his HQ at this place and did not move across
the Wadi Ghazze as originally intended. Although the Official
History explains this failure to move Desert Column's HQ as due to
unforeseen delays and the rapid success of the mounted troops it seems
more likely that Dobell wanted Chetwode nearby for consultation, since
Chetwode was far more conversant with the plan of battle than he was.
Finally, Murray positioned Advanced GHQ at El Arish in a railway
train,	 in touch with Eastern Force exchange at Rafah by telegraph
and telephone. Interestingly enough, Lynden-Bell had informed the
War Office in January that if Dobell and Chetwode were involved in a
battle together then Murray would assume command; this, however, did
not occur in March and the C in C left Dobell to conduct affairs while
merely observing proceedings from his train. 9 Such arrangements
were far from satisfactory and led to an excessive degree of
leadership in a battle that was to be determined by a series of
crucial decisions.
Nature now took a part in the proceedings. 	 A dense sea fog
moved Inland so that by 5 a.m. on the morning of 26 March visibility
27 The troops of the 53rd Division were, therefore, already tired
before the battle had ever begun. This was surely an error, but
was made necessary by the need f or secrecy.
2S Official History, p.288.
	 Chetwode to MacMunn, 12 Jan. 1925,
CAB 45/78.
29 Lynden-Bell to Gen. Whigham, 9 Jan. 1917, W.O. 33/905.
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was down to about 20 yards. The movement of the mounted troops could
not easily be halted in spite of these conditions and the operation
continued although the 53rd Division suffered because its commander,
General Dallas, was unable to reconnoitre the ground over which he
would attack; he therefore waited for the fog to lift while some of
his men edged their way forward.	 This fog certainly caused confusion
right at the start of the battle, as Dawnay later admitted: 'We had
extraordinarily bad luck... for it opened with a thick fog... which
tremendously hampered the troop movements and prevented any air
reconnaissance'. 30 Meanwhile, thanks to good guiding and excellent
sense of direction the mounted troops - concealed by the fog - had, by
10.30 a.m., enveloped Gaza and placed themselves between the Turkish
formation to the east and the town itself: the stage was now set f or
the infantry assault.
It had been hoped to launch the 53rd Division against Ali Muntar
by 10 a. m., but this never happened. The delay in the reconnaissance
of the ground was more serious than it seemed since no orders f or the
attack were drawn up until this had been done - and, in the meantime,
the 159th Brigade had been left behind, causing a further delay before
it caught up with the rest of the troops.	 In the end, Dallas did not
issue his orders until 11 e.m.	 with the actual attack not starting
before 11.45 a,m.
	
Chetwode, becoming anxious at the delay, tried to
spur Dallas on, but this proved	 wk..JA-S,	 since the GOC 53rd
Division had gone over to one of his Brigade HQs. All these
difficulties meant that Dallas's assault upon Au Muntar was 'not
properly synchronised, and consequently their Brigades... went in
Dawnay Diary, 2 Apr. 1917.
302
piecemeal'. $1
In spite of these various tribulations Dallas's men did their job
superbly and by 6.30 p.m. had gained their objectives. But the
casulties were high, for the infantry had to cross open ground and
force positions held by determined soldiers.	 The losses were far
worse than anyone had expected and the medical services of the 53rd
Division were swamped. The evacuation of the wounded proved a
nightmare because much of it had to be done on the night of 26 March
and transport proved to be totally insufficient, with the consequence
that many of the casualties had to walk or be carried to the rear. 52
There can be little doubt that facilities collapsed under this strain
in spite of claims to the contrary in the official account. In
fact, the members of Advanced HQ, for example, had no idea of the
scale of these losses and were shocked to learn of them.
With the exception of these heavy losses - and they could be
considered Justifiable if the ultimate outcome was successful - by
nightfall the battle seemed won: Gaza was surrounded completely
except f or its south-western side, the Turks had fallen back to the
town and during the night patrols of the A. and N.Z. Mounted Division
from the north met Infantry of the 53rd Division in the eastern
streets.	 Chetwode had, In fact, ordered his cavalry to attack the
• 'Report on the action at Gaza on 26 Mar. 1917.' by Chetwode, 6
Apr. 1917, W.0. 95/4449. An interesting contrast is possible
with the official account which says of the attack of the 53rd
Division 'Its advance.., was a model In precision and
steadiness.., a good example of British infantry tradition,'
op.cit., p.301.
aa W.D. 1/2 Welsh Field Ambulance 53rd Division 26, 27 & 28 Mar.
1917, W.0. 95/4622. W.D. Assistant Director Medical Services 53rd
Division 26, 27 & 28 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4618.
Official History, p.325.
	
The official version is that 'improved
arrangements... made it possible to handle the heavy casualties.'
4 James Gammell to Dawnay, 27 Oct. 1925, CAB 45/79.
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town from the north and east once he became aware of the serious delay
in the infantry attack. The only problem remained the advance of
Turkish reinforcements to the north of Gaza which had started to
pressurise the mounted troops before dark.
Dobell and Chetwode were now both concerned about the position of
their mounted troops,for their horses had barely been watered during
the day and enemy reinforcements were closing in. They decided that
unless Gaza was taken by nightfall the cavalry would be withdrawn.
By 6p.m. (with darkness falling) Chetwode had received no news from
events at All Muntar where, as we have seen, the position was not
secured anyway until 6.30 p.m.; but reports from the mounted troops
were none too encouraging, because they outlined the steady advance of
enemy reinforcements. • Chetwode now decided to pull his mounted
divisions out of the battle; this was a decision that had to be taken
rapidly if it was to have any effect, and it was fully supported by
Dobell.	 General Chauvel's official report on the battle details
the decision and the reason behind it:
At 18. 10, owing to the hour and the strength and positions of the
enemy forces pressing in from the North and East, and the
difficulty of continuing the attack in the town of Gaza in the
dark the GOC Desert Column, decided to withdraw the Mounted Troops
and orders were received to break off this action after dark. 7
These orders from Chetwode were not issued by Chauvel until 6.35 p.m.
- but by then the mounted troops had already stopped advancing into
Gaza and had actually started to collect their wounded. Ø
Sf Dawnay to MaJ.. Gen. MacMunri 4 Dec. 1924, 	 CAB 45/78.
$ 'Personal notes on First and Second Gaza' by Sir C. Dobell, 5 July
1917,	 CAB 45/78.
37 'Account of action of Anzac Mounted Division from 24 Mar. 1917 to
08.30 27 Mar.' by Chauvel, 4 Apr. 1917.
Ibid.
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There has been some debate as to what extent Chauvel protested
about this order at the time. There appears to be no written
evidence of any protest and the Official History actually claims that
no such protest whatsoever was made to Chetwode verbally, by
telephone, or messengers. • On the other hand, Australian sources
suggest that Chauvel did, in fact, object strongly to the decision -
and told Chetwode over the phone. 40 However, this kind of behaviour
would appear to have been against the nature of a man like Chauvel. 41
What seems to have happened is that Chauvel did protest verbally, but,
according to Dawnay, he did so too late and thus the force of his
objection was greatly weakened. 42 Indeed, it is hard to accept that
he felt very strongly about the matter at the time since he makes no
mention of it in his report on the battle.
One man who did most certainly protest at these events was General
Dallas of the 53rd Division. Chetwode had informed him that the
mounted troops were withdrawing, with the result that his infantry
would be exposed on their right flank and so would have to be
withdrawn. It seems Dallas may have expressed himself somewhat
emotionally on receiving this news in the light of the effort his men
had just made, and the telephone was hardly the best medium for such
an exchange of views. 44 So strongly did Dallas feel about the matter
•	 Official History, p.307.
40 Hill, pp. 104-105.	 Australian Official History, p. 282.
41 Chetwode to MacMunn, 12 Jan, 1915, CAB 45/78.
42 Dawnay to MacMunn, 4 Dec. 1924, CAB 45/78.
4 Chetwode to MacMunn, 12 Jan. 1925, CAB 45/78.
4 Garsia, p.76.	 'A telephone is not always a satisfactory means of
communication in the field.	 The fact that the circuit is not
metallic tends to make hearing difficult.	 Moreover, there is
little doubt that... the psychological atmosphere was not...
favourable for an informative interchange of views'.	 This
opinion	 may well throw additional light on the Chetwode-
Chauvel protest debate.
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that he issued a special order to his men after the battle:
All ranks can no doubt well understand the feelings of the GOC...
when under instruction from higher authority he had to order the
troops to evacuate the positions they had so bravely gained and
which they were all so ready to hold at any cost. 1
Chetwode seems to have felt some regret about this decision for he
wrote to Dallas on 29 March, which prompted a more conciliatory
response from the infantry general. 4'
Matters had not been helped by a misunderstanding which had arisen
between Dallas and Chetwode - a misunderstanding of which neither was
aware but which would prove most damaging. Chetwode told Dallas that
his right must be withdrawn sufficiently to make touch with the 54th
Division, but Dallas was not aware that Chetwode had ordered the 54th
Division further forward. Thus the 53rd Division interpreted
Chetwode's verbal order as involving a fuller withdrawal than was
necessary and evacuated all the captured f3ositions.
Meanwhile, Dobell had finally become aware of the true state of
affairs - but too late. By 11 p.m. he knew for certain that Dallas
had taken Ali Muntar and it seems that either at about this time or
during the next few hours he learnt that, according to an intercepted
enemy wireless message, the garrison of the town had been on the point
of evacuating at dusk - when the mounted troops had been ordered to
retire.	 '	 Somewhere, something had gone wrong, because this
information appears to have reached Eastern Force HQ at Rafah before
6.30 p.m.,	 yet Dobell did not hear of it until it was of little
value, as we have seen.	 This was a crucial failure,	 since
Special Order by Maj.-Gen. Dallas, 29 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4614.
' Dallas to Chetwode 29 Mar. 1917,	 Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.
It is not clear precisely when Dobell received this information:
the Official History (p.309) says 11 p.m. while Dawnay claimed it
was not until 1 a.m, 27 Mar., and Garsia (p.77) seems to agree.
See Dawnay to MacMunn, 4 Dec. 1924, CAB 45/78.
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the information contained in this intercepted message would probably
have prevented or at least delayed Chetwode's decision to pull out his
cavalry, as Dawnay explained after the war: 'If we had had an inkling
of it, it would have put a different complexion on the situation.'
The precise reason for this lapse on the part of the British is not
clear but it appears likely that it was caused by a collapse in
communication between the different headquarters before Gaza. There
is evidence that Dobell's Battle GQ found its telephonic
communications	 with Eastern Force's permanent HQ at Rafah
interrupted. Moreover, we know that Advanced GHQ at El Arish
definitely passed on intercepted enemy wireless messages to Rafah;
all of which tends to confirm the Official History's version that
these were not passed on to In Seirat because of pressure on the line.
4*	 That there was pressure on the line between Rafah and In Seirat
cannot be doubted and this probably csed delays in the dissemination
of information; but according to the Field Register of Eastern
Force's Battle HQ 'intercepted wireless messages' were received
sometime after 3. 15 p. m., with one definitely logged at 6. 20 p. m. SO
This additional evidence suggests that Dobell's HQ at In Seirat did
receive these vital massages at the very time when he and Chetwode
were deciding to withdraw the mounted troops. 	 If this surmise is
correct then we are left with a further difficulty: 	 why were these
two generals not informed of the existence of these messages? One
possibility might be that in the heat of the moment, when the whole HQ
was taken up with a series of critical decisions, these messages were
overlooked either by the staff or even by the generals themselves.
Of course, it is possible that this information was interpreted as
being incorrect or a bluff by the enemy to induce Desert Columns to
over-commit its troops, with the result that its true importance was
not recognised at the time.
4 Dawnay to MacMunn 4 Dec. 1924, op. cit.
40 Field Register, Eastern Force, G.S. (Battle HQ), 26 Mar. 1917,
V.0. 95/4449.
° W,D. Eastern Force, G.S. (Rafah), 26-27 Mar. 1917, W.O. 95/4449.
26 Mar, 1917, Field Register,	 W.O. 95/4449.
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Whatever the truth behind this affair the whole matter was interpreted
by the EEF as a failure of good communication: 'The value of good
information often depends on how quickly it can be got to the
Commanders concerned.'
To return to the actual battle, fresh orders and new circumstances
added a touch of tragedy on the following day. Chetwode, finally
realising that the infantry had totally evacuated their hard-won
objectives because of the misunderstanding with Dallas now ordered
him to find out if the enemy had re-taken these positions.
	 Strong
patrols were sent forward and a number of companies re-occupied All
Muntar and Green Hill. However, enemy counter-attacks made such
forward positions most precarious: just before 9 a.m. Dobell received
the following news from the 53rd Division: 'Our patrols which re-
occupied hills south All Muntar and All Muntar have been driven off
just as reinforcements arriving.' 	 In truth, Dallas could not hold
on. He told his Chief that the 53rd and 54th Divisions could only
maintain their present positions if a counter-attack were made to
drive the enemy from a position at Sheikh Abbas where he threatened
Dallas's troops. Dobe].l now decided to withdraw the infantry from
the action and he issued the necessary orders In the afternoon, the
withdrawal taking place after dark and without any serious
interference from the Turks. Dallas's infantry, who had given so
much and ultimately to no avail, finally started to crack under the
strain; it was 900 in the shade on 27 March and this, along with the
troops' total exhaustion, meant that they retired in a somewhat
disorderly manner, leaving a good deal of equipment behind. So
ended the First Battle of Gaza; but for Murray, in one sense, It had
only just begun.
51 G.S.Desert Column to COG Brigades, Imperial Mounted Division, 29
Mar. 1917, W.0. 95/4549.
27 Mar. 1917.	 Field Register,	 W.0. 95/4449.
'Notes on Four Despatches from Egypt, 1916-1917' by Murray,
Murray papers 79/48/3. 'Report on the action at Gaza on 26
March, 1917' by Chetwode, 6 Apr. 1917 %IO.
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THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE
The First Battle of Gaza came so close to complete success and
yet, in the end, it was a serious rebuff for the EEF. For this very
reason it has excited a certain amount of attention and various
explanations have been given for the ultimate failure of Murray,
Dobell and Chetwode to translate their tactical successes into a
strategic victory: but what were the major factors that frustrated
Eastern Force on 26 and 27 March, and how do these square with the
explanations given for the reverse at the time?
A great deal was made of the fog on the morning of 26 March in the
contemporary reports of the battle. Murray actually attributed the
entire outcome of the engagement to this natural obstacle in which, he
claimed, everyone lost their way including Dobell in his motor car.'
4 Robertson had earlier consoled his subordinate that this was 'bad
luck', but, in fact, this was far from being the full story. 	 - The
fog proved both a blessing and a curse to the operations of 	 26
March, as Chetwode readily confessed:
The very dense fog... while undoubtedly delaying the... GOC 53rd
Division... at the same time gave immunity from gun fire to my
troops during the time they were crossing the Wadi, and enabled
the mounted troops to work forward some distance before their
presence was detected, 6
And, in reality, the delay incurred by the 53rd Division may not have
been much more than an hour in the end.
General Dallas has been the butt of much criticism. Chetwode
described him as 'hopelessly inefficient' and claimed that his
Murray to Robertson, 3 Apr. 1917, B.M. Add. MS 52462.
B Robertson to Murray, 2 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers 1/14/69.
U 'Report on the action at Gaza on 26 Mar. 1917', by Chetwode, 6
Apr. 1917, W.O. 95/4449.
Official History, p.316.
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brigadiers ref used to serve under him again. S There was certainly
dissatisfaction amongst the EEF's upper echelons with Dallas's
performance, f or on 9 April Murray informed London that the general
had resigned and needed a 'complete rest'. 6 But the C in C himself
deserved some of the blame for this since he had originally promoted
Dallas against the choice of Robertson. O	 Yet even if it i
accepted that Dallas did make some errors on 26 March we must not
overlook one important fact: his men reached all their objectives and
held them securely until ordered to withdraw. It is hard not to
believe, therefore, that if the battle had been a victory Dallas would
have been highly commended.
There can be little doubt, as we have already seen, that the EEF
underestimated both the strength and the determination of the Turkish
garrison at Gaza. Dobell, f or example, estimated that the town
contained about 4,000 enemy troops when, in reality, it probably held
at least three times that number. • The problem was that Kress
ordered Gaza to be strengthened in the second half of March;
consequently, the intelligence estimates used when the plan of battle
was drawn up were out of date by the time the plan was executed. 62
Even so, the troops themselves were soon made aware of their
miscalculation; they had been told to expect the 'meagre remains' of
one 'severely mauled' division and, as a result, were given the
impression that 'the whole affair would be a "cake-walk"; therefore
as the battle unfolded they beca,ne. aware that something had been
'badly wrong' with the information they had been given.
Nevertheless, by 6 p.m. on 26 March the British were poised to secure
Gaza and win a decisive success; so this criticism does not fully
Chetwode to MacMunn, 12 Jan. 1925, CAB 45/78.
GOC in C Egypt to W.O., 9 Apr. 1917, W.O. 33/905.
SO Robertson to Murray, 18 May 1916, and Murray to Robertson, 6 June
1916, B.M. Add. MS 52462.
CI 'Personal notes on First and Second Gaza', by Dobell 5 July 1917,
CAB 45/78.	 Australian Official History, p.265.
$2 Official History, p.321.
3 A. Bluett, With our army in Palestine 	 (London, 1919), p. 100.
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explain the failure. Nor do any possible weaknesses within the plan
itselffor the very same reason - by nightfall on the first day of the
attack it had delivered all that it had been designed to do; in fact,
one might drgue Chetwode was taken aback by the sheer scale of success
simply because, before the battles he had refused to believe such a
victory could occur. A case has been made by some that the timing of
the battle was all wrong; the argument is that a delay of two weeks
would have allowed for more effective supply depots and a closer
railhead. Murray probably would have been happier with this
alternative; but it is hard to see how it could have improved matters
significantly, since the enemy would surely have taken advantage of the
additional time available and a totally different kind of battle would
then have been fought - more along the lines of the Second Battle of
Gaza.
The most significant reasons for the British rebuff at Gaza in
March lie in the area of command. It was a battle that hinged upon a
number of crucial decisions made by the generals concerned; and these
decisions were dependent upon information received at the various HQ's
and good communications with the troops in the field.
	 In all these
areas Eastern Force performed woefully.
	 Arrangements f or the
direction of the battle were far from perfect; Advanced GHQ at El
Arish was 'a bit of a War Office sittingon the back of a commander in
the field' with no real influence upon events themselves, since it was
too far in the rear and had no reserves to wield in the conflict;
Dobell and Chetwode, on the other hand, were on top of each other and
the GOC Desert Column must have felt cramped with his immediate
superior looking over his shoulder. 	 Such circumstances were
hardly conducive to successful generalship, but, in truth, they were
far worse than even this suggests.
	 Eastern Force was dangerously
short of staff officers. 	 Dawnay described the Force as 'hopelessly
understaffed' and we know that Dobell, for instance, only had three
Garsia, p. 117.
James Gammell to Dawnay, 27 Oct. 1925, CAB 45/79.
	 Hill, p. 103.
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staff officers himself - and two of these were sent out to ascertain
what was going on at the front during the battle! The strain on
these few officers must have been immense and this may explain the
apparent mystery over the intercepted enemy wireless messages and the
misunderstandings that seemed to plague the direction of the battle on
the British side. It is possible, as well, that the added strain of
an over-stretched staff intensified the air of crisis within
Chetwode's headquarters as he pondered the crucial decisions of the
battle. An interesting comparison can be drawn between the First
Battle of Gaza and the Suvla landing at Gallipoli in August 1915, for
example, the point being that at Suvia there was a freak mist, not
unlike the fog at Gaza, but with more resolute leadership on the
British side a significant success could have been achieved, for the
enemy had been taken by surprise and took some time to recover.
One has to accept that more resolute leadership was needed on 26
March. Although Chetwode's decision to pull his mounted troops out
of the engagement has been described as 'technically correct' and one
worthy of 'full marks' in any staff examination, given the information
then available to him, he could have scored a distinction if only he
had held on just a little longer! 6 Chetwode, whose influence upon
the planning of the battle had been most imaginative, even daring,
revealed in the very implementation of that same plan that he perhaps
'just lacked as a commander the quality of determination and drive.'
6
Similar criticisms can also be made of Chetwode's and Dobell's
handling of the infantry assault.	 Murray later explained that he was
Personal notes on First and Second Gaza, op.cit., and note by
Dawnay, no date, CAB 45/78. Dawnay to MacMunn 4 Dec. 1924, CAB
45/78.
This comparison is made more telling by the fact that the 53rd
Division had been at Suvla.
6S Wavell to Liddell Hart 8 Jan. 19L6, Liddell Hart papers 1/733/1.
H. Lock, With the British army in the HolyLand (London, 1919),
p. 39.
S J Connell, Wavell:	 soldier and scholar. (London, no date),
p. 136.	 Wavell served on Chetwode' s staff In 1918.
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displeased at the time that Dallas's forces had not been reinforced on
26 March so that his attack would have been pressed still more
effectively and the positions his men captured could have been held.
In fact, he felt there was far too much anxiety on Chetwode's part for
the security of the 53rd Division once it had occupied Au Muntar by
the evening of 26 March. '° 	 And, on 27 March the C in C considered
a fresh attack should have been made: 'Sitting behind at... GHQ I
felt sure Dobell ought to have thrown in the 52nd and 54th Divisions
in a strong counterstroke, but he... judged that to do so... was
unsound... I should have attacked.' " In his official despatch,
however, Murray appeared to support Dobell's decision to retire,which
was probably a wiser assessment of the situation, for the condition of
the troops was certainly giving cause for concern by the afternoon and
evening of 27 March. 72 The bold application of Dobe].l's reserves on
the previous day, on the other hand, might well have changed the
course of the battle. In conclusion therefore, it would probably be
fair to say that while the planning for the battle was 'brilliantly
conceived',the final execution of these plans left something to be
desired. 7S
Murray to Edmonds, 1 May 1925, CAB 45/79.
Murray to Robertson, 3 Apr. 1917, B.M. Add. MS 52462.
?2 Murray's Despatches. Fourth Despatch 28 June 1917, p.152.
78 Maj.-Gen. S.F. Mott to Director, Historical Section, 20 Feb. 1926,
CAB 45/79.
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MURRAY' S REPORT OF ThE BAULE
On 28 March Murray telegraphed London with the first official news
of the events at Gaza. This telegram was subsequently to prove a
source of embarrassment to the C in C of the EEF because its contents
were somewhat misleading. For one thing, Murray made no mention of
Gaza at all, but rather managed to convey the Impression that his
forces had become 'heavily engaged' while continuing their steady
advance along the coast. 	 However, the most significant part of the
telegram was surely his description of the effect this engagement had
upon the enemy:	 'we inflicted very heavy losses', he claimed, and
then outlined his estimation of the Turkish casualties and gave
details of those captured. This, apart from a brief commendation of
the behaviour of his own troops, constituted the entire telegram,
which was remarkably brief, and no mention was made of any British
losses.
At first glance It Is hard to ascertain any similarity between
this communication and the actual battle itself. 	 But we need to
consider the affair from Murray's perspective: his intention had
always been to continue the advance across the Sinai and into
Palestine steadily in the hope of bringing the Turks to battle In a
serious engagement that would smash their forces; in the meantime he
allowed Dobell and Chetwode to plan and execute the attack on Gaza;
if it succeeded then he would be in Gaza earlier than expected, but if
it did not then his policy would remain the same - to bring the Turks
to battle in such a way that he could employ his full strength. 	 His
telegram was entirely consistent with this perspective on the action.
Nor should we overlook the information upon which Murray's version
of events was based.	 We have already seen how the heavy losses
GOC in C Egypt to CIGS, 28 Mar. 1917, W.O. 33/905.	 British
losses in the battle were actually a little under 4,000 and almost
entirely amongst the infantry. 	 See Official History, p.315.
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incurred by Eastern Force came as a complete surprise to Advanced GHQ
and had probably not been accurately detailed by the time Murray's
telegram was despatched. Moreover, the information he received from
his subordinates was certainly more optimistic than one might have
expected; Dobell described the battle as a 'brilliant victory' and
the Desert Column's official report for 26 March stressed the
casualties inflicted upon the enemy, while failing to mention its own
losses. ' Dobell's later affirmation that 'this action could not be
described as a success' lends strength to the accusation that he
misled his Chief at the time in his desire to paint as positive a
picture as possible of the recent battle. ' We know for certain, as
well, that Murray visited both Dobell and Dallas at Khan Yunis on 28
March, so he must then have received full verbal descriptions of the
encounter at this meeting. 'V It is just possible that Dobell's
infectious enthusiasm and confidence - for which he was well known -
may have influenced Murray in the drafting of his telegram on the same
day.	 This could explain partly why Murray's fairly negative
descriptions of the battle in his diary were not reflected in the
subsequent telegram.	 But perhaps most significant of all is the
fact that Murray sent a second telegram on 28 March to the CIGS which
was not nearly so sanguine. It explained that the enemy had taken up
positions west of Gaza and the EEF were bringing up heavy equipment
with the intention of forcing the Turks back 'by deliberate attack'.
This time, moreover, casualties were mentioned somewhat ambiguously,
and Robertson was assured that these were 'not out of proportion to
success obtained.'	 This second telegram - which gave a more balanced
f Handwritten report on First Gaza, by Dobell, Dawnay papers
69/21/2. Desert Column to Eastforce, 27 Mar. 1917,W.O. 95/4449.
This report was sent on to GHQ and seems to have formed the basis
of Murray's telegram to London.
7* Personal notes on First and Second Gaza, op.cit. 	 Australian
Official History, p.291.
Murray Diary, 28 Mar. 1917.
79 Ibid.	 On 26 Mar. Murray wrote:	 'Attack on Gaza first day.
Only fairly successful'.	 On 27 Mar. he commented:	 'Action in
neighbourhood of Gaza continued; disappointing.'
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version of events - seems to have been lost amidst the uproar caused
by Murray's first telegram, and some of the responsibility f or this
must lie with Robertson, to whom it was addressed. 7'
Nevertheless, London was still left ignorant as to what had
actually taken place on 26 and 27 March. The GIGS probably expected
further telegrams from the Commander of the EEF and expressed some
surprise that he had not heard from him again on the last day of
March. •o The CIGS therefore cabled Murray asking for more details
and including a slight complaint at the paucity of the information
received. .1	 Murray's reply came in a very long telegram on the
next day in which he gave a most detailed description of the recent
operations. This time Sir Archibald estimated his own casualties,
explained why his commanders had decided to pull their troops out of
the conflict at the last minute, and ended with these memorable words:
The operation was most successful, and... just fell short of a
complete disaster to the enemy. Our troops are exceedingly proud
of themselves, particularly the 53rd Division... It is proved
conclusively that in the open the enemy have no chance of success
against our troops, but they are very tenacious in prepared
positions.	 In the open our mounted troops simply do what they
like with them. •
T GOC in C to CIGS, 28 Mar. 1917, W.O. 106/715.	 This second
telegram was a personal one from Murray, for it bears his code
(A.M. 1735).	 The other telegram, however, bears no such code so
it may have been sent by his staff. 	 The Official History does
not mention this telegram (pp.322-325).
•O Repington, p. 504.
,I dOS to GOd in C Egypt, 31 Mar. 1917.
GOC in C Egypt to CIGS, 1 Apr. 1917, W.O. 33/905.
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Robertson's request for further information had flushed further
details of the battle from Murray, but even now his description
remained somewhat ambiguous and encouraged optimism.
And so the whole affair would have ended had it not been for the
reaction caused by Murray's initial telegram. The CIGS was certainly
impressed by it, for in a paper written f or the War Cabinet on 29
March he wrote: 'On the Egyptian frontier the Turkish 4th Army was a
few weeks ago thrown back into Palestine with severe losses, and has
Just suffered a further and still greater defeat south of Gaza.'
Moreover, when Robertson told the Imperial War Cabinet of the contents
of Murray's telegram its members were so excited that they ordered the
CIGS to send their congratulations to Sir Archibald. • On the
following day the CIGS, pressed for further information by the
politicians, revealed the contents of Murray's second telegram and,
consequently, informed the Imperial War Cabinet that the enemy had
fallen back to their prepared position east of Gaza, and that steps
were being taken to deal with them there. • • Robertson clearly
believed, after Murray's first telegram that the EEF had won a
significant success and he gave this impression to the Imperial War
Cabinet even though he was still very short of details and Murray's
second telegram was less optimistic. One very important reason why
the CIGS was so ready to abandon his usual caution was that other
recent events in the Middle East all boded well for the British and
seemed to presage a collapse of the Turkish war effort: Maude had
defeated the Turks at Kut and taken Baghdad, the Russians were doing
well in Persia, and the Grand Duke had promised to attack around
Mosul, while the Turkish population was believed to be war-weary and
their soldiers were deserting.
Ibid. Murray states that the Camel Corps 'nearly annihilated' a
Turkish Cavalry Division, but this was simply not true and one can
only assume that the CCC was badly advised.
S4 'Addendum to note by the CIGS dated 13 Feb. 1916', by Robertson 29
Mar. 1917,	 CAB 24/9 G.T. 326.
•' Imperial War Cabinet meeting, 29 Mar. 1917, CAB 23/40. The CIGS
had no idea of the true nature of the battle, for he said the
Turks had attacked the British 5 miles west of Gaza on 26 & 27
Mar.!
' Imperial War Cabinet meeting, 30 Mar. 1917, CAB 23/40.
• Addendum to note by the CIGS, op. cit.
	 Robertson II, p. 168.
317
With the arrival of the detailed telegram of 1 April, however, the
CIGS realised his mistake and the extent to which all had not been as
it first appeared, as one member of the General Staff remembered: 'I
shall never forget the receipt of Murray's telegram and the gradual
dawn of the truth on Robertson...I don't think the delusion about a
qualified victory at First Gaza lasted for long'." But it had lasted
long enough. Meanwhile, the CIGS had reprimanded Murray for his
first telegram and explained the difficulties it had caused him:
'Your first report... gave rise to somewhat extravagent hopes, both on
the part of the Government and of the general public.' • 	 Murray was
hurt at this response from his Chief and claimed that if he had the
chance again he would 'not alter a word' of his first telegram. The
friendship between Robertson and his loyal subordinate was clearly
under strain - with Murray explaining that he did not like the
'insinuation' that he had lied and making the perfectly fair
observation that he could not be held 'responsible... for any
extravagent reading of my plain statements.' •0	 He would have been
far more unhappy, however, if he had read what Robertson wrote to
General Monro about the whole affair: •The truth is that in Murray's
early telegrams he led us to believe that he had had a considerable
victory, whereas it afterwards turned out that he had a failure. •
It was clear, therefore, that Robertson's confidence in Murray had
been dealt a fatal blow.
One reason for the CIGS's anger was that the British authorities
in London had been made to look foolish when the Turkish communiqués
describing the battle as a British defeat started to come to light.
The British press reported the battle as a success, with the ironic
result that some time later an enemy aircraft dropped the following
9 ErtLIo,ew 4b W'oveII, ho tt, AIkhL,y po.ptrs G/vu1/.23.
Robertson to Murray, 2 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers 1/14/69.
S Murray to Robertson, 3 Apr. 1917, B.M. Add. MS 52462.






message over the EEF's lines: 	 'You beat us at communiqués, but we
beat you at Gaza!' 2	 With such divergent accounts of the conflict
every kind of rumour started to circulate as to what actually had
44+etafh w*t 'v.ger*sIy
taken place at Gaza.	 NeVeY+kLlessAcensoredl in Egypt and when
information came to light that attempts were being made in England to
publish Dobell's Special Order of the Day, Issued after the battle,
steps were immediately taken to stop this and 'prevent the recurrence
of any such indescretIon in the future.' •
Murray's initial report of the First Battle of Gaza undoubtedly
sparked off an over-enthusiastic reaction in London, and the telegram
itself probably was not all it should have been. According to the
Official History the affair revealed an example of a commander in the
field who had 'unconsciously understated' the extent of his set-back
in order to avoid needless despondency. But there are problems
with the official version of these events, for there is evidence which
suggests that Edmonds wished to emphasize the effect of Murray's
telegram to make it an example of how commanders may exaggerate their
successes or make little of their reverses, and so confuse their
superior. That the C in C of the EEF could later be accused of
• one of the grossest deceits ever practised by a military commander on
his government',probably reflects more the scale of London's reaction
to Murray's telegram than its actual contents. •
A.B. Moore, The Mounted Riflemen in Sinai and Palestine (London
1920), p. 67.
Gen. Byng to Chetwode, 30 May, 1917,	 Chetwode papers PIC(/otderS.
W.O. 95/4367, 26 June 1917.
Official History, p. 320.
Note by MacMunn added to letter Robertson to Edmonds, 4 Feb. 1917,
CAB 45/50.
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CHAIrEI 13
TEE SECOND BATFLE OF GAZA: APRIL 1917
'Tradition has it that Tell Alt Muntar was the hill to which Samson
carried the doors of the pta of the city 1 of Gaza; and it was at the
foot of this bill that the British Army in the First World War lost
about ten thousand men in the two unsuccessful attacks against the
Turkish forces In Gaze by Sir Archibald Murray.'
Moshe Dayen
MURRAY' S INSTR(XTIONS ARE ALTERED AFTER FIRST GAZA
At the War Cabinet on 30 March 1917, Robertson suggested that the
situation had now 'greatly changed' as far as Murray's forces were
concerned because of the recent successes in Mesopotamia and Syria.
He therefore suggested that Sir Archibald should be instructed to
develop his recent successes to 'the fullest possible extent and to
adopt a more offensive role in general.' ' The result of these
suggestions was a telegram to Murray from the CIGS sent on the same
day; in it Robertson outlined an alteration in the general's
instructions: from now on the EEF's aim would no longer be to prepare
for a major offensive in the autumn but rather to defeat the enemy
units south of Jerusalem and occupy that town as soon as possible. *
Witing about this change of policy at the end of March 1917
after the war Robertson admitted that the early reports about the
battle at Gaza did influence the General Staff 'very much indeed.'
Nonetheless, he also explained that this was only one of four factors
that caused him to change Murray's instructions; the other factors
involved were the British advances in Mesopotamie and the hope that
these would draw Turkish troops away from Syria; the chance of co-
operation with the Russian army which, Robertson had been promised,
would advance on Mosul at the end of April; and finally - and most
significantly of all - a desire on the part of the CIGS to 'please
1	 War Cabinet meeting 30 Mar. 1917,CAB 23/2.
2 CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 30 Mar. 1917,
	 Official History, p.322.
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the War Cabinet as far as one could do without serious danger.' a
These admissions are important for they demonstrate that Robertson
does seem to have snatched at Murray's initial telegram on Gaza
without a great deal of thought in order to strengthen his position in
London at a time when the strain of war was beginning to telL
Robertson was clearly a man under strain, himself, at the end of
March, and one might suggest that his decision to urge Sir Archibald
forward demonstrates the degree of confidence that he had in his
friend in Egypt at the end of March, for such a course of action
appeared to be a safe option.
Unfortunately, Murray's response to this fresh initiative was
none too enthusiastic. Although he claimed that he was keen on a
rapid move towards 3erusalem he explained that this was unlikely
unless he could deal the enemy another 'severe blow'; and this might
be difficult because the Turks were good defensive fighters and could
not be removed from their current positions 'without considerable
losses' on the part of the attacking forces. 	 These were prophetic
words when one considers the events at Gaza later in April and make
Murray's intentions quite plain. But what may have unsettled London
even more was Murray's determination to re-state what he later called
his 'never-varying' estimate of the troops required (which he had made
in October 1916 and again in Jenuary 1917) if his options were to
continue.
In London this telegram was regarded as en example of a general
with 'cold feet'; even Maurice Henkey, who had been friendly with
Murray, later commented that the general 'dwelt at some length on the
difficulties' caused by his new orders.	 And Robertson's
Robertson to Edmonds 4 Feb. 1920,CAB 45/80.
GOC in C Egypt to dOS 31 Mar. 1917, WO 33/905.	 Murray
Despatches.	 Fourth Despatch 2 June 1917, p. 133.
. Memorandum by Hankey for Lloyd George 7 Feb. 1920,	 Lloyd George
papers F/24/2/8 (b).
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immediate reply to Murray's less than encouraging communication did
not give Sir Archibald much room to manoeuvre. The CIGS accepted
that there might be severe fighting' and he was prepared 'to justify
heavy casualties' since the situation was promising. *
On the afternoon of 2 April 1917 the War Cabinet discussed the
future operations of the EEF and considered the various telegrams that
had recently passed between the CIGS and Murray. At this most
important meeting the conversation turned to the moral and political
advantages to be gained from the capture of Jerusalem 'quite apart
from its purely military aspects.' Since the War Cabinet's
perspective was one of a morale-boosting victory in Palestine to
sustain Britain's flagging population it should not surprise the
reader that Murray's attitude was criticised since, it was felt, he
failed to appreciate the prestige-value of such a success. Finally,
the War Cabinet instructed the CIGS to inform Murray that he should
seek to capture Jerusalem and give a full estimate of all his
requirements so that the capture of that city could be ensured.
Murray seems to have been stung by the implied criticism of the
War Cabinet even though Robertson worded his subsequent telegram
carefully. • In his official reply he defended his conduct during
his 15 months in Egypt by explaining - quite rightly - that his 'sole
idea' had always been to extend his railway in order to invade enemy
territory and so bring the Turks to battle; that not a single day had
been wasted and he now stood 110 miles from his starting-point. But
this was not enough for the now obviously furious Murray and he
allowed his emotions to spill over into his telegram
Your telegram... might be read to mean that the War Cabinet
considered there had been a lack in the conduct of my operations
' CIGS to 0CC in C Egypt 1 Apr. 1917,W.0. 33/905.
" War Cabinet meeting 2 Apr. 1917, CAB 23/2. This meeting was
preceded by one at 12 noon at which Robertson revealed the details
of Murray's telegram of 1 Apr. about the battle of Gaza.
• CIGS to 0CC in C Egypt 2 Apr. 1917 W. 0. 106/716.
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hitherto, and that I need to be spurred on. 	 I would respectfully
request that it may be rea4lred on this point. I feel sure that
the members will forgive me if this telegram shows me to be over-
sensitive, or if I have read into the wording views which were not
intended. '
It would seem that Murray, in such an emotional state, promised
more than he could offer. Although he still pointed out that he did
not have the troops he had asked for he now sounded a far more
optimistic note about his further operations: 'I feel that there is a
good chance of achieving considerable success with (a] properly
organised attack.' 10 He even declared that he expected to be ready
to attack Gaza again in 16 days; so he had fully committed himself to
a second battle with the intention of defeating the Turks end
advancing upon Teruselem!
Interestingly enough Murray also sounded a similar note of
optimism in his private correspondence with Robertson. Once again,
he allowed his previous objections to the ambitious plans of the War
Cabinet and the enthusiastic telegrams of the CIGS to be laid aside,
so much so, in fact, that he told his superior 'your telegrams on the
subject of the advance to the Jaffa-Jerusalern line suit me admirably.'
It would be a little simplistic, therefore, to see these events
purely in terms of the CIGS and the War Cabinet forcing an
unacceptable course of action upon an unwilling general. In fact,
even when Robertson telegraphed the conclusions of the War Cabinet to
Sir Archibald on 2 April he added a remarkable proviso: 'Let me know
at once if you are not satisfied as to this.' 12
GOC in C Egypt to GIGS 4 Apr. 1917,W.O. 106/716.	 Murray makes no
mention of this telegram in his official despatch,which suggests
that he may have been a little embarrassed by its contents.	 See
Murray Despatches.	 Fourth Despatch 28 June 1917, p. 133.
10 GOC in C in Egypt to CIGS 4 Apr. 1917,W.O. 106/716.
11 Murray to Robertson 3 Apr. 1917,B.M. Add. t' 52462.
1* CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 2 Apr. 1917, W.O. 106/716.
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On 6 April the Prime Minister sent the CIGS a note asking f or
information as to what steps were being taken to meet all Murray's
needs.' 1	Robertson replied two days later that all Was being done,
but the problem was the shortage of shipping; nevertheless, he
explained that the Secretary of State for War had made it a matter of
personal attention and since the situation had changed because of the
alteration in strategy they had both found it necessary to expedite
matters. 14	 Murray had formed two new divisions and needed a great
deal of fresh equipment as well as more rails if he was to extend his
line up to and beyond Gaza. So concerned did Derby become about the
shipping problem, as far as getting supplies to both Egypt and
Salonica was concerned, that in April he talked of instituting an
overland route via Taranto. But by the middle of the same month
Derby informed the Prime Minister that he was encountering problems in
shipping horses from America to Egypt since there simply were not
enough ships to meet the needs of France and Egypt simultaneously. IC
As for Murray's demand for rail, this became a long-running saga.
On 2 April he informed India that unless the material promised from
them arrived soon he would have exhausted all additional railway stock
by the end of the month. In fact, as often hppened when anything was
shipped from India, one of the transports with the equipment needed
had bean delayed by plague. " Meanwhile, the Indian authorities
were informed by London that Egypt's demands for railway materials
should take priority over those of IEF Force D in Mesopotamia, the
latter force having to make do with smaller rails.
	
*	 One
Note by Lloyd George to CIGS 6 Apr. 1917, Lloyd George papers
Ff4413/il.
14 Robertson to Lloyd George 8 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers 1/19/12.
" Derby to Haig 3 Apr. 1917,Derby papers.
' Derby to Lloyd George 17 Apr. 1917, Lloyd George papers F/14/4/37.
' GOCEEFtoCinCIndie2Apr. l9l7andCinCIndiatoGCCEEF3
Apr. 1917, LIMIL/17/5/3916.
S W.O. London to C in C India 7 Apr. 1917, L/MIL/17/5/3916.
325
problem for Murray was that any equipment assigned to his force from
England might be diverted to France; for example, on 16 April
Robertson had to explain to the War Cabinet why 30 mile8 of rail
promised to the EEF had actually been sent to the Western Fronts "
Finally, however, the War Office admitted that India was the only
source of track available for Egypt since the entire output of England
was needed for France, with the inevitable result that still greater
pressure was placed upon India. '°
Meanwhile other arguments had been raised in London that seemed to
strenghten still further the need for an early advance by Murray.
Ormeby-Gore wrote a long memorandum which he subsequently passed on to
Hankey early in April; in it he argued that Murray's target ought to
be Damascus, not Jerusalem, and that the EEF should seek to have moved
beyond the western plain of Palestine before the malaria season of the
summer caused a very high sickness rate amongst the troops.
Consequently he wanted the EEF to use its mobile troops to the maximum
extent and move inland to snatch Damascus, as well as Jerusalem, by
autumn. Although this was a very optimistic outline of future
operations it nevertheless impressed Hankey who described it as
'really good stuff', and he sent it on to Robertson. 21 Such ideas
gained a wider audience as Hankey adopted them In the revised version
of his 9 December 1916 memorandum which he produced on 18 April:
the climate of the coast of Palestine end Syria in summer is
abominable.., and if the hill country is not reached before July
it might be unwise to commit further forces to this theatre before
the autumn.
1	 War Cabinet meeting 16 Apr. 1917,	 CAB/23/2.
° W.O. London to C in C India 17 Apr. 1917, L/MIL/17/5/3916.
21 'PalestIne.	 Geographical and Political' by Ormaby-Gore 1 Apr..
1917.	 Ormeby-Gore to Hankey 6 Apr. 1917.	 Hankey to Robertson
10 Apr. 1917, CAB 21/15.
Memorandum on War by Harikey 18 Apr. 1917, CAB 63/20.
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THE EEF PREPARES FOR A SECOtID ATTACK ON GAZA
Although the recent battle at Gaza had not achieved complete
success there were still those in Egypt who regarded it as en
achievement worthy of mention. Dawnay actually described it as a
'great success' because it had forced the Turk to concentrate his
forces so that in future 'he will have to fight and be beaten', 2$
This enthusiasm for a second engagement was shared by Wingate;
writing on 9 April he explained that Murray would soon defeat the
enemy end, consequently, the earlier battle 'will have proved a
blessing in disguise' since it had drawn the Turkish forces into a
fixed position when they could be assaulted. 24
There was no doubt that the Turks had begun to concentrate.
Before the first battle Gaza had merely been an outpost held by a
strong enemy unit; now it soon became the strongest position in an
entrenched line that covered terrain from the sea end along the road
towards Beersheba as far as a position at Abu Hureira. In the lull
that followed the earlier battle the Turks constructed fresh defensive
works and, while a continuous line was not attempted, the various
positions were, nevertheless, well chosen. In one sense the Official
History is quite correct in stating that the problem now facing Murray
had 'changed completely'; but there is also a sense in which thi8
apparently simple statement completely misses the point. 2 In fact
it probably would be more accurate to declare that the problem now
facing the C in C had reverted to the one for which he had been
planning since Janusry.
	 This, of course, helps to explain the
enthusiasm end optimism of the two contemporaries whom we have Just
quoted. The initial clash at Gaza had been a spur of the moment
affair as far as GHQ was concerned - a rude interruption to their
long-term plan of crushing the Turkish forces in a full-scale, modern
23 Dawnay Diary 2 Apr. 1917.
24 Wingete to Strachy 9 Apr. 1917, Wingate papers 145/4/90.
' Official History, p.326.
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battle in which the EEF'e superiority in modern equipment would make
all the difference. GHQ was not caught off guard by the problem that
now faced them, but rather by the urgency that was forced upon them
from London.
The EEF now began to prepar. for its next battle. The first step
was to extend the railway so that the full force could be employed;
by 5 April it had reached Deir el Balah where the H Q of the Eastern
Force was positioned. 	 Since the railhead was now closer to the front
line it became possible to bring forward more heavy artillery: more,
at least, than had been available at the end of March, but not enough
for the task that lay ahead.	 As early as 30 March Murray had
foreseen this eventuality and had pleaded with the War Office for more
ammunition for his heavy guns in time for a second battle. On the
next day he again asked for help; this time he requested ten of the
most modern RFC planes to combat the enemy's use of German aircraft
which outclassed his own. a.
With the major preparations complete attention turned to how best
to deliver a knock-out blow to the Turkish forces. Now, if the
Official History is to be believed, the planning end indeed the entire
episode which has become known as 'Second Gaza' 'needs no comment' and
'has none of the interest' of the previous battle. But this is
unfair, for the planning phase of this battle is absolutely fascinating
and contains much that was both imaginative and thought-provoking.
General Dobell had produced a plan for the ensuing engagement on 3
April. His conception was f or a battle in two stages: first, a
general advance would be made to a position two or three miles beyond
2 GOC in C Egypt to W.O. 30 Mar. 1917.	 COC in C Egypt to W.O. 31
Mar. 1917, W.O. 33/905. Murray did not get any new aircraft
until after the second battle of Gaza even though his telegram
explained that they were 'essential to the success of my future
operations.'
27 Official History, p.348.
328
the Wadi Chazze from which the final attack could be launched; next,
after a pause to bring up the artillery and a heavy barrage had been
laid down, a frontal assault was to be commenced by three infantry
divisions with two of these being assigned the enemy position at Au
Muntar 'on the same general lines as the attack of the 53rd Division
on 26 March', while the third was to move through the sand-dunes on
the coastal side of Gaza. As for the EEF's much-vaunted mounted
troops of the Desert Column, they were to cover the right flank of the
infantry against any Turkish advance from positions at Atawine and Abu
Hureira on the Gaza-Beersheba road. 2C
This was the basis of the plan; but of far greater interest were
the various strategems and points of detail which, it was hoped, would
make a frontal attack successful at Gaza. Dobell hoped to use gas
and was optimistic about its effects; he believed it would cause a
'consequent depression of... morale' amongst the Turks. 2C This
mention of gas caused Murray some consternation, f or he feared that
Dobell's desire to use such means actually revealed uncertainty on his
part as to whether he really could defeat the enemy. Dobe].l was
horrified and sought to reassure his chief that his intention had bean
only to ensure that the final stage of the operation was concluded in
a single day, and that he had every confidence in the strength of his
force. 0 However, the subject of gas continued to to permeate the
planning procedure as the full implications of its use were
considered. Dawnay suggested that it might be used from the air
while Murray - although he seemed none too enthusiastic over its use
and according to some believed its use was 'inhuman' - sanctioned its
employment in the form of gas shells in order to combat additional
Turkish reinforcements.	 One problem concerning any recourse to
2C E.S. 125 by Dobell 3 Apr. 1917, W.O. 95/4450.
2	 Ibid.
•° Dobell to CGS, GHQ 1 Apr. 1917, W.0. 95/4450.
	 This would seem to
substantiate the charge that Murray was taken in by Dobeli's
'boundles8 confidence', 	 See Australian Official History, p. 300.
$1 Notes on smoke clouds and gas by Dawnay 3 Apr. 1917,
	 Dnay




gas was, naturally, the reaction of the enemy and this seems to have
caused the EEF some anxiety. According to intelligence received the
Turks would employ gas as a reprisal for any 'first use' by the
British and attention was consequently given to gas helmets since the
Germans had developed a new gas shell. 32
It was also hoped to create a smoke cloud to 'drift across the
attack' by the utilisation of smoke candles. Such a cloud, it was
felt, would not only reduce casualties amongst the assaulting force,
but it might also have a detrimental effect upon Ttjcish morale since
the smoke could easily be mistaken for more gas. •
Dobell opted for the use of tanks in his original plan because the
terrain was thought to be suitable - and his own men had a good look
at it at the end of March. While no changes were to be made in the
general plan in order to suit the tanks some serious thought was given
to their employment; they were to be used in pairs, to clear lanes
through the notorious cactus hedges and - by their very presence - to
draw enemy fire away from the advancing infantry. •4 The tanks, gas
and smoke were all regarded as 'accessories' to the standard equipment
available to Eastern Force; but this is not to say that much was not
expected of them, for great stress was laid upon the need to keep
their existence secret until the final phase of the battle so that
they might achieve 'some measure of surprise' over the enemy. '
Also of note amidst the numerous plans laid for the coming
conflict were the special arrangements developed in order to improve
communications between the British forces after the dreadful showing
Daily Intelligence Summery 14 Apr. 1917, W.O. 157/798. Capt.
Kavanagh to 3rd Australian L.H. Brigade 23 Apr. 1917, W.O.
95/4549.
3 Smoke clouds and gas,op.cit. and Use of Smoke, no date, by Dawnay,
Dawnay papers 69/12/2.
14 'Special Instruct ions: - Tank.?, no date, by Dawnay,	 Dawnay papers
69/12/2.
$f Dawnay to GOC 52nd Division 12 Apr. 1917, Dawnay papers 69/12/2.
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In this area during the previous battles the aim was to ensure 'the
rapid and constant transmission of information to Headquarters...
while operations are in progress'. • Dobell's command had learnt
vital lessons from the events of 26 March, therefore, in the heat of
battle that they were determined not to forget.
Meanwhile, as more definite intelligence concerning the Turkish
positions began to come in, Dobe].l started to consider making changes
to his scheme and introduced a degree of flexibility into the planning
process that had not previously been present Cat least as far as the
final phase was concerned), for he now allowed for the possibiity of a
response to enemy troop movements around the Hureira and Atawine
areas. 5? Such flexibility was necessary not only because of enemy
dispositions, but also due to a very real debate going on within the
EEF as to the best means of taking Gaza. At an important Eastern
Force conference held on 11 April the various options were considered.
• The first alterative was to attack the Turkish line in depth along
the coast;	 this had been suggested by General Smith of the 52nd
Division who, along with three of his brigadiers, was not at all
optimistic about Dobell's plan. •	 A second possibility was a far
more ambitious attack involving a wider enveloping movement to the
right of Gaza. This line of thinking developed into Dawnay's famous
Gaza-Beersheba appreciation that was used as the basis for Allenby's
triumphant capture of both towns in November; in fact, Dawnay had
actually begun work upon this very paper in the second week of April.
40	 The intention was to take Gaza not by direct assault but rather
• 'Liaison service', no date, by Dawnay,
	 Dawnay papers 69/12/2.
•7 Situation - 10 Apr. 1917,	 Dawnay papers 69/12/2.	 Official
History, p.331.
Conference, 11 Apr. 1917,	 Dawnay papers 69/12/2.
5 A.H. Leggett to Director, Historial Section 26 Nov. 1925, CAB
45/79. Official History, p.330. This is the only mention of what
was a serious alternative and would be raised again when Allenby
took over.	 See Garsia, p.212.
4° Dawnay to Wavell 29 Dec. 1938,Allenby papers 6/VIII/35.
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by piercing the Turkish line at Beersheba, where it was much weaker,
and so outaenk Gaza.
A second conference took place on 16 April at Khan Yunis and was
attended by Dobell and the divisional commanders, with Murray and GHQ
presiding. 41 According to Dawnay, Dobell did actually raise the
Beersheba operation at this meeting as a serious substitute because,
although it needed a larger force and more time, it did offer greater
advantages. Unfortunately, the C in C would have none of it since
such a project needed at least six more weeks, which was too long
because 'the urgency of Whitehall weighed strongly with him', and in
80 saying he showed a telegram to Dobell from Robertson. 42 Dobell's
plan remained intact, therefore, in spite of fierce opposition towards
it from many of his subordinates, above all because it was 'at least
straightforward... although it may require hard hitting.' "
These facts require some comment before we continue with the
narrative. Firstly, they prove beyond all doubt that Murray felt
constrained by London to attack at the earliest possible date, and
that this urgency made Dobell's original plan the most attractive of
all the available alternatives largely because it could be executed
rapidly. It was this fact more than any other which prevented an
early development of the Beersheba scheme and not, as the Official
History claims, solely a lack of resources and problems of water
supply. 4 Secondly, the traditional version of the second battle of
Gaza, that it involved the creation and execution of an unimaginative
plan, iG not correct, for even the plan finally adopted was not
totally unimaginative, nor was it simply accepted without fuss, but
rather only after a fierce internal debate within the EEF.
41 Murray Diary 16 Apr. 1917.
42 Notes by Dawnay 20 Dec. 1924, CAB 45/78.
'	 Conference, 11 Apr. 1917, op.cit.
' Official History, p.329. Clearly the Official History tries to
play down the failures in British strategy at the highest levels
which caused these events, for it makes no mention of any idea of
urgency in the planning.
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Interestingly enough, the attitude of the leading actor in this
drama was ambiguous. Murray was clearly under a great deal of
stress; he felt the pressure from his superiors in London, and no
doubt could not forget the error he had made in his initial report
upon the first clash at Gaza, while he was also suffering from the
added tension caused by the death of his mother on 3 AprIl. In a
letter to Wingate of 14 April we get some idea of his own Impressions
of Dobell's plan and the prosps which awaited its execution:
We shall do our best to defeat the Turks during the next week or
80 but it will not be a rapid business and is very difficult...
We may not take Gaza... but in that case we hope to establish
ourselves in close contact and must try to wear the Turks down.
4•
These are surely the words of a man resigned to making the best of a
bad job and compare most unfavourably with the comments he was making
to Robertson and the War Cabinet at the same time.
On the other hand, it certainly was not true that the plan of
battle 'met with approval nowhere'. Confidence did remain high
amongst Murray's subordinates about the coming conflict In spite of
any disputes over the plan of action. 	 Chetwode, for example, could
write to Murray on 9 April: 'I am veryhopeful of big results... our
deliberate preparations... should make the matter very safe. • In the
same letter the commander of the Desert Column also pronounced himself
satisfied with all of Dobell's plan of action apart from the role
assigned to his own troops. 4S Such statements made before the
battle stand in stark contrast to those he made after the war. For
example, in 1939 he told Wavell that he 'objected to the second battle
' Murray Diary 3 Apr. 1917. 	 Murray did not actually hear of her
death until 4 Apr.
" Murray to Wingate14 Apr. 1917,Wingete_papers 145/4/113.
'7 Garsia , p. 145. [Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.1
' Chetwode to Murray 9 Apr. 1917, L
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taking place at all because I knew it was impossible to win it' end in
1940 he went into print with the following: 'The Second Battle I had
nothing to do with except to object to its taking place at all.' '•
Chetwode stands condemned of seeking to avoid any connection with what
became a disastrous failure; but his example is by no means unique and
is cited here to show how careful one mu8t be of statements made after
the event, especially one as brutal as the second Battle of Gaza.
There is also evidence to suggest that Dawnay may have been guilty of
'distancing' himself from the planning of the battle because on 16
April, the very day of the conference at Khan Yurtis, he made the
following comment in his diary:
This has been a wonderfully intere8tthg time - and, if things go
well, I have great hopes. What has been done has been closely
reviewed by GHQ, and I must say I was very pleased to be told that
it was good.
Of course, such a statement also fully implicates GHQ; and this is a
point which Dobell made forcefully after his subsequent dismissal.
He argued that since his Chief approved his plan 'in detail' then, in
reality, Murray's responsibility f or the events of the Second Battle
of Gaza was greater than it had been for the earlier battle; and
conversely, therefore, Dobell could say with some justification of the
subsequent déb&cle: 'I do not consider my responsibility to be so
complete.' " In truth, nearly everyone had a hand in the battle
both at GHQ and at Eastern Force HQ; but some would, by fortune or by
later successes, avoid the taint of involvement in this defeat, while
others would never be able to remove it.
A certain degree of over-confidence did pervade the EEF at this
time and was caused by two factors. One was undoubtedly the string
of victories that the EEF had enjoyed over the Turks which culminated
in the near victory at Gaza in March.
	 The Turks seemed to be on the
4 Chetwode to Wavell 17 Feb. 1939, Allenby papers 6/VIII/31.
Garaie, p.ix.
° Dawnay diary 16 Apr. 1917.
Personal notes on First and Second Gaza, op.cit.
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run and if one division and a single brigade could do so much Ia a
lightning strike then surely a force of four divisions would achieve
a
much more inAcarefully-prepared assault, or so many in the EEF seemed
to reason.	 The second reason was a good deal more subtle and
had to do with a complete failure correctly to evaluate the qualities
of the Ottoman Infantryman. 	 As one reads the various plans and
memoranda one becomes aware of the emphasis that everyone laid upon
the damage that could be done to enemy morale. For instance, 4hen
considering the role of the tanks the following assumption was made:
'it is anticipated that the use of these engines will come as a
surprise to the enemy, commanders should bear in mind the moral effect
of their appearance.' • Similar statements were made concerning the
use of gas, smoke and heavy artilley, with the result that one cannot
help but feel that Eastern Force IIQ regarded the Turks as about akin
to a native force unable to face a modern army. If this sounds
somewhat unlikely it should be remembered that Dobell had only
recently been in action against the Senussi - exactly this type of
enemy; moreover, Lynden-Bell, obviously concerned at Dobe].l's lack of
experience of facing a more resilient enemy, instructed the commander
of the Eastern Force to	 consult Chetwode fully, because he had
recently been on the Western Front in France. 4
52 Chetwode to Murray 9 Apr. 1917,Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.
•	 'Special Instructions:- Tanks', op. cit.
'4 L.ynden-Bell to Chetwode 2 Apr. 1917,Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 2.
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THE EVENTS OF 17-21 APRIL 1917
The second battle of Gaza commenced on 17 April, although the
preliminary movements had actually begun on the previous evening.
Elaborate preparations were made to deceive the enemy so that they
would not be alarmed by any initial occupation of forward
positions before it was too late. t In fact the first phase of the
battle was an unqualified success so that the Eastern Force could
report: 'all going well, all quiet'. " All positions were reached
with the minimum of casualties and on 18 April Robertson informed the
War Cabinet that 'the attack had commenced successfully, and...
General Murray' a army was now about two miles from Gaza.'
There now followed the pause deemed necessary before the final
assault began. Finaleparations were made for the attack: troops
got into position, ammumnit ion was brought forward and the enemy were
bombarded.	 Meanwhile, permission was given by Eastern Force HQ to
use gas shells against selected targets. 5 Murray's impression of
18 April was one of continuous bombardment by his army before the
next, and most important, phase of the battle commenced.
The passive attitude of the enemy to the initial British advance
meant that Dobell could discard the 'second thoughti he had had about
his original plan after the reports of 10 April; consequently the
main assault was no1 to be as he had always intended it; the
attack would be from Mansura and Sheikh Abbas, with the aim being to
'Report of Operations 16-20 Apr. 1917 5 May 1917 by Major-General
Smlth,W. 0. 95/4450.
'East Force Operations in the Vicinity of Gaza 17-20
Apr.', W. 0. 95/4450.
War Cabinet meeting 18 Apr. 1917, CAB 23/2.
fS 'East Force Operations in the Vicinity of Gaza', op.cit. IiQ made
it clear that any target bombarded by gas shells was notibbe
shelled with normal ammunition; thus, when gas shells proved
ineffectual this very policy may well have contributed to the
failure of the British attack.
f' Murray diary 18 Apr. 1917.
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capture Au Muntar and wheel left on Gaza.
Even before the attack was made, however, the proposed artillery
bombardment had come up against problems. Visibility was poor early
on 19 April, the effect of the gas shells could not be observed and
low clouds meant that any co-operation with the aircraft was seriously
hindered. •	 Indeed, it soon became abundontly clear that the
artillery had not silenced the enemy guns for as the men of the 52nd,
53rd and 54th Divisions moved forward they soon came under fire. So
deadly was the Turkish fire that the EEF infantry lost heavily and
those units which did reach enemy positions were so depleted that they
could not withstand the inevitable counter-attacks. Moreover, heavy
losses, isolated units in advanced positions and the general chaos
created in any major engagement caused confusion so that the requested
artillery support did not materialise and forward positions failed to
be consolidated. •2	 It was clear that 19 April was rapidly becoming
a 'black day' for the EEF; but this ought not to blind us to the fact
that there was some chance of success that day. The vital positions
of All Muntar, Middlesex Hill and Green Hill were all within a small
area so that if they could have been subjected to a sufficiently
intense bombardment then 'it is quite possible that they would have
been captured by the 52nd Division, which would then... have been in a
position dominating Gaza.' •$ But no such bombardment was possible -
and the chance was lost. Murray, sitting at his advanced HQ at Khan
Yunis, was very disappointed and confided to his diary 'Attack...
gained 1,000 to 2,000 yards, not as much as I should have liked.' 4
•° Official History pp.334-335. 	 Even at this, the last minute,
Dobell allowed for a degree of flexibility in his plan.
" W.D. 534Division 19 Apr. 1917,WO 95/4614. 'East Force Operations
in the Vicinity of Gaza', op. cit. 'Operations carried out by East
force Heavy Artillery Group between 17 and 20 Apr. 1917', WO
95/4451.
•* 'Report of Operations 16-20 Apr. 1917',op.cit.
•3 Official History, p.341.
	 The description of 19 Apr. as 'that
black day' comes from the Official History (p.338) and is doubly
significant since this work tends to avoid such emotive language.
' Murray diary 19 Apr. 1917.
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With the initial attack having failed the question now arose as to
what should be done next. Murray wanted the attack resumed at dawn
the next day and Lynden-Bell informed Dino.y of this over the phone.
However, Dobell, having discovered that all his subordinate commanders
were opposed to renewal of the attack, decided to rescind the order to
attack, a decision for which he did not receive sanction from Murray
until after it was made but which undoubtedly was the bravest decision
he made that day for it prevented further carnage. That Murray
was not entirely eatisfied with this development became clear when he
summoned Dobell to Khan Yunls on 20 April and explained to him that he
was still anxious for the attack to be resumed shortly. " Events,
however, had turned against the EEF's commander f or his forces had now
switched to the defensive in order to frustrate an expected Turkish
counter-attack which intercepted enemy wireless messages seemed to
reveal was on the way. '
	 Murray did hold out some hope of gaining a
victory by crushing this Turkish attack;
	 but even this slim
possibility was denied him since the enemy never attempted a major
assault. 'S Although Murray maintained in his communications with
London that he still intended to attack as late as 22 April in reality
this was becoming less and less a possibility since intelligence
sources informed him: 'there are indications from several sources
that the Turks... have decided to try by every means to stop our
further advance.., a stream of reinforcements is being diverted into
Syria.' •	 The battle was over and on 23 April Robertson admitted to
the War Cabinet that the EEF 'had not achieved success.' 70
• Notes by Da'siey 20 Dec. 1924,CAB 45/78.
SC 'Personal Notes on First and Second Gaza', op. cit.
	 The Official
History makes no mention of this important meeting.
'7 Chltwode to Chuvtl 20 Apr. 1917,W0 95/4450.
" GOC in C Egypt'CIGS 20 Apr. 1917,WO 33/905.
CCC in C Egypt to CIGS 22 Apr. 1917,WO 106/716.
70 War Cabinet meeting 23 Apr. 1917,CAB 23/2.
	 S*t, N.I3 22Apr.
iq.i, Wcis7/71+.
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THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT AI ITS CONSEQUENCES
Perhaps the biggest single cause contributing to the second defeat
at Gaza was the sheer strength of the Turkish position. In their
strong point on All I4untar the Turks could actually lay their guns
with open sights on to the British positions. 	 Then, of course,
the cactus hedges, which had proved such an obstacle in March, still
remained to be overcome. These natural advantages had been wisely
exploited by the enemy by the intelligent positioning of machine-guns;
indeed, information received by the EEP had warned them that the Turks
had been increasing the number of machine-guns in their force since
the end of March so that it was admitted that the enemy army at Gaza
had more such guns 'than any Turkish force with which we have hitherto
been in contact.' 72	 The Ottoman infantry had worked hard digging
trenches around the town and these, too, added strength to a
redoubtable defence. 9 The Turks seem to have handled their
artillery with some skill also and had certain advantages over that of
the Eastern Force since it was often directed by Arab spies who moved
amongst the British camps. ' All of these factors combined to
create a formidable defensive system, and it is hardly surprising that
the assaulting British infantry were often confounded in spite of
their great gallantry:
owing to the intense concentration of the enemy's artillery and
machine gun fire and the extremely difficult nature of the ground,
affording... concealed protection and immunity from shell fire to
innumerable rifle men end machine guns, a further advance was
practically impossible. '
Fir.ly, the enemy succeeded, to a certain extent, In anticipating the
various movements of the Eastern Force's infantry with the consequence
71 R.M. Goodsall, Palestine Memories (Cantbury,1925),pp.13-14.
72 Intelligence Summary No. 177 19 May1917 and No. 181 24 May 1917 Wo 1c7/71c.
W.D. Eastern Force 7,8 and 9 Apr. 1917,W0 95/4450.
7 Australian Official History, p. 325. 	 Blueft, pp. 131-134.
'Report of Operations 16-20 April 1917', op.cit.
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that the divisional commanders found their task that much harder. 76
Nor were the Turks short of men; although estimates vary as to their
exact numbers at Gaza in April, it seems they had at least 18, 185
rifles alone for the battle end this may have risen to 25,500 by 22
April. 77
If the Turkish forces conducted a skiljul defence and made the
most of their many advantages then the EEF made a number of blunders.
For one thing, Dobell's plan was open to a certain degree of criticism
and contained inherent weaknesses. It has been called 'a culpably
stupid affair' because the troops were forced to attack on too narrow
a front at the enemy's strongest point,
	 although such criticism
ought to be tempered by Dobell's own admission of these very failings
since they were partially forced upon him by lack of water. 'S
Moreover, even though the plan talked of creating a gap through which
the mounted troops might pass in order to exploit any success this was
never a real possibility, since the objective was clearly stated as the
town of Gaza, nothing more and nothing less. . But the most
significant failing of Dobell's scheme was the pause it demanded
between the two phases of the attack, and its reliance upon artillery.
The British did achieve a certain degree of surprise during the first
phase of their advance, but all surprise was surrendered for the final
onslaught. 0	 As f or the preliminary bombardment before the main
7 'The following brief account of the operations of this Force
between 15th and 20th instant is published for imformation by HQ
52nd Division,	 95/4597.
77 Official History, p. 349.	 Intelligence Summary No. 153 22 Apr. 191?
WO 157/714.
7 Liddell Hart to Lloyd George 25 June 1934,	 LiddtlL Hart papers
1/450/file 1.
	
'Personal Notes on First and Second Gaza', op.cit.
Garcia, p. 145. Garsia goes into great detail as to the failings of
Dobell' a plan and the whole of the EEF' s command system. He
argues that one major failure was the lack of any real
appreciation (p. 144); but as we have seen such en appreciation
considering the various alternatives was drawn up, the
trouble being that this was only done after Dobell's plan had
already been accepted.
6O Marginal notes by Major-General S.F. MotE ,no date,CAB 45/79.
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attack, there were those amongst Dobell's subordinates who considered
it the 'most futile thing possible' since it merely served to warn the
enemy of an imminent advance.
The British also made a number of errors during the battle itself.
Dawnc*y certainly believed that the 52nd and 53rd Divisions were
'extremely feebly handled' by their commanders, a fact which may not
seem so surprising if one remembers that one of these officers was the
very same General Smith who had criticised Dobell's plan and suggested
an attack on the coastal side of Gaza. •a Murray surely agreed
and commented later: 'the tactical handling was not all that could be
desired'. S3	 Mistakes were certainly made with the gas shells; they
were fired at the enemy trenches far too soon so that their content
evaporated before the Turkish troops moved their positions. S4 In
fact, the whole matter turned out to be something of a farce; since
the gas 'had no more effect in that atmosphere than squibs' the Turks
never realised it had been used, and, of course, the EEF was hardly
going to tell them!	 So well was the whole matter kept quiet that
even the British forces in Mesopotamia were not sure if gas had
actually been used. • Some complaints were also made about the use
of the tanks which achieved little in the battle, since it was
considered they ought to have been used in a single concentration
rather than in pairs. •
a' Major-General Smith to Director, Historical Branch 27 Nov. 1917)
CAB 45/80.
8*2 Personal Notes on First and Second Gaza,op.cit. Marginal comment
by Dawray.
Notes on Four Despatches from Egypt 1916-1917, op. cit.
•4 Chaytor to Director, Historical Branch 26 Oct. 1925 ) CAB 45/78.
Murray to Edmonds 1 May 1925,CAB 45/79. 	 'Defensive Measures
Against Poison Gases 4 May 1917 - 8 Oct. 1917' by GHQ, IEF'D',WO
158/659.
Australian Official History, p. 307.
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Eastern Force oi.o laboured under a number of disadvantages f or
which they could not be considered responsible. Dobell most
assuredly suffered from a lack of troops, a fact which Murray was
only too ready to declare himself whenever he considered the reasons
f or his second failure at Gaza:	 'If the five divisions repeatedly
stated to be necessary had been there Gaza would have fallen.' 	 We
have already made mention of the woeful performance of the British
artillery during the battle. 	 The major reason for this was, not so
much any failure on the part of the gunner but rather the result of
the basic deficiency of guns amongst Eastern Force. 	 For example, the
54th DivIsion hadA8x5 inch howitzers and 16x18 pounders. To a
certain extent, however, the British only had themselves to blame for
this state of affairs, for in February Dobell had sanctioned the
formation of new units in the following fateful terms:
In this theatre... the enemy is not equipped with a powerful
artillery, and in existing circumstances I would therefore feel
disposed to recommend the formation of divisions with the minimum of
artillery recommended. e5
On the other hand, shortage of guns wa not the only problem f or the
artillery; ammunition also ran short, and often during crucial stages
of the battle. °
' 'Notes on Four Despatchea from Egypt 1916-1917', op.cit. The 52nd,
53rd and 54th Divisions were, on average, 1,500 below
establishment before the battle.
	
Official History,p. 328.
Notes by Major-General Hare 9 Nov. 1925,CAB 45/79.
• Dobell to CGS, GHQ 20 Feb. 1917,WO 95/4449.
9° Official History,p. 341.
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The immediate effect of this second defeat of the EEF was upon the
troops themselves. Eastern Force lost up to 6,000 men in the battle
for no appreciable gain whatsoever; in fact, one brigade had lost 30%
of its men by the conclusion of the first day of the battle alone.
These losses caused the British troops much anxiety, for the lifeless
bodies of their friends lay where they had fallen for at least six
months as 'a gruesome spectacle'. 02. There was no wayhJichthe scale
of the defeat could be hidden from the common soldier as a result,
for he saw the bodies of his comrades on the battlefield and could not
avoid noticing the continuous dressing and evacuation of the wounded
by the Field Ambulances which went on until mid-day on 20 April.
They realised, how could they not, that this battle had been 'the
biggest setback' for the EEF so far. 4 It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that a degree of bitterness arose amongst the ranks in the
light of this apparently useless slaughter and in consequence of the
great measure of confidence they had been fed by their officers before
the battle. Of This resentment was hardly improved by the various
descriptions of the battle in the British press which called it a
'minor engagement', or even a British victory, and concealed the true
nature of the defeat. •	 Even the Turks were surprised at the
inaccuracy of the British reports. In fact, the C in C was not
above releasing descriptions of the battle that were somewhat
misleading; for example, on 20 April he told Robertson that he was
' Official History, p. 348. It is of interest that the Official
History actually gives a higher estimate of the losses than the
contemporary documents; for example, it gives the 52nd Division's
losses as 1,874 whereas the Division's own diary gives a figure of
1,368 (excluding officers). See WO 95/4597 21 Apr. 1917.
	 The
155th Brigade of the 52nd Division suffered 30% casualties.
92. Lock,p.41.
'S W.D. 53rd Division	 1/2nd Welsh Field Ambulance 19 Apr. 1917,
WO 95/4622.
4 McPhero	 papers 80/25/1 Volume XI letter CXI 20 Apr. 1917.
• M.S. Briggs, Through Egypt in War-time (London,1918)pp.249-250.
04 Bluett p. 144. Adam Block to Lord Hardings2O June 1917, Lloyd
George papers F/3/2/22.
7 DJ enal Pasha,p. 181.
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consolidating his ground in readiness for more deliberate operations,
a telegram which prompted the CIGS to tell his subordinate that he was
in doubt as to Murray's actual views and wanted to know 'whether you
can with your present force, continue offensive operations with
adequate prospect of success.' Nor was it until 22 April that
Murray admitted that he could not achieve more than 'a local success'
without additional troops. Under such circumstances morale was
bound to collapse - and it did; a great feeling of lethargy fell upon
the men of the EEF as they became convinced that little could now
happen on their front. 100
Changes in the command-structure of the Eastern Force followed the
defeat at Gaza, General Dobell was replaced by Chetwode and Chuvel
stepped into Chetwode's shoes as commander of the Desert Column.
According to his official telegram to the CIGS Murray stated that he
was sending Dobell home because he was suffering from strain due to
service in a hot climate which, along with a 'recent touch of sun',
rendered him 'unfit' for the apprching summer. 11	 In a private
letter to Robertson, however, Murray told his Chief that Dobell was
going home and Chetwode, whom he preferred, was replacing hIm. 1O
According to Dobell he visited Advnced HQ at Khan Yunis and wee shown
a telegram which contained news of his replacement ) iY'ri5. as the
reason that he was 'ignorant'; however, Lynden-Bell later phoned to
ask Dobell if he would accept the term 'ill health' instead; Dobell
agreed and hence the contents of Murray's telegrams already cited. 1O
This sort of behaviour did not endear the C in C to	 his
subordinates, since Dobell had been popular with many of them and they
GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 20 Apr. 1917 and CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 21
Apr. 1917,	 33/905,
'P GOC i C Egypt to CIGS 22 Apr. 1917,W0 106/716.
'°° Elgood,p. 304.
01 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 21 Apr. 1917,W0 106/716.
'°* Murray to Robertson 22 Apr. 1917,B.M. Add. MS 52462.
10S'Personal Note on First and Second Gaza',op. cit.
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felt he had been poorly treated. 0




MURRAY'S FINAL MONTHS WITH THE EEF: APRIL - JUNE 1917
'How many "coming men" one has known.
Where on earth do they all go to?'
PInero
THE EEF ENTRENCHED BUT NOT INACTIVE
On 21 April Chetwode took over command' of Eastern Force and
immediately made his presence felt among his troops; he rode or
walked along the entire defensive line held by his men and
instilled a measure of reassurance by his 'strong and guiding
personality'. 1 Eastern Force desperately needed an energetic
general who showed an interest in the common soldier and his
plight because, in the words of the Official History, 'the prospect
ahead was not a pleasant one.'2
With the second failure before Gaza over the EEF's front
gradually developed a permanence based on something which had
become most familiar in France - the trench. Yet we should be care-
ful not to suggest that the situation now facing Chetwode was a
'carbon copy' of the Western Front, because there was one important
difference in the very nature of the two defensive lines now being
construted by the EEF and the Turks opposite each other. Both had
a completely open flank around the Beersheba area and on this, the
British right, the EEF's room for manoeuvre was restr(cted only by
the shortage of water in the countryside. Another difference
I Australian Official History, pp.3k2-3k3.
2 Official History, p.351.
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between southern Palestine and the Western Front was the distance
between the two trench lines: in the Gaza vicinity the opposing
troops could be quite close, but once one reached Sheikh Abbas the
two linesdiverged, so that around Qamle on the Wadi Ghazze the
British positions were nine miles from those of the Turks. Finally,
Chetwode was determined to keep his mounted troops active and with
this in mind he ensured that there was an exit in the EEF's line so
that the cavalry could patrol the open plain between the Wadi. Imleih
and the Wadi Ghazze.3
In spite of these differences, however, as Chetwode's men began
to consolidate their positions, they suffered the frustrations of
any entrenched army caused by the continuous ggjflg•L These
frustrations were felt at every level from the C in C downwards, and
they were not decreased by additional difficulties common to trench
warfare. 5
 Flies, the numbers of which seemed 'absolutely past
belief', tormented the soldiers as did the weather, which alternated
between temperatures of 1014.0 in the shade, gale-force winds and
heavy showers of rain; it is hardly surprising, consequently, that
at least one officer was forced to comment that life was 'becoming
In fact, matters were worse than the men realized, for
plague had broken out around the Suez Canal, brought in by Indian
rats, and the fear was that the rats would hide behind any wooden
structure, especially those in trenches and dugouts.7
C -
3 Chetwode's subordinates did not always fully understand his
intention and Chauvel dug a continuous line. See Chetwode to
Chauvel 28 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3.
14. McGrigor Diary 12 June 1917.
5 Murray to Robertson 3 May 1917, BM Add. MS 521462.
6 Baird Diary 22 & 27 Apr. 1917, Baird MSS Eur. B239.
7 GHQ to GOC Eastern Force 21 May 1917.
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Meanwhile, Eastern Force tried to adapt itself to the rigours
of trench warfare, for which it was ill-prepared; desperate
representations were now made to London asking for an officer who
could train men in marksmanship 'as the present situation offers
good opportunities for sniping.., and we wish to take full advantage
of it.' 8 Orders were issued to the divisional commanders to plan
regular trench raids, and Chetwode's general aggressive intentions
were outlined:
With the forces at present at our disposal it may not
be possible to undertake a general attack, but it may
be very possible to conduct deliberate and well thought
out operations, planned to the last detail, and
assisted by overwhelming concentrations of artillery. 9
Limited attacks were sanctioned, therefore, in order to maintain
some degree of offensive spirit among the troops, to boost their
confidence after two defeats and to unsettle Turkish defensive
10preparations.
If the EEF could not seriously damage the enemy by orthodox
methods for the present it could, nevertheless, go on to the
offensive in a somewhat different manner. Although the Turks had
recently scored two successes over the British their army still
consisted of disparate nationalities from across their empire who
remained unhappy about the war. Many Turkish deserters who daily
crossed the lines told the British that desertion was 'rife' among
those units which discovered they had to serve in southern Syria.
8 19 May 1917, WO 95/k367.
9 Dawnay to GOC 52, 53, 5k and 7k Divs. 2k Apr. 1917. Dawnay to
GOC 52, 531 5k and 7k Divs. 23 Apr. 1917, WO 95/kk5O.
10 McPherson papers 80/25/1 Vol. XI, Letter CXII, no date.
ii 8 May 1917, WO 95/k367. Intelligence Summary 18 May 1917,
WO 157/715.
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It seemed sensible, consequently, to try to exploit this weakness in
the Turkish ranks, and all sorts of ideas were considered, including
the use of a special ship to transport large numbers of deserters to
Egypt from behind enemy lines.12
But nobody was satisfied with desertion as the best way to sap
Turkish strength. In fact, the conclusion of the second engagement
at Gaza ushered in a feverish period of planning by the EEF's top
staff officers that would lay the foundations for Allenby's successes.
We ought not to be confused, as a result, by the very real anger
displayed by men like Chetwode when they learnt of London's ignorance
about Palestinian conditions:
With regard to the question of convincing the great
ones as to the true situation I should have thought
that a trench map of the enemy position... with a
comparative rifle strength of the opposing forces and
a few notes about water would have convinced even a
Cabinet Minister. 13
What concerns us here is the reason for such sarcasm: Chetwode's
frustration that he could not do more sooner, and the inability of
the War Cabinet to understand, was the cause - not any lack of
offensive spirit or determination to strike at the enemy on his part.
The continuing offensive spirit of the EEF was demonstrated by
a major raid it conducted in May. Murray drew Chetwode attention
to the Turkish railway line south of Beersheba which ran to El Luja
and could become a threat to Eastern Force's lines of communication;
the C in C's solution to this potential menace was the railway's
destruction by offensive action - and his subordinate was not slow
12 Intelligence Summary 13 May 1917, WO 157/715. On 19 May a
conference was held on the best ways to encourage desertion in
the Ottoman army.
13 Chetwode to Lynden-Bell 8 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/
Folder 3.
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1i.to agree. Plans were rapidly drawn up and the operation took place
on 23 May with two columns involved. The first, the 1st Light Horse
Brigade and field engineers, moved on Asluj, 12 miles south of
Beersheba; the second included the Imperial Camel Brigade, and its
own engineers, and was ordered to make for El Auja. 15
 While the
engineers worked on the railway the cavalry demonstrated southwest
of Beersheba and a bombardment was opened at Gaza in order to distract
the enemy. The operation was completely successful: 13 miles of rail
were damaged and seven bridges were rendered useless. The importance
of this episode lies not in the execution of the raid itself but in
what it foreshadowed for the future. For one thing, the entire
operation, to a certain extent, resembled the EEF's great break-
through battle in November 1917 - rapid cavalry action in the Beer-
sheba region and diversionary actions at Gaza. Lest such similarities
be thought coincidental or farfetched one final point needs to be
made about this action. During the raid some of the mounted troops
'nearly got into' Beersheba, a fact which pleased Chetwode, who
considered the greatest achievement of the episode to be the
knowledge gained of the terrain around Beersheba: 'All this part of
1k Murray to Chetwode 9 May 1917 and Chetwode to Murray 11 May 1917,
Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3. These letters prove that Murray's
strategic perception prompted Chetwode to launch the raid; the
Official History (p.363) is quite wrong, therefore, to ascribe
the thinking behind the raid to Chetwode. This episode is most
instructive in demonstrating Murray style of generalship, which
could be very successful; he made a most perceptive suggestion to
his subordinate that led to a completely successful operation. Of
course, such leadership is unobtrusive and therefore receives no
attention; it can, nevertheless, be effective.
15 Dawnay to GOC Desert Column 13 May 1917, WO 95/kk5O
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the world will be of great importance to us later on.6
Greater and greater attention was being given to the Beersheba
area by Eastern Force and GHQ after the Second Battle of Gaza, and
this raid accelerated the process. Murray himself had already
identified it as the Turks' 'vulnerable point' and Lynden-Bell
obviously agreed, because by the end of May he was writing in the
following vein: 'We want to narrow our front and if possible strike
17the enemy's line in the neighbourhood of Beersheba.'	 On the other
hand, Lynden-Bell was also at pains to explain that GHQ was not
'definitely committed' to this plan. This is instructive, for once
again a debate was being conducted within the EEl as to the best
strategy to employ in order to break the Turkish line. For example,
Murray explained the various options to Robertson: the Turkish left
was fairly accessible', he pointed out, and once the EEF's mounted
units broke the Gaza-Beersheba line they could attack anywhere -
the only problem being the need for additional pipelines to carry
water to the soldiers operating on the Turkish left; on the other
hand, there were 'certain advantages' to a further attack from the
British left at Gaza, but any such action would depend upon the
strength of heavy artillery that the EEl could utilize.16
In line with this kind of thinking Murray requested an estimate
of the amount of heavy artillery ammunition needed to capture the
Gaza front. The EEl's artillery expert made his disconcerting
calculations on the assumption that any such battle would last for
16 Fergusson to D'Ewes 23 May 1917, Fergusson papers. Chetwode to
Lynden-Bell 2k May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3.
17 Lynden-Bell to Gen. Maurice 26 May 1917, /o Io/7i.
18 Murray to Robertson 28 May 1917, BM Add. MS 52k62.
351
seven days and the necessary bombardment require double the number
of 18-pounders Eastern Force then possessed. 19 Such an estimate was
quite beyond the EEF's resources.
Aware of the strategic debate within the EEF, Chetwode opposed
a further attack at Gaza: 'the results are hardly likely to be
proportionate to the cost.' 2° Nor did he approve of the air of
uncertainty created by Murray's flexibility and desire to examine
every option, for this very flexihility offered Eastern Force's GOC
no definite objective to aim at. 21 The same factor, on the other
hand, allowed Chetwode to pursue serious alternatives to a third Gaza
assault. This he did with the aid of his most able CGS, Guy Dawnay,
who produced a memorandum in the middle of June outlining all the
offensive alternatives open to the EEF but strongly advocating an
attack in the Beeraheba region. 22 With the groundfrules plainly stated
Dawnay and Chetwode now collaborated with their next paper, 'Notes on
the Palestine Operations', dated 21 June 1917. The conclusion was
consistent with their previous findings:
An attack against the enemy's left flank from
Bir Saba to Hariera would afford us the opportunities
presented by an open flank, and the advantages of
attacking from higher ground and against works less
formidable than elsewhere. 23
Of equal significance were the minimum requirements Chetwode believed
19 'Estimated artillery requirements for the capture and consolidat-
ion of the enemy's defensive line near Gaza' 29 May 1917. Note
by Murray 28 May 1917, Note by Maj.-Gen. Smith 20 June 1917.
Note by Capt. Gammell 22 June 1917, WO 95/kk5l.
20 Chetwode to GHQ 25 May 1917, WO 95/kk5O.
21 Chetwode to Lynden-Bell 31 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/
Folder 3.
22 Memorandum by Dawnay 17 June 1917, Dawnay papers 69/21/2.
23 'Notes on the Palestine Operations' by Chetwode 21 June 1917,
Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3. Bir Saba is an alternative
rendering of Beersheba.
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the EEF would need for such operations: seven infantry divisions
and. three cavalry divisions, no less, for full success. These
conclusions were to be of lasting influence since Chetwod.e sent this
appreciation of the situation in Palestine to Allenby in a private
letter which the latter received on his arrival in Egypt.2I The new
C in C arrived at an opportune time, therefore, as far as the
planning of the EEF was concerned. Murray had initiated a complete
rethink of the best way to break the Turkish line and had himself
realized the weakness of its left flank; Chetwode and Dawnay had
developed in detail the strategic and tactical thinking behind the
exploitation of this weakness. It was left to Allenby to accept
this fresh assessment and, ultimately, to act upon it in November.
Much of the staff work necessary for success was done during
Murray's time with the EEF, therefore; his tragedy was that he never
had the forces available to execute it. Hence the significance of
Chetwode's demands for additional troops if his plans were to become
reality - reinforcements which Murray never saw, but which his
successor received.
Moreover, in the last months of hi time in Egypt Murray laid
the foundations of future success in other ways. Although he has
been frequently criticised for his command-structure after the
creation of Eastern Force and the subsequent advance into Palestine,
it has not been recognized that he himself saw the need to alter the
arrangements but was overruled by his staff, especially, it would
seem, by Lynden-Bell. Murray wrote to the CIGS on the subject in May
2k Chetwode to Edmonds 26 Sept. 192k, Edmonds papers 11/1/32.
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in the following manner:
I have considered very carefully the question as to
whether I should move my General Headquarters to
Palestine and take personal command of Eastern Force.
This I should naturally have liked to do very much,
but the considered opinion of my staff... is that to
move.., away from Cairo would be to upset completely
the military and political machine in Egypt. 25
Even if Murray had not agreed to his staff's assessment any attempt
by him to move his GHQ might have been frustrated at a still higher
level, because Lynden-Bell had been gathering support for his plans
in London at the same time, 2
 The C in C had nevertheless called into
question the existing command-structure. It must have greatly eased
Allenby's task in July when he decided to move GHQ to Palestine.
MURRAY'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE CHANGED AGAIN
The almost immediate effect of the Gaza failure in April was to
make Robertson uneasy about the last set of instructions he had
telegraphed to Murray. Sir Archibald, we remember, had been ordered
27to engage in operations which would 'justify heavy casualties'. Now
the CIGS feared the ever-loyal Murray might seek to fulfil these
instructions even though the situation no longer offered sufficient
chances for major success. Robertson shared this concern with the War
Cabinet, explaining that Murray 'was not unlikely, in his desire to
carry out his instructions, to undertake a further attack, in which
he might lose a very large number of men with doubtful prospects of
success.28 The politicians took Robertson's point; the resulting
telegram which the CIGS was authorised to send to Egypt made it clear
25 Murray to Robertson 28 May 1917, BM Add. MS 52k62.
26 Lynden-Bel]. to Gen. Maurice 26 May 1917, op.cit.
27 CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 1 Apr. 1917, WO 33/905.
28 War Cabinet meeting 25 Apr. 1917, CAB 23/2.
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that the policy in Palestine had changed - once more. This time,
Murray was ordered 'to take every favourable opportunity of defeating
the Turkish forces', but the urgency of earlier telegrams was absent
and the object of the campaign - driving the Turks from Palestine -
seemed only a distant poss].bility.29
Robertson need not have troubled himself about Murray throwing
away men in futile assaults because of blind obedience to clearly
impossible orders. The EEF's commander informed the CIGS on 22 Lpril
that he felt he had only sufficient men for 'a local success'; once
again he stated categorically that he needed five fully-trained
divisions for a continuous offensive whereas, at present, he had only
three. 3° Furthermore, in a letter to Robertson written the same day
Murray confessed privately his doubts as to whether he could reach
Jerusalem - as requested - and even his belief that if the Turks
massed still more men against him he might have to withdraw.31
Finally, early in May he admitted to the CIGS that he considered any
attempt to commence a general offensive on his front 'out of the
question'; all that could be hoped for was a policy of 'active
defence' with the forces currently at the EEF's disposal. 32 As Murray
had already learnt that he could not expect to receive the additional
divisions he so desperately needed there seemed little chance of any
further advances in Palestine.33
29 GIGS to GOC in C Egypt3 Apr. 1917, WO 33/905.
30 GOC in C Egypt to GIGS 22 Apr. 1917, WO 106/716. What may have
worried Robertson in this telegram was the following: 'I am
prepared to carry on with what I have got if what I ask for cannot
be sent, and I will certainly keep the enemy busy.'
31 Murray to Robertson 22 Apr. 1917, BM Add. MS 52k62.
32 Murray to Robertson 3 May 1917, BM Add. MS 52k62.
33 GIGS to GOC in C Egypt 27 Apr. 1917, WO 33/905.
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Although additional troops were not immediately available there
was the possibility that they could be obtained from Salonica. The
campaign in Macedonia had halted far more ignominiously than the
EEF's; moreover, at a time when London was experiencing great stress
because of the rampant German submarines, Salonica seemed close to
Egypt in terms of troop transportation.3k General Smuts may well have
been the first to suggest such a course of action in an important
memorandum he submitted on the general strategic situation facing
Britain on all fronts. 35 Certainly, by early May the British were
pushing hard for the transfer of troops from Salonica to Palestine.
Henry Wilson noted that Robertson was now trying to get men to Egypt
36from Salonica. Meanwhile, at the Anglo-French conference held in
Paris from k to 5 May Lloyd George and Robertson found themselves
working side by side in an attempt to win over the French. The Prime
Minister stressed the urgency of the shipping problem which, he
argued, made the support of a force at Salonica impossible; Robertson's
argument was that the Allies were risking 'a great dater by
allowing 600,000 of their troops to be held up by 30,000 Bulgarians
when the Turks were massing against the EEF.37
The Salonica solution to Murray's paucity of troops was in many
ways ideal for London. Lloyd George had become disillusioned about
operations in Macedonia and still looked to Palestine for the success
he so desperately sought. Salonica offered him the chance to do a
deal with his CIGS who, he believed, had been able to reassert his
3k Roskill, p.382.
35 'The general strategic and military situation and particularly
that on the Western Front' by Smuts, 29 Apr. 1917.
36 Henry Wilson Diary 1 May 1917.
37 Summary of the Proceedings of the Anglo-French Conference held
at Paris on May k and 5, CAB 28/2.
35i
own negative attitude to a campaign in the Holy Land after Murray's
second failure at Gaza. 8
 The Prime Minister agreed to remove
British troops from Saloziica (something the GIGS had always wanted)
provided these same troops went to Palestine. 39
 To Robertson the
proposal made practical military sense: the strain of supplying the
Salonica force was growing; the cavalry in Greece could not be used,
whereas Murray might be able to do 60 (Haig certainly could not on
the Western Fronts); and a small reserve in Egypt would. be
 useful if
trouble arose in India. These were the arguments the GIGS maTshalled
to convince the French, while simultaneously making it clear that
L4.o
such a move had 'no direct connection with operations in Palestine.'
Although Robertson actually believed that these troops would never be
transferred to Egypt because the Royal Navy could not guarantee their
safety in transit, he admitted that he was not entirely opposed to
further operations in Syria, as he explained to Admiral Jellicoe:
'There is no question as to the value of our getting hold of
Palestine if we can. But it is not what we wish to do but what we can
kido.'	 Moreover, later in the same month he wrote that if a
favourable opportunity offered itself in Palestine he still thought
k2the Turks 'should be licked'.
Meanwhile, the GIGS had been in contact with General Murray.
On 21 May he informed Sir Archibald that the EEF's front line ought
to be prepared to maintain five infantry divisions, three cavalry
38 V. H. Rothwell, British war aims and peace diplomacy, 191k-1918
(Oxford, 1971), p.129.
39 D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the generals (Newark, 1983),
p.168.
kO Robertson to Foch 23 May 1917, Robertson papers I/3k/28.
ki Robertson to Jellicoe 18 May 1917, Robertson papers I/36/k6.
k2 Robertson to Smuts 26 May 1917, Robertson papers 1/35/50.
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divisions and a full complement of heavy artillery by ji1k3 In
truth Poberteon was being placed under almost intolerable pressure,
a fact he did not conceal even from official memoranda. In a paper
dated 12 June, for example, the CIGS asserted that the Prime Minister
had 'impressed upon me' on 'several recent occasions' the need for a
decisive campaign in Palestine.
London's deep interest in a Palestine campaign at this time had
not been dispersed even by a serious military reverse at Gaza in
April. Leo Amery, for example, still hoped to do 'something really
effective in Palestine'; with this in mind, he wanted to form a small
committee to look into future developments in the Balkans and
paiestine.k5 His suggestion bore fruit in the creation of the War
Policy Committee, comprising the Prime Minister, Curzon, Mi].ner and
Smuts, which enabled Lloyd George to articulate his opinion that
Turkey and Austria should now be the main object of Allied
k6
offensives.
Smuts had always made it clear that if an offensive was
intended in Syria such a campaign would ultimately 'in all
probability assume an importance eventually second only to that of
the Western Front.L17 He considered it ought to be a condition of
this command that the necessary forces be provided. He drew up a
Lf3 CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 21 May 1917, WO 33/935.
14 'Military policy in the various theatres of war', 12 June 1917
by CIGS, WO 106/1512.
k5 Amery to Lloyd George 5 June 1917, Lloyd George papers
F/2/1/k.
k6 Woodward, p.170.
k7 'The general strategic and military situation and particularly
that on the Western Front', op.cit.
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rough plan as to how these might be used and advocated landing a
force of some 100,000 men at Haifa in order to crush the Turkish
forces in Palestine.	 He realized a massive effort was required
to ensure success in the Palestine campaign, and he did not believe
this could be justified. Thus his Haifa scheme died and, for a time,
the enthusiasts for a rapid conquest of the Holy Land were held in
check. ' Interestingly enough, however, Smuts' ideas for an
amphibious assault were not unique in the summer of 1917; Sir
Reginald Wingate suggested a similar kind of operation to Robertson
twice in June.5°
One obvious obstacle to a major campaign in Palestine was the
condition of Russia. The original intention had been to combine any
offensive in Palestine with a simultaneous effort by the Russians
in the Caucasus; with the internal turmoil of the Russian state,
however, this looked increasingly unlikely. 51
 It was the CIGS's
opinion that the collapse of the Russian war effort was of
monumental significance to operations in Palestine. He believed the
loss of the Russian component made a successful campaign to capture
Jerusalem 'very doubtful' without using an 'altogether
disproportionate' number of troops, while it certainly meant the
end to all ideas of advancing as far north as Aleppo. The CIGS's
advice was plain: Britain should confine herself primarily to the
defence of Egypt, at the same time being careful to take advantage
k8 Robertson to Jellicoe 11 May 1917, Robertson papers I/36/k5.
k9 Smuts to Lloyd George 31 May 1917, Lloyd George papers
F/k5/9/k. The background to Smuts' suggestions was that he had
been offered command of the EEF, as we shall see.
50 Wingate to Robertson 12 June 1917 and 26 June 1917, Wingate
papers 16k/8/178.
51 Robertson to Milner 8 May 1917, Mimer papers MS Mimer dep k5
folio 57-58.
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of 'any favourable opportunity' to strike at the Turks. 52 Robertson
was certainly reflecting the view of the EEl', for GHQ in Egypt
feared that the collapse of Russia might release a large number of
Turkish troops who would find their way to Palestine.53
Conversely, the possible collapse of the Russian war effort
appeared to have precisely the opposite effect in some circles in
London. Hankey, for example, believed that there was a possibility
of forcing a separate peace on Turkey if a final and successful
attack could be launched on her while Russia was disabled. 1 Lloyd
George took up this line of reasoning as well; he argued that if
Russia was about to leave the war Britain needed to gain as many
bargaining counters as possible when she came to negotiate with
Germany, of which Palestine would be one. 55 Moreover, in a
conference at the Foreign Office to consider the possible
consequences of a Russian withdrawal from the war Leo Amery came
away with the opinion that the question of operations in Palestine
was now 'of increasing importance'. 6 Meanwhile, since the March
revolution in Russia Curon had chaired a sub-committee on the
effects of a Russian departure from the conflict, and he maintained
that Britain needed a Palestine offensive to secure Egypt and defeat
the Turkish forces in the region before they were powerfully
reinforced by troops from the Caucasus.57
52 'Military effect of Russia seceding from the Entente' by CIGS
9 May 1917, Robertson papers.
53 Lynden-Bell to Chetwode 5 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3.
5k Memorandum on the war by Hankey 18 Apr. 1917, CAB 63/20.
55 Woodward, pp.162-166.
56 J. Barnes & D. Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery diaries, 1896-
1929 (London, 1980), I, p.158.
57 'Policy in view-,of Russian developments' by Curon 12. May 1917,
CAB 2k/12.
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Views like these demonstrate the difference between London
and Cairo that now existed and gave birth to a real sense of
grievance in the EEF because, it was felt, the War Cabinet did not
grasp the problems facing the army. Lynden-Bell expressed himself
forcefully on the subject:
the people at home do not understand the situation
at all out here, and cannot in any way visualise
the difficulties of the ground and of obtaining
water. I gather... that the pundits of the War
Cabinet have gone mad over.., getting intG Jerusalem,
and they cannot understand why we are not already in
possession of Jerusalem. 58
A dangerous chasm had opened, therefore, between the expectations
of London and those of the EEF, and relations were starting to
break down. In an effort to improve matters Murray sent a full
appreciation of his position and its prospects to the War Office.
In it he argued that the EEF now faced up to eight Turkish
divisions (through the collapse of the Russian war effort) in
strongly entrenched positions, while his own troops were dangerously
under-strength, so that he felt he could attempt only an 'active
defensive' policy at present. In a strongly worded paragraph he
sought to explain what was the true purpose of this official letter:
I feel bound to place the actual situation before
you as clearly as possible, in order that there
may be no misapprehension... as regards the causes
which have made my rapid advance into Palestine...
now no longer possible. 59
So Murray, egged on by his staff and by the nature of the situation
in which he found himself, had decided to adopt a far more obstinate
attitude towards the CIGS and his political superiors in London than
was usual. Sadly for him it was now too late to save his career; but
58 Lynden-Bell to Chetwode 5 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3.
59 C in C EEF to CIGS 7 May 1917, CAB 2k/13 G.T.75k.
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it was probably in time to help his successor.
Murray went on to assert that although on paper he bad five
infantry divisions in reality he had only three, because the 74th
Division possessed no artillery and required further training,
while the 75th existed only on paper. Even this fact did not
adequately demonstrate the EEl's appalling weakness at this time,
for Murray's other three infantry divisions were all undermanned:
the C in C estimated that he required 350 officers and 9,000 other
ranks to bring them up to full strength. Because of these shortages
Sir Archibald made it plain that there could be no question of his
attempting any offensive operations for the present; all he could
do was to adopt a policy of 'active defence'. 60
Together with this important communication to the CIGS Murray
sent another on the subject of railways. In this, he made a
startling claim: once the 74th and 75th Divisions were ready for
the front the existing rail system would be 'strained to the limit
of its capacity' so that, if it were intended to reinforce the EEF,
the railways would have to be improved. He therefore suggested
concentrating every effort on his communications over the next few
61
months.
These two letters gave Robertson and the General Staff in
London much to chew over; they made the situation in Palestine
absolutely plain. And they were needed, for even the CIGS had not
yet grasped the true nature of the situation there. He was still
60 Ibid.
61 Murray to CIGS 7 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/Folder 3.
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writing to Murray in May, for example, urging him to give the
Turks 'a really bad knock' even if it meant his not advancing very
far. By advocating such a course of action the CIGS was not thinking
of a full-scale offensive but rather of some kind of attritional
encounter. Nonetheless he still seemed much taken by Murray's
'fine mounted troops' and was disappointed that more could not be
done with them because of a shortage of water.62
But Sir Archibald would not budge from his reading of the
situation. His last letter to Robertson before being replaced as
C in C made this clear:
If the Force is not to receive a further Division,
or Divisions, the strength will only admit of
sapping forward gradually and gaining local successes.
Should it be the intention to assign to the Force
more Divisions it is obviously the GOC's duty... to
wait for them.., and not to weaken his force
piecemeal. 63
In the same letter Murray admitted that it had been his great wish
to begin doubling the rail system at once so that if it were
decided to send out more troops at a later date a more vigorous
offensive policy would be possible.61
Murray left Palestine having made it absolutely clear that the
Government must take a decision: either the EEF be reinforced and
its railways upgraded, or abandon all thought of the occupation of
Palestine. From now on, it was as if the departing C in C had said,
there could be no more half-measures as in the past, half-measures
that, one might argue, had cost Murray his post.
62 Robertson to Murray 12 May 1917, Robertson papers 1/32/58.




Sir Archibald was informed on 11 June 1917 by telegram from
the Secretary of State for War that the War Cabinet had decided to
effect a change in the command of the EEF. In polite but pregnant
words the message explained that while the Government appreciated
his 'good work' they considered it 'desirable in the public interest'
to replace him with General Allenby, who would leave England that
very week. 6 This blow to all Murray's hopes was delivered to him
at 7.30 a,m. on 12 June, and we can assume that it ruined his
breakfast although he remains as reserved as ever about it in his
66diary.
The decision came as something of a shock to many in the EEF,
Chetwode describing it as 'astounding news' when he was informed.6
Such was not the case in London nor among senior generals in France.
For example, as early as 29 April Henry Wilson heard a rumour that
Murray was to be recalled, although he had no idea who would replace
68him. By May, moreover, both Cavan and Godley had heard that Murray
was in danger, although in Godley's case at least his information
suggested that Murray would actually survive. 6 There were those who
almost willed these rumours to be true; one of these, not
surprisingly, was General Maxwell, who confessed to 'a feeling of
some satisfaction' on learning of Murray's possible predicament.7°
65 Secretary of State for War to Gen. Sir A. Murray 11 June 1917,
wa 33/935.
66 Murray Diary 12 June 1917 simply reads: 'Lynden-Bel]. brought me
the news at 7.30 a.m. that I was recalled and that Allenby would
succeed me.'
67 Chetwode to Murray 13 June 1917, Wingate papers 1k5/8/68.
68 Henry Wilson Diary 29 Apr. 1917.
69 Cavan to Chetwode 11 May 1917 and Godley to Chetwode 25 May 1917,
Chetwode papers PWCl/Thlder 3.
70 Maxwell to Henry Wilson 8 May 1917, Henry Wilson papers 73/1/21.
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Meanwhile, Lady Murray told Repington that she was 'much
exercised' about her husband's future because his recall was
'persistently advertised in conversation.' 71 Indeed, it is very
likely that she passed this anxiety on to her husband for, in a
rare admission of emotion in his diary, Murray noted on 11 May
that his most recent mail from home concerned a 'worrying matter.'72
If this was so he must have felt insecure from the middle of May,
a supposition that can be substantiated by a comment be made to
Robertson in a letter dated 20 May, when he wrote that he realized
how much he himself owed to Robertson's 'firmness' of purpose 'if
half the gossip I hear from home is
What then was the source of all this gossip and why were the
rumours of Murray's dismissal so strong in April and May when he
was not in fact replaced until 11 June 1917? For an answer we must
turn to discussions within the War Cabinet as early as 5 April.
On this day the War Cabinet discussed the possible removal of Murray
in the belief that 'he has not the energy and go to force through
7k
the Palestine expedition successfully.' 	 On the following day,
however, a decision was taken to allow him to remain in command of
the EEF until after his next offensive (i.e., the second battle of
Gaza). 75 His fate was sealed, therefore, as early as 6 April, and
71 Repington, p.565. 7-11 May 1917.
72 Murray Diary 11 Nay 1917.
73 Murray to Robertson 20 May 1917, BNPdd. MS 52k62.
7k Hankey Diary 5 April 1917, HNKY 1/2.
75 'Operations in Palestine' by CIGS 23 Apr. 1917, CAB 2k/il
G.T.533. There is no mention of this 4ecision in the official
minutes of the War Cabinet for 5 and 6 Apr. and it can only be
traced in Hankey's diary, this memorandum by Robertson and the
War Cabinet minutes for 23 Apr. (CAB 23/2) which refer to a
conference on the subject -6 Apr., the minutes of which were
neither printed nor circulated.
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it was never the War Cabinet's intention for him to lead British
troops into the planned winter offensive in Palestine - although
Hankey's published memoirs certainly try to give the impression
that it was Murray's failure at the Second Battle of Gaza which
precipitated his downfall.6
This delayed decision by the members of the War Cabinet is
open to severe criticism, as Robertson himself noted at the time,
for it meant that they pressed on with a general in whom they did
not have the fullest confidence and whom they intended to replace
anyway. 77 If Murray was not the man for the job he should have been
replaced at once: why, then, was he not? One reason was quite
simply that he still engendered a fair degree of loyalty in the
breasts of many in London. Robertson himself admitted that he had
fought a battle for Murray before the War Cabinet after the news of
the first clash at Gaza had filtered through to the poiiticians.8
Repington remained Murray's most ardent supporter, at the same
time, and continued to do all he could to stimulate others to help
his friend's cause. 79 Meanwhile, Lloyd George, who had been
dissatisfied with Murray 'for some time' and who clearly had been
one of the main instigators behind the decision of 6 April, tried
to influence Lord Derby to see the need for Sir Archibald's removal;
while he was ultimately successful, it must have taken a certain
degree of effort on his part, for he was not completely sure about
Derby's position even after the attempt.80 Finally, some of the
76 Hankey, II, p.637.
77 Repington, p.51k. 13 Apr. 1917.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p.565. 7-11 May 1917.
80 A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: a diary by Frances
Stevenson (London, 1971), pp.153-15k. 23 Apr. 1917.
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military staff felt that Murray's dismissal would crown a most
unfair wartime career with yet another dlsappointment.81 A comment
by Maxwell on Murray's lack of popularity at the time in London
is, therefore, to be viewed with some distrust: 'I hear our
ItWulije ll is the only one in Great Britain who wishes the great Sir
Archie to remain in Egypt, the former I think is getting tired,
the latter remains what he always was.t82 It would seem, therefore,
that although the War Cabinet had decided to replace Murray in
early April there existed afterwards a significant body of opinion
sympathetic towards the doomed general's prospects. This can be
seen even in the official War Cabinet papers themselves, for the
report on the meeting of 6 April explained that all present
'recognized the exceptionally good' work done by Murray in Egypt.8
Unfortunately, Murray's second failure at Gaza finally discredited
his supporters in London, when a success might just have been
enough to strengthen his support and even reverse the original
8kdecision. So at the War Cabinet of 23 April the decision was
taken, with the 'concurrence' of the CIGS and the Secretary of State
for War, to remove Murray. 8 Everyone, including ILord Derby, was now
in line: Murray must go. Robertson was responsible for bringing the
crisis to a head on 23 April, as it was he who reminded the War
Cabinet of their conclusions of 6 April; his motive, however, was
81 Caliwell to Wingate 6 June 1917, Wingate papers 168/8/22.
82 Maxwell to Henry Wilson 20 May 1917, Henry Wilson papers
73/1/21.
83 Operations in Palestine, op.cit.
8k For evidence that the matter was not entirely settled see
Robertson to Maude 9 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers I/lk/70. The
CIGS asked Maude for suggestions as to replacements for Murray,
but added: 'This is all very much in the air and by no meana
certain to materialise.'
85 War Cabinet meeting 23 Apr. 1917, CAB 23/2.
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not to force Murray out but rather to make his political masters
face the harsh realities of the situation and either remove Murray
or give him their total support: 'It is... very necessary that the
War Cabinet have full confidence in the Commander, not only when he
is successful but also when, sometimes, he is not, for no Commander
can guarantee success at all times.' 86
 Yet this was still only 23
April, and Murray was not officially telegraphed about his recall
until 11 June: what caused this further delay in the implementation
of the War Cabinet's decision?
The problem with any dismissal is always whom to appoint to
fill the vacancy. Ideally, of course, those who dismiss a general
have already unanimously decided who should replace him. This was
not the case in April and May 1917, when several different names
were put forward. Almost immediately after the meeting of 6 April
Robertson started to search for possible candidates if it became
necessary to find employment for Murray elsewhere. He contacted
General Maude in Mesopotamia, asking whether he considered General
Cobbe suitable for Egypt, or, should Maude himself be sent to
Egypt, whether Cobbe could handle Mesopotamia. Maude's reply made no
comment on the possibility of his own transfer to Egypt, simply
stating that General Marshall, also under his command, was a better
soldier than Cobbe - an opinion he shared with General ?4onro in
87India, whom the CIGS also consulted. How serious Robertson was
about these suggestions it is impossible to tell, but his tentative
enquiries caused Maude to confide to Marshall that the latter might
88lose his chief to Egypt.
86 Operations in Palestine, op.cit.
87 Robertson to Maude 9 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers I/lk/70. Maude
to Robertson 11 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers 1/14/71. Monro to
Robertson 14 Apr. 1917, Robertson papers 1/14/72.
88 Marshall, p.248.
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Lord Mimer, another member of the War Cabinet, had his own
favourite for the post: Henry Wilson. Milner wrote to Wilson in the
middle of May saying that he had considered him for the command but
had made no move because he feared that no significant operations
would be attempted in the region; should things change for the
better, however, he would put Wilson's name forward. 8
 The Prime
Minister himself was 'mad keen' on General Smuts assuming the
command. 9° At the War Cabinet meeting of 23 April Smuts was the only
name mentioned as a possible successor to Murray, although he was
described only as 'one of the most suitable selections'; this proves
that Lloyd George's energetic support for Smuts did not render
irrelevant the various other candidates, especially as there were
those who felt the South African's qualities could be better used
91
'in the higher conduct of the war',
On 25 April the War Cabinet again tackled the issue without
arriving at a decision on Murray's replacement. Smuts' name was
again the only one mentioned, but this time more objections were
raised to his candidature: he would not be popular with the large
Australian contingent and, more important, he had 'no experience in
the modern conditions of European warfare, which also prevailed to
some extent in the Palestine Campaign.'92
Smuts himself was placed under considerable pressure to accept
the appointment to the Egyptian command, with Lloyd George trying
to make the post seem as attractive as possible. Smuts described his
89 Mimer to Henry Wilson 19 May 1917, Henry Wilson papers 73/1/21:
90 Ibid.
91 War Cabinet meeting 23 Apr. 1917, CAB 23/2.
92 War Cabinet meeting 25 Apr. 1917, CAB 23/2.
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position to a friend: 'I was taken on a high bill and shown the
kingdoms of the world'. 93
 The Prime Minister certainly tried to
'tempt' the South African with talk of 'the last and greatest
9k
crusade'.	 As Hankey noted in his diary, the Prime Minister was
'trying very hard' to win Smuts over. 9' Even Smuts' own South
African Government wanted him to accept the offer, but he remained
unsure of what to do and sought advice from different quarters.6
The War Cabinet actually sent Robertson specially to see Smuts to
discover his thinking, for they were under the impression that he
would take the command only if sufficient troops were made
available 'to carry the Expedition to a successful conclusion.'97
Before visiting Smuts Robertson told Mimer that he felt'it would
certainly be foolish and might be fatal for the Cabinet to give any
kind of promise that the wants of Palestine shall be supplied to
the full extent'; after all, he went on, did not what we could give
to Palestine depend upon the situation in France?8
Robertson's meeting with Smuts convinced the CIGS of the South
African's views: 'Smuts does not wish to go unless it is going to
be a real thing, and he doubts the feasibility of this.'99
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister, Lord Derby and Robertson all
requested to see Sthuts one last time in the hope that he might yet
93 W. K. Hancock & J. van der Poel (eds.), Smuts papers (Cambridge,
1966), III, p.528. Smuts to N. C. Gillett 31 May 1917.
9k Ibid., p.k80. Smuts to S. M. Smuts 27 Apr. 1917.
95 Hankey Diary 9 May 1917, HNKY 1/3.
96 Hancock & van der Poel, III, p.300. G. Brebner to Mrs Smuts
10 May 1917.
97 War Cabinet meeting 8 May 1917, CAB 23/2.
98 Robertson to Mimer 8 Nay 1917, MS Milner dep k5 folio 57-58.
99 Robertson to Jellicoe 11 May 1917, Robertson papers I/36/k5.
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accept the offer; time was now running out and the CIGS told
Smuts that if a new man was to take over in Egypt the decision
had to be made 'at once'. 10° This time Robertson appears to have
made a more concrete promise of support for a major campaign in
Palestine than he had done previously, thus impressing Smuts.
Smuts gave Leo Amery the impression that his requirements had been
101
met and that he might be going to Palestine after all. 	 If Amery
is correct it seems possible that Robertson may have promised much
more than we know he did in his letter to the South African.
Whether Smuts was given the wrong impression or the CIGS was over-
ruled by an aggressive Lloyd George is not clear, but what appears
to have happened is that Robertson subsequently informed Smuts
there was no real hope of substantial reinforcements for
Palestine. 102 In his perplexity Smuts sought the counsel of his
old adversary in South Africa, Lord Milner, who seems to have been
of the opinion that he would do well to reject the command.103
Smuts finally decided to reject the command and he sent two
letters to the Prime Minister. The first was a personal letter to
Lloyd George assuring him of the great honour he felt at being
offered the post; the second officially outlined his reasons for
declining the appointment and gave his views on the future of the
Palestine campaign itself. In this second, most interesting,
100 Robertson to Smuts 26 May 1917, Robertson papers 1/33/50.
101 Barnes & Nicholson, I, p.158. 29 May 1917.
102 Ibid., p.159. 31 May 1917.
103 Ibid. and Mimer Diary 30 May 1917, MS Mimer dep 88. These
were the most influential factors in Smuts' decision and not,
as has bee suggested, a telegram from Botha urging Smuts to
decline the\command because he was no general. For a full
discussi6n o this see Hancock, Smuts: the sanguine years
(Cambridge, 1962), I, pp.k33-k35.
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letter Smuts clearly states that he considers a Palestine campaign
a 'mistake' unless at least the capture of Jerusalem is made 'a
reasonable certainty' and all the reinforcements necessary are
'assured' - anything less would serve no real purpose and might
appear as a 'fresh failure.1#
At the War Cabinet meeting of 5 June it was officially
recorded that Smuts had declined appointment to the Palestine
command. The question before the Cabinet now was who should replace'
MurrW with their prime candidate out of the race. The minutes read
that there was 'some discussion as to the qualifications of the
di.fferent generals for the post'. 105 We have already noted that
there were several possible candidates and General Byng, writing
only a few days before this meeting, commented: 'There seems to be
a good deal of discussion going on as to who is to command in
Egypt, every sort of name has been mentioned and some of us have
106been sitting on rather prickly thorns.' 	 That General Allenby
was chosen as the next commander of the EEF probably owed less to
his suitability for the post than to events on the Western Front.
Allenby had been responsible for the planning and execution of the
recent Arras campaign, which had generally been regarded as a
failure; Allenby had never enjoyed favourable relations with GHQ
and now Haig asked for his removal. Allenby, therefore, was
available and by suggesting him for Egypt the CIGS could kill two
birds with one stone: Haig would be appeased and so, in turn,
would be the Prime Minister, for Allenby was, by experience and
i0 Smuts to Lloyd George 31 May 1917, Lloyd George papers	 -
F/k5/9/3. Smuts to Lloyd George 31 May 1917, Lloyd George
papers F/k5/9/k.
105 War Cabinet meeting 5 June 1917, CAB 23/3.
106 Byng to Chetwode 30 May 1917, Chetwode papers PWCl/'older 3.
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inclination, a cavalry general and so more acceptable to the
Weishman, who still harboured grand designs of a major offensive
in Palestine. 107
 It was a master-stroke by Robertson and leads
one to suggest that there were occasions when he could 'handle'
his Prime Minister without any kind of direct confrontation and
get his own way.
If the CIGS can be applauded for finally extracting a
decision from the War Cabinet that was generally acceptable in
London, there were strong grounds for criticising the actual
decision from the	 perspective, at least. For one thing, the
delay in the process of selecting a replacement for Murray left
the new commander with little time to acclimatise to conditione
in Palestine, especially as Allenby departed for England on 11
June and set off for Egypt on 22 June, which hardly allowed him
much time to prepare for an autumn offensive. The story of Lloyd
George presenting Allenby with his personal copy of Adam Smith's
volumes on Palestine - so often recounted as in some way laudable
or at least 'romantic' - probably reflects to a certain extent
the generally 'cavalier' attitude of the authorities in London to
108this new appointment, therefore. 	 Henry Wilson dined with Allenby
on the very evening that he commenced hi journey east, and noted
in his diary that Allenby had been told nothing except that he
would get some new divisions and that Lloyd George was still
'desperately anxious' for him to reach Jerusalem - scarcely the
sort of briefing likely to instil confidence in the hearts of the
107 Edmonds papers Edmonds 111/2. Unpublished memoirs, Chapter XIV.
Edmonds claims Wavell deliberately kept this information out of
his biography of Allenby.
108 B. Gardner, Allenby (London, 1965), pp.112-115.
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109troops in Egypt, who were shortly to receive their new C in C.
The choice of Allenby was not viewed with much optimism by
those who knew Egypt and Palestine. As Birdwood explained to
Wingate, the new C in C of the EEF possessed no relevant experience
whatever to draw upon for his new role; 'I am rather wondering how
the]... will get on, as he has no experience whatever of the East,
and I doubt if he has ever set eyes on a MohammedanL' 11 ° Chetwode,
moreover, writing from his GHQ in the Sinai, failed to see much
logic in the appointment, since it meant 'replacing a man with all
the local knowledge... at his fingers' ends, by one who.., must
take many weeks to get the "atmosphere" of the campaign.'111
Murray was terribly disappointed by the news of his recall
and there were those about him who realized this. Lynden-Bell,
writing to General Maurice after Murray had left Egypt, asked his
friend to be 'kind' to Sir Archibald because he 'feels his knock
very very deeply.' 2
 The true depth of Murray's feelings can be
gauged by his comments on the matter as late as 19k1: 'I feel the
ln3ustice 3ust as much today as 21+ years ago... the recall from
Egypt hurt too deeply.' 113
 Yet Murray won the respect of many by
the way in which he conducted himself once he had received the
ilk
news.
	 His remarkably dignified behaviour contrasts most
109 Henry Wilson Diary 22 June 1917.
110 Birdwood to Wingate 2ZJune 1917.
111 Chetwode to Murray 13 June 1917, Wingate papers 1k5/8/68.
112 Lynden-Bell to Gen. Maurice 3 July 1917, wO 106/718.
113 Murray to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore 21 May 19k1,
Murray papers 79/k8/k.
uk Hill, p.109. Hill quotes a letter by Brig.-Gen. Anderson
recounting the experience of an Australian officer who called
on Murray half an hour after the fateful telegram had arrived:
'He accepted the situation in a very fine way, and had
nothing but good things to say of his successor and the
excellence of his selection.'
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favourably with Maxwell's, who had caused the maximum amount of
trouble over his recall, thereby significantly hindering Murray's
efforts to rationalise a confusing situation. This time the
departing general did everything in his power to resolve any
possible problems for his successor, with the result that we must
ascribe to him some of the credit for Allenby's success.
The day after receiving official news of his recall Murray
wrote a private letter to !obertson in which he made no mention of
any complaint he might have about his dismissal; his letter was
full of advice on how best to continue the campaign. 115
 Moreover,
when Allenby landed at Alexandria Murray made sure he was met by
Lynden-Bell and brought to Cairo, where Murray greeted him at the
atation in the evening of 27 June. The following day Murray and
Allenby sat in conference together from 10 a.m. until 12.45 p.m.,
and on 29 June Allenby officially took over command of the EEF.h16
So rapidly, in fact, had Murray organized the handover that some
of Allenby's staff were caught out, because they had been hoping to
occupy Murray's mess only to find that it had been already 'broken
117
up'
Once Murray had briefed Allenby he kept himself away from the
new C in C with the clear intention of affording him a free hand
118
and not cramping his style.
	 Indeed, it was not long before Murray
sailed for home; he did so on 1 July 1917.119 In London he found
115 Murray to Robertson 12 June 1917, BM Add. MS 52462.
116 Murray Diary 27-29 June 1917.
117 Letter by Dick Andrew, Allenby papers 6/VIII/2.
118 Evans to Wavell 5 Jan. 1 938 , Allenby papers 6/viii/k6.
119 Murray Diary 1 July 1917. Murray sailed for Brindisi on this
day.
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there were those who were ready to meet him, but they seem to
have been largely other discarded generals such as Ian Hamilton,
120
Lord French and Wolfe Murray.	 As for the Government itself,
even after Murray had been in London for a week, it did not ask him
for his views or attempt to draw on his experience; in fact, if
Repington is to be believed, Smuts did not even know that Murray
had returned when he met the journalist on 17 July. 121 This was
surely shabby treatment towards a man who had served his country
so loyally. It was also somewhat foolish, for it was undoubtedly
true that Murray could have provided the War Cabinet with a great
deal of most useful information.
120 Murray Diary 18-29 July 1917.
121 Repington, pp.615-61?. ik and 17 July 1917.
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CHAPTER 15
THE EEF AND THE ARABS: JANUARY 1916 - JUNE 1917
'The jealousy of Sir Archibald Murray
might have wrecked the Sherif's rebellion.'
T. E. Lawrence
MURRAY'S EARLIEST EXPERIENCES OF THE ARABS
When General Murray arrived in Egypt in January 1916 there
seemed some prospect of trouble for the Turks in Syria. According
to Egyptian Intelligence food shortages and executions by Turkish
troops had caused discontent in the region, but nobody was quite
sure if this would be enough to initiate a general revolt. 1
 On the
other hand, Italian sources seemed to suggest that it would, for
they picked up news of various disturbances in Syria. 2 Perhaps
more significantly Egypt learnt that Nun Shalaan had withdrawn
deep into the desert to the east of Syria, which suggested that he
might be preparing to oppose the Turks openly. 3 Unfortunately for
British hopes, similar events had occurred in Syria in the prewar
years, but they had not led to a general revolt then - nor would
they now. Moreover, even talk of possible negotiations with Djema].
Pasha seemed in reality to be merely an attempt by the Ottoman
leader to sow suspicion between Britain and the Arabs.k There had
been tangible benefits, nevertheless, and. Cairo had not lost all
1 Intelligence Summary 5-11 Jan. 1916, WO 157/700.
2 F.O. to McMahon 12 Jan. 1916, FO 371/2769/5209.
3 DM1 Egypt to W.O. 15 Jan. 1916, FO 371/2668/9639.
14. See Negotiations with Djemal 11 Jan. 1916, FO 371/2767/582k.
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hope of possible action in Syria by the indigenous population. For
example, it was known that the Turks could not obtain enough
camels for a major advance on Egypt because Nun Shalaan's tribe,
the Anazeh, refused to assist them. 5
 Meanwhile the War Office
sought the fullest possible information asAthe attitudes of the
various peoples of Syria, together with their military strength,
including the Druse and Kurds, from an Arab friendly to the
British cause then with the Indian forces in Mesopotanna.6
As early as February 1916 Murray began to discover that he
might be drawn into serious operations in Arabia if he was not
careful. For example, it was suggested that he should combine his
efforts with the navy in an attack at Jeddah on the coast of the
Hejaz partly because there was talk of enemy submarines in the
vicinity. Sir Archibald asked Maxwell for advice and he opposed
the action since it would mean landing 'infidels' in the Hejaz
close to the holiest places of Islam. Murray agreed, and objected
also on the grounds that such an operation would probably require
at least a brigade and might disrupt the defensive works then
being constructed at the Canal. 7
 In March Vice-Admiral Wemyss, the
Naval C in C of the East Indies, recommended to Murray that, since
there were currently in Egypt military resources 'greater than the
situation requires', a combined operation could be tried at Aden,
where the Turks had attempted to seize the territory from the
British. Lynden-Bell suggested that the admiral might help by
bombing the Turkish arms depot with his seaplanes, but that no
5 Intelligence Memo. The Turkish railway to the Egyptian frontier
12 Jan. 1916, WO 157/700.
6 Cairo to C in C India 13 Jan. 1916, L/MIL/17/5/3908.
7 Superflux to Chief Medforce 21 Feb. 1916 and Chief Medforce to
Chief London 22 Feb. 1916, %Th
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troops could possibly be sent from Egypt. Murray's views on the
matter were not quite identical: he believed that the entire affair
did not fall within his sphere of influence; as a result, he could
neither help nor interfere.8
Meanwhile, the Sherif of Mecca and his numerous sons had
already begun to be of positive assistance to the British cause in
Egypt. Feisal was in Syria and hoped to win over the Arab element
in any large Turkish attack upon the Canal, while the Sherif's
eldest son, Abdullah, had moved north towards Medina and the Heaaz
railway. 9
 Feisal also started to feed Cairo information about
Turkish intentions in Syria, although there was some concern in
April as to whether he could be trusted at all because it was
thought he had been talking to Ottoman leaders. 1 ° Attempts were
also made by Cairo to get the Sherif to convince Ibn Rashid not to
sell camels to the enemy, thereby reducing the mobility of their
forces in desert areas. 11 Moreover, there was even talk of using
Britain's good relations with Hussein to assist the desperate
situation at Kut, where General Townshend's troops were encircled.
India suggested that since the Sherif was seeking to detach the
Arab element in the Turkish army in Syriw the same tactic might be
tried in Mesopotamia. '2 Unfortunately, it soon became clear that
there was nothing the Sherif, or Feisal in Syria, could do to save
8 Wetnyss to Murray 1 Mar. 1916. Note by Lynden-Bell 3 Mar. 1916.
Note by Murray k Mar. 1916, WO 158/607.
9 High Commissioner, Egypt to F.O. I Mar. 1916, PC lkl/k61/1198.
10 Extract from Intelligence Summary, Cairo 21 Mar. 1916, L/MIL/
17/5/391 0 . Clayton to Governor-General, Erkowit 22 Apr. 1916,
PG 882/k/116772.
11 Intelligence Summary, GHQ IEF 'D' 25 Apr. 1916, WO 157/786.
12 Viceroy, Foreign Department to P.O. 2k Mar. 1916, FO 371/2768/
56911.
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Townshend. in time, and the suggestion was dropped.13
But Hussein's assistance had to be bought, as Murray soon
discovered. On 21 March 1916 Clayton explained to the C in C that
the Sherif had asked for a British landing on the Syrian coast and
although Murray rejected the proposal this was not the end of the
matter by any means.1k In April Hussein's precise aims became a
trifle clearer; he wanted British troops to land in Syria and
occupy the railway line connecting Syria and Anatolia 'so as to make
it easy for our friends in Syria to rise up with their followers
who expect relief to come to them.' The Sherif was clear as to the
correct chronology of events in any revolt, moreover: his followers
in the Hejaz would act first and seize the railway connecting
Medina with Damascus before moves were begun in Syria with the
support of British troops, who had been landed, presumably, in the
Alexandretta region. 15
 This general strategic plan submitted by
Hussein reflected the true strength of Arab nationalism and
opposition to Turkish rule in Syria: It was now obvious that dis-
contented groups there, such as the Druse, would not act without
direct military support, while the Arab chiefs to the east were
16
currently too dispersed to lead a significant revolt alone.
Scrutiny of Arabian affairs in Egypt was intensified early in
1916 by the formation of the Arab Bureau. This move had been agreed
13 Clayton to Governor-General 22 Apr. 1916, op.cit.
1k Intelligence Summary GHQ EEF 21 Mar. 1916, WO 157/702.
15 Sherif Hussein to High Commissioner, Egypt 18 Apr. 1916,
ro lkl/k61/1198.
16 Note by H. Cuinberbatch 2 Apr. 1916, TO 371/2768/6k300. McMahon
to F.O. 18 Apr. 1916, TO 371/2768/7k130.
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upon in January 191 in London at a special conference. This new
body was to be organized as a section of the existing Sudan
Intelligence Department in Cairo and would harmonize British
political activity in the Near East together with propaganda among
the Arab peoples of the region. 17
 In fact, the Arab Bureau's job
was to study developments among the Arabs and collect information
about them. The day-to-day running of this new office in Cairo was
to be supervised by the already overworked but most influential
Clayton under the general control of the High Commissioner and the
Foreign Office. The first director of the Bureau was D. G. Hogarth,
who did not begin work until April 1916. He later described the
Bureau as 'a sort of general liaison Intelligence Department',
which, along with Clayton's crucial role in Cairo, explains why it
did have such an influence upon Sir Archibald and his staff at
Ismailia.1
In the meantime, as the EEF began its advance into the Sinai
Murray's troops came into close contact with the Bedouin tribes of
this desert - and they did not like what they founds For example,
on 20 April 1916 the C in C ordered No. 3 Section of the Canal
Defences to clear the Qatia district of the indigenous population
and place them in 'a concentration camp' at El Salhia. 19
 The wisdom
of this decision seemed to have been confirmed by subsequent events
at the battle of Qatia on 23 April 1916. For one thing, later
evidence suggested that the local Bedouin who had been allowed
into the Yeomanry camps before the battle actually passed vital
17 Establishment of an Arab Bureau in Cairo 7 Jan. 1916,
FO 882/2/116772.
18 Hogarth to Falls 29 Nov. 195, CAB k5/79.
19 GHQ to No. 3 Section Canal Defences 20 Apr. 1916, WO 95/Lf362.
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information to the attacking forces, while the Turks even disguised
some of their agents as Sinai tribesmen. 20 Part of Kress von
Kressenstein's force which attacked Qatia consisted of Arab
irregulars; although some of them fought with reckless courage,
the British were, to say the least, unimpressed with their
behaviour after the engagement, because they stripped the bodies
of the dead Yeomanry. 21 According to information available to the
EEF the Turks had 600 - 800 Arab volunteers from Medina with them
at Qatia. 22 Impressed by these facts, Murray informed Robertson
that the enemy had armed up to k,000 Bed.ouin Arabs and 'although
their fighting value may not be very good, they are atill... a
force to be reckoned with as they are invaluable guides in the
23desert.'
Events at Qatia undoubtedly made many of Murray's staff
hostile towards the Sinai Bedouin, and they gradually became less
and less tolerant towards them. From now on these tribesmen would
be rounded up before any battle, as indeed they were prior to the
engagement at Rafah in January 1917, to prevent them leaking
information to the enemy. Even wells in the Sinai had to guarded
by the EEF to keep Bedouin patrols away from them.2k Nevertheless,
the nomads continued to violata British dead, even to the extent
of digging up their recently-buried bodies and then stripping them
nakedl 25 By January 1917 many officers were determined to hit
these tribesmen wherever and whenever it was possible, as Lynden-
20 Chayttr to Director, Historical Section 22 Oct. 1925, CAB k5/78.
21 Qatia Patrol Report 25 Apr. 1916, WO 95/k520.
22 W.D. G.S. Intelligence Section EEY 25 Apr. 1916, WO 157/703.
23 Murray to Robertson I May 1916, BM Add MS 52k61.
2k McGrigor Diary 9 Nov. 1916.
25 Ibid., 13 Jan. 1917.
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Befl admitted to Chetwode:
The fellows... that ''1
 do want to get on to are those
Bedouins, and I hope we shall be able to do it
effectively 1when we get to Pafah. Of course, a great
many of these fellows ae fighting with a rope round
.kheir necks, and I suppose intend doing as much
damage as they can before we do them in. 26
Because of this hostility, officers of the EEF actually applauded
Turkish deserters who shot Arabs on their way to the British lines. -
GHQ- realized at.tey could not themselves indiscriminately
shoqt tribesmen, for at some stage in the future it was hoped to
win ther support. 27
 There can be little doubt that adverse
experiences with nomadic tribesmen in the Sinai helped to poison
the minds of many regular soldiers in the EEF towards the
activities of any Arab forces throughout the war.
Remarkably, however, GHQ did consider using Arabs in co-
operation with the main EEF forces in the Sinai. Early in May 1916
such a suggestion was raised and even carefully examined but was
finally rejected because 'those Arabs whose services we could
procure in this country would be so unreliable that they might
well prove a source of danger rather than of security.' 8
 Yet this
was not the end of the matter; nor was Sir Archibald irrevocably
opposed to such action, for when a similar recommendation was made
later in the month GHQ admitted that the C in C had 'no objection
in principle' ifhe various problems of unreliable tribesmen and
29
a shortage of experienced British officers could be overcome.
Murray's true attitude to this subject became avparent during the
6 Lynden-Bell to Chetwode 18 Jan. 1917, Chetwode papers
PWCl/rolder 1.
27 Fergusson to D'Ewes 22 Jan. 1917, Ferguseon papers DEY/k.
28 GHQ to GOC 9 Army Corps k May 1916, Wa 95/k362.
29 GHQ to GOC Western Frontier Force 12. May 1916, WO 95/k362.
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final days of his command in Egypt when he suggested to the War
Office that Arab scouts could be recruited from the Sudan for use
in the Sinai and Palestine. The intention was to emply these men
in protecting outlying wells and special locations as well as in
small raids against enemy communications and isolated units. In
conclusion the departing C in C strongly urged this fresh
initiative: 'I am convinced value of this small force of Arab
camel men... would be considerable. Their presence, moreover,
should prouce good effect on local Arabs.'3°
PLANS FOR ACTION AT AQABA AND RABEGH
Sherif Hussein finally decided to revolt openly against
Turkish rule on 5 June 1916 in the Heja. This official revolt
against Turkish forces placed unexpected strains upon the strategy
which had already been outlined for the EEF. Indeed, it was to put
Murray at the centre of a tug of war between the demands of Egypt
and those of the rebel forcea in the Hejaz - a struggle that
extended to London and divided' the War Comittee and then the War
Cabinet for weeks.
Murray's involvement in these matters can be easily explained.
The EEF, with its GHQ in Egypt, represented the closest British
forces to the Hejaz and the Sherif, as we have already seen, had
frequently requested an operation in S rr1a to cover his revolt
when it ultimately started. The British had explained that they
could not possibly conduct such a manor amphibious attack. But
30 GHQ Egypt to W.O. 1k June 1917 and GHQ Egypt to W.0. 23 June
1917, L/P&S/11/123/2097.
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there was another option open to them. The remaining Turkish
forces in the Hejaz were dependent for their communications upon
the Hejaz railway, which ran from Damascus to Medina via Maan - a
town 60 miles to the north-east of the port of Aqaba in the Sinai.
If British troops took Aqaba they could disrupt the Turks' line of
communication in the Hejaz and answer the Sherif's demand for some
kind of military action by Britain to assist his struggle against
31the Ottoman overlord.	 The CI$ took up this line of reasoning
with Murray on 1k June 1916; he wanted the EEl' to consider the
feasibility of accupying the town in the autumn as part of a
general advance across the Sinai centred on El Arish on the
Mediterranean coast, because such an action would 'undoubtedly
encourage' the Sherif and might lead to a 'very desirable
extension' of the Arab movement. 32
 But Sir Archibald was none too
enthusiastic at this prospect, for in his memorandum of 15
February 1916 he had plainly stated that if El Arish was captured
no further positions needed to be held permanently in the Sinai.33
Mention of Aqaba added a whole new dimension to the subject of
future operations in the Sinai, and he regarded it as a separate
issue entirely: 'I would only occupy it if it is considered
advisable for the furtherance of the Arab movement.' 3
 There
seemed to be something of a misunderstanding between Robertson and
Murray, for the CIGS now talked of a 'forward movement' to El
Arish and Aqaba as if the two tasks could be undertaken together
31 McMahon to Grey I June 1916, FO 800/k8.
32 CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 1k June 1916, WO 106/715.
33 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 15 Feb. 1916, WO 95/k361.
3k GOC in C Egypt to GIGS 26 June 1916, WO 106/715.
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as part of the SEP's occupation of the ffinai. His impression may
have been strengthened by Murray's mention of the settlement of
Nekhl in his original memorandum of February; this lay north-west
of Aqaba in the heart of the Sinai, though the two were connected
by one of the main routes across the peninsula. Robertson
suggested its occupation along with Aqaba as having a possible
influence upon the Sherif in his communication of 1k June 1916; it
is a logical conclusion, therefore, that, at this point at least,
he envisaged an overland advance upon Aqaba, since Nekhl would be
the obvious half-way position in any march from the Suez Canal.
However, Sir Archibald rather quashed this idea by explaining that
it was not convenient for him to take Nekhl. 35 But the CIGS
was not to be denied so easily. On 28 June 1916 he still talked of
a 'general advance' on El Arish and Aqaba, but added a significant
suggestion - Murray was to consult the Royal Navy over the
occupation of El Arish. 6 If Nekhl were not to be occupied - and
Robertson made no mention of it again - naval assistance would be
required to get British troops to Aqaba. The occupation of this
town was starting to assume the appearance of a separate operation
all of its own, even if there were those in London who still
failed to grasp this important fact. 37 Murray, on the other hand,
believed that any attempt to seize Aqaba might develop into a
serious diversion from his desire to capture El Arish and thus
secure Egypt, as well as a strain on the limited resources of the
EEP, which could not be pulled two ways at once. But he was
35 Ibid.
36 CIGS to GOC in C Egypt 28 June 1916, WO 106/715.
37 'The Sherif of Mecca and the Arab movement.' General Staff.
1 July 1916, CAB k2/16/1. This memorandum talks of El Arish
and Aqaba as if they were joint operations.
3o
prepared to help the Arabs - and the calls for action of some sort
38had reached a shrill note early in July.
Murray did not waste time. He contacted Admiral Wemyss to
explain that he could get a force to Aqaba only by sea and that he
possessed very little information on the area; he therefore
requested a seaplane reconnaissance of the town so that adequate
maps could be produced from the resulting photographs. 39 The
flight proved that Aqaba was 'entirely undefendeê' at that time.k0
Meanwhile, Sir Archibald explained his thinking to Robertson: 'I
should like to put a small force there and to undertake a raid
against the Hejaz railway to destroy a vulnerable part of the
kiline.'	 His conception of the operation was along very limited
lines, therefore. But problems were soon to arise.
There were those who had argued for a British action at Aqaba
who did not see the operation as Murray did. Wingate in the Sudan,
for example, had expected a far larger force that could take Maan
as well and establish a permanent line of communications between
the two towns, since, in his opinion, using a small force could be
k2
risky.	 The element of risk related to British prestige; Wingate
feared that if a small force of about 200 men was defeated by the
enemy, the Sudan might be adversely affected - let alone what it
could do to the Arabs of the He3ak3 Murray now found himself
38 McMahon to F.0. 10 July 1916, CAB k2/16/5.
39 Murray to Vice-Admiral, C in C East Indies 1i . July 1916 and
GHQ to GOC No. 1 Section Canal Defences 25 July 1916, WO 95/k36k.
ti.0 W. Benn, In the side shows (London, 1 919), p.116.
tfl Murray to Robertson 1k July 1916, BM Add. MS 52k61.
i-2 Wingate to Clayton July 1916, Clayton papers '410/3/11.
143 Murray to Robertson 18 Aug. 19 16 , BM Add. Ms 521f61.
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British action at Aqaba. 14 It does not surprise us, therefore, to
find the following comment about the Aqaba scheme in the EEF War
Diary for August 191 : indefinitely postponed.'
Once more, this was not the end of the matter. Long after the
military had rejected the idea others continued to broach it. For
example, the India Office still expected action at Aqaba early in
September 1916•k9 Other powerful voices were also starting to be
raised in its favour: Sykes considered that Aqaba would make an
excellent base from which to contact the Arabs, and the French had
decided that they would be only too willing to see Murray in
position at Aqaba. 5° Even Murray himself resurrected the subject
when it suited him, tending to be somewhat ambiguous in his
comments. When it was clear the CIGS had lost interest in the
project Murray told him: 'I have never liked the idea of an
expedition to Aqaba.' 5 When he directly confronted the High
Commissioner in September, however, he changed his tune: 'I have
always been keen... on going to A ,aba', he claimed.52
Murray's apparently ambiguous stance on possible operations
at Aqaba was partly due to fresh developments in the Hejaz.
Attention now shifted to a town on the coast of the Heja called
Rabegh, 150 miles from Medina. The significance of this settlement
14.7 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 15 Sept. 1916 and Egyptforce to Arbur
18 July 1916, WO 158/60a. Official History, p.232 barely
mentions Aqaba in this connection and suggests it was solely
the Sherif's opposition that killed the scheme.
14-8 Summary for Aug. 1916, WO 95/14-365.
14.9 Note by A. HirtLel I Sept. 1916, L/P&S/10/600/3528.
50 War Committee meeting 1 Sept. 1916, CAB k2/19/1. Grey to Bertie
11 Sept. 1916, CAB k2/20/3.
51 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 15 Sept. 1916, op.cit.
52 Conference held Ismailia 12 Sept. 1916, WO 156/602.
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was its location, for it lay upon the most obvious route from
Medina to Mecca. Now this became of vital importance, because the
Turks were known tomassing troops at Medina with the intention of
advancing upon Mecca, Hussein's headquarters, and crushing the
Arab revolt. From now on, therefore, it seemed to many that what
was at stake ws not how best the British could assist or
encourage the Sherif, but whether the Sherif would survives Nor
were the Arabs coy about asking for help: they had already begun
to plead for troops to be sent to stiffen their forces in August;
but the whole issue erupted early in September.53
At a conference held at Murray's house in Ismailia on 12
September 1916 on the Sherif's current situation, the High
Commissioner said. he would drop the question of a landing at Aqaba
but, at the same time, he 'urgently insisted' that British troops
be despatched to Rabegh. ' Grey raised the issue at the War
Committee of 18 September, explaining to his colleagues that he
had received a telegram from McMahon advocating the sending of an
infantry brigade to the town from Egypt. The timing was unfortunate
for the CIGS since he had to admit that the Aqaba scheme was not
feasible at the meeting and that no brigade was available for
Rabegh, so that his attitude appeared almost totally negative.
Moreover, the members of the War Committee were concerned that the
Sherif might collapse if he were given no support at Rabegh. 55 Yet
53 McMahon to F.O. 31 Aug. 1916, CAB k2/19/1. The initial request
was for troops to be sent to Yenbo - a town to the north of
Rabegh and also on the coast of the Hejaz - but this soon fell
into the background.
5k Chief Egyptgorce to Chief London 12 Sept. 1916, WO 158/602.
55 War Committee meeting 18 Sept. 1916, CAB k2/20/3.
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there was considerable ignorance in London as to where Rabegh
actually lay: both Bonar Law and Asquith at successive War
Committee meetings asked if it was on the coast, while Henry
Wilson believed the town to be in the Yemen5
The issue was rapidly becoming a major area of concern for
the strategists in London, nevertheless, and fresh arguments both
for and against its execution were raised each time the matter was
discussed. For example, on 25 September 1916 Robertson claimed the
support of both Clayton and Sykes in his opposition to the venture,
while it now came to light that Rabegh did not cover all the
routes between Medina and Mecca - information which greatly
reduced its strategic significance. On the other hand, Austen
Chamberlain felt sure troops should be sent to Rabegh, and Paris
urged this action as well.57
The CIGS began to find himself under increased pressure in
October, and he complained to Lloyd George, now the Secretary of
State for War, that his position was being undermined at the War
Committee because the advice of subordinate commanders was to be
sought on the subject. 8 In a revealing letter to Haig, Robertson
confessed that 'great pressure' had been placed upon him to send
troops to the Hejaz and it waa' only with 'great difficulty' that
he had prevented this enterprise - at least for the present.59
Because of the strength of the opposition to Robertson's views
56 Ibid., and War Committee meeting 25 Sept. 1916, CAB k2/2O/6.
Henry Wilson Diary 21 Sept. 1916.
57 War Committee meeting 25 Sept. 1916, op.cit.
8 Robertson to Lloyd George 11 Oct. 1916, Robertson papers
T/19/7a.
59 Robertson to Haig 16 Oct. 1916, Robertson papers 1/22/83.
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in London on the subject he found himself having to rely heavily
upon the support of Murray in Egypt. Sir Archibald was absolutely
consistent in his opposition to the proposal because it could
mean reducing the number of troops available to him for his
advance on El Arish. He therefore did all he could to prevent the
landing, although he made sure an infantry brigade was prepared
in case all his efforts ultimately failed. Murray sought the
Sultan of Egypt's advice and, much to his personal satisfaction,
discovered that the Egyptian leader was not in favour of action
at Rabegh; the fact was soon communicated to the CIGS.60 He also
told Wingate that he opposed the landing and believed he was
supported in this by the India Office.61 Surprisingly he enjoyed a
certain degree of support from Wingate, who believed he understood
the C in C's attitude: 'Murray is naturally opposed to reducing
the troops at his disposal which, in his opinion, are inadequate
for his impending advance on El Arish, and I sympathise with him
to a certain extent.62 These are important words, for the Sirdar
was a strong advocate of action at Rabegh and support for the Arab
movement, yet he could recognize validity in Murray's position. It
follows, therefore, that there was considerable justice in
Robertson's stance in London even if precious few of the War
Committee could actually see this in September and October 1916.
Although the GIGS thought he had successfully managed to
60 Murray to Robertson 22 Sept. 1916, BM Add. MS 52k62.
61 Chief Egyptforce to Sirdar 1k Oct. 1916, WO 158/602.
62 Wingate to Wilson 12 Oct. 1916, Wingate papers lkl/3/k5.
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frustrate the Rabegh option he was not quite correct. Towards the
end of October Egypt received information that a Turkish attack on
41e
Mecca could be expected in about a month's tlme:Amatter was far
from dead. 6 Nor had Murray been correct in his evaluation of the
India Office's position, for at the end of October Austen
Chamberlain, the Secretary of State, noted that he and his Office
were in favour of a landing at Rabegh, although he admitted that
6k
whatever was done 'we take great risks either way.'	 Early in
November Lord Islington at the India Office urged Lloyd George to
press for an occupation of Pabegh, claiming the support of the
Military Secretary, General Barrow. 6 Moreover, a memorandum
written by Captain Bray, who had recently been at Rabegh,
advocated the occupation of the town by British troops in order to
66
save the revolt in the He3az. 	 This report had been addressed to
the India Office, but it was subsequently circulated to the War
Committee. So intense had debate about Rabegh become in London
that on 2 November 1916 Asquith suggested that the entire matter
had been exaggerated.6
A special conference was held, nevertheless, at the Foreign
Office on 11 November 1916. At the meeting the CIGS made it quite
clear that he wished to avoid the mistakes of the Dardanelles and
Mesopotamia campaigns ly
	
an operation with insufficient
63 Sirdar to Arbur 2k Oct. 1916, WO 158/602.
6k Note by Chamberlain 29 Oct. 1916, L/MIL/5/858.
65 Islington to Lloyd George 5 Nov. 1916, Lloyd George papers
E/2/8/1.
66 Report by Capt. Bray to Military Secretary, India Office. 8
Nov. 1916, CAB k2/2k/8. Bray later wrote about his experiences
in Arabia: see N. N. G. Bray, Shifting sands (London, 1935).
67 War Committee meeting 2 Nov. 1916, CAB k2/23/3.
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strength. He therefore refused to accept that a brigade could ever
be strong enough for such action. However, the various ministers
present stressed the 'disastrous consequences' of te Sherif's
collapse, explaining that these were far more amportant than any
68
suspension of the drive towards El Arish. As a result of this
conference Robertson found himself directed to produce a detailed
memorandum on the number of troops required for action at Rabegh.
After some discussion with his deputy, during which the CIGS
inflated the original estimate of troops necessary for the
campaign, Robertson produced a paper arguing that 15,000 British
soldiers would be needed, and that such a drain on the EEF must
render the El Arish operation impossible. 6
 As far as Lord Grey was
concerned it had now become a straight choice between the advance
to El Arish and supporting the Arabs at Rabegh. There was strong
support in the War Committee for El Arish, however, and the whole
businesa intensified interest in this most cherished of all
Murray's operations in London. The CIGS was requested to write yet
another paper - this time on El Arish.7°
Meanwhile, Murray took a hand in proceedings. Having received
a memorandum by a certain Captain T. E. Lawrence opposing despatch
of British troops to Rabegh he passed it on to London, encouraging
71the CIGS' to read it at once.	 This report was also circulated to
68 Note by Grey 11 Nov. 1916, CAB k2/2k/8.
69 Notes by Robertson on draft of memorandum, Robertson papers
1/25/la . Despatch of an Expeditionary Force to Rabegh by CIGS
13 Nov. 1916, CAB k2/2k/8.
70 War Committee meeting 16 Nov. 1916, CAB k2/214/8.
71 Report from Capt. Lawrence of Intelligence Staff, Cairo 17
Nov. 1916, WO 106/1511. Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 17
Nov. 1916, WO 158/627.
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the War Committee, where, according to Robertson, it made a 'great
impression." In his enthusiasm to provide the CIGS with
additional ammunition with which to oppose action at Rabegh,
however, Murray had acted somewhat precipitately. Although he told
Wingate, with whom he was supposed to be co-ordinating action on
behalf of the Arabs, that he thought he ought to inform London of
the contents of this most recent paper, he did not wait for a
reply before sending it, nor did he confirm that he had done
When Wingate's response advised against transmitting the report it
7k
was therefore too late. 	 The first Wingate learnt of these events
was when the Foreign Office asked him for his opinion on Lawrence's
report; he had to telegraph Murray requesting to see its contents.75
The War Committee, realizing what had happened, instructed
Robertson to rebuke Muiray for 'lack of co-ordination' because the
Sirdar had not seen the original teiegram. 6 The C in C was stung
by this complaint and excused himself by stating that since
Lawrence had 'just come to me after spending several days with the
Sirdar I naturally understood he was fully in possession of
Lawrence's news. In fact Lawrence informed me to this effect.'77
Officially, Wingate maintained silence about the affair, but
privately he was upset by a 'want of straightness on the part of
certain people who should be above that sort of thing' and would
72 Robertson to Murray 8 Dec. 1916, Robertson papers I/lk/53.
73 Chief Egyptforce to Sirdar 17 Nov. 1916, WO 158/627.
7k Sirdar, Khartoum to Chief Egyptforce 18 Nov. 1916, WO 158/627.
This telegram was not deciphered until 19 Nov.
75 F.O. to Sirdar 20 Nov. 1916, FO 371/2776/80053.
76 Chief London to Chief Egyptforce 22 Nov. 1916, WO 158/60k.
77 Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 3 Nov. 1916, WO 158/60k.
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not have been convinced if he had seen Murray's explanation, for
he was quite sure why this had all taken place:
The whole point of this little 'storm in a teacup'
was evidently an attempt to get out of any
responsibility for sending troops to the Hejaz and
basing it on L's views that the landing of
Christian troops in any numbers at Rabegh would at
once cause Feisal's Arabs to throw in their hands
and return to their homes. 78
But all Murray's efforts could not prevent the new War
Cabinet deciding on 9 December 1916, after a discussion of
'considerable length', to order Sir Archibald to prepare a brigade
for Rabegh. 79 The C in C had anticipated this and admitted to
Lynden-Be1L only two days earlier that they ought to be ready to
lose one or two brigades.80 On 15 December it was reported at the
War Cabinet that the Sherif had officially requested a brigade be
81
made ready at Port Said or SueL for despatch to Rabegh. London
82
greeted this definite decision with some relief.	 It saved the
British from more embarrassment than they had anticipated, for the
French had offered some of their Senegalese troops if Murray
refused point blank to send any men. As these soldiers were fetish
worshippers te/ were considered to be 'even more repugnant' to the
Arabs than any Christian troops would be near to the holy places of
83Islam.
On k January 1917 the new High Commissioner in Egypt, Wingate,
78 Wingate to Wilson 23 Nov. 1916, Wingate papers 1k3/6/52.
79 War Cabinet meeting 9 Dec. 1916, CAB 23/1.
80 Note for CGS by Murray 7 Dec. 1916, WO 158/627.
81 War Cabinet meeting 15 Dec. 1916, CAB 23/1.
82 Chamberlain to Curzon 16 Dec. 1916, MSS Eur F 112/116.
83 Minute by Clark 15 Dec. 1916, P0 371/2776/2536kk.
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received what appeared to be a request from the Sherif for troops
8kto be sent to Rabegh at once. Murray afterwards contacted the
CIGS asking for his aaction while recording his own objection to
the decision which would, he claimed, have 'an unfortunate effect
on my own operations now progressing so weii.' 8 He also wrote to
Wingate telling him what a 'blow' this most recent news had been
86to him.	 The comment in his diary, short and to the point as
always, reveals the extent of the C in C's anger: 'much annoyed.'8
Events now took an unexpected turn. Colonel Wilson, organizing
British assistance to the Arabs in the Hejaz, warned Cairo not to
send' any troops simply on the strength of one telephone call
(which was all the message of 4 January 1917 had been) but to wait
until the Sherif had presented a formal request in writing. 88 On
the strength of this telegram Wingate decided to delay despatch of
the troops for a day in the hope that confirmation would be duly
received from the Sherif. 8 Meanwhile, Murray was informed by the
CIGS that the War Cabinet had decided not to allow the troops to
be sent unless a formal request from Hussein reached the British.90
As it never arrived the entire affair came to an end, for the
Sherif finally admitted he did not want any troops landed in the
Hejaz at present. 91 According to the India Office Murray had
84 Pearson, Jeddah to Arbur for Sir R. Wingate, Cairo 4 Jan. 1917,
WO 158/627.
8 Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 5 Jan. 1917, WO 158/627.
86 Murray to Wingate 5 Jan. 1917, WO 158/627.
87 Murray Diary 5 Jan. 1917.
88 Wilson, Jeddah to Arbur, Cairo 7 Jan. 1917, WO. 158/627.
89 Wingate to Murray 8 Jan. 1917, WO 158/627.
90 Chief London to Chief Egyptforce 8 Jan. 1917, WO 158/627.
91 Wingate to P.O. 12 Jan. 1917, WC 158/627.
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prevented London from becoming embroiled in a very messy business:
But for the fact that Sir Archibald Murray was
sufficiently obstinate not to move without
confirmation from the W.O., H.M.G. would not
have known that this 'formal application' was
nothing more than a telephone message in which
the whole responsibility was thrown on usL 9a
The C in C's attitude had been vindicated, therefore, for he had
actually suggested to Wingate on 5 January 1917 that the Sherif
would be more: or less 'obliged' to accept this assistance because
of the way in which the British authorities had handled the
matter. 93 Moreover, the value of the EEF's operations in Sinai to
the Arabs had finally been proven beyond a doubt, for the success'
at Rafah apparently caused the Turks to withdraw their advanced
positions past Medina, and with them both the threat to Mecca and
the need for action at Rabegh.9k From now on Murray's advances in
Syria stopped any further Turkish moves towards Mecca, and the
Rabegh question was resolved.
THE EEF AND DIRECT SUPPORT FOR THE SHERIF AFTER JUNE 1916
The outbreak of the Sherif's revolt did not merely place an
additional strain upon Murray's strategic designs in the Sinai; it
also created a considerable degree of administrative confusion in
Egypt that, in turn, caused not a little tension between the
various' authorities both inside and outside the country involved
in the affairs of the revolt. And yet the C in C's initial
/
response to events in the Hejaz early in June was most positive.
92 Note by Hirtzel 15 Jan. 1917, L/P&Z/11/116/2k3.
93 Murray to Wingate, op.cit.
9k Wingate to F.O. 2k Jan. 1917, L/P&S/11/118/585.
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He instructed his staff to ensure that 'every possible assistance
is to be given to the Sherif' and at the end. of June he could
claim 'so far every demand... has been complied. with in full by the
Army - at once.' 95 These demands consisted largely of requests for
arms and ammunition; but Murray's interest extended beyond this
even in these early days of the revolt. He actually offered to
undertake the military supervision of affairs in the HejaE,
although this suggestion was rejected by the War Office because
there were so many different interests involved in the Arab move-
ment. Sir Archibald's motive for this suggestion was his well-
founded fear of administrative chaos, as he explained to Wingate:
'I foresee that these operations may be long, costly, and will
increase demands on us... I think some controlling organisation
must be set up so as to keep the threads together and to avoid.
friction.' 6 In fact, a logical system of control was desperately
needed, for the High Commissioner, the Foreign Office, the Sirdar,
Murray, the new Arab Bureau, the War Office and the India Office
were all wrapped up in this affair. So confusing was the situation
that Mark Sykes felt that, with the possible exception of the
ancient Polish constitution, the system of command in Arabia was
the most complicated ever producedl97
At first McMahon seemed to believe that Hussein ought to be
left to run his own campaign apart from the odd piece of advice
from himself every so often about general lines of action. 8 The
95 W.D. Intelligence Section EEF 10 and 30 June 1916, WO 157/705.
96 Chief Egyptforce to Sirdar 25 June 1916, WO 158/602.
97 Appreciation of attached Arabian Report No. XIV by Sykes
15 Oct. 1916, CAB 17/177,
98 McMahon to Murray 20 June 1916, FO lkl/738/3818.
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High Commissioner was no doubt thinking in terms of the negotiations
b bad been conducting with the Sherif before June; however the
situation had now altered, and after discussion with Murray he
seemed to grasp this, for he and the C in now recommended that
Wingate in the Sudan ought to organize 'the general direction of
military matters connected with our assistance to the Sherif.'99
Ultimately Wingate did take over this sade of the revolt, but only
after a delay and some confusion, as a letter from him to Murray
in the middle of August indicates: 'I am sonewhat surprised to
learn from your letter that the operations in, and arrangements
for, the Hejaz are in no way under your direction. As you are
100
aware, they are not under mine either.' 	 Such confusion led to
administrative friction in Egypt. Murray discovered that members
of his own Intelligence Department had become involved in the
supervision of operations in the Hejaz without his knowledge. The
entire incident may have been caused by a misunderstanding, but it
101
annoyed the C in C.	 Bad feeling resulted, which Murray took
steps to prevent recurring by warning his staff not to assist the
Arab Bureau; this instruction was later modified, however, so that
Lieutenant T. E. Lawrence could help the Bureau 'in all but where
action is necessary' while Hogarth was given permission to consult
102
the EEF's Intelligence Department.
The impression that Sir Archibald was hostile towards the
Arab Bureau, and therefore to the revolt itself, seemed to be
further confirmed in the minds of some by his behaviour during a
99 High Commissioner to Sirdar 28 June 1916, WO 158/602.
100 Wingate to Murray 10 Aug. 1916, Wingate papers 139/2/102.
101 McMahon to Murray 20 June 1916, FO lkl/738/3818.
102 Parker to Wingate 6 July 1916, Wingate papers 138/3/69.
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conference at his house on 12 September 1916. At this meeting the
C in C adopted a firm line, refusing to countenance the sending of
a British force to Rabegh; unfortunately, while doing so he force-.
fully criticized the Sirdar's representative with Hussein, Colonel
Wilson, whose telegram, he claimed, demonstrated 'a want of
103
military knowledge.'	 Wilson was deeply hurt, and later told
Wingate that the C in C had behaved in 'a damned caddish manner'
and that there had been 'a very considerable lot of mud slung at
me.10k Wingate's temperate reply expressed some sympathy for Sir
Archibald's position: 'I dare say both Murray and Robertson could
criticize with perfect justice a good many of our military actions
and conclusions.' He also realized that behind the outburst lay a
clash between the C in C and the High Commissioner, and not simply
hostility to Arab operations. 10' The belief that Murray was opposed
to the Arab Bureau and its works was consequently quite false for
by November Clayton was describing him as 'entirely sympathetic'
to the Bureau itself, and explained that the division between this
new body and the Intelligence Department 'was bound to lead to
small difficulties at first, but these are I hope over and done
106
with.'
The earliest problems the British experienced with Hussein
were largely due to the latter's overconfidence and ambition. He
wanted, it seemed, to form a regular army and invade Syria as soon
as possible. 107 McMahon thought this foolish, fearing the Sherif
103 Conference held at Ismailia 12 Sept. 1916, WO 158/602.
10k Wilson to Wingate 20 Sept. 1916, Wingate papers lkO/5/32.
105 Wingate to Wilson 29 Sept. 1916, Wingate papers iko/8/ioi.
i06 Clayton to Wingate 27 Nov. 1916, Wingate papers 1k3/6/88.




might spread his forces over too wide an area. 	 But the
motivation behind this prudent advice was not purely military: the
British also feared that an invasion of Syria by Heja Arabs could
lead to 'serious complications' with the French, for whom Hussein
109
had little love.	 In fact, a French military mission to the
Hejaz arrived in Egypt in September under a Colonel Br6mond. and
Murray explained to the CIGS that he feared 'politically we shall
have to eventually pay a very high price' for all material
assistance given to the Arabs by Paris.° The British remained
suspicious of French intentions in the He3az and believed that
they did not want Hussein to do too well in case this precipitated
a revolt in Syria and so render France's claims in that region
harder to enforce. 1 Murray, who was remarkably astute politically
for a general, knew of these French designs and did not hesitate
112
to pass on his knowledge to Robertson in London.
The Sherif's ambitions had little chance of ever becoming
realities in the summer of 1916 since there was no possibility of
direct support from the EEF during these months. This very fact
tended to make GHQ believe that a mistake had been made; Hussein
had been encouraged to act too early, they felt, before serious
operations in the Sinai could be executed to assist him. 113 The
belief that events in the Heja might become a fiasco into which
the EEF would be drawn influenced Murray, as did the very actions
of the Arabs themselves. The C in C tended to be scathing in his
108 McMahon to Murray 20 June 1916, op.cit.
109 Arbur to Sudan 6 July 1916, wingate papers 138/3/60.
110 Chief Egypt to CIGS 6 Sept. 1916, FO 371/2779/178902.
111 Col. Wilson to Wingate 10 Feb. 1917, FO 371/30'1-'f/'f085.
112 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 5 Feb. 1917, WO 33/905.
113 Parker to Wingate 6 July 1916, op.cit.
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opinion of Hussein himself, accusing him of having 'muddled the
business' and ridiculing his request for aircraft since he clearly
ilk
understood nothing about them.	 Moreover, although he was lavish
in his supply of munitions to the Sherif, by October he did not
feel he had gained much by this: 'What the Arabs do with the small
arms ammunition passes my knowledge. They have had about twenty
million rounds and I don't suppose have killed or wounded 2,000
Turks and now they ask for many millions more.' 115 Nonetheless, he
saw value in these muddled operations in Arabia and he was prepared
to admit that he would pay the Sherif £10,000 a month just to keep
the Hejaz rail north of Medina cut; he even offered to supply
116
explosives and train men to make all of this possible. 	 His
desire to keep this vital line of communication closed reflected
his concern about the activities of the Turkish Hejaz Expeditionary
Force at Medina, which the Arabs had been unable to take despite
the capture of Mecca. There were thought to be as many as 15,000
enemy troops in the Hejaz: if they decided to evacuate Arabia they
could create problems on Murray's right flank as he advanced to El
Arish and beyond. To tie these troops to the Hejaz was all that
GHQ implicitly asked of Hussein in the early months of the revolt.
As the EEF's operations towards El Arish began to develop,
however, so rekindled enthusiasm for Hussein and his prospects
started to emerge in British military military circles as the
possibility of direct co-operation between the EEF and the Arabs
seemed likely. Early in October Sykes communicated his hopes to
ilk Murray to Robertson 1 Sept. 1916, Robertson papers I/32/k7.
115 Murray to Wingate 18 Oct. 1916, Wingate papers lkl/k/2k.
ii6 Ibid.
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the War Office; he argued that if a serious offensive into Syria
were begun by the EEF in the winter of 1916-1917 and managed to
contain the bulk of the Ottoman forces, then attempts could be made
to arm and raise in revolt the Syrian Arabs, such as Nun Shalaan,
the Druse and the Maronites. 7 Robertson, apparently encouraged
by Sykes' views and Murray's advances in the Sinai, wrote to Grey
suggesting that once the EEF reached El Arish the time would be 'a
favourable moment for raising the various elements in Syria who
are discontented with Turkish rule.' He also suggested that since
this would involve some action in the French sphere of influence
Paris ought to be informed to see if she would be prepared to
help.h18 Paris agreed to do so, but added that the time was not
ripe for such action and that the Allies ought to concentrate
their efforts e1sewhere. 9 Sykes was not to be frustrated by such
a lukewarm response; he now estimated precise numbers of
'disaffected armed bodies' in Syria including 22,000 Druse, 12,000
Maronites and 25,000 Anazeh tribesmen led by Nun Shalaan. He
argued that these men would act if Sir Archibald delivered a
120powerful blow at the enemy.
This fresh enthusiasm for a revolt in Syria had partly been
engendered by new reports that, like the Sherif, Nun Shalaan had
openly revolted. Because false stories of this chief's decision to
117 Sykes to Director Military Operations, w.o.k Oct. 1916,
Sykes papers.
118 Robertson to Grey 5 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2775/199608.
119 Note from French Ambassador 11 Oct. 1916, CAB k2/21/5.
120 Memorandum on the French reply of 5 Oct. 1916 regarding co-
operation in Syra, by Sykes i8 Oct. 1916, CAB k2/22/3.
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rebel had circulated before in Egypt, the Arab Bureau was sceptical
about these most recent reports in early November. 121 News of
Druse unrest was also available, but separate information tended
to suggest that these tribesmen had in fact been terrorised by the
Turks. 122 What Cairo was picking up, in fact, was evidence of 'an
anarchical state of affairs' in eastern Syria as Arabs and Druse
continued their prewar habit of attacking isolated Turkish posts;
there was 'no organized rebellion on a large scale.' 123 In the
Hejaz, however, Feisa]. seems to have been impressed by this news,
as he was reported to entertain ambitions to contact Nun Shalaan
and move into syria.12k
In London, meanwhile, as the next step to be followed by the
EEF beyond El Arish came under scrutiny early in December the
support of disaffected elements in Syria became an important aspect
of planning for any future advance into Palestine. The planners at
the War Office knew that taking El Arish itself would have little
effect in Syria; what was needed was an advance to the Jaffa-
Jerusalem-Jericho line, from where contact could be established
with Bedouin around Amman and Es Salt and Nun Shalaan so that a
125general rebellion could be raised in the region. 	 Robertson was
also impressed with the possibility of an uprising in Syria, but
121 Note on Nun Shalaan by Arab Bureau 6 Nov. 1916, WO 138/603.
122 Appreciation of attached Arabian Report 8 Nov. 1916 by Sykes,
CAB 17/177. Report of an inhabitant of Athlit, Syria 1 Nov.
1916, L/MIL/5/735.
123 W.D. Intelligence Section EEF 17 and 21 Nov. 1916, WO 157/710.
12k Notes on the military situation by Lt.-Col. Wilson k Nov.
1916, WO 158/60k.
125 Memorandum on El Arish operations 10 Dec. 1916, wO 106/715.
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he remained realistic as to its extent and strength:
There is good reason to believe that the population
in Syria will be willing enough to rise against the
Turks, but we could not rely on their assuming active
hostilities until they were in a position to receive
direct support from us. They will probably rise
behind us and not in front of us. 126
As the CIGS outlined the chance of an offensive towards Jerusalem
he probably better than anybody else calculated the true strength
and capabilities of anti-Turkish feeling in Syria. The War Office
also believed that Arab co-operation could help Murray by reducing
the number of units he would need to hold back from the front line
to cover his lines of communication.127
Enthusiasm for co-operation with Arabs and. the other peoples
of Syria also influenced the EEF in December. Murray informed the
GIGS that he thought the Syrians might rise if he reached
128
Beersheba as a result of action beyond El Arish. 	 Eastern Force
HQ was also interested in any Arab response to their actions after
the occupation of El Arish and it seems that the cavalry raids at
Magdhaba and 1afah were designed partly to make an impression upon
129the Arabs of southern Syria.
Murray's attitude to all these events is interesting and
worthy of some note. His opinion of the military value of the
Sherif's forces remained unflattering; he explained to the GIGS:
'it is not probable if the Arabs are worth anything as soldiers,
126 Note on a proposal to undertake a campaign in Palestine during
the winter months with the object of capturing Jeruealem, by
CIGS 29 Dec. 1916, WO 106/715.
127 Note on proposed operations on the Eastern Frontier of Egypt
12 Dec. 1916, WO 106/715.
128 Murray to GIGS 10 Dec. 1916, WO 106/715.
129 Dawnay to GOC Desert Column 18 Dec. 1916, WO 95/kkk9.
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which, except for the purposes of guerilla warfare, I confess,
130
seems doubtful.' 	 His was, in fact, an accurate assessment of
Hussein's men, who were quite incapable of facing a trained enemy
in open warfare; this shortcoming was reflected in their inability
to capture Medina and their lack of belief in their capacity to
defend Mecca without possible British support at Rabegh. If
contact could be established, however, the C in C saw real
possibilities in co-operation with the Arabs of eastern Syria. In
November, therefore, as news of Nun Shalaan's supposed uprising
reached GHQ he made a most imaginative suggestion. In a telegram
to the CIGS he recommended establishing temporary air strips in
the Arab chief's territory so that 'heavy weight carrying machines'
could strike at the Heja railway nearby in conjunction with local
Arab levies organized by British officers. 131 It was decided that
the best location for a landing site was at Jauf, east of Maan,
from which strip aircraft could control a vast stretch of country
even as far as Aleppo, with the possibility of making aerial
contact with the British forces in Mesopotamia. 132 As Cairo had no
idea where Nun Shalaan actually was the Sherif had to be asked
for information of the nomad's location. 133 Meanwhile, the French
had got wind of the scheme after Grey asked if they would object
to operations in Nun Shalaan's territory. Murray was somewhat
bemused, therefore, when the French Military Attache in Egypt
asked to see him and offered to help his operation with planes,
130 Murray to Robertson 12 Dec. 1916, Robertson papers i/ik/60.
131 GOC in C Egypt to CIGS 8 Nov. 1916, WO 33/905.
132 Note by Clayton 11 Nov. 1916, wo 158/626.
133 Arbur to Wingate 8 Nob. 1916, WO 158/603.
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arms and subsidles.13k There were more serious complications than
this to contend with. The EEF remained desperately short of planes
and was unlikely to obtain the twelve heavy bombers that the C in C
had requested from the CIGS, for the demands of France were sure to
receive precedence in such matters. Moreover, as it turned out, the
tribes around Jauf were actually still pro-Turk, a fact which made
it difficult to contact Nun Shalaan via the Sherif, let alone get
135the necessary equipment to him from there, as had been proposed.
Ultimately the entire scheme simply depended on too many
imponderables, and came to nothing. It remains of importance,
however, because of the evidence it affords of Murray's enthusiasm
for any co-operation with the Arabs that could provide direct
assistance to his forces in the Snai and Syria. Indeed, this always
remained the C in C's basic attitude: he would supply all he could
in the way of equipment to the He3az, but ifwere able to foster
Arab action on his forces' right flank then he was prepared to act
himself. The Jauf scheme did not disappear entirely; it re-emerged
in the form of a plan to establish a landing-strip at Aqaba in
136
January 1917.
In spite of this less than encouraging experience, Murray was
still confident about Arab support, especially when the agreed
winter offensive by the EEF finally began, as he informed the CIGS
in February:
It is not at all unlikely that if the war should
13k Chief Egyptforce to Chief London 12 Nov. 1916, WO 95/k366.
135 Note by A. Hirtzel 11 May 1917, L/P&S/11/123/20k6.
136 Wingate to Murray 22 Jan. 1917, Wingate papers 1k5/1/61.
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continue after the autumn that the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, with the Arabs working
in conjunction, will surely sweep the Turks
right out of Palestine and thus threaten their
communications with Mesopotamia. 137
In the meantime h4oPed that as he began his advance into Syria
this would assist the Hejaz Arabs, so that 'I may yet see them in
force in the neighbourhood of Maan - an additional security to
southern Slnai.h138 The C in C, therefore, was coaxing the Arabs
forward gradually in the hope that even the Sherif's men might
soon be able to assist him directly. In Egypt at the same time
steps were taken to establish an Intelligence service in Syria
139
with its base at Kerak. 	 However, events in Syria were soon to
overtake these plans, for the first battle at Gaza and then the
complete failure at the same place in April meant that the question
of Arab support rather fell into the background from the end of
March until the end of April, at least as far as the EEl' was
concerned. Nevertheless, on 11 March 1917 Murray informed Robertson
that he hoped to get to the Gaza-Beersheba line as soon as he could
in order to raise the southern Syrians and also help the Sherif.
This seemed of added importance at the time, because there had been
reports that the Turks intended to evacuate Medina and return to
Syria with 12,000 men; if Hussein could be encouraged, therefore,
the C in C hoped he would prevent this move through attacks upon
the Hejaz raiiway.140 No such move was made by the Turks at Medina,
however, so that the Sherif had proved his worth by tying these
troops to the Heja.
137 Murray to Robertson 11 Feb. 1917, BM Add. MS 521462.
138 Murray to Robertson 26 Feb. 1917, BM Add. MS 521462.
139 W.U. Intelligence Department, Cairo HQ 8, 9, 17, 23 and 2k
Feb. 1917, WO 157/712.
114.0 Murray to Robertson 11 Mar. 1917, BM Add. MS 521462.
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PLANNING TO SEIZE SYRIA BY ARAB ACTION AFTER THE SECOND BATTLE OF
GAZA
The second defeat at Gaza was in many ways a turning-point as
far as the EEF's policy towards the various Arab tribes was concerned.
Prior to it attention had been centred to a great extent, as we
have already noticed, upon the varied population of Syria behind
the enemy lines, which, it was hoped, would assist any British
advance. The conclusive failure at Gaza, however, forced an urgent
reappraisal of this strategy. It was realized that the Arabs of
western Palestine were now less likely to think highly of British
military prowess and correspondingly more open to Turkish propaganda
and overtures of assistance.1 1
Mark Sykes appreciated this altered situation. He argued that
if the EEF's policy was no longer to operate on a grand offensive
scale then all projects involving Arab activities in Syria had to
be dropped. He feared that the Turks might turn on the people of
Syria thus making Great Britain 'morally responsible' for any
massacres that might eventuate, since he - and others - had
deliberately sought to foment unrest there.1L42 Nevertheless, Sykes
had not capituited his tactics changed to meet fresh realities.
Since the populations of urban Syria were vulnerable, British
attention would now return solely to those groups who were 'strong
enough to and by themselves', i.e. the Arabs in the He3az,
already in revolt, of course; the Druse in the Hauran mountains;
and the nomadic tribes of the Syrian desert, largely under the
1 1+1 Australian Official History, p.359.
12 Sykes to F.O. 2k Apr. 1917, P0 371/3052/8k226.
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1k3influence of Nun Sbalaan. 	 Efforts would be made from now on,
therefore, to use these three groupings against the Turks even
without a substantial offensive from the EEF.
Prince Feisal, commander of Hussein's northern army in the
Heja, had for some time harboured desires to march north into
Syria to liberate Damascus for the Arabs. Although certain of his
British advisers had sought to confine him to 'local ambitions' he
I 1Fkhad nevertheless 'from somewhere... developdd very wide ideas.'
Feisal was encouraged by the deputations he was receiving from the
tribes to the north who promised him allegiance and support. During
March the British had been coo]. about such ideas because of their
fears of a Turkish evacuation of Medina. By the end of April,
however, it became clear that this danger was recedlng.1k5 A plan
began to crystallise, therefore, by which the Hejaz railway could
be disabled and, at the same time, a serious move into Syria
attempted.
Feisal's initial ideas were two: first, to move north up the
Hejaz railway with the ultimate aim of taking Maan and using Aqaba
as a base; or, secondly, to send a small force into the Druse
mountains, from which point - with Druse support and that of the
Syrian nomads to the east - he could attack the railway between
i'+6
Damascus and Maan.	 Although it was made clear to Feisal that
1k3 Ibid.
ikk Capt. Joyce to Col. Wilson 1 Apr. 1917, TO 886/6. It would
seem quite likely that a certain T. E. Lawrence may well have
been responsible for these 'very wide ideas's
1k5 Clayton to DM1 London 28 Apr. 1917, TO 882/6/11735k.
ik6 Note on information received from Col. Newcombe by Clayton
5 Apr. 1917, WO 158/606.
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'the business which is already in hand' - the defeat of the Turks
in the Hejaz - should take first place, his plan was not dismissed.hhl7
It gradually developed into a grand strategic enterprise for the
entire Hejaz campaign: Hussein's various Arab armies were all to
cut the Heja railway once and for all, so it was hoped, totally
isolating Fakri Pasha and hi Turkish forces at Medina from Syria.
Feisal's role in this plan would be to capture El Ula, while
Sheikh Auda Abu Tiyeh of the eastern Howeitat and Captain Lawrence
were to start for the area east of Maan in order to capture that
town and Aqaba. Only when El Ula was secure and Medina captured
ik8
would Feisal himself move north.	 The British hoped for much
from this 'ambitious plan': 'If the plan of operations outlined...
materialises, it should prove of considerable assistance to the
1k9
British Army in Palestine.'
The plan received support in Egypt, as well. At a meeting in
Cairo on 12 May 1917 Wilson argued that 'Feisal should now be
encouraged to proceed to Hama and instigate raids... in the
neighbourhood of the Turkish lines of communication as far north
as possible'; he even suggested that these plans be 'hurried
forward' irrespective of the planned operations in the Heja
150
designed to isolate and capture Medina. 	 Since any activities by
Feisal in the Maan, Deraa or Hama area would fall into the EEF's
domain the conference decided to seek General Murray's support.
1 1f7 Ibid.
ik8 Note on the proposed military plan of operations of the Arab
armies by Lt.-Col. Wilson I May 1917, P0 882/6/11735k . A date
was even set for this operation - 18 May - although Wilson
was somewhat sceptical about forces being ready by then.
1k9 Ibid.
150 Note of a meeting at the Residency, Cairo, on 12 May 1917,
Wingate papers 1k5/6/61.
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Murray's reaction could not have been more favourable: he had,
after all, been considering how to use the Arabs in conjunction
with his forces in this very region in 1916 and 1917. He was
therefore rather surprised that it might be thought that he would
not approve: 'Of course I approve of this action,' he wrote,' 'It
was my suggestion.' 151 In a letter to Lord Hardinge commenting on
the affair, Wingate correctly described Murray's thinking on the
subject:
Sir A. Murray is in entire concurrence with this
policy which will, I think, prove helpful to him
now that his forces are hung up indefinitely opposite
Gaza where there is no doubt the Turks are collecting
considerable reinforcements. 152
Although the starting date for the general offensive in the
Hejaz passed without any action, by June there was still a good
deal of optimism that the Arabs could really achieve something
which might be of tangible benefit to the EEF. For example,
intelligence sources suggested that only a railway battalion
covered the line between Damascus and Maan, rendering it vulnerable
to any attack. It was also reported that there were up to 10,000
deserters from the Turkish army hiding in the Jebel Druse area and
at Nablus waiting to be organized, armed and led against the
Turks. 153 With information as encouraging as this flooding into
Egypt plans for Arab operations became still more grandiose. It
was now suggested that Feisal and a few hundred trained Arabs
should 'start the Revolt in Syria' from the vicinity of the Jebel
15 1 Note by Murray 1k May 191? and Note for CS by Lloyd on the
conference 12 May 1917, WO 158/606.
152 Wingate to Hardinge 15 May 1917, Wingate papers 1k5/6/70.




These plan had their critics, however. Clayton pointed out
that if Peisal wished for a secure line of communications between
himself and his small force to be maintained while he was in
position then the scheme was unworkable, since any supply route
from El Arish could not be kept open, while the security of Aqaba
as a supply-base could not be guaranteed either, even if the Arabs
proved capable of capturing it in the first place. Any move north
by Feisal, consequently, would be 'in the nature of a gamble' and
Clayton felt it best for the Prince to wait until his position was
155
more secure.	 It was now suggested that Feisal's base for
operations against eastern Syria should be Tad.mur, a position that
could be supplied by British forces in Mesopotam].a.156 Supplies
could be sent to Tadmur in advance of Feisal's arrival so that
operations could then commence immediately, while the presence of
one of Hussein's eons might encourage some o± the Mesopotamian
tribes in the vicinity to adopt a more openly hostile attitude to
the Turks.157
This attempt to use the British position in Mesopotamia in
order to assist the activities of Emir Feisa]. reflected a policy
towards the Arabian people by the military in Egypt that was
remarkably broad in its conceptions. Moreover, when it came to
stimulating Arabian untest the British engaged in a level of co-
operation between their forces in Palestine and Mesopotamia that
was significantly superior to that of almost any other sphere of
15k Proposed operations in Syria by Col. Wilson 17 June 1916,
ro 882/16.
155 Clayton to High Commissioner 30 May 1917, FO 882/6.
156 Proposed operations in Syria by Wilson 21 June 1917, FO 882/16.
157 Note on Turkish forces in Hejaz 26 June 1917, FO 882/6.
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operations. At the conference of 12 May 1917 a point had. been made
of the need for greater co-operation between Egypt and Mesopotamia,
while an officer from General Maude's forces - Colonel Leachman -
was actually present at the meeting. In one sense close co-operation
was inevitable, for the British had contacts with tribes whose
boundaries were by no means fixed and who were sometimes mutually
hostile. If Murray or Maude wanted an Arab operation their krab
experts might first have to settle existing territorial disputes
between tribes. Precisely this happened on 12 May 1917, for
Leachman feared that the Sherif might instigate Nun Shalaan to
seize Hail and so antagonize Ibn Saud, thus dividing Britain's two
158
most powerful tribal allies, Hussein and Ibn Saud.
Another reason for the surprisingly close co-operation
between the EEF and Maude was a matter of geography. In some cases
it was simply easier to contact the tribes to the east of Syria from
Mesopotaniia, especially as the British continued to advance up the
Tigris and Euphrates and drew ever closer to northern Syria. The
fall of Baghdad and Felujah opened up the eastern routes to
Palestine and so represented, potentially, a source of threat to
the Turkish left flank in Syria. For the British Nun Shalaan's
importanQe grew, therefore, for his tribe covered this area and was
considered of some significance: 'These Arabs are amongst the best
Bedouins there are; all they want are arms, thnmunition, and money,
to be really useful.' 159 It was quite conceivable, therefore, that
a camel force of British troops operating from the Euphrates line
might co-operate with these tribesmen - strengthened by European
i38 Note of a meeting at the Residency, op.cit.
159 'Palestine: geographical and political' by Ormsby-Gore.
1 Apr. 1917, CAB 21/15.
415
equipment - in 'well timed' attacks upon the Hama to Maan
160
region.
Of particular importance in this whole issue was the contrast
between the attitudes of the two General Staffs towards Arab
operations and their relative successes or otherwise. The EEF had
helped to foster the .Arab revolt, which was containing an entire
Turkish army and looked as if it might now finally start to 'spill
over' into Syria. Maude and his officers, on the other hand, had
experienced no real success whatsoever in their contacts with
Arabs. Mark Sykes was concerned by this apparent discrepancy in
the relative successes of the two commands; he felt Maude was
'unaware of scope of Arab movement' and should be urged on in this
161
area by London.	 What actually took place next was carefully
monitored by the India Office: 'Quite recently the War Office,
acting on a hint from Sir Mark Sykes, have telegraphed to Sir
Stanley Maude urging the importance of getting into close
relations with the outlying trlbes.162 Maude therefore received a
telegram direct from the CIGS on the subject.
Robertson's actual telegram was remarkable, for it reflected
the successes of the EEF: he told Maude that the Arab movement
'has been of distinct military advantage in the past', but might
cease to be so in the future if he 'marked time' in his contacts
with the various tribes. Maude was instructed, therefore, to
outline 'proposed action' to enlist the sympathies of the Arabs
north of and adjacent to the Euphrates, and to extend 'the scope
6O Ibid.
161 Wingate to P.O. 12 May 1917, L/P&S/11/119/735.
162 Note by J.E.S. 18 May 1917, L/P&S/11/123/20k6.
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of the whole movement.'
Maude's reply was none too enthusiastic; he was not sure
exactly what was expected of him and wanted the CIGS to clarify
16kthe matter.	 Behind Maude's questions lay concern that if he
ws'('
propelled the Arabs into action not onlythe Turks suffer, but the
whole country, which he had desperately been trying to pacify,
165
might erupts	 No doubt much to Maude's chagrin, Robertson's next
telegram remained uncompromising in its demands; in fact, the CIGS
made his views clearer and the influence of the EEF's experience
more obvious:
The Arabs of the Hejaz assisted by us... are engaged
in raiding with success the Turkish communications
via the Heja railway and it has been represented
that the Arabs might... be induced to take similar
action along the Euphrates thus hampering the
operations of the Turks in Mesopotamia. 166
Finally, as June was drawing to a close, Maude telegraphed
his proposals and thoughts on the subject to the CIGS. Maude's
plans largely depended upon the Arab chief, Fahad Bag Ibn Hadhdhad,
whose influence extended between Baghdad and Damascus; with his
help, Maude's officers could contact Nun Shalaan and initiate
attacks on the Palestine railway above Hama.167 As this line of
action would not be started until the autumn, it was too late for
Murray. On the other hand, its timing was almost perfect for the
EEF's new commander, as Robertson himself explained to Maude: 'I
163 CIGS to GOC in Force D 16 May 1917, L/P&S/11/123/20k6.
16k Maude to CIGS 1 June 1917, L/P&S/11/123/20k6.
165 Maude to Robertson 2k May 1917, FO 371/3056/1369k5.
166 CIGS to Gen. Maude 5 June 1917, L/P&S/11/123/2046.
167 GOC Force D to CIGS 2k June 1917, L/P&S/1l/123/20k6.
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have little doubt that this will be welcomed in Egypt. Allenby is
now on hi way to relieve Murray and I will communicate with him...
168
as soon as he has had time to consider situation.'	 It was all
coming together at just the right time for Allenby as a result of
what had been achieved under MurrayL
No action until autumn from Mesopotamia meant that Feisal's
ambitious plan appeared to have been scuppered for the present.
The general Arab offensive on the Hejaz railway never materialized
and Feisal did not establish himself at Tadmur or any other
position to the east of northern Syria, but a party of Feisal's
men under the leadership of T. E. Lawrence and Chief Auda had been
active north of the Hejaz. Even as Allenby was replacing Murray
this force blew up a 'high bridge near Maan', while the Turkish
commander there was reported to have asked for reinforcements
since he feared a general revolt by the Arabs in the area and his
communications with Aqaba had been severed.169 Aqaba was about to
be taken by an Arab force, so that General Allenby would be able to
enjoy what Murray never had - tangible and direct contact between
the EEY and the Sherif's forces. Writing about T. E. Lawrence's
most famous exploit, the seizing of Aqaba in July 1917, Murray
drew upon all his experience with Arab forces throughout 1916 and
1917 to explain this achievement:
It is difficult to gauge to what extent the Arabs
can, or will, carry out what they plan or
promise. What seems easy and reasonable never
comes off whilst the 100 to I chance succeeds. 170
168 CIGS to GOC Force D 26 June 1917, L/P&S/11/123/20Li6.
169 W.D. Intelligence Section EEF 28 and 29 June 1917, WO 157/716.
170 Murray to Curzon 11 Aug. 1917, Eur MSS F 112/536.
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'Well, let them send out who they will he
will get on no quicker - there can be no
fireworks in this campaign.'
General Murray 13 June 1917
In a sense this has been the story of two generals, Maxwell
and Murray. The experiences of both men were remarkably similar.
Both were sent to Egypt to take control of the country at an
important time when concern for its security in London was considerable.
Both did a good job in clearing up a confuding situation in Egypt on
their arrival when it would not be an exaggeration to say that chaos
reigned iii the country. Both men fought a battle in which they did
not gain the sort of success hoped for and which ultimately made
their position in Egypt insecure. Indeed, neither man ever regained
the prestige they had enjoyed earlier in their careers once they
were removed from Cairo. Both generals never had the number of
troops they asked for and consequently found themselves overreached
because of the numerous different demands of their commands. What
is more, neither of them ever sorted out entirely satisfactorily
how to govern Egypt and to conduct operations successfully in the
Sinai at the same time - although Murray came as close as it was
possible to come to this, given his meagre resources through the
• formation of Eastern Force and Desert Column and the appointments
of Generals Dobeil and Chetwode. Finally, both men left Egypt
disillusioned by the way in which they had been treated and
embittered towards those whom they considered responsible. Maxwell,
somewhat ironically, blamed Murray, and his letters after March 1916
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reveal a continued hostility for his successor. Murray, on the
other hand, saw Lloyd George and the Government as the real culprits
behind his dismissal.
Of course, since General Allenby succeeded so dramatically
after July 1917 it has often been argued that this merely reveals
the inabilities of both Maxwell and Murray to come to terms with
their commands. But this will not do. For one thing, Allenby was
given the troops that neither Maxwell nor Murray ever had and the
full support of the War Cabinet to launch a major offensive that
had already been planned while Murray was still in Egypt. Moreover,
the new C in C's ideas and plans did not differ drastically from
those of his predecessor, as Lynden-Bell explained early in July
1917: 'As regards the general situation I do not think you will
find the present Chief's views any diferent from those of Sir
Archibald's.' 1
 Interestingly enough even Allenby's much vaunted
move of the EEF's GHQ from Cairo into Palestine may not have been
as sensible as is usually imagined, for it undoubtedly led to a
degree of isolation between himself and Egypt which would become
one of the causes behind internal trouble in that country after the
2
war.
Rather than ascribing the failures of Maxwell and Murray solely
to their own mistakes and weaknesses, therefore, a far more balanced
approach would seem necessary, taking account of what can only be
described as a failure in British strategy in the region up to June
1917. That the Government realized it had made mistakes can easily
be proven. After his return to London Sir Archibald presented for
a-
1 Lynden-Bell to Gen. Maurice 3 July 1917, WO 106/718.
2 Elgood, p.
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publication his final despatch from Egypt dated 28 June 1917, in
the opening lines of which he made the following accusation: 'I
think it necessary to point out that the policy of the War Cabinet
underwent several changes between the end of 1916 and April
l9l7.' This accusation clearly nettled the Government, for at the
meeting of the War Cabinet on 17 August 1917 a discussion on the
subject of this despatch was held and it was 'pointed out that the
first paragraph of the Report gave a somewhat misleading impression
of vacillation in the War Cabinet's policy.' Although the point was
also made that some of the information contained in the despatch
could be of use to the enemy, there could be little doubt that it
was the charge of vacillation which had angered the politicians and
led to a decision that the despatch could not possibly be published
k
without 'drastic revision.' The GIGS initially supported this ban
upon the publishing of this despatch because he believed it could
aid the Turks if it were released before Allenby had launched his
offensive; this meant he had to write to the editor of the Times
explaining the decision, since there had been a considerable amount
of speculation on the subject in the press. 5 A 'very much cut down'
version of the despatch appeared in the London Gazette on 20
November 1917, but this did not please Sir Archibald. 6 Meanwhile,
he had begun to win the sympathy of the men at the War Office as the
underlying reason for the withholding of his despatch was becoming
clearer. For example, on 31 December 1919 Henry Wilson, then the
CIGS, made the following comment on the subject: 'There is nothing
3 Murray Despatches. Fourth Despatch. 28 June 1917, p.l29.
k War Cabinet meeting 17 Aug. 1917, CAB 23/2.
5 Robertson to Dawson 12 Oct. 1917, Robertson papers 1/36/25.
6 Notes on Four Despatches from Egypt 1916-1917, Murray papers
79/1f8/3.
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in all this to which we soldiers can object.' 7
 Still more revealing
was the contents of a note to the GIGS early in 1920: 'The objections
to publication are political rather than military.' 8
 A special
conference on the subject actually bad to be held at 10 Downing
Street in February, and even then there was concern that if
permission were granted for publication General Murray might still
accuse the Government of 'deliberate suppression of unpalatable
facts.' 9 Moreover, Lloyd George still wished for certain constraiiis
to be placed upon Sir Archibald if permission were given:
The Prime Minister thinks that the best plan would
be to point out to General Murray that the various
changes of policy on which he lays stress... were
based not merely on the local considerations
connected with the campaign... but on a general
review of the course of the war as a whole. 10
This letter actually formed the text of a note that the War Office
demanded be placed at the head of the despatch when it was finally
published in 1920. In the meantime Sir Archibald had received the
evidence of vindication for his belief that he had been badly
treated in 1917, since he was promoted to full general on 6
September 191. Moreover, in Allenby's final despatch dated 28 June
19 1 9 he mentioned, after two years of silence, Murray's 'brilliant
Sinai campaign' which enabled him to reap 'the fruits of his
foresight and strategical imagination.'"
These events have been covered in some detail in order to
demonstrate just how sensitive the Government was, even in 1920,
7 Note by Henry Wilson 31 December 1919, WO 32/513k.
8 Note to CIGS by H. Creedy 2 Jan. 1920, W 32/513k.
9 Extract from Draft Conclusion of a Conference held at 10 Downing
Street 3 Feb. 1920, WO 32/513k.
10 Hankey to Churchill 23 Feb. 1920, WO 32/513k.
11 Despatch by Allenby 28 June 1919 quoted in Murray Despatches,
p.vii.
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about accusations as to its vacillation in strategic matters in 1916
and 1917. There can be little doubt, therefore, that British military
policy in Egypt and Palestine from 191k until June 1917 was
formulated during a failure in strategy at the highest level in
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